Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Astec sold its first wood-pellet plant to Hazlehurst in 2013, providing $60 million in financing. In 2015, Astec sold its second wood-pellet plant to Highland for $152.5 million. Highland required the plant to pass a “Reliability Run” by April 2018; otherwise, Astec was to refund the purchase price. Astec did not inform its investors of this clawback provision. Both plants failed to perform. Astec CEO Brock repeatedly told investors that everything was progressing well. In 2017, Astec issued a press release that described the issues occurring at the wood-pellet plants. Brock asserted that Astec had just discovered the design flaws and still had a rosy outlook. The plants’ performance never improved. During secret negotiations with Highland, Brock reassured investors but was aware of inspection results. In 2018, Astec filed a Form 10-K, reporting the possibility that Astec would have to refund the Highland purchase price. Brock sold his Astec stock, earning $3.2 million. Days later, Astec filed its quarterly 10-Q Form, publicly disclosing Highland’s clawback provision. Brock announced Astec’s decision to “exit” the Highland plant. Astec’s stock price dropped 20%, A subsequent poor earnings report drove the stock price further down.Investors filed a securities-fraud action under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 and Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that plaintiffs had not met the heightened pleading requirements of FRCP 9(b) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The plaintiffs pleaded plausible claims against Astec and Brock but have abandoned or forfeited their claims against the other individual defendants. View "City of Taylor General Employees Retirement System v. Astec Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

Cardinal, a distributor of wholesale pharmaceutical products, purchased commercial umbrella insurance policies from National Union. Various plaintiffs have filed more than 3,000 lawsuits against Cardinal and other manufacturers, distributors, and dispensers of prescription opioids. The majority of federal cases are consolidated in coordinated, multi-district proceedings in the Northern District of Ohio. Plaintiffs “assert a wide variety of federal and state causes of action, many seeking to recover for increased payments, services, treatment, and/or care allegedly necessitated by the opiate-related addictions, overdoses, and deaths of those they serve.”National Union has reserved its right to deny coverage for opioid litigation claims. Cardinal sought a declaratory judgment in the Franklin County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas. National Union removed the suit to the Southern District of Ohio. The district court granted Cardinal’s motion and remanded the case to state court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court found no evidence of procedural fencing and properly declined to weigh that factor in favor of federal jurisdiction. The court noted a preference to allow state courts to answer questions of insurance contract interpretation and the actively developing nature of insurance coverage claims related to opioid litigation in Ohio state courts. The district court adhered to the principles of federalism and comity and engaged in a reasoned analysis of each factor in declining jurisdiction. View "Cardinal Health, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh" on Justia Law

Dr. Heyd, the prison's medical officer, treated inmate Murray, who had a heart attack in 2008, before his incarceration, and was hospitalized in 2010 for deep-vein thrombosis in his leg. Murray was prescribed a treatment regimen of Coumadin. He was hospitalized multiple times during 2011 for his deep-vein thrombosis. His hematology-consult team recommended “a fair trial of Coumadin with an (INR) [international normalized ratio] ranging between 2.5 and 3.” In 2012, Murray suffered from a cerebral blood clot that left him permanently blind.Murray filed a “deliberate indifference” claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. His expert declaration from a hematologist stated that Heyd and his staff allowed the INR to fall into subtherapeutic levels, failed to follow the hematology recommendations, and failed to appropriately adjust the Coumadin doses; Heyd failed to personally evaluate Murray when he complained of headaches and nausea, symptoms of cerebral edema.Heyd sought qualified immunity in a motion for summary judgment, which the district court denied. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There is sufficient evidence for a jury to find facts from which the inference of a substantial risk of serious harm to Murray’s health could be drawn, and that Heyd knew of and disregarded that substantial risk. An inmate’s rights to medical care that is not unreasonably delayed and to adherence to a prescribed treatment plan were clearly established at the time of Heyd’s conduct. View "Murray v. State of Ohio Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Trozzi, a pre-trial detainee, reported gastrointestinal health issues related to gastric bypass surgery. Doctors had placed Trozzi on a specialized diet and prescribed antacids to prevent ulcers. Trozzi sought help filling her prescriptions and an adjustment in her diet, twice referring to an ulcer. Nurse Snow scheduled Trozzi to meet with a doctor. During the night before her appointment, Trozzi called for help. Officer Stakich found Trozzi doubled over in pain. Stakich's supervisor instructed that Trozzi be taken to a medical holding cell for observation. Trozzi received an over-the-counter antacid; she had a normal heart rate, blood pressure, and blood oxygen saturation. Snow advised Capron to continue monitoring. Trozzi alleges that she became covered in her own urine, feces, and bloody vomit as she waited in her cell. At the scheduled visit, the doctor sent Trozzi to the hospital, where she underwent surgery for a perforated ulcer.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of Trozzi’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. An inadequate-medical-care claim requires proof that the plaintiff had an objectively serious medical need; a reasonable officer at the scene (knowing what the particular officer knew) would have understood that the detainee’s medical needs subjected the detainee to an excessive risk of harm; and the officer knew that his failure to respond would pose a serious risk to the detainee but ignored that risk. The defendants lacked the requisite knowledge. View "Trozzi v. Lake County, Ohio" on Justia Law

Tescari and Salame, Venezuelan citizens, have two minor children. Tescari removed the children from their home in Venezuela and brought them with her to the U.S. Salame filed a petition seeking their return under the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Abduction. Tescari and the children were granted asylum in the U.S.The parties stipulated that Salame had a prima facie of wrongful removal and retention. Tescari claimed an affirmative defense under Article 13(b) of the Convention, 22 U.S.C. 9003(e)(2). The court concluded Tescari failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, her affirmative defense that returning the children to Venezuela would subject them to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm or otherwise place them in an intolerable situation.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Because the alleged abuse was relatively minor, the court had no discretion to refuse the petition nor to consider potential future harm. The determination that Salame could provide the children with shelter, food, and medication in Venezuela is not clearly erroneous. Despite Venezuela’s political schisms and civil unrest, Tescari failed to introduce sufficient evidence that it is a zone of war, famine, or disease. Any defects in the Venezuelan court system fall short of "an intolerable situation." While the factors that go into a grant of asylum may be relevant to Hague Convention determinations, the district court has a separate and exclusive responsibility to assess the applicability of an Article 13(b) affirmative defense. View "Ajami v. Solano" on Justia Law

Butler County Jail (BCJ) booked Westmoreland on a bench warrant for failure to appear. Westmoreland requested to be separated from fellow inmate St. Clair because St. Clair believed Westmoreland was an informant. Westmoreland was assigned to a general population dormitory with six cellmates that did not share a common area with St. Clair. Westmoreland’s mother called to express concerns that St. Clair was telling other inmates Westmoreland had “told on him.” The next day, St. Clair was permitted to mop floors outside of Westmoreland’s cell and allegedly told Westmoreland’s cellmates that he was a “rat.” Westmoreland's subsequent request to be moved was denied. That night, other inmates attacked Westmoreland, who required two surgeries for his injuries; his jaw was wired shut for several months. The district court rejected Westmoreland’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the district court applied the wrong standard in evaluating the liability of an individual jail supervisor. A failure-to-protect claim by a pretrial detainee requires only an objective showing that an individual defendant acted (or failed to act) deliberately and recklessly. Whether BCJ is liable for that officer’s actions is contingent on whether a constitutional violation occurred. View "Westmoreland v. Butler County" on Justia Law

Ohio's legislatively-established municipal and county courts possess jurisdiction within their territorial limits over certain civil and criminal matters with the same authority as other common pleas judges. Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court employees certified a union as the exclusive collective bargaining representative for 136 employees, not including judges. A 2016 collective bargaining agreement was to extend through December 2019 and stated that the court would respect its terms until the parties reached a new agreement, the union disclaimed the contract, or the employees decertified the union. In 2019, negotiations stalled. In December 2020, the Juvenile Court sought a declaration that the agreements were void or expired. The union counterclaimed for breach of contract. The Juvenile Court subsequently treated union members as nonunion employees, decided to stop deducting union dues from paychecks, imposed new work schedules, and eliminated grievance procedures.The union sued in federal court, citing the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Sovereign immunity bars the union’s claims against the Juvenile Court because it is an arm of the State of Ohio. Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for the union’s Contracts Clause claims against the individual defendants; qualified immunity barred the money-damages claims against them under the Takings Clause. View "Laborers' International Union of North America v. Neff" on Justia Law

Fisher is the personal representative of his mother’s estate and a co-trustee of her trusts with his siblings, Perron and Peter. Perron recorded telephone discussions of estate matters without informing her siblings that she was recording. Perron sued Fisher and attached transcripts of one call to pleadings; the probate court struck the transcript from the record, prohibited its further use, and held Perron liable for attorney’s fees and costs.Fisher sued, alleging that Perron violated the Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510– 23, which prohibits a call participant from recording the call “for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act” or disclosing or using any such illegally intercepted oral communication; violated Michigan’s eavesdropping law, which makes the use of an electronic “device to eavesdrop upon [a] conversation without the consent of all parties thereto” a felony; and committed the tort of public disclosure of private facts.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. A participant does not violate Michigan’s eavesdropping statute by recording a conversation without the consent of other participants. The complaint contains no facts to support an inference that a reasonable person would find the facts disclosed in the call “highly offensive” to support a claim of public disclosure of private facts. Because Fisher did not establish either the tort or the state law violation, he did not establish “the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act” under federal law. View "Fisher v. Perron" on Justia Law

Debtor and Creditor have three children. Their decree of dissolution was entered in 2008. Domestic support and child custody issues have continued to be litigated. In 2017, Creditor obtained primary custody of the children; he filed a Motion for Child Support and Motion for Contempt in Family Court. A monthly support amount was determined. Pre-petition, the Family Court established that the parties would split the cost of the childrens' medical care and extra-curricular activities. Creditor was seeking reimbursement for Debtor’s share of incurred expenses when Debtor’s bankruptcy petition was filed. The Family Court, post-petition, found Debtor in contempt of a prior order.Debtor filed a motion with the Bankruptcy Court requesting sanctions for violation of the automatic stay for the post-petition hearing and Creditor’s collection efforts made pursuant to Family Court orders. The Bankruptcy Court found that some actions violated the automatic stay and awarded attorneys’ fees as actual damages and punitive damages. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. The Family Court hearing was conducted to modify a domestic support obligation; the hearing and subsequent garnishment order were excepted from the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. 362(b)(2)(A)(ii); 362(b)(2)(C). The Family Court Judgment finding Debtor in civil contempt violated the stay and is void. An order of payment, directly to Creditor, toward a pre-petition debt, also violated the stay. View "In re: Dougherty-Kelsay" on Justia Law

Under the “individual mandate” within the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, non-exempt individuals must either maintain a minimum level of health insurance or pay a “penalty,” 26 U.S.C. 5000A, the “shared responsibility payment” (SRP). The McPhersons did not maintain health insurance for part of 2017, and Juntoff did not maintain health insurance in any month in 2018. They did not pay their SRP obligations. In each of their Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases, the IRS filed proofs of claim and sought priority treatment as an “excise/income tax”: for Juntoff, $1,042.39, and for the McPhersons, $1,564.The bankruptcy court confirmed their plans, declining to give the IRS claims priority as a tax measured by income. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed. DIstinguishing the Sebelius decision in which the Supreme Court determined that the SRP constituted a “penalty” for purposes of an Anti-Injunction Act analysis and a “tax” under a constitutionality analysis, the Panel concluded that the SRP is not a penalty but a tax measured by income. It is “calculated as a percentage of household income, subject to a floor based on a specified dollar amount and a ceiling based on the average annual premium the individual would have to pay for qualifying private health insurance.” View "In re: Juntoff" on Justia Law