Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Linda’s daughter, Johnnie Moser, fled to a neighbor’s house one night after Johnnie’s boyfriend (James) physically assaulted Johnnie. The neighbor called the police. Officers Davis and Parton were at the neighbor’s house when Linda approached, visibly upset and worried about her daughter. Parton observed James following behind Linda and moved to arrest him. Linda began shouting that Parton had the wrong man and touched Parton’s arm, despite having been ordered, four times, to sit down. Davis stepped onto the porch, grabbed Linda, took her to the ground, and then pinned her, resulting in a fractured hip and femur. Body-camera footage indicates that Davis could have kneeled on Linda for up to 23 seconds. Linda pleaded guilty to interfering with the arrest of another. Linda sued Davis and the City of Etowah. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Linda, Davis violated her clearly established right to be free from injury-threatening physical force when not actively resisting an arrest. Minimal physical contact does not automatically rise to the level of active resistance. Linda’s subsequent conviction is therefore not determinative of whether Moser actively resisted Parton’s attempt to arrest Ferguson. View "Moser v. Etowah Police Department" on Justia Law

UT instructor Tyger subjected Wamer, a UT student, to inappropriate touching, comments, and text messages and made inappropriate comments in class. Wamer contacted a UT faculty member; each submitted a complaint to UT’s Title IX Office. Wamer alleges that she was afraid of seeing Tyger on campus and of retribution and that UT stated it would pursue the investigation even if she did not come in for an interview. Three weeks later, UT closed its investigation, taking no action. About five months after the harassment began, a more senior faculty member reported Wamer’s allegations. UT then placed Tyger on paid leave and banned him from campus. Wamer alleges that Tyger then attempted to smear Wamer’s reputation. UT investigators found that Tyger had engaged in sexual misconduct.Wamer sued under Title IX, claiming that UT was deliberately indifferent to the initial reports of sexual harassment, which “unreasonably interfered with Wamer’s participation in and enjoyment of the benefits of UT’s educational programs and activities.” The district court dismissed, applying the elements of a deliberate-indifference claim used in cases of student-on-student harassment and finding Wamer did not allege that UT’s actions post-notice resulted in harassment or made her more vulnerable to further harassment.The Sixth Circuit reversed. A plaintiff can satisfy the causation requirement by showing that following the school’s unreasonable response, the plaintiff experienced an additional instance of harassment or that objectively reasonable fear of further harassment caused the plaintiff to take specific reasonable actions to avoid harassment, which deprived the plaintiff of educational opportunities available to other students. View "Wamer v. University of Toledo" on Justia Law

Deputy Johns shot and killed Palma after responding to a 9-1-1 call at Palma's home. Johns knew that there was a dispute about the television and that Palma suffered from mental health issues. Arriving, Johns saw Palma standing outside with his hands in his pockets. Palma did not respond to greetings but began walking toward Johns. Johns repeatedly told Palma to stop and take his hands out of his pockets. Palma did not respond. Johns radioed for backup with “intermediate” priority. Johns warned Palma he would use his taser. Palma did not stop. Johns tased him twice before Palma fell down. As Palma got up, Johns tased him again. Palma walked toward Johns, still not responding to commands. Johns kept retreating; he believed that Palma’s intention was to “perhaps obtain [his] weapon.” Johns pointed his gun at Palma, who did not stop. Johns first shot Palma’s leg. Palma continued to walk toward Johns, who continued shooting until Palma "no longer came towards [him].” Palma never spoke and never reached toward Johns. Palma was unarmed. The encounter lasted eight-10 minutes.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment of qualified immunity. There are genuine disputes of material fact; a reasonable jury could find that Johns used excessive force when he shot at Palma. In cases involving mental health crises, officers should use the least force necessary to subdue the person. View "Palma v. Johns" on Justia Law

Khaytekov, a citizen of Uzbekistan, came to the U.S. in 2001 and overstayed his visa for many years. In removal proceedings, Khaytekov sought asylum. alleging that he had been persecuted “by nationalist[s] and fascist[s]” in Uzbekistan because of his religion, nationality, and political opinion and feared “physical attacks” if he returned. While his removal proceedings were pending, Khaytekov married a U.S. citizen, withdrew his request for asylum, and applied to adjust his status to lawful permanent resident, which required him to show that he was “admissible” 8 U.S.C. 1255(a). An IJ found Khaytekov inadmissible because he had filed a “completely fabricated” asylum application. Khaytekov later admitted that the application contained false information; he had not been persecuted in Uzbekistan. Khaytekov’s subsequent request for a hardship waiver was denied because Khaytekov had knowingly filed a frivolous asylum application, which rendered him “permanently ineligible” for any benefits under the immigration laws, section 1158(d)(6). The BIA upheld the decision.The Sixth Circuit previously denied relief, rejecting a “Pereira” claim in which Khaytekov alleged that he received a defective notice to appear. Following a remand from the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit again denied Khaytekov’s petition. To be “permanently ineligible,” an asylum seeker who files a frivolous application must have received adequate notice “of the consequences” of doing so, section 1158(d)(4)(A), (d)(6). The standard asylum application form contains a warning about frivolous applications. The IJ did not give Khaytekov the customary verbal secondary warning, but nothing in section 1158(d) requires an additional warning. View "Khaytekov v. Garland" on Justia Law

After more than a decade of employment, a seizure disorder ended Dr. Autran’s career as a P&G research scientist. Autran received total-disability benefits under P&G’s Health and Long-Term Disability Plan in 2012-2018. The Committee terminated those benefits after concluding that Autran no longer qualified as totally disabled within the meaning of the Plan, and awarded him his remaining 19 weeks of partial disability benefits. Autran sued under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B). He died while the suit was pending.The Sixth Circuit upheld summary judgment in favor of the Committee. Because the Plan delegates discretionary authority to the Committee to decide benefits claims, the court applied the deferential arbitrary-and-capricious test. The Committee had rational reasons to depart from the earlier total-disability finding. Among other new evidence, a doctor who performed many objective tests on Autran for over six hours found no basis to conclude that he suffered from a debilitating condition. Thorough medical opinions gave the Committee a firm foundation to conclude that Autran did not, in the Plan’s words, suffer from a “mental or physical condition” that the “medical profession” would consider “totally disabling.” View "Autran v. P&G Health & Long Term Disability Benefit Plan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this consolidated appeal are businesses that operate Michigan-based restaurants and entertainment venues that made claims against their commercial property insurance policies, held by Cincinnati Insurance, based on COVID-19 losses. These policies contained three provisions under which Cincinnati Insurance would compensate a policyholder only if the policyholder suffered direct physical loss or damage to its covered property, or if loss to a non-policy holder’s property prevented access to a policyholder’s property. Cincinnati Insurance denied their claims, indicating that neither the presence of the COVID-19 virus nor shutdown orders issued by the Michigan governor constituted physical loss or damage.The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims, finding that, under Michigan law, “direct physical loss” to property covers only tangible harm or damage to property, rather than mere loss of use. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Michigan Supreme Court would agree with its interpretation of the law–that COVID-19-related shutdown orders do not constitute “direct physical loss or direct physical damage” to property because “a loss of use simply is not the same as a physical loss.” The plaintiffs alleged “not tangible, physical losses, but economic losses.” View "Dino Drop, Inc. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In 2004, Chattanooga police executed a search warrant at the home of Johnson’s friend, searched Johnson’s person, and did not find any drugs on Johnson’s person. Officers found a revolver lying in a box, digital scales, 0.9 grams of crack cocaine, and 110 pills. Johnson admitted to possessing the firearm and the crack cocaine. He was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1); possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 18 U.S.C. 2; and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i). The court sentenced Johnson to 360 months’ imprisonment, reasoning that he was a career offender and rejecting Johnson’s objection “based on the disparity between crack cocaine and other drugs.”The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Johnson’s motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act of 2018. While the sentence was procedurally reasonable, it is substantively unreasonable. The court unduly weighed the nature of the offense, Johnson’s criminal history and characteristics, and the need to deter future criminal conduct and protect the public, while inadequately considering unwarranted disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Johnson pleaded no contest in Michigan state court to drug crimes. He was sentenced as a habitual offender, at the bottom of his guidelines range. Johnson later sought state post-conviction relief, seeking to withdraw his plea because his trial counsel was ineffective, and seeking resentencing because the judge based his sentence on a fact not admitted or proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson sought to compel his trial counsel to produce his case files and sit for an interview with Johnson’s new counsel. That interview apparently never took place, but Johnson secured an affidavit from his trial counsel. Johnson did not file that affidavit (or any other evidence) and did not ask for additional discovery, for a date for an evidentiary hearing, or for a ruling on his motion.Johnson filed a federal habeas petition, acknowledging that the state court had not yet ruled on his motion but asserting that special circumstances existed due to “the inordinate delay.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies. Any delay was attributable to Johnson, particularly his failure to request a state court evidentiary hearing. Johnson’s case is not the extreme instance in which circumstances beyond his control left him “incapable” of remedying the constitutional violations he alleges. View "Johnson v. Bauman" on Justia Law

Russell was a passenger in a car that the East Cleveland Police stopped and searched. They found two handguns, which resulted in a felon-in-possession charge for Russell. After the denial of his motion to suppress, Russell entered a conditional guilty plea.The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction. To assert a Fourth Amendment claim, Russell must have “standing” to challenge the search; normally a car passenger without a possessory interest in the car lacks such standing. The government failed to object to Russell’s lack of standing before the district court and raised the argument for the first time on appeal. Fourth Amendment standing, unlike Article III standing, is not jurisdictional and can be forfeited or waived. The government’s failure to raise the argument below was a forfeiture, not a waiver because the government took no steps to “expressly abandon” its objection. Under Sixth Circuit precedent, the government can raise a forfeited argument for the first time on appeal and prevail if it satisfies the plain-error inquiry under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). The government satisfied that test. Even if the government did not object, Russell had at least some burden to establish standing. Allowing Russell to benefit from the exclusionary remedy would lead to a rightfully diminished view of the judicial proceeding. View "United States v. Russell" on Justia Law

Tiwari and Sapkota sought to establish a home healthcare company that would focus on serving Nepali-speaking individuals in the Louisville area. Kentucky restricts the number of such companies that may serve each county. When the Commonwealth denied their certificate-of-need application, Tiwari and Sapkota filed suit, claiming that the regulation violates their Fourteenth Amendment right to earn a living, serving only the illegitimate end of protecting incumbent home healthcare companies from competition, and lacking a rational basis.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, upholding the requirement. Economic regulations, even those affecting an individual’s liberty to work in a given area, are subject to “rational basis” review. While expressing skepticism about certificate-of-need laws, the court concluded that a legislator could plausibly believe that the regulation has a rational connection to increasing cost efficiency, improving quality of care, and improving the healthcare infrastructure in place. View "Tiwari v. Friedlander" on Justia Law