Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Barber owns land adjacent to Mill Pond and the Mill Pond Dam (built 1836) in Springfield Township, Michigan. Parts of her property “run directly into the Mill Pond” and include parts of the pond itself. The Township and the County (Defendants) are jointly responsible for maintaining the Dam. In 2018, Oakland County conducted a study. The Township ultimately recommended removing the Dam. Defendants hired engineering firms and allocated money to the project. A local newspaper article titled “Mill Pond Dam to be Removed Next Year,” ran in March 2021. Barber alleges that removing the Dam, among other things, will decrease her property value, interfere with her riparian rights, deprive her of her right to use and enjoy her land, physically damage her property, “will likely pollute, impair and destroy natural resources, including . . . surface water, wetlands, and wildlife and natural habitat,” and “may cause flooding and property damage.” She sought to enjoin the Dam-removal project, alleging that it would constitute a taking under the federal and Michigan constitutions and a trespass under Michigan law.The district court granted the Defendants judgment on the pleadings. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding Barber’s claims ripe, and that she has standing to sue. She plausibly alleges that she faces a risk of “concrete” and “particularized” injuries. Plaintiffs may sue for injunctive relief even before a physical taking has happened. View "Barber v. Charter Township of Springfield, Michigan" on Justia Law

In 2014-2017, Carlson and his friends, using private chartered planes, trafficked about 1,680 kilograms of cocaine, 2,050 pounds of marijuana, 40 pounds of methamphetamine, and between $500 million and $1 billion of cash in drug proceeds, for the Sinaloa Mexican drug cartel. Carlson got caught and turned in his coconspirators, including Matthews and Wallace.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Matthews’ convictions for conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), conspiracy to distribute 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana, sections 846, 841(a)(1), and conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h), and the 60-month below-Guidelines sentence imposed on Wallace (one of the pilots) for his guilty plea on one count. Matthews’ convictions were based on sufficient evidence; the district court did not err in providing a deliberate-ignorance jury instruction. Matthews’ confrontation rights were not violated after the court allowed Carlson to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination as to certain questions on cross-examination and she was not prejudiced by a variance between the indictment and proof at trial on conspiracy to distribute cocaine and methamphetamine. View "United States v. Matthews" on Justia Law

Battle Creek Officers Ziegler and Kerschen stopped LaPlante’s vehicle. LaPlante's passenger, Robbins, exited the vehicle. As Kerschen dealt with Robbins, LaPlante exited the vehicle with an open beer and did not comply with orders to put the beer down and stop moving. Ziegler eventually pulled LaPlante to the ground in a prone position. The officers struggled to handcuff LaPlante. It took approximately 90 seconds to effectuate LaPlante’s arrest. Ziegler notified dispatch that LaPlante was experiencing pain and loosened the handcuffs at LaPlante’s request. LaPlante was transported to a hospital before being taken to jail. LaPlante had dislocated his elbow and sustained a small avulsion fracture. LaPlante pleaded guilty to felony DUI and a high misdemeanor charge of attempted obstruction of a police officer. LaPlante had an outstanding felony warrant for absconding parole and the officers recovered marijuana from LaPlante’s vehicle. LaPlante subsequently sought medical support for a variety of injuries.In his 42 U.S.C. 1983 excessive force action, LaPlante alleged that Ziegler threw him to the ground and Kerschen failed to intervene. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity as to Ziegler and reversed the denial of qualified immunity as to Kerschen. There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether LaPlante resisted arrest; the use of a takedown maneuver, in some scenarios, can amount to excessive force. Kerschen did not have enough time to perceive what was going on and intervene. View "LaPlante v. City of Battle Creek" on Justia Law

The Rice family planned to annex their 80-acre farm into the Village of Johnstown and have it zoned for residential development. The Johnstown Planning and Zoning Commission rejected the Rice application at the preliminary stage. The family claimed that Johnstown had unlawfully delegated legislative authority to the Commission, violating its due process rights, and sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The district court held that because the farm was not located in Johnstown, but in adjacent Monroe Township, the family lacked standing to bring its claim and granted Johnstown summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. Whatever the merits of the claim, the family has standing to bring it. Because the Johnstown ordinance has since been amended, claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot. Only the claim for damages survives. Establishing standing at the summary judgment stage requires “a factual showing of perceptible harm.” The family alleges that because of Johnstown’s unconstitutional delegation to the Commission, its zoning application was subjected to a standardless and conclusive review by allegedly private parties who acted for arbitrary reasons; they have shown a procedural injury. While a procedural right alone is insufficient to create Article III standing, the family’s procedural injury is tied to its economic interest in developing its property. Without the Commission’s approval, their development plans could not proceed; the family is no bystander. View "Rice v. Village of Johnstown, Ohio" on Justia Law

Attorney Romanzi referred a personal injury case to his employer, the Fieger law firm; meanwhile, creditors were winning default judgments against Romanzi. The case settled for $11.9 million; about $3.55 million was awarded as attorney’s fees after Romanzi quit the firm. Romanzi’s employment at the firm entitled him to a third of the fees. Before Romanzi could claim his due, his creditors forced him into Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The trustee commenced an adversary proceeding against the firm to recover Romanzi’s third of the settlement fees for the bankruptcy estate. The parties agreed to arbitration.Two of the three arbitrators found for the trustee in a single-paragraph decision that was not "reasoned" to the firm’s satisfaction. The district court remanded for clarification rather than vacating the award. On remand, the panel asked for submissions from both parties, which the trustee provided; the firm refused to participate. The arbitrators’ subsequent supplemental award, approved by the district court, awarded the trustee the fees plus interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the arbitrators’ original award was compromised according to at least one factor allowing vacation under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 10(a); that the act of remanding and the powers exercised by the arbitrators on remand violated the doctrine of functus officio; and that the supplemental award should have been vacated under the section 10(a) factors. The district court’s and panel’s actions fall under the clarification exception to functus officio. View "In re: Romanzi" on Justia Law

Gould responded to an online advertisement that offered to allow someone to “engage in a live online session with an 8-year-old in exchange for child pornography.” That advertisement included a photo of a minor. Gould responded, offering to send money. Gould was speaking to a real individual, but law enforcement apprehended that person. Gould then began speaking with an undercover DHS agent who had assumed the arrested person’s online identity. The agent offered to let “his” minor daughter have sex with Gould, explaining that he would “video” the encounter. Gould sent the undercover agent links to child pornography, and Gould’s password to a cloud account with thousands of images of minors, including toddlers. Gould flew to Tennessee to meet the "daughter" and presented a blood test indicating he had no sexually-transmitted diseases. After he was arrested, Gould admitted that he responded to the advertisement and confirmed that he saw the images of the 8-year-old in that advertisement.Gould was charged with Enticing a Minor to Engage in Sexual Activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). Gould entered a plea agreement with no appellate waiver. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Gould’s 210-month sentence (the bottom of the Guidelines range). A FaceTime call constitutes a “visual depiction” for purposes of an enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2G1.3(c)(1) and responding to an advertisement “involved” “offering or seeking by notice or advertisement” under that Guidelines provision. View "United States v. Gould" on Justia Law

King worked for the Hospital as a registered nurse since 2002; her asthma began worsening around 2013-2014. During particularly bad asthma flare-ups, King called in sick. The Hospital offers up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) 29 U.S.C. 2601, to employees who have worked at least 1,250 hours in the past year. Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement, employees may seek up to one year of unpaid medical leave even if they are not eligible for FMLA leave. A third-party administrator, FMLASource, handles all leave requests. King received several warnings for attendance issues. King called FMLASource and was told she was ineligible because she had not worked enough hours. The parties dispute whether the call constituted an inquiry or an application King tried to correct the error in calculating her hours through human resources and kept calling in sick. The Hospital terminated her employment. Later, FMLASource retroactively approved King for non-FMLA leave.King sued, alleging interference and retaliation under the FMLA and failure to accommodate and disability discrimination under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112. The district court granted the Hospital summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Accepting King’s version of events, the Hospital did not give her all of the benefits of non-FMLA leave and, therefore, failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. The Hospital did not establish that King’s absence, while she tried to obtain leave, caused undue hardship. View "King v. Steward Trumbull Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

Cromer, formerly a “managing loan officer” for Union Home Mortgage, agreed to several restrictive covenants, including that he would “not become employed in the same or similar capacity” with a competitive entity. Cromer left Union and started working for Homeside Financial as a “non-producing” branch manager. Union sought a preliminary injunction to enforce Cromer’s restrictive covenants, citing the 2016 Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. 1836; the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act; the non-compete, confidentiality, and nonsolicitation covenants; the contractual duty of loyalty; and the common law duty of loyalty. Against Homeside, Union alleged tortious interference with business relationships and with contracts.The district court issued an injunction—without any time limitation—prohibiting Cromer, and anyone acting in concert, from “competing with Union Home.” The Sixth Circuit vacated. The injunction failed to satisfy the specificity requirements of FRCP 65(d)(1), was overbroad, and was otherwise improperly granted under the standard for preliminary injunctions. The broad prohibition covers any form of competition, irrespective of Cromer’s employer, job title, or duties, and created an inherent risk that the scope of the injunction exceeds the Agreement that the parties signed. The district court also failed to consider whether the non-compete covenant is reasonable and thus enforceable. View "Union Home Mortgage Corp. v. Cromer" on Justia Law

Nunley’s brother, Basil, learned that Nunley had a firearm and tried to persuade him to “get rid” of it. A fight ensued. Nunley fired seven shots at Basil, who nonetheless left unharmed. Officers responded to a call of shots being fired and encountered Nunley in a car. Nunley pointed the firearm at an officer, then led the officers on a high-speed chase. Nunley abandoned his car and ran, firing at the officers, then barricaded himself in a building. Officers used an armored truck to breach the building. Nunley was arrested in possession of a 9-millimeter pistol. Nunley pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1).The sentencing court rejected Nunley’s objections to a four-level “Additional Felony” sentencing enhancement and a six-level “Official Victim” enhancement. Nunley argued impermissible double counting because the enhancements punished the same conduct—his shooting at the officers; he claimed that shooting at Basil was self-defense.With a Guidelines range of 120-150 months, compressed by a 120-month statutory maximum sentence, the court sentenced Nunley to 112 months’ imprisonment. The court detailed the nature and circumstances of the crimes, Nunley’s long criminal history, his history of drug abuse and mental health issues, and his acceptance of responsibility, citing the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. View "United States v. Nunley" on Justia Law

McDonald worked as an Ohio bank examiner and a loan officer. As a loan officer, McDonald obtained funds by fraudulently making loans to others. Some of the loans were unknown to the “borrowers.” McDonald filed for individual Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The U.S. Trustee argued that 11 U.S.C. 727(a)(5) prevented the discharge of his debts because McDonald had failed to satisfactorily explain the dissipation of many of his assets. McDonald produced bank statements, brokerage account statements, canceled checks, and his tax returns for 2012-2015. He did not produce his 2010-2011 tax returns, bank account records covering January-March 2010, or many canceled checks, which the court requested. More than $250,000 of McDonald’s assets were unaccounted for. At the Rule 2004 Exam, McDonald refused to testify about one loan, exercising his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. He later confessed to the scheme.The bankruptcy court granted the Trustee summary judgment. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed. Section 727(a)(5) contains no intent requirement; it “imposes strict liability” when the debtor fails to provide a satisfactory explanation for the deficiency in assets. McDonald's threadbare recitation from memory is not enough. His testimony throughout the bankruptcy proceedings was rife with unclear, uncertain statements often couched with “likely,” “I think,” or “I don’t know.” View "Vara v. McDonald" on Justia Law