Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Elhady, a U.S. citizen returning from Canada, was detained for questioning by border-patrol agents. They took Elhady’s jacket and shoes, leaving him only his shirt, pants, undergarments, and socks. According to Elhady, the cell “got colder and colder,” and he began shivering uncontrollably. He says he yelled to the officers but they told him, “you’ll be out soon.” After about four hours, the officers told him he could leave. He stated he felt too ill to drive. The officers called an ambulance. The EMT noted that Elhady received the highest score on a test that measured his level of consciousness; he had delayed capillary refill, consistent with exposure to the cold. When he reached the hospital, his temperature was 96.08 degrees, barely below the normal range. The physician let him rest. When Elhady woke up, the doctor told him he was “good to go.” Elhady sued several border-patrol officers, seeking monetary damages under “Bivens.”The district court found that extending Bivens to provide an implied cause of action here was appropriate and found enough evidence to show that one officer, Bradley, had violated Elhady’s right to be “free from exposure to severe weather and temperatures,” which was clearly established so that qualified immunity did not protect Bradley. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court erred in engaging in the “disfavored judicial activity” of recognizing a new Bivens action. National security is a special factor counseling against extending Bivens to the border context. View "Elhady v. Unidentified CBP Agents" on Justia Law

Hale, charged with failing a drug test while on pretrial diversion in Boyle County, was detained at the Marion County Detention Center ahead of her trial. The Boyle County Sheriff’s Office transported Hale between the counties for her monthly court appearances. Court Security Officer Pennington was the driver. Hale and Pennington repeatedly performed oral sex on each other and had unprotected penetrative vaginal sex in Pennington’s van. Before and during the encounters, Pennington showered Hale with perks—she rode cuffless in his van’s front seat, he bought her sodas, and he allowed her to smoke. He also offered to intervene in Hale’s pending criminal case. Hale gave birth to their child.Hale filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against Pennington, Boyle County, and Sheriff Robbins. The district court found that Hale’s consenting to sexual contact and intercourse with Pennington negated her constitutional claims, and granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Hale’s assertions against Pennington are properly viewed as an excessive-force claim that should be evaluated under an objective test. Hale asserted intimidation and coercion. She presented a genuine dispute of material fact about whether the encounters with Pennington were consensual. View "Hale v. Boyle County" on Justia Law

In 1955-1976, WPC, a manufacturer of industrial valves, bought primary and excess level liability insurance policies from OneBeacon’s predecessor. In 2001, asbestos lawsuits started coming against WPC. OneBeacon began its defense. The parties reached an impasse over several issues.WPC sought declaratory relief in Ohio state court concerning OneBeacon’s obligations. WPC also sued OneBeacon in federal court, alleging breach of contract. OneBeacon unsuccessfully moved to dismiss or stay the case. The district court rejected OneBeacon’s argument that the federal and state proceedings were parallel. WPC amended its state complaint, adding breach of contract claims. The state court held that OneBeacon had not committed the alleged breaches. OneBeacon again moved to dismiss WPC’s federal lawsuit, arguing that the state court’s ruling precluded WPC’s federal claims. The court acknowledged that the state court judgment likely satisfied the elements of claim preclusion, but declined to dismiss. The court stayed the case, noting that WPC’s amended state court complaint made the state and federal proceedings parallel. After OneBeacon filed its federal notice of appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed in part, finding that OneBeacon breached some of the policies. Pennsylvania subsequently liquidated OneBeacon and stayed all litigation.The Sixth Circuit reversed, first holding that exercising appellate jurisdiction here will in no way “hinder [the] operation” of Pennsylvania’s claims process and priority scheme. Claim preclusion bars the federal suit. View "William Powell Co. v. National Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

In 2011, Hewlett-Packard hired Sloat, then 54, to develop training programs. For the next five years, his performance reviews were notably positive. In 2015, Sloat developed a highly0regarded training program. In 2016 Hewlett-Packard promoted Sloat to an executive-level position; he reported to Keller, who found that Sloat’s performance met expectations. After being transferred to a new team, Sloat then 60, was the oldest person reporting to his new manager, Hagler, who was immediately unfriendly toward Sloat. Hagler called Sloat “Uncle Ron” and “young man,” referred to “old skills," and asked Sloat, “When are you going to retire?” After Sloat reported his concerns, Hagler reassigned Sloat’s remaining responsibilities and tried to have Sloat reassigned. Hagler was told to wait until the company proceeded with a pending “significant downsizing” before firing him. In Sloat’s mid-year performance review, Hagler gave Sloat a performance rating of “Stalled.”After his subsequent termination, Sloat sued, asserting age discrimination and retaliation under both the ADEA and the Tennessee Act. The district court granted Hewlett-Packard summary judgment “based substantially on the post-hoc explanations of Hewlett-Packard’s own witnesses.” The Sixth Circuit reversed. Many of the facts that support Sloat’s prima facie case for the discrimination claim would also allow a jury to find that Hagler had a retaliatory motive in setting Sloat up for termination and that Hewlett-Packard’s explanation for his termination was pretextual. View "Sloat v. Hewlett-Packard Enterprise Co." on Justia Law

In 1992, Michigan voters, wanting to amend Michigan’s Constitution to establish term limits for state legislators, state executives, and members of Congress, got a petition on the ballot; 58.8% of voters approved the measure. Term limits became part of the Michigan Constitution (six years in Michigan’s House of Representatives; eight years in the Michigan Senate). Some voters sued, arguing that the term limits violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Sixth Circuit upheld the term limits. About 20 years later, a bipartisan group of veteran legislators challenged the term-limit provision, making many of the same ballot-access and freedom-of-association claims, and citing two procedural provisions of the Michigan Constitution.The district court granted Michigan summary judgment. After determining that it had jurisdiction because the legislators raise claims under the Federal Constitution, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Precedent bars their claims as voters. Voters have no fundamental right to “vote for a specific candidate or even a particular class of candidates.” As candidates, the legislators hold no greater protection than the voters they wish to represent. Candidates do not have a fundamental right to run for office. Michigan has several legitimate government interests in enacting term limits, including its sovereign interest in structuring its government as it sees fit. View "Kowall v. Benson" on Justia Law

Edmonson County Sheriff’s Deputy Meredith attempted to initiate a traffic stop on an automobile for an unilluminated license plate and the failure of a passenger to wear a seatbelt. The automobile was being driven by Embry, with M.S. and C.S. (minors), as passengers. Embry attempted to flee. Deputy Jones joined the pursuit, which lasted 12 minutes (18 miles), with the vehicles reaching speeds of almost 130 mph. Jones learned that the initiating offense was an unilluminated license plate, that there were multiple passengers, and that at least one passenger was unbelted. Jones saw Embry’s vehicle fishtail and almost lose control and crash. Jones and Meredith observed objects being thrown out of the car. Another officer radioed that he had found ammunition where objects had been thrown from the vehicle. Embry’s vehicle made an abrupt turn and severely crashed into another vehicle. Jones tased C.S., then unconscious, after C.S. failed to respond to Jones’s order to show his hands. M.S. had to be mechanically extracted from the vehicle.The district court denied Jones’s motion for summary judgment on C.S.’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 and battery claims, and denied both Jones’s and Sheriff Doyle summary judgment on state-law negligence and gross negligence claims, ruling that they were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit, on interlocutory appeal, agreed that Jones is not entitled to qualified immunity on the section 1983 and battery claims. The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity under Kentucky law on the state-law negligence and gross negligence claims. View "Browning v. Edmonson County" on Justia Law

WCI holds an Ohio liquor license and does business as Cheeks Gentlemen’s Club. In 2014, the Ohio Department of Public Safety sent undercover agents to Cheeks. During the investigation, a female dancer offered an agent a private lap dance. She took the agent to a private room, disrobed, and performed the lap dance fully nude. Ohio Administrative Code Rule 52 prohibits a business with a liquor license from allowing nude performances on its premises. The Liquor Control Commission held a hearing and required WCI to pay a fine of $25,000 or give up its liquor license. Ohio courts upheld the order.WCI filed suit in federal court, alleging First Amendment, Eighth Amendment, Equal Protection Clause, and Due Process Clause violations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the First Amendment and equal-protection claims. On remand, the district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction because the Eleventh Amendment bars the suit, WCI lacks standing to pursue an injunction, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars all of WCI’s claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Sovereign immunity bars WCI’s claim for damages. Neither the bare threat of potential, future sanctions nor the effect of those potential sanctions on WCI’s current business is sufficient to establish standing for injunctive relief. View "WCI, Inc. v. Ohio Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

The Food and Drug Administration denied Breeze’s Premarket Tobacco Product Applications for its electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS). Breeze sought a stay of the FDA’s order. Under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act “any person adversely affected by” the denial of a Premarket Tobacco Product Application may seek judicial review of the denial, 21 U.S.C. 387l(a)(1)(B). Breeze argued that seeking a stay from the FDA would have been impracticable because the order takes effect immediately and the FDA can take months to consider an agency-level request for a stay.The Sixth Circuit denied the requested stay, finding that Breeze had not made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits.” Breeze has not made a strong showing that it would likely succeed on its claim that the FDA’s review of its application was arbitrary or capricious nor that the FDA’s denial of its application contradicted the FDA’s nonbinding 2019 guidance. That guidance contemplated more rigorous scientific data than contained in Breeze's application that its ENDS product adequately protected public health. The FDA cited well-developed evidence showing that flavored ENDS products’ special appeal to youths harms public health to a degree not outweighed by the (far-less-supported) effects of adult cigarette smokers switching to e-cigarettes. View "Breeze Smoke, LLC v. United States Food and Drug Administration" on Justia Law

During an investigation into whether Elmore sexually abused a seven-year-old girl, officers obtained and executed a warrant to remove Elmore’s vehicle from his stepmother’s home and search the vehicle. Elmore’s stepmother gave officers a key fob for Elmore’s car. Searches of the car and of a storage unit revealed no evidence. Weeks later, Elmore’s stepmother found that Elsmore had two more key fobs and notified the officers of her nagging suspicions that Elmore was hiding child pornography on one of the fobs. The officers also had a tip from Elmore’s fellow inmate. Aided by a warrant, a subsequent search of the fobs revealed a memory card containing child pornography. Elmore was indicted for knowingly possessing child pornography. Elmore twice unsuccessfully moved to suppress the memory card evidence, then pleaded guilty, preserving his right to appeal the suppression rulings.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Elmore’s conviction (18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2)) and the revocation of his earlier term of supervised released (based on a prior child pornography conviction). Elmore’s suppression argument rests on his view that his stepmother’s actions were the “tainted consequences of law enforcement’s unlawful searches and seizures” but the search of the key fobs was separated from the earlier searches. The affidavit passes constitutional muster. View "United States v. Elmore" on Justia Law

Michigan Department of Corrections inmates may hold formal group services or possess certain religious property only if the Department has formally recognized their faith. Though the Department recognizes the Ifa faith, it is one of only three recognized religions that was denied group services. A group is not guaranteed religious services if there are less than five prisoners within the same security level in a facility; the Department may bar group services if they may pose “safety and security” concerns. When an inmate submits a request for group worship or religious property, the warden must forward the request to the Special Activities Coordinator, who must evaluate the request. The deputy director makes the final decision. Discretion is minimal.Between his conversion to the Ifa faith in August 2015 and filing this lawsuit more than two years later, Byrd sent four requests for Ifa group services and nine items that he considers essential to his faith (a straw prayer mat, herbs, and beads). Although Byrd enlisted the chaplain’s assistance, none of his requests received a response. Byrd sued, alleging violations of his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, the Free Exercise Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. The district court erred in viewing the problem as procedural; the long delay is tantamount to a substantive denial. View "Byrd v. Haas" on Justia Law