Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Before 2013, the Michigan Department of Corrections provided kosher meals with meat and dairy to Jewish prisoners and allowed charitable Jewish organizations to bring in traditional religious foods for Jewish holidays. In 2013, MDOC implemented a universal vegan meal for all prisoners who qualify for a religious diet and stopped allowing Jewish organizations to send food. Prisoners claiming that their religious convictions require them to eat a meal with kosher meat and one with dairy on the Jewish Sabbath and four Jewish holidays brought a class action on behalf of all Jewish MDOC prisoners under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1(a), arguing that the policy substantially burdens their sincere religious beliefs.The Sixth Circuit affirmed a judgment in the prisoners’ favor. Because MDOC’s policy completely bars the asserted practice here—eating meat and dairy at mealtime—the prisoners’ failure to buy meat and dairy products at the commissary does not undermine the sincerity of their belief. Even if the prisoners spent every penny on beef sticks and dry milk, prison policy would still bar their religious exercise of eating those items as part of their meals. There was evidence suggesting that these prisoners do in fact sincerely believe that cheesecake is required on Shavuot. View "Ackerman v. Washington" on Justia Law

In 2009, Lemons pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment, based on the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which requires the imposition of a 180-month mandatory minimum sentence if the defendant has “at least three previous convictions for certain ‘violent’ or drug-related felonies.” The district court concluded that Lemons' three Tennessee convictions for aggravated burglary qualified as ACCA predicate offenses. The Sixth Circuit affirmed and later ordered the reinstatement of that sentence after the district court granted Lemons 28 U.S.C. 2255 relief.After serving approximately seven years of his sentence, Lemons sought a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), citing the risk presented by COVID-19 given his medical condition (hypothyroidism), his lengthy sentence, and his progress towards rehabilitation. The district court denied the motion, finding that Lemons did not present extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a sentence reduction, and declining to consider 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)’s factors. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting Lemons’ access to the COVID-19 vaccine. Rehabilitation alone is not a basis for relief and Lemons’ mandatory minimum sentence is not a post-sentencing factual development that can serve as an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce a sentence. View "United States v. Lemons" on Justia Law

McKeon has sold “MACK’S” earplugs to retail consumers since the 1960s. In the 1980s, Honeywell's predecessor began marketing and selling MAX-brand earplugs to distributors. The brand names are phonetically identical. In 1995, McKeon sued. The parties entered a settlement agreement that the district court approved by consent decree. To prevent customer confusion, Honeywell agreed not to sell its MAX-brand earplugs into the “Retail Market” but could continue to sell its earplugs in “the Industrial Safety Market and elsewhere." The agreement and the consent decree never contemplated the internet. In 2017, McKeon complained about sales of MAX-brand earplugs on Amazon and other retail websites.The district court ruled in favor of McKeon. The Sixth Circuit affirmed and remanded. Laches is available to Honeywell as an affirmative defense but does not apply to these facts. Parties subject to consent decrees cannot scale their prohibited conduct over time, using minor undetected violations to justify later larger infringements. Honeywell did not establish that McKeon should have discovered the breaching conduct before Honeywell drastically increased online sales. McKeon’s interpretation of the consent decree is the better reading. Concluding that Amazon is a “retail establishment” makes sense given the parties’ intent. View "McKeon Products, Inc. v. Howard S. Leight & Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

Marc was arrested and taken to the Madison County Detention Center (MCDC). Marc’s wife, Dawn, told the police that her husband had lung cancer and needed immediate medical attention. Marc’s medical records also stated that he had a blood clot in his leg. Dawn alleges that medical staff removed his pain medication patch, placed him on “inappropriate” psychoactive medications, and failed to provide him with his prescriptions. The medical contractor, Correct Care, refused to honor Marc’s scheduled chemotherapy appointments. Marc was transferred to Kentucky State Reformatory (KSR). He arrived with an elevated heart rate, difficulty breathing, and swelling in his leg. Staff withheld his prescribed medication, breathing treatments, and chemotherapy. Marc died less than a month after his arrest. His family was informed two days later. The autopsy revealed fluid accumulated in his lungs. Medical staff would have discovered this fluid if they had administered his prescribed breathing treatments.Dawn’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 Eighth Amendment complaint alleged supervisory liability against Erwin, Acting Commissioner of the Kentucky Department of Corrections, claiming that Erwin “accepted” Marc’s transfer into KSR and “would have been made aware of [Marc’s] medical conditions” and had promulgated and maintained some of KSR’s allegedly unconstitutional policies. Dawn alleged that Erwin was “specifically aware that Correct Care” had a pattern of failing to provide inmates with adequate health care. The Sixth Circuit ordered the dismissal of the claims against Erwin. Dawn's complaint did not allege any “active unconstitutional behavior” by Erwin nor explain how his behavior proximately caused Marc’s injuries; Erwin is entitled to qualified immunity. View "Crawford v. Tilley" on Justia Law

Rafael, a citizen of Guatemala, applied for admission to the U.S. DHS served her with a Notice to Appear at a place and time “to be determined.” Months later, she received a Notice of Hearing, stating the time, date, and location for that hearing. Rafael appeared and applied for asylum and withholding of removal on the basis that, if returned to Guatemala, she would suffer violence because she is a woman. An IJ found Rafael credible, considered the evidence, including the 2018 State Department Report, then found that Rafael could not show that the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to protect women from persecution by private individuals. The IJ found that the Guatemalan government had taken measures to address the problem and that Rafael had not established a cognizable protected group, proven a nexus to a protected ground, or shown either that she had suffered past persecution or held an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution.Before the BIA, Rafael claimed that the removal proceedings were invalid for lack of jurisdiction because the initial Notice did not state the time and place. The BIA dismissed her appeal. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. Rafael received the necessary notice and the IJ had jurisdiction; for purposes of her due process claim, she was not prejudiced by the omission of the place and time from the original notice. View "Rafael v. Garland" on Justia Law

Western Michigan University, a public university, requires student-athletes to be vaccinated against COVID-19 but considers individual requests for medical and religious exemptions on a discretionary basis. Sixteen student-athletes applied for religious exemptions. The University ignored or denied their requests and barred them from participating in any team activities. The student-athletes sued, alleging that University officials violated their free exercise rights.The district court preliminarily enjoined the officials from enforcing the vaccine mandate against the plaintiffs. The Sixth Circuit declined to stay the injunction and proceedings in the district court pending appeal. The court called the issue “a close call” but concluded the free exercise challenge will likely succeed on appeal. The University’s vaccine mandate does not coerce a non-athlete to get vaccinated against her faith because she, as a non-athlete, cannot play intercollegiate sports either way. The mandate does penalize a student otherwise qualified for intercollegiate sports by withholding the benefit of playing on the team should she refuse to violate her sincerely held religious beliefs. The court applied strict scrutiny and reasoned that the University did not establish a compelling interest in denying an exception to the plaintiffs or that its conduct was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. View "Dahl v. Board of Trustees of Western Michigan University" on Justia Law

The 1954 Atomic Energy Act allowed private construction, ownership, and operation of commercial nuclear power reactors for energy production. The 1957 Price-Anderson Act created a system of private insurance, government indemnification, and limited liability for federal licensees, 42 U.S.C. 2012(i). In 1988, in response to the Three Mile Island accident, federal district courts were given original and removal jurisdiction over both “extraordinary nuclear occurrences” and any public liability action arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident; any suit asserting public liability was deemed to arise under 42 U.S.C. 2210, with the substantive rules for decision derived from state law, unless inconsistent with section 2210.The Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant enriched uranium for the nuclear weapons program and later to fuel commercial nuclear reactors. Plaintiffs lived near the plant, and claim that the plant was portrayed as safe while it discharged radioactive material that caused (and continues to cause) them harm.Plaintiffs, seeking to represent a class, filed suit in state court asserting claims under Ohio law. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the removal of the case on the grounds that the complaint, although it did not assert a federal claim, nonetheless raised a federal question under the Price-Anderson Act, and affirmed the subsequent dismissal. The Act preempted plaintiffs’ state law claims and the plaintiffs did not assert a claim under the Act but asserted that their “claims do not fall within the scope of the Price-Anderson Act.” View "Matthews v. Centrus Energy Corp." on Justia Law

Nicolescu, Miclaus, and coconspirators posted fake eBay car auctions. Operating from Romania, they concealed their IP addresses, and employed US-based “money mules,” to collect payments from unsuspecting buyers, taking in $3.5-$4.5 million. In 2014, a virus created by Nicolescu was embedded in the eBay auctions and in spam emails to collect more than 70,000 account credentials, including 25,000 stolen credit-card numbers. Their network of virus-infected computers “mined” for cryptocurrency, reaping $10,000–$40,000 per month, 2014-2016. The FBI and Romanian police executed a search warrant on members’ residences and retrieved electronic devices. Nicolescu and Miclaus were convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 12 counts of wire fraud, conspiracy to commit computer fraud, conspiracy to traffic in counterfeit service marks, five counts of aggravated identity theft, and conspiracy to commit money laundering.The district court added 18 levels to their Guidelines calculation (U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1)(J)) for causing a loss of $3.5-$9.5 million, two levels (2B1.1(b)(4)) for being in the business of receiving and selling stolen property, two levels (2B1.1(b)(11)(B)(i)) for trafficking unauthorized access devices, four levels (2B1.1(b)(19)(A)(ii)) for being convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(5)(A), and four levels (3B1.1(a)) for being an organizer or leader. They were sentenced to 216 and 240 months’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to jury instructions, but vacated the sentences. The court upheld the loss calculation and leadership enhancement. The court erred in applying the stolen property enhancement and in applying a 2B1.1(b)(19)(A)(ii) enhancement because the men were convicted of conspiracy, not a substantive section 1030(a)(5)(A) offense. View "United States v. Miclaus" on Justia Law

Hernandez, a citizen of Guatemala, has two minor children. Her daughter, A.L. is also a citizen of Guatemala. Her son, born in 2018, is a U.S. citizen. In 2016, Hernandez left Guatemala with her daughter and entered the U.S. without authorization. In removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), Hernandez sought asylum and withholding of removal, alleging that she was a member of the indigenous K’iche’, whom the Guatemalan government does not help. She alleged that she had suffered and feared future “persecution in the form of severe economic disadvantage or the deprivation of liberty, food, housing, employment and other essentials of life” on account of her status as an indigenous K’iche’ woman.Although the IJ found Hernandez credible, he denied her claims for relief and ordered her removed. The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. Substantial evidence supports a conclusion that Hernandez had not shown “persecution” because any economic deprivation she suffered or feared was not, and would not be, “deliberately imposed by the Guatemalan government or non-government actors the government is unable or unwilling to control.” View "Hernandez-Hernandez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g) for unlawfully possessing a firearm—one for being a convicted felon, the other for being a domestic violence misdemeanant. In this case, defendant's convictions stemmed from shooting his ex-girlfriend after an argument.The Sixth Circuit remanded with instructions to vacate defendant's sentence on one of the section 922(g) counts and to merge the two counts of conviction into one. The court concluded that this statute does not permit a court to, as the district court did here, impose multiple punishments on a defendant who commits one act of possession yet is both a felon and a domestic-violence misdemeanant. Furthermore, the district court plainly erred in doing so. The court otherwise affirmed the district court's judgment in all other respects, concluding that defendant's sentence was procedurally reasonable where the district court did not clearly err in applying the USSG 2A2.1(a)(2) cross-reference for attempted second-degree murder in calculating defendant's offense level. View "United States v. Grant" on Justia Law