Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In subsequently-consolidated cases, various relators sued Community Health Systems (CHS) and others, alleging that CHS submitted fraudulent claims for medically unnecessary hospital admissions to federal public-health insurance programs, such as Medicaid and Medicare. Relators’ counsel performed thousands of hours of work in assisting the government with the investigation. Seven years ago, the relators, the government, and CHS entered into a settlement agreement, disposing of the underlying claims. The settlement agreement left undecided the allocation of attorney fees under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3730(d). After settling with all the relators, CHS now claims that the relators are not entitled to attorney fees because the FCA’s first-to-file rule and public-disclosure bar precluded their claims. The district court agreed with CHS.The Sixth Circuit reversed. We CHS cannot now rely on these separate provisions of the FCA as a last-ditch effort to deny attorney fees to the relators. After the global settlement reached pursuant to a collaborative process between the government and relators’ counsel, there is no reason to apply the first-to-file and public-disclosure rules. The court remanded with instructions to the district court to determine an award of reasonable attorney fees to relators’ counsel. View "Cook-Reska v. Community Health Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

An undercover Kentucky police detective used a computer program to search for individuals who were illegally trading and downloading child pornography on a peer-to-peer file-sharing network, and, on several occasions in May-June 2017, downloaded child pornography from a computer with an IP address located in Independence, Kentucky. Officers used the information to obtain a warrant to search Michael Clark’s residence.In April 2018, officers executed the search warrant. Clark and others were home. The officers seized multiple computers, interviewed Clark, and recorded the interview. They told Clark that he was not under arrest, and they did not give him Miranda warnings. Clark stated that the MacBook laptop was his work computer. The three seized computers were sent to a forensic examiner. An examination of the MacBook computer found 295 images and 62 videos of child pornography, a user profile named “Mike,” and evidence suggesting the former presence of additional illegal content and filesharing programs.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Clark’s conviction on five counts of knowingly distributing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2), and 192-month sentence, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the interstate-commerce and “knowing distribution” elements of the conviction, to the admission of the recorded interrogation, to the admission of evidence concerning old computers found in Clark’s home, and to evidence of Clark’s computer knowledge. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Tempo’s convictions and 30-year sentence for drug conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)–(C), 846; drug possession and distribution, section 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); and drug possession and distribution near a school, sections 841, 860. The court rejected a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and an argument that he was sentenced under an unconstitutionally vague sentencing provision.The court upheld Sadler’s convictions for drug conspiracy, drug possession and distribution near a school, felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)), conspiracy to obstruct justice (section 1512(k)), and witness tampering, section 1512(a)(2)(A). The court held that jury instructions correctly stated the causation standard under 841(b)(1)(C), where serious bodily injury or death results from the use of the drugs distributed. The court vacated Sadler’s sentence and remanded for a new trial on the sole question of whether Sadler was within the chain of distribution as required before imposing an enhanced sentence under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C) based on the overdoses. View "United States v. Sadler" on Justia Law

Mizori pled guilty to distributing crack cocaine; his PSR recommended a finding that Mizori had acted as a manager or supervisor within a conspiracy. A police investigator and an informant testified that Mizori had played a leadership role in the conspiracy. Mizori did not call any witnesses. The district court sentenced him to 20 years’ imprisonment.Mizori sought a sentence reduction under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that his counsel’s failure to offer any witnesses at the sentencing hearing amounted to constitutionally ineffective assistance. Mizori attached supporting affidavits from three co-conspirators. Almost four years later the district court denied Mizori’s motion. Mizori, then confined in a high-security Special Housing Unit, “SHU,” had 60 days— until September 15, 2019—to file a notice of appeal but had no access to stamps or a law library. He was confined in the SHU until September 29. Days later, Mizori timely moved, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5), for an extension of time to file his notice of appeal.The district court denied his motion, stating that “Mizori has not met his burden of establishing excusable neglect" but did not address whether Mizori had shown “good cause” for an extension, Rule 4(a)(5)(A)(ii), the ground on which Mizori sought relief. The Sixth Circuit held that Mizori does not need a certificate of appealability to appeal the denial of his Rule 4(a)(5) motion and that the district court abused its discretion by denying that motion. View "Mizori v. United States" on Justia Law

Tomei went to Parkwest Hospital after he injured his foot and leg. He is deaf and communicates using American Sign Language. He asked for an interpreter. Parkwest never provided one. Medical staff gave him an antibiotic and ibuprofen and sent him home. Days later he went to the emergency room, where doctors determined he had blood clots in his leg. Parkwest offered only to connect Tomei with an off-site interpreter via webcam. The connection was so glitchy that Tomei could not effectively communicate. After surgery, Tomei could not tell the medical staff that he was still experiencing pain. Tomei was sent home. Tomei’s family doctor sent him to the University of Tennessee Medical Center, where interpreters helped him through a second surgery. Ultimately, doctors amputated nearly one-third of his leg. About 15 months after he was first denied an interpreter, Tomei sued under section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).The Sixth Circuit rejected an argument that the suit was untimely under Tennessee’s one-year statute of limitations for personal injury suits. Unless federal law provides otherwise, a civil action “arising under” a federal statute enacted after December 1, 1990, is subject to a four-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. 1658(a). Tomei brought his discrimination claim under the ACA—not the Rehabilitation Act. No statute or regulation explicitly sets a statute of limitations for violating the ACA’s discrimination bar. View "Tomei v. Parkwest Medical Center" on Justia Law

Guzman-Torralva, a 35-year-old Mexican citizen, illegally entered the United States at age 19. He lives in New Jersey and has two children who are U.S. citizens. In 2018, ICE detained him as an alien present without being admitted or paroled. Attorney Krajenke represented Guzman-Torralva at his first hearing, at which he conceded removability; a second hearing was set for November 28, Guzman-Torralva was released on bond. The second hearing was rescheduled. The updated notice again warned Guzman-Torralva that failing to appear could result in an order of removal being issued in his absence. Guzman-Torralva then hired a new attorney, Fuentes, who filed an appearance and moved to change the venue of the hearing. His filings were rejected because Fuentes failed to provide proof of service on Krajenke and to properly sign and paginate the filings. Neither Guzman-Torralva, Krajenke, nor Fuentes appeared at the hearing,Guzman-Torralva was ordered removed in absentia. Guzman-Torralva then hired a third attorney and moved to reopen his removal order, citing ineffective assistance of counsel. The immigration court denied the motion because Guzman-Torralva had not filed a bar complaint against Fuentes nor adequately explained the failure to do so. The BIA denied his appeal for the same reason. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. Precedent requires more than a statement that the alien is “not interested in filing a formal complaint.” View "Guzman-Torralva v. Garland" on Justia Law

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Kentucky temporarily (for about six weeks) barred healthcare corporations like Estes, which operates two dental clinics from providing nonemergency care. Estes lost substantial income as a result. Estes’ property insurance policy required Cincinnati Insurance to pay Estes for lost business income that results from a “direct” “physical loss” to its dental offices.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Estes’ suit against Cincinnati, noting that circuit courts have uniformly interpreted this “physical loss” language not to cover similar pandemic-related claims under the laws of many other states. The court concluded that Kentucky’s highest court would agree with those decisions. The phrase “physical loss” would convey to the “average person” that a property owner has been tangibly deprived of the property or that the property has been tangibly destroyed. COVID-19 and the government shutdown orders caused only intangible or economic harm. View "Estes v. Cincinnati Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In Ohio, to place an advertising billboard on a highway, you must apply for a permit from the Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT). Under the “compliance rule,” ODOT will not process a permit application if the applicant has outstanding fees, changes his billboard without prior approval from ODOT, or maintains an illegal advertising billboard. ODOT put Kenjoh’s billboard permits on hold under the compliance rule, alleging that Kenjoh was maintaining an illegal billboard.Kenjoh sued, asserting that the compliance rule was an unconstitutional prior restraint under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed his claims for damages and injunctive relief. The Sixth Circuit vacated. While the case was pending on appeal, the Ohio legislature amended a key definition in the statute, which changes how the regulation applies. Before the amendment, a person needed a permit from ODOT to erect a billboard that was “designed, intended, or used to advertise.” Now, a person needs a permit if he will be paid for placing a message on the billboard, regardless of the message. The court affirmed the grant of qualified immunity to an ODOT supervisor on a claim for damages despite the amendment, based on the law as it existed at the time of the official action. View "Kenjoh Outdoor, LLC v. Marchbanks" on Justia Law

El-Khalil, a podiatrist, joined the Oakwood Taylor medical staff in 2008. During his time there, El-Khalil alleges that he saw Oakwood employees submit fraudulent Medicare claims, which he reported to the federal government. In 2015, Oakwood Taylor’s Medical Executive Committee (MEC) rejected El-Khalil’s application to renew his staff privileges. El-Khalil alleges that the MEC did so in retaliation for his whistleblowing. Pursuant to Oakwood’s Medical Staff Bylaws, El-Khalil commenced a series of administrative appeals. On September 22, 2016, Oakwood’s Joint Conference Committee, which had the authority to issue a final, non-appealable decision, voted to affirm the denial of El-Khalil’s staff privileges. On September 27, the Committee sent El-Khalil written notice of its decision.On September 27, 2019, El-Khalil sued Oakwood for violating the whistleblower provision of the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3730(h). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit as untimely under a three-year limitations period, which commenced when Oakwood decided not to renew El-Khalil’s medical-staff privileges, rather than when it notified El-Khalil of that decision five days later. Section 3730(h) contains no notice requirement. As soon as Oakwood “discriminated against” El-Khalil “because of” his FCA-protected conduct, he had a ripe “cause of action triggering the limitations period,” View "El-Khalil v. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

Polselli underpaid his federal taxes. The IRS has made formal assessments against him; the outstanding balance is over $2 million. While investigating assets to satisfy those liabilities, IRS Officer Bryant learned that Remo used entities to shield assets and that Remo “may have access to and use of” bank accounts held in the name of his wife, Hanna. Bryant served a summons on a bank, seeking account and financial records of Hanna “concerning” Remo. Remo was a client of the law firm Abraham & Rose; Bryant served the firm with a summons. The firm asserted attorney-client privilege and represented that it did not retain any of the requested documents. Bryant then issued identical summonses against banks, seeking any financial records of Abraham & Rose and a related law firm, “concerning” Remo. Bryant did not notify Hanna or the law firms of the bank summonses.After receiving notices from their banks, Hanna and the law firms petitioned to quash the summonses, alleging that the IRS failed properly to notify them under 26 U.S.C. 7609(a). The district court and Sixth Circuit agreed with the IRS that 7609(b)(2) and (h) waived sovereign immunity only for parties entitled to notice of the summonses and because the IRS was seeking the bank records “in aid of the collection” of Remo’s assessed liability, there was no entitlement to notice under 7609(c)(2)(D)(i). The district court, therefore, lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Polselli v. United States Department of the Treasury" on Justia Law