Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Anthem provides health insurance and hires nurses to review insurance claims. The company pays those nurses a salary but does not pay them overtime. Canaday, an Anthem nurse who lives in Tennessee, filed a proposed collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 206. claiming that the company misclassified her and others as exempt from the Act’s overtime pay provisions. A number of Anthem nurses in other states opted into the collective action.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the out-of-state plaintiffs on personal jurisdiction grounds. In an FLSA collective action, as in the mass action under California law, each opt-in plaintiff becomes a real party in interest, who must meet her burden for obtaining relief and satisfy the other requirements of party status. Anthem is based in Indiana, not Tennessee. General jurisdiction is not an option for out-of-state claims. Specific jurisdiction requires a connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue. The out-of-state plaintiffs have not brought claims arising out of or relating to Anthem’s conduct in Tennessee. View "Canaday v. The Anthem Companies, Inc." on Justia Law

Phillips, currently incarcerated for a 2001 armed bank robbery, filed a pro se motion seeking to waive the accumulated interest on his $51,086.10 restitution sentence. He had not challenged that order on appeal or when the court set up a payment plan in 2005. As of December 2019, Phillips’s outstanding principal balance was $13,191.04, with $25,550.51 owed in interest.The district court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to modify a restitution order post-sentencing. Phillips argued that the district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 3612(f)(3), which provides: If the court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest under this subsection, the court may-- (A) waive the requirement for interest; (B) limit the total of interest payable to a specific dollar amount; or (C) limit the length of the period during which interest accrues.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Although the circuits are split on the issue, and the statutory language is not clear, the fairest reading of the statute is that the district court’s power to waive interest on restitution because of a defendant’s inability to pay can be exercised not only at initial sentencing but also at a point after initial sentencing in light of changed circumstances regarding the ability to pay. View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

At about 4:30 a.m., an anonymous 911 call reported a break-in at neighboring apartment 103, with screaming, Seven Southfield Police officers responded, entered the building, and heard screaming but could not identify the source; the door to 103 was not broken. The officers determined that the window was not a point of entry; they received no response to intermittent knocking. The dispatcher called the anonymous caller back; the caller said that she “can’t be positive what apartment it was coming from.” After about eight minutes, Mitchell opened the door to 103. She denied that there were any problems. Although none of the officer noticed any injuries on Mitchell or saw any signs of suspicious activity, they pushed their way inside, injuring Mitchell’s knee. Mitchell continued to object to the warrantless entry. The officers arrested Mitchell’s guest, Williams, allegedly employing unnecessary force. The officers found no evidence of illegal activity in the apartment. Charges against Williams for resisting arrest and obstruction of police were dismissed.Mitchell and Williams filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting unlawful entry and excessive force. Williams also asserted false arrest and malicious prosecution. Certain claims were dismissed. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the officers’ appeal of the grant of summary judgment to Williams on his false arrest claim for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the denial of the officers’ qualified immunity motion for summary judgment on the unlawful entry claim and Mitchell’s excessive force claim. View "Williams v. Maurer" on Justia Law

Attorney Conn represented Plaintiffs and thousands of others in seeking disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (SSA). Conn bribed doctors to certify false applications and bribed an ALJ to approve those applications. After Conn’s scheme was uncovered, SSA identified more than 1,700 approved applications that it believed might have been the product of fraud. SSA redetermined and denied Plaintiffs’ applications,Several class actions challenged the SSA’s redetermination procedures. The Martin case was dismissed without a class having been certified because the named plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. The Hughes case was stayed before a class was certified. In the meantime, the Sixth Circuit held that the SSA’s redetermination procedures violated due process. Plaintiffs had 60 days to seek judicial review of the SSA’s decision, 42 U.S.C. 405(g). Each waited more than two years. As absent Hughes class members, they relied on the Supreme Court’s “American Pipe” doctrine under which filing a class action pauses the deadlines for members to file related individual actions. Once the district court remanded Hughes, plaintiffs filed their civil actions.The district courts dismissed the suits as untimely. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. American Pipe tolling continues after a district court denies a motion for class certification solely as a matter of docket management, without deciding that certification is unwarranted. The outright dismissal of an uncertified class action ends American Pipe tolling and restarts class members’ statute-of-limitations clocks. View "Messer v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

Ward received twice medical treatment at Stonecrest. Stonecrest hired NPAS, Inc. to collect Ward’s outstanding balances. NPAS first sent Ward a billing statement on October 3 related to his July hospital visit. The statement provided NPAS's full name and address at the top of the first page; the reverse side explained who it was. NPAS called Ward on October 24 and left a voice message: We are calling from NPAS on behalf of Stonecrest … Please return our call. On November 17, NPAS, sent a second billing statement. On December 27, NPAS left a second, identical, voice message. NPAS then returned his account to Stonecrest. Ward’s second account regarding his October hospital visit followed a similar process. On December 28, after retaining counsel, Ward sent a cease-and-desist letter to “NPAS Solutions, LLC,” an entity unrelated to NPAS, Inc. Ward stated at his deposition that NPAS, Inc.’s voice messages caused him to become confused as to which entity had called him.Ward filed suit under the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692e(11) alleging NPAS failed, in its voice messages, to identify itself as a debt collector and failed to identify the “true name” of its business. The Sixth Circuit held that the case should be dismissed because Ward lacks Article III standing. Ward does not automatically have standing simply because Congress authorizes a plaintiff to sue for failing to comply with the Act. The procedural injuries Ward asserts do not bear a close relationship to traditional harms. View "Ward v. National Patient Account Services Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

A deputy observed a vehicle swerving in traffic and initiated a stop. Kerns was operating the vehicle. When the car stopped, Kerns’s prior romantic partner exited and yelled that Kerns had kidnapped her at gunpoint. Kerns was arrested. He admitted to driving from Kentucky to Colby’s Michigan residence and threatening to kill her family if Colby did not leave with him. Colby had jerked the wheel of the car to get the deputy's attention. Kerns was indicted for kidnapping (18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1)), interstate domestic violence (2261(a)(1)), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (924(c)(1)(a)(ii)). After being found competent to stand trial, Kerns pleaded guilty to kidnapping and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. Kerns confirmed he had reviewed the PSR and had no objection to its findings. The court explained that the recommended sentencing range for the kidnapping count was 87-108 months’ imprisonment and that the section 924(c) count carried a mandatory consecutive minimum sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment. The court sentenced Kerns to 192 months: 108 months on the kidnapping count plus months on the firearm count. The court also referenced a fine. Neither party objected. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that an inconsistency existed between the court’s oral reference to a fine of $1,000 and its imposition of a total fine of $2,000. The guilty plea was valid and the sentence was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Kerns" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit previously affirmed the Federal Trade Commission’s decision to block a merger of ProMedica and St. Luke’s Hospital in Lucas County, Ohio. As part of the unwinding of the merger, ProMedica and St. Luke’s signed an agreement in which ProMedica’s insurance subsidiary, Paramount, agreed to maintain St. Luke’s as a within-network provider; Paramount could drop St. Luke’s if ownership of the hospital changed. A large healthcare company based in Michigan, McLaren, subsequently merged with St. Luke’s. Paramount ended its relationship with St. Luke’s, removing the hospital from its provider network. St. Luke’s then alleged that ProMedica’s refusal to do business with it violated the antitrust laws. The district court preliminarily enjoined ProMedica from ending the agreement. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Because ProMedica had a legitimate business explanation for ending the relationship, St. Luke’s is unlikely to show that ProMedica unlawfully refused to continue doing business with it. St. Luke’s has little likelihood of establishing an irreparable injury given the option of money damages. View "St. Luke's Hospital v. ProMedica Health System, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1993-2017, Penfound worked for a company that provided its employees with a 401(k) plan and voluntarily contributed a portion of his wages to the plan. In 2017, Penfound transitioned to a new company, Protodesign, which did not offer a 401(k) plan. Penfound was unable to make further contributions to his retirement account. He left Protodesign in March 2018 and, weeks later started working for Laird, which offered a 401(k) plan. Penfound eventually resumed making contributions. In June 2018, Penfound and his wife filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, seeking to deduct $1,375.01 per month from their disposable income as voluntary contributions to John’s 401(k) retirement plan. The Trustee objected.The bankruptcy court found that the Penfounds could “not exclude their voluntary contributions . . . from the calculation of disposable income.” The district court affirmed. In the meantime, the Sixth Circuit held that 11 U.S.C. 541(b)(7) “is best read to exclude from disposable income a debtor’s post-petition monthly 401(k) contributions so long as those contributions were regularly withheld from the debtor’s wages prior to her bankruptcy.” Rejecting a “good faith” argument, the Sixth Circuit affirmed as to Penfound, who had made no contributions within the six months pre-petition. View "Penfound v. Ruskin" on Justia Law

Warren pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm. His plea agreement bound the parties to “recommend that the Court impose a sentence within” Warren’s Guidelines range, calculated at 51-63 months, and prohibited either party from “suggest[ing] in any way that a departure or variance” from Warren’s Guidelines range “is appropriate.” Before sentencing, the district court notified Warren that it was considering an upward variance and ultimately sentenced him to 120 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit vacated, reasoning that “because the Guidelines already account for a defendant’s criminal history,” the “extreme variance” based solely on Warren’s criminal history was “inconsistent with the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities.”On remand, the district court again circulated a notice of possible upward variance. At the hearing, the court asked the parties to discuss the potential variance. The prosecuting attorney stated that she “wanted to clarify something that defense counsel brought up because she is asking the Court to have a standard of reliance upon this.” The prosecutor acknowledged the existence of a plea agreement, which “the government has no intention of violating” but indicated that, had the full extent of Warren’s history been known, there would have been a different recommendation. The Sixth Circuit vacated the 96-month sentence imposed on remand as substantively unreasonable. The government breached Warren's plea agreement. View "United States v. Warren" on Justia Law

Based on activity related to former Kentucky Secretary of State Alison Lundergan Grimes’ campaign for the U.S. Senate seat held by Mitch McConnell in 2014, Emmons and Lundergan (Grimes’s father) were convicted for knowingly and willfully making unlawful corporate contributions aggregating $25,000 or more, Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. 30109(d)(1)(A)(i), 30118, and 18 U.S.C. 2; conspiracy to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. 371; willfully causing the submission of materially false statements, 18 U.S.C 1001(a)(2) and 2; and the falsification of records or documents, 18 U.S.C. 1519 and 2.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of the ban on corporate contributions as applied to intrafamilial contributions from a closely-held, family-run corporation. Such contributions present a risk of quid pro quo corruption. The district court adequately distinguished between independent expenditures and contributions in the jury instructions. The district court properly admitted evidence of Lundergan’s uncharged acts in connection with Grimes’ campaigns for Kentucky Secretary of State as res gestae evidence and under 404(b). The government presented sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find that Emmons had the requisite intent to cause unlawful corporate contributions and the Grimes campaign to submit false campaign-finance reports. View "United States v. Emmons" on Justia Law