Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Mills and his ex-wife struggled with drug addictions and neglected their four children. The children’s maternal grandparents obtained custody of the children. Around 10:00 p.m. on June 29, 2016, Mills showed up unannounced at their home, picked up his two-year-old daughter and carried her outside, then drove away with the child. The grandparents called the police. Mills ran out of gas, abandoned his vehicle, and walked up the road carrying his daughter. Officers arrived and ordered Mills to stop, but he ignored their commands. Mills fell and released the girl. Officers engaged in a five-minute struggle with Mills, using a taser, striking Mills with a flashlight, kneeing Mills in the face and head, and repeatedly hitting Mills with a baton. An officer eventually shot Mills twice, killing him. According to the officers and bystanders Mills had threatened to harm the officers, fought them with “super-human” strength, and charged at them. One bystander later claimed that the officers brutally beat Mills although Mills did not resist and that they could have easily handcuffed him.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit reversed, in part, summary judgment in favor of the officers. The testimonial dispute instead raises a classic jury question. Even accepting the testimony, however, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to their initial use of force to recover the child, and the local government is entitled to summary judgment on the federal claim. View "Gambrel v. Knox County" on Justia Law

Wood wore a shirt bearing the words “Fuck the Police” to the county fair. According to Wood, police officers ordered him to leave and escorted him from the fairgrounds because of his shirt. While leaving, Wood made several coarse insults directed to the police and the fairground’s administrator. The officers then arrested Wood for disorderly conduct. After the charges were dismissed, Wood filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the officers, alleging false arrest and retaliation. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, citing qualified immunity on the false arrest claim and insufficient evidence of retaliation.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Wood’s speech was protected by the First Amendment. With respect to the retaliation claim, the court held that a reasonable jury could conclude the officers were motivated to surround Wood and require him to leave in part because of his shirt. While Wood’s speech was profane, the circumstances did not create a situation where violence was likely to result. Neither proximity nor Wood’s demeanor and volume provided probable cause for arrest. Because there was no probable cause to arrest Wood for disorderly conduct, and because Wood’s right to be free from arrest was clearly established, the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Wood v. Eubanks" on Justia Law

Washington then age 15, claimed that on January 30, 1989, he encountered Chinn, whom he had met a year earlier and only knew by the nickname, “Tony.” According to Washington, Tony had a gun. He and Tony robbed two men, fatally shooting one. A few days later, police arrested Washington, who confessed and named “Tony” as the killer but could not provide Tony’s last name. Washington helped police prepare a composite sketch, which a newspaper printed. Police arrested Chinn and conducted a lineup for Washington and four other witnesses. Three were able to identify Chinn. Chinn’s classmate and instructor testified that Chinn was present for a midterm examination on the night of the murder, and his classmate testified that Chinn rode home on a bus with her. Chinn’s mother testified that he was at home by 9:30 p.m. and stayed home the entire evening. Some witnesses also considered the shooter to be taller than Chinn.Convicted, Chinn was sentenced to death. The district court denied Chinn’s 2002 petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit denied relief, rejecting arguments that the prosecution suppressed evidence, in violation of “Brady,” that Washington suffered mental disabilities; the court improperly admitted irrelevant and prejudicial testimony concerning Chinn’s alleged visit to a law office before his arrest; and Chinn was denied his right to present mitigating evidence to the sentencer on remand and was sentenced to death without a valid jury recommendation. View "Chinn v. Warden, Chillicothe Correctional Institution" on Justia Law

Officers executing a warrant for Cooper’s arrest on firearms and narcotics charges learned that Cooper was a high-ranking gang member and saw a Facebook photo of Cooper holding a Glock handgun. At the home of Cooper’s girlfriend, Walton, Officer Fox knocked on the door. When Walton answered, Fox saw Cooper inside. Concerned about spooking Cooper, Fox showed Walton a photograph of another individual and asked whether he could come inside to look for the individual. According to Fox, Walton agreed. Fox arrested Cooper while other officers rushed in to conduct a protective sweep. Officer Jensen noticed a lump in the mattress, flipped it, and discovered the Glock handgun depicted in Cooper’s Facebook post. Fox then presented rights-waiver and consent-to-search forms. Walton initialed lines stating that she was consenting freely. Officers then conducted a thorough search but recovered only the hat seen on Facebook.Charged with possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), Cooper unsuccessfully moved to suppress the gun. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The district court largely engaged in an attenuation analysis focused on whether Walton’s subsequent consent was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal protective sweep. That was the wrong analysis The gun was seized during the initial unlawful search, so inevitable discovery is the correct analysis. On remand, the court should focus on whether officers would have sought (and obtained) Walton’s consent to search If the illegal protective sweep had never happened and whether the ensuing consent search would have led to the gun. View "United States v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Ammex operates a duty-free gas station in Wayne County, Michigan, near the bridge to Canada, but positioned “beyond the exit point” for domestic commerce established by U.S. Customs and Border Protection. In 2012, the Michigan Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (MDARD) sought to enforce an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule requiring Wayne County gas stations to dispense low-pressure gasoline in the summer. MDARD, in conjunction with the EPA, implemented this rule to bring Southeast Michigan’s ozone levels into compliance with the Clean Air Act.Because of its unique location and certain sales privileges granted to it by U.S. customs law, Ammex resisted efforts to apply the rule to its gasoline sales. In 2019, the Sixth Circuit determined that MDARD was enforcing federal regulatory law, and was not in violation of the Supremacy Clause or dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. Ammex then argued that the environmental rule, properly construed, did not apply to Ammex and that the customs statute giving Ammex the right to sell duty-free goods supersedes the environmental regulation and renders it unenforceable against Ammex. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of those claims. the Summer Fuel Law unambiguously applies to Ammex and does not impact Ammex’s ability to sell gas duty-free. View "Ammex, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

Before the end of the 2019–20 academic year, MSU had several Division I sports teams: men’s baseball, basketball, cross country, football, golf, ice hockey, soccer, swimming and diving, tennis, track and field, and wrestling; and women’s basketball, cross country, field hockey, golf, gymnastics, rowing, soccer, softball, swimming and diving, tennis, track and field, and volleyball. In October 2020, MSU announced it would no longer sponsor the men’s and women’s swimming-and-diving teams after the 2020–21 school year. During the 2019–20 school year, the teams had 29 men and 33 women. Women student-athletes sought a preliminary injunction to prevent MSU from eliminating the women’s swimming-and-diving team, arguing that MSU failed to provide women with substantially proportionate athletic opportunities, as required by Title IX. In the 2018–19 school year, 48.8% of undergraduate students were male and 51.2% were female; and, in the 2019–20 school year, 49.1% were male and 50.9% were female.The district court denied a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their Title IX claim. The Sixth Circuit vacated, first finding that MSU did not inflate its number of women athletes. The correct inquiry focuses on the number of participation opportunities, not the gap as a percentage of the athletic program. . A school may fail to achieve substantial proportionality even if its participation gap is only a small percentage of the size of its athletic program View "Balow v. Michigan State University" on Justia Law

In 1985, Manning was convicted of first-degree murder, carrying a weapon with unlawful intent, and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony. Manning was sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissals of Manning’s first and second habeas petitions. Since then, Manning has filed multiple unsuccessful motions for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive habeas petition.Manning, pro se, again sought an order authorizing a second or successive habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2244(b). The Sixth Circuit again rejected his petition. Manning did not make a prima facie showing that his petition relied on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. Manning cited Miller v. Alabama (2012), which held that defendants “under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes” cannot be sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Manning sought to extend Miller’s new rule to persons who (like Manning) were 18 years old at the time of their offense. Miller unambiguously applies to only those who were under 18 at the time of their offense; for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, an individual’s eighteenth birthday marks a bright line. View "In re: Manning" on Justia Law

Johnson was convicted of unlawful imprisonment, assault of a domestic partner by strangulation and suffocation, interstate domestic violence, witness tampering, and assault, 18 U.S.C. 13, 113(a)(8), 113(a)(4), 2261(a), 1512(b). Based on his criminal history, he was sentenced to 864 months’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Johnson did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. The district court erred in allowing Johnson to proceed pro se. During the hearing on defense counsel’s motion to withdraw, the court asked Johnson if he understood the ramifications of his decision to represent himself without knowledge of the law but a review of the record indicates that the court’s questions did not reflect that the requirements of the Bench Book were met. The judge commented that he had already asked the “taxpayers to pay for two of the finest lawyers in the district to represent [him].” Instead of confirming that Johnson knew the maximum potential sentences, as required by the model inquiry, the court downplayed his potential sentence. Stemming from that error, the court likewise should have directed Johnson’s counsel to file subpoenas and witness lists on Johnson’s behalf. The district court did not adequately apply the section 3553(a) factors when determining Johnson's sentence. The court ordered assignment to a different judge on remand. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Albright was severely injured in a car accident and used opioids to manage her chronic pain. She became addicted to opioids. Seeking treatment for her addiction, Albright turned to Dr. Christensen to administer a one-week in-patient detoxification program. Christensen started Albright with a patient-controlled analgesia pump to supply her with hydromorphone, a pain reliever; he also gave Albright phenobarbital, which depresses the central nervous system. Christensen terminated these treatments after Albright became “anxious and tearful” while the two discussed the treatment. Changing tack, Christensen twice administered Suboxone—an opioid-replacement medication—to Albright. On both occasions, Albright immediately developed muscle spasms, pain, contortions, restlessness, and feelings of temporary paralysis. She refused further treatment and was discharged. Albright still suffers shaking, muscle spasms, and emotional distress.The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Albright’s suit against Christensen. The suit sounds in medical malpractice rather than negligence. Michigan’s affidavit-of-merit and pre-suit-notice rules for medical-malpractice actions conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and do not apply in diversity cases in federal court. Federal Rule 3 requires only the filing of a complaint to commence an action—nothing more. The district court mistakenly invoked Erie and applied the pre-suit-notice rule in Albright’s case. View "Albright v. Christensen" on Justia Law

McKinnie, a recidivist drug dealer, was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment, based on a career offender enhancement, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. He had a 2011 crack cocaine conspiracy conviction and an Ohio attempted trafficking conviction. The enhancement increased McKinnie’s Guidelines range from 60-71 months to 151-188 months. After McKinnie’s sentence became final, the Sixth Circuit decided in “Havis,” that an attempted crime is not a predicate “controlled substance offense” under section 4B1.1. McKinnie then sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255 The district court denied McKinnie’s petition, reasoning that error in calculating the advisory Guidelines range, such as a Havis error, is not cognizable on collateral review, where relief is available only when a sentence violates the Constitution or a federal statute.McKinnie separately moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), citing the Havis error, his obesity and hypertension, and the risk of contracting COVID-19 as “extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce his sentence.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Havis error was not, as a matter of law, an extraordinary and compelling reason. McKinnie’s vaccination against COVID-19 mitigated his COVID-19 risk; his obesity and hypertension were insufficient to grant relief. His potential rehabilitation was not an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce his sentence. View "United States v. McKinnie" on Justia Law