Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The federal government successfully prosecuted multiple members of the “Devils Diciples Motorcycle Club” for their role in a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c)(d) that trafficked large quantities of methamphetamine and engaged in numerous other illegal acts (violent crimes, illicit gambling, thefts, and obstruction of justice). The district court imposed sentences that ranged from 28 years to life in prison.In consolidated appeals, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences. The district court correctly instructed the jury to convict each defendant if it found that he joined an agreement that encompassed a future violation of the substantive RICO offense. The court also upheld the application of a two-level sentencing enhancement for maintaining drug premises under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(12) via sections 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)’s relevant-conduct provision. Nothing in section 2D.1(b)(12) “otherwise specifie[s]” that it cannot be applied based on jointly undertaken criminal activity under section 1B1.3(a)(1)(B); the district court correctly concluded that the premises enhancement could be applied to a defendant even though he did not personally maintain premises for purposes of drug manufacturing or distribution. View "United States v. Castano" on Justia Law

The noncitizens, victims of grave crimes, cooperated with law enforcement. They applied for U-visas, 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1), 1101(a)(15)(U), and authorization to work; two sought derivative U-visas and work authorization for some of their family members. They have waited years for USCIS to adjudicate their applications and remain unable to obtain lawful employment, to visit family members who live abroad, or to attain deferred-action status that would protect them from removal. They filed suit. While an appeal was pending, USCIS announced a new program for persons with pending U-visa applications: the “Bona Fide Determination Process.”The Sixth Circuit held that the issuance of the Bona Fide Determination Process does not moot any part of the case. Federal courts are not precluded from reviewing claims that USCIS has unreasonably delayed placing principal petitioners on the U-visa waitlist. USCIS is required by 8 U.S.C. 1184(p)(6) and the Bona Fide Determination Process to decide whether a U-visa application is “bona fide” before the agency can exercise its discretion and decide whether principal petitioners and their qualifying family members may receive Bona Fide Determination Employment Authorization Documents, so 5 U.S.C. 706(1) permits the federal courts to hasten an unduly delayed “bona fide” determination. View "Garcia v. United States Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging two sections of House Bill 2263: Section 216 criminalizes the performance of pre-viability abortions at cascading intervals of two to three weeks, beginning with the detection of a "fetal heartbeat" and continuing through a gestational age of 24 weeks; and Section 217 criminalizes the performance of an abortion if the physician "knows" the reason for the abortion is "because of" the race, sex, or a Down syndrome diagnosis of the fetus. Both sections contain an affirmative defense provision when the abortion was performed because, "in the physician's good faith, reasonable medical judgment," the abortion was necessary to avoid a medical emergency.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and concluded that the district court properly issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of Sections 216 and 217 of H.B. 2263 because the provisions are constitutionally unsound. The court stated that it is still clear that when burdens are substantial enough, a law restricting access to pre-viability abortions is unconstitutional. Because the court found that all provisions of Section 216 pose a substantial burden to a person seeking an abortion at the relevant time LMP, it is unnecessary for the court to fully address the State's interests. Even if the court were to consider the State's interests, there are questions about whether its declared reasons for the law are, in fact, genuine. The court stated that the Supreme Court has been clear that laws that have the purpose or effect of placing an obstacle in the path of a woman seeking abortion "cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends." The court explained that this legislative history indicates a likelihood that the justifications offered in court have been mere pretext and that the bill was passed with knowledge that it was unconstitutional. Therefore, it is likely that plaintiffs would succeed on the merits in demonstrating that Section 216 is unconstitutional because it is in direct violation of the principles established in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973), and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).In regard to Section 217, the court concluded that the district court correctly determined that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their void-for-vagueness challenge. Declining to address whether Section 217 violates principles of substantive due process, the court concluded that the district court should resolve this issue in the first instance and, in doing so, should analyze the ban on abortions for Down syndrome separately from bans on abortions for reasons of race or sex.The court noted that it is unnecessary to decide whether the medical-emergency affirmative defense is constitutional because the injunction on other grounds moots the issue. The court further concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the other relevant factors weighed in favor of granting the preliminary injunction. Finally, the court stated that, although this circuit's recent—and alarming—decisions have broadened the extent to which the government may impede a person's constitutional right to choose whether to carry a pregnancy to term, the law remains clear that if a regulation is a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion, it is invalid. View "Memphis Center for Reproductive Health v. Slatery" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision rejecting the bankruptcy trustee's efforts seeking to avoid payments from Fair Finance to Textron as fraudulent transfers under Ohio's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (OUFTA).The court concluded that the district court correctly rejected the trustee's bad-faith-invalidation argument at summary judgment. In this case, Textron's actions did not render its perfected interest ineffective against the holder of a judicial lien subsequently obtained in a hypothetical UCC priority contest. Therefore, Textron enjoyed a valid lien under OUFTA. The court explained that its conclusion is grounded in the nature of the UCC's priority test as well as critical distinctions between normal priority disputes and the OUFTA valid-lien test. The court also concluded that loan payments encumbered by the perfected 2002 security interest are not transfers under OUFTA and thus cannot be avoided as fraudulent transfers. The court disagreed with the trustee that the jury erred in determining that the 2004 changes did not amount to a novation and concluded that, to the extent there was an error in the jury instruction, it was harmless. The court rejected the trustee's additional argument to the contrary. View "Bash v. Textron Financial Corp." on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner on his claims that counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase and that he was denied a fair trial because of jury tampering. The court concluded that the Kentucky Supreme Court's ruling that petitioner suffered no prejudice from counsel's ineffective assistance at the penalty phase by neither investigating nor presenting mitigating evidence was not contrary to Supreme Court precedent, and was not so obviously wrong as to be beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement. The court also concluded that petitioner failed to provide credible testimony of jury tampering. Finally, the court concluded that petitioner defaulted on his juror bias claim. View "Hodge v. Jordan" on Justia Law

In 1991, Congress prohibited almost all robocalls to cell phones and landlines, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(B). A 2015 amendment attempted to allow robocalls if they were made “solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.” The Supreme Court, in AAPC, held the amendment was unconstitutional content discrimination but that the exception was severable from the rest of the restriction, leaving the general prohibition intact. In 2019-2020, Lindenbaum received two robocalls from Realgy advertising its electricity services. She sued, alleging violations of the robocall restriction. After the Supreme Court decided AAPC, the district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction reasoning that severability is a remedy that operates only prospectively, so the robocall restriction was unconstitutional and therefore “void” for the period the exception was on the books. Because it was “void,” the district court believed, it could not provide a basis for federal-question jurisdiction.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Because severance is not a remedy, it would have to be a legislative act in order to operate prospectively only. The Court recognized only that the Constitution had “automatically displace[d]” the government-debt-collector exception from the start, then interpreted what the statute has always meant in its absence. View "Lindenbaum v. Realgy, LLC" on Justia Law

Osborn, an Army veteran suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, left a threatening voicemail for Georgia Congressman Henry Johnson. Osborn pleaded guilty under 18 U.S.C. 115(a)(1)(B), (b)(4), and (c)(4). At sentencing, the district court refused to apply a four-level reduction under U.S.S.G. 2A6.1(b)(6) because it concluded that his offense did not “evidenc[e] little or no deliberation.” In doing so, the court relied on prior threats Osborn made against other government officials that are not “relevant conduct” under U.S.S.G. 1B1.3.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. While the relevant conduct provision prohibited the district court from altering the base offense level using certain uncharged conduct, it did not alter its traditional fact-finding role; the court did not clearly err in concluding that Osborn’s offense evidenced more than “little or no deliberation.” View "United States v. Osborn" on Justia Law

A drug manufacturer cannot distribute a drug in interstate commerce without obtaining the FDA’s approval for the uses listed on the drug’s official label, 21 U.S.C. 355(a). The Act does not prohibit doctors from prescribing FDA-approved drugs for “off-label” use but leaves the regulation of doctors to the states. Hydroxychloroquine is approved to treat malaria, lupus, and arthritis but not to treat COVID-19. In 2020, the FDA relied on then-available data and issued an Emergency Use Authorization, permitting hydroxychloroquine in the federal government’s strategic stockpile to be distributed to treat COVID-19 patients in limited circumstances.The Association, a nonprofit organization with physician members, sued, challenging restrictions barring use of hydroxychloroquine to treat COVID-19 except for hospitalized patients. The Association alleged that these restrictions violated the implied equal-protection guarantee in the Fifth Amendment; violated the First Amendment right to associate by limiting access to medication useful for meeting in groups; and violated the Administrative Procedure Act. The Association alleged an injury to itself: it was considering canceling a conference purportedly due to the restrictions. It also invoked associational standing on behalf of its physician members who could not prescribe hydroxychloroquine for COVID-19.The district court held that none of these injuries plausibly pleaded the Association’s standing to challenge the Authorization. The court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Associaiton failed to plausibly plead that any member has been injured by the FDA’s actions. View "Association of American Physicians & Surgeons v. United States Food & Drug Administration" on Justia Law

The Training Academy hired Smith as a firefighter recruit. If Academy recruits do not pass their practical skills exams after three tries, they are dismissed. The vertical ventilation test requires climbing a ladder, then cutting a hole in the roof of a burning building, wearing full firefighting gear, within 10 minutes. Recruits study this skill in the classroom and then practice on a simulator. Smith and his squad took the test on the same house. Everyone passed on the first attempt, except for Smith and one other recruit, who passed on his second try. Smith failed all three attempts. The evaluating instructors noted that Smith hit the ladder with the running chainsaw, “would not follow directions," and “repeatedly cut towards his body.”Because Toledo was trying to attain a more racially diverse fire department, Smith was given two more opportunities to take the test. No other firefighter was ever given more than the initial three attempts. Contrary to Academy policy, Smith was allowed to complete the course with his squad and to participate in graduation. Before each additional attempt, the Academy provided Smith with individual instruction and practice. On his third attempt, Smith again failed three times. Smith was dismissed from the Academy and filed suit, alleging racial discrimination, 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 2000e-2(a)(1) (Title VII) and deprivation of a liberty interest, section 1983; conspiracy to violate civil rights, sections 1985(3) and 1986. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on all claims. View "Smith v. City of Toledo" on Justia Law

While patrolling a known drug house, Sergeant Murch recognized a Buick that he had stopped twice before, each time culminating in a drug-related arrest. Murch ran the plates and discovered that the vehicle’s owner, Shehan, lacked a driver’s license. Murch saw the Buick speed away. Murch stopped the car for speeding and driving without a license. The driver identified himself as Garcia and admitted that he lacked a driver’s license. Because permitting someone without a license to drive a car violates Michigan law, the officers sought to discover whether Shehan was among the vehicle’s passengers. Two passengers gave names. The third refused to identify himself after repeated requests. A patdown of the unidentified man uncovered 11 empty plastic bags and $1033 in cash. Officers took him in for fingerprinting. Jail officials had the man remove his sweater. His arms bore tattoos: “Marc” and “Barrera.” After running the name through a database, officers confirmed that they had detained Barrera, a parole violator with outstanding arrest warrants. A strip search of Barrera revealed marijuana and cocaine. The Michigan trial court denied Barrera's suppression motion. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed his convictions.After leaving state prison, Barrera sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the officers s with respect to qualified immunity. The officers had probable cause to take Barrera to jail; his refusal to identify himself under these circumstances violated Michigan law. View "Barrera v. City of Mount Pleasant" on Justia Law