Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Card was diagnosed with “chronic lymphocytic leukemia,” which can cause fatigue. Card alleges her worsening fatigue left her unable to perform her job as a night-shift nurse. She applied for disability benefits under an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) plan administered by Principal, which denied her requests for short-term, long-term, and total disability benefits. Card sued. The district court granted Principal summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to Principal for further proceedings. Principal granted Card short-term disability benefits but requested additional information for her other claims. Card then filed motions in the district court, seeking attorney’s fees and asking the court to reopen the case because Principal had not reached a benefits decision for her other claims within the 45 days allegedly required by ERISA . The district court issued a “virtual order” on its docket, denying the motions for lack of jurisdiction.The Sixth Circuit first held that it had jurisdiction to review that order then vacated and remanded to the district court. A district court retains jurisdiction over a beneficiary’s ERISA suit during the remand. "As in every other ERISA case in this procedural posture," the prior decision remanded to the district for it to retain jurisdiction while Principal engaged in the new benefits determination. View "Card v. Principal Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In 2018, Traylor was convicted of conspiracy to commit health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349, 1347; conspiracy to pay and receive healthcare kickbacks, 18 U.S.C. 371; and five counts of health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347. The district court initially sentenced Traylor to 135 months’ imprisonment, which was reduced to 120 months at her recent resentencing. In a pro se third motion for a sentence reduction, Traylor argued that, due to her various health ailments (e.g., diabetes, sleep apnea, asthma, obesity, being a recent organ transplant recipient, and use of immunosuppressive therapy), she is susceptible to contracting and becoming severely ill from COVID-19 in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Traylor did not demonstrate an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting a sentence reduction because she had received two doses of the Pfizer vaccine, significantly reducing her risk of contracting and becoming severely ill from COVID-19. The district court was not required to address the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and did not abuse its discretion by declining to do so. View "United States v. Traylor" on Justia Law

In 2009, Augustin asked Jordan to “find somebody” who sold cocaine. “Hoss,” subsequently sold Augustin six ounces of cocaine for $5,100. The deal went bad and Augustin kidnapped Jordan at gunpoint. Augustin’s associate released Jordan. Augustin was arrested. From prison, Augustin tried to arrange for a hitman to kill Jordan. The district court ultimately sentenced Augustin to a 380-month term for seven counts of conviction plus a consecutive 120-month term under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) for using a firearm during a crime of violence. After an unsuccessful appeal, Augustin unsuccessfully moved to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255.Later, Augustin filed a second or successive section 2255 motion, arguing that his section 924(c) conviction was unlawful under the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Davis” decision. The district court agreed. Rather than resentencing Augustin, the court corrected his sentence by vacating the section 924(c) conviction and its consecutive 120-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Augustin’s section 924(c) sentence played no role in the district court’s calculation of his other sentences. View "United States v. Augustin" on Justia Law

After serving several stints in prison, Latimer moved into his girlfriend’s Akron home. When Ohio parole officers knocked on the door, Latimer, apparently freshly awakened greeted the officers and allowed them to enter. The officers noticed a 9-millimeter pistol on a loveseat, just steps away. The officers detained Latimer and requested assistance to search the entire home. In Latimer’s bedroom, officers discovered large sums of cash, including a six-inch stack of dollar bills. Officers found three cell phones, dialed Latimer’s known phone number, causing one of the phones to ring. The phone contained text messages referencing Latimer’s “strap,” an indication that Latimer owned and was using a firearm. Information extracted from the phones suggested that all three belonged to Latimer and revealed that Latimer was selling powder cocaine out of the home. In an adjacent bedroom, officers found two additional firearms. In the kitchen, officers discovered numerous baggies of cocaine and a digital scale, a picture of which was saved on one of the seized phones, and more cash.Latimer was convicted under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), and for being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The district court sentenced Latimer to 175 months plus 24 months’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively, for supervised-release violations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the government failed to show that Latimer possessed the contraband found at his residence. View "United States v. Latimer" on Justia Law

In 1989, Middlebrooks of felony murder and aggravated kidnapping and sentenced to death. His conviction and death sentence were upheld on direct and collateral review. When Middlebrooks was sentenced to death, electrocution was Tennessee’s only method of execution. In 2000, Tennessee adopted lethal injection as the default method of execution. Under current law, electrocution is an option for execution only if an inmate sentenced to death before 1999 chooses execution by electrocution; lethal injection is declared unconstitutional; or the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) certifies that a necessary lethal-injection ingredient is unavailable. Middlebrooks will not choose execution by electrocution. In 2018, TDOC adopted a three-drug protocol of midazolam, vecuronium bromide, and potassium chloride as an alternative to pentobarbital.Middlebrooks and other death row challenged the constitutionality of the three-drug protocol. Tennessee then eliminated the pentobarbital protocol The state court dismissed their complaint. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving that pentobarbital was available as an alternative means of execution, although other states used pentobarbital in executions.The district court dismissed Middlebrooks’ 42 U.S.C. suit, citing res judicata. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. Middlebrooks' facial challenge plausibly alleged new facts that allow a reasonable inference that pentobarbital is available to Tennessee for use in executions. Middlebrooks’s as-applied claim does not rest on any newly developed individual condition that would render impermissible the application of res judicata principles. View "Middlebrooks v. Parker" on Justia Law

Lakeside, a Michigan corporation, fabricates stone countertops in Michigan. Cambria a Minnesota LLC, is a nationwide manufacturer of countertop products. Lakeside buys “solid surface products” from manufacturers like Cambria. In 2011, the two companies executed a Business Partner Agreement (BPA) including a Credit Agreement, a Security Agreement, Order Terms and Conditions, Lifetime Limited Warranty, and a Business Operating Requirements Manual Acknowledgment Form. The BPA’s choice-of-law provision and forum-selection clause, in a single paragraph, state: This agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Minnesota. Any proceeding involving this Agreement and/or any claims or disputes relating to the agreements and transactions between the parties shall be in the ... State of Minnesota. Pursuant to the BPA, Lakeside opened a fabrication facility in 2017. Discussions about Lakeside becoming Cambria’s sole Michigan fabricator led to Lakeside terminating the relationship.Lakeside filed suit in the Western District of Michigan, alleging breach of contract, violations of the Michigan Franchise Investment Law (MFIL), UCC violations, and promissory estoppel. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit, finding the forum-selection clause unenforceable. MFIL’s prohibition on forum-selection clauses is a strong Michigan public policy and enforcing the forum-selection clause here would clearly contravene that policy. The MFIL claim is not Lakeside’s only claim, and the choice-of-law provision may be applied, as appropriate, to claims within its scope. View "Lakeside Surfaces, Inc. v. Cambria Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Owsley. a nurse for Care Connection, a company providing home healthcare to Medicare patients, alleged that she observed, firsthand, documents showing that her employer had used fraudulent data from Fazzi to submit inflated claims for payment to the federal and Indiana state governments. She sued both companies under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1)(A), (B), (C), (G), and an Indiana statute.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Owsley’s complaint provided few details that would allow the defendants to identify any specific claims—of the hundreds or likely thousands they presumably submitted—that she thinks were fraudulent, and did not meet the requirements of Civil Rule 9(b). While Owsley’s allegations describe, in detail, a fraudulent scheme: Fazzi fraudulently upcoded patient data, which Care then used to submit inflated requests for anticipated Medicare payments, that information does not amount to an allegation of “particular identified claims” submitted pursuant to the fraudulent scheme. View "Owsley v. Fazzi Associates., Inc." on Justia Law

ZF appealed an order granting limited discovery to Luxshare under 28 U.S.C. 1782. Luxshare plans to use the discovery in the parties’ international arbitration. ZF sought a stay pending appeal, citing the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Servotronics (2021), and its own pending motion before the Supreme Court to grant an immediate appeal on the same issues raised in Servotronics.The Sixth Circuit first held that there was an appealable order; the district court’s decision whether to order discovery conclusively resolves the subject matter of the underlying proceeding. Orders under section 1782, including on motions to quash subpoenas, are final, appealable orders under 28 U.S.C. 1291. The court then denied a stay after considering the likelihood of success on the merits, the likelihood of irreparable injury absent a stay, whether issuance of the stay would substantially injure other interested parties, and where the public interest lies. The Supreme Court has since dismissed Servotronics and ZF failed to show that the minimal and nonconfidential discovery would constitute irreparable harm. View "Luxshare, Ltd. v. ZF Automotive US, Inc." on Justia Law

Canton’s 2006 Tree Ordinance prohibits the unpermitted removal, damage, or destruction of trees of specified sizes, with exceptions for agricultural operations, commercial nurseries, tree farms, and occupied lots smaller than two acres. If Canton issues a permit, the owner must replace removed trees on its own or someone else’s property or pay into Canton’s tree fund. For every landmark tree removed, an owner must replant three trees or pay $450. For every non-landmark tree removed as part of larger-scale tree removal, an owner must replant one tree or pay $300.In 2016, Canton approved the division of F.P.'s undeveloped property, noting the permitting requirement. The parcels were bisected by a county drainage ditch that was clogged with fallen trees and debris. The county refused to clear the ditch. F.P. contracted for the removal of the trees and debris and clearing other trees without a permit. Canton determined that F.P. had removed 14 landmark trees and 145 non-landmark trees. F.P. was required to either replant 187 trees or pay $47,898. F.P. filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for F.P. on its as-applied Fifth Amendment claim; although the ordinance, as applied to F.P., was not unconstitutional as a per se physical taking, it was unconstitutional as a regulatory taking and as an unconstitutional condition. Canton has not made the necessary individualized determination; the ordinance fails the “rough proportionality” required by Supreme Court precedent. View "F.P. Development, LLC. v. Charter Township of Canton" on Justia Law

A Xenia Police dispatcher contacted officer Reed about a double-parked vehicle with the person in the backseat allegedly “shooting up.” Reed observed a vehicle straddling the line between a standard parking spot and a handicap-only space; it was not displaying a handicap placard or license plate and was illegally parked. Prigmore opened the rear passenger door of the vehicle. Reed saw what appeared to be a handgun in the pocket of the door; he activated his body camera, unholstered his firearm, and secured the gun. With Prigmore out of the vehicle, Reed observed another firearm (a BB gun) on the seat where Prigmore had been sitting.Days later, federal agents arrested Prigmore for drug trafficking. The agents did not interview or Mirandize Prigmore immediately because he appeared to be “under the influence.” When he arrived at booking, Prigmore appeared coherent and stated—unprompted—“that gun was mine.” A warranted search of Prigmore’s residence uncovered a box of ammunition. Charged with possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), Prigmore had a “volatile relationship” with his attorneys, resulting in two competency hearings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction and 120-month sentence, rejecting arguments that the district court erred in finding him competent to stand trial, should have granted his motions to suppress, and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Prigmore" on Justia Law