Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Adrian Galvez-Bravo, a Mexican national, entered the United States in 1994 and has lived in the Memphis area since then, except for a brief return to Mexico to marry his wife. He has three children, two of whom are U.S. citizens. In 2013, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him, alleging he was a noncitizen present in the U.S. without being admitted or paroled. Galvez-Bravo conceded the charge and sought cancellation of removal under § 240A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, arguing that his removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his U.S. citizen children.An Immigration Judge (IJ) disagreed with Galvez-Bravo's assessment of hardship, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ's decision, ordering his removal to Mexico. Galvez-Bravo then filed a motion to reopen the removal proceedings, citing new evidence, including his daughter's recent dyslexia diagnosis and the potential impact on his children's education and well-being if he were removed. The BIA denied the motion, concluding that the new evidence did not meet the hardship standard required for cancellation of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court confirmed its jurisdiction to review the legal challenges presented by Galvez-Bravo, noting that his arguments focused on whether the BIA engaged in reasoned decision-making. The court found that the BIA had articulated a rational explanation for its decision, considering the new evidence but determining that the hardship did not exceed what would normally be expected upon the removal of a close family member. The court also rejected Galvez-Bravo's argument that the BIA's decision was inconsistent with its prior decisions, noting that the unpublished decisions he cited did not establish a pattern of conflicting outcomes.The Sixth Circuit held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Galvez-Bravo's motion to reopen and denied his petition for review. View "Galvez-Bravo v. Garland" on Justia Law

Tamir Abdullah, a federal prisoner convicted of crack-cocaine offenses, sought to reduce his life sentence under Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. This act made the Fair Sentencing Act's provisions retroactive, aiming to reduce sentencing disparities between crack and powder cocaine offenses. Abdullah argued that his conviction for conspiring to distribute between 500 grams and 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine qualified as a "covered offense" under the First Step Act, making him eligible for a sentence reduction.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio initially failed to address the merits of Abdullah's motion. Instead, it construed the motion as one for "compassionate release" due to the COVID-19 pandemic and denied it, citing the low number of COVID-19 cases in Abdullah's prison. Abdullah appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court had erred in its interpretation of Abdullah's motion. However, the appellate court affirmed the denial of the motion based on intervening case law. The court held that Abdullah was not entitled to a sentence reduction under the Fair Sentencing and First Step Acts because the changes in drug quantity thresholds did not affect his mandatory life sentence. Specifically, the Fair Sentencing Act increased the threshold for a mandatory life sentence from 50 grams to 280 grams of crack cocaine, but Abdullah's conviction involved quantities well above this new threshold.Therefore, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Abdullah's motion for a sentence reduction, concluding that the district court had no discretion to reduce his sentence under the applicable laws. View "United States v. Abdullah" on Justia Law

The defendant, Tarrence Parham, pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. During sentencing, the district court increased his base offense level, concluding that his prior Tennessee conviction for attempted second-degree murder constituted a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. Parham appealed this conclusion and the district court’s refusal to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds.The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee denied Parham’s motion to dismiss the indictment, which argued that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen. Parham then pleaded guilty to the single-count indictment. The Probation Office determined his base offense level was 22, considering his prior conviction for attempted second-degree murder as a crime of violence. Parham objected, but the district court overruled his objection and sentenced him to 108 months’ imprisonment, relying on an unpublished opinion from the Sixth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the elements of attempted second-degree murder in Tennessee categorically match the Guidelines’ definition of a crime of violence. The court also found that Parham’s Second Amendment challenge was foreclosed by binding precedent, specifically United States v. Williams, which upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) both facially and as applied to individuals with a history of dangerous behavior. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, including the calculation of Parham’s base offense level and the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. View "United States v. Parham" on Justia Law

Nicholas and Stacy Boerson, owners of New Heights Farm I and II in Michigan, faced a disappointing corn and soybean harvest in 2019. They submitted crop insurance claims to Great American Insurance Company, which were delayed due to an ongoing federal fraud investigation. The Boersons sued Great American, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture for breach of contract, bad faith adjustment, and violations of insurance laws.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed the Boersons' claims. It ruled that claims related to Great American's nonpayment were unripe due to the ongoing investigation, while claims alleging false measurements and statements by Great American were ripe but subject to arbitration. The court also dismissed claims against the federal defendants on sovereign immunity grounds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. It held that the claims related to nonpayment were unripe because the insurance policy barred payment until the investigation concluded. The court also found that the arbitration agreement in the insurance policy covered the ripe claims against Great American, requiring those disputes to be resolved through arbitration. Additionally, the court ruled that sovereign immunity barred the claims against the federal defendants, as there was no clear waiver of immunity for constructive denial claims under the Federal Crop Insurance Act. View "New Heights Farm I, LLC v. Great American Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Lamonte Jackson-Gibson celebrated his birthday with friends, including his girlfriend, Toriel Dixon, in Detroit’s Greektown neighborhood. While listening to street musicians, Sergeant Reginald Beasley and other officers asked the group to move along. Jackson-Gibson questioned the order, leading to a verbal exchange and some physical pushing. Sgt. Beasley tased Jackson-Gibson in the back while he was embracing Dixon, and both were arrested. They were charged with obstructing or resisting a police officer, and Jackson-Gibson was also charged with disturbing the peace. A jury acquitted them of all charges.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan reviewed the case. Sgt. Beasley moved for summary judgment on the excessive-force claims, arguing for qualified immunity, but did not move for summary judgment on the wrongful-arrest claims. The district court granted summary judgment on Dixon’s excessive-force claim but denied it for Jackson-Gibson’s excessive-force claim. Sgt. Beasley’s motion to reconsider was also denied, leading to this interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Sgt. Beasley’s challenge to the wrongful-arrest claims for lack of jurisdiction, as he did not seek qualified immunity for those claims in the lower court. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on Jackson-Gibson’s excessive-force claim. The court held that a reasonable jury could find that Sgt. Beasley’s use of a taser was objectively unreasonable, as Jackson-Gibson’s alleged crimes were not severe, he did not pose an immediate threat, and he was not actively resisting arrest. The court also held that the right to be free from excessive force when not actively resisting was clearly established by 2019. View "Jackson-Gibson v. Beasley" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Laurie DeVore, worked at the University of Kentucky from 1999 to 2022. She retired rather than comply with the University's COVID-19 test-or-vaccinate policy, which she claimed conflicted with her religious beliefs. DeVore filed a lawsuit alleging that the University violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by failing to accommodate her religious beliefs. The University had denied her requests for a hybrid work schedule and religious exemptions from the testing policy, which required unvaccinated employees to undergo weekly COVID-19 testing.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky granted summary judgment in favor of the University. The court found that DeVore did not establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination because she failed to demonstrate that the University's policy conflicted with her sincerely held religious beliefs. DeVore appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court examined whether DeVore had a sincere religious belief that conflicted with the University's testing policy. DeVore's objections to the nasal PCR tests were initially based on invasiveness, manipulation, and coercion. However, the University offered alternative testing methods, such as oral swab and saliva tests, which DeVore also rejected without providing evidence of a religious conflict with these alternatives.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that DeVore failed to establish a conflict between her religious beliefs and the University's testing policy. The court noted that DeVore's objections were largely based on personal moral codes and secular concerns rather than religious principles. Consequently, DeVore's Title VII claim did not succeed. View "DeVore v. University of Kentucky Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

Following an accident, Jeremy Marchek sued his auto insurer, United Services Automobile Association (USAA), claiming that the company breached the terms of the policy it issued to him. Marchek argued that USAA wrongfully failed to compensate him for sales taxes and mandatory fees necessary to purchase a replacement vehicle after USAA declared his vehicle to be beyond repair. USAA paid Marchek the pre-accident value of his vehicle minus a deductible but did not include taxes and fees in the payment.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed Marchek’s complaint, ruling that USAA was not contractually obligated to compensate him for taxes and fees. The district court found that the insurance policy did not require USAA to cover these additional costs when calculating the actual cash value (ACV) of the vehicle.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the plain language of the insurance policy plausibly requires USAA to compensate Marchek for the sales taxes and mandatory fees necessary to purchase a replacement vehicle. The court found that the policy’s definition of ACV, which is “the amount that it would cost, at the time of loss, to buy a comparable vehicle,” does not unambiguously exclude taxes and fees. Therefore, the case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether USAA breached the contract by not including these costs in its payment to Marchek. View "Marchek v. United Services Automobile Association" on Justia Law

The defendant, Sylvester Gailes, has a history of domestic violence, including multiple incidents where he physically assaulted his partners. In 2012, he struck his girlfriend in the face, and in 2014, he dragged her by her hair and kicked her in the head. In 2018, he assaulted another ex-girlfriend, choking her and threatening her with a handgun. Gailes was convicted of domestic-violence misdemeanors for each of these incidents. Later, during a traffic accident investigation, police found Gailes in possession of two loaded pistols, leading to his indictment for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits individuals convicted of domestic-violence misdemeanors from possessing firearms.The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee denied Gailes's motion to dismiss the indictment, in which he argued that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) is unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen. Gailes then pleaded guilty to the charges and was sentenced to 50 months in prison. He appealed the district court's decision, challenging the constitutionality of the statute under the Second Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court applied the two-step framework from Bruen, first determining that the Second Amendment's plain text covers Gailes's conduct. The court then examined whether the statute is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court found that historical analogues, such as surety laws and "going armed" laws, support the constitutionality of disarming individuals who pose a clear threat of physical violence. Consequently, the court held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) is facially constitutional and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Gailes" on Justia Law

Ohio enacted a law to prevent foreign nationals from influencing its elections by banning their political contributions and expenditures. The law defines "foreign nationals" to include lawful permanent residents, unlike the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), which exempts them. Plaintiffs, including advocacy organizations and lawful permanent residents, challenged the law on First Amendment grounds, arguing it violated their rights. The district court agreed, finding the law unconstitutional as applied to lawful permanent residents and issued a preliminary injunction preventing Ohio from enforcing the law against all foreign nationals.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted the preliminary injunction, reasoning that the law was overbroad and violated the First Amendment rights of lawful permanent residents. The court allowed Ohio to enforce the law against foreign governments and political parties but severed the definition of "foreign national" to exclude lawful permanent residents. Ohio appealed the decision and requested an emergency stay of the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and granted Ohio's motion for a stay. The court found that Ohio was likely to succeed on the merits, concluding that the law was not overbroad and did not violate the First Amendment rights of lawful permanent residents. The court held that Ohio has a compelling interest in preventing foreign influence in its elections, which includes lawful permanent residents. The court also determined that the law was narrowly tailored to serve this interest and was neither overinclusive nor underinclusive. The stay allows Ohio to enforce the law while the appeal is considered. View "OPAWL - Building AAPI Feminist Leadership v. Yost" on Justia Law

Christopher Goins challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits firearm possession by individuals convicted of crimes punishable by imprisonment for over a year. Goins, with multiple felony convictions, argued that the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle and Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen rendered this statute unconstitutional as applied to him. In December 2021, Goins had an associate purchase a firearm for him, which he then took possession of, despite being on probation with a condition prohibiting firearm possession.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky denied Goins's motion to dismiss the indictment, holding that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional as applied to him. Goins pled guilty but reserved the right to appeal the district court's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and upheld the district court's decision. The court found that Goins's probation condition, his relatively short probation sentence for a dangerous crime, and his repeated dangerous conduct justified his disarmament under the Second Amendment. The court emphasized that historical traditions support the temporary disarmament of individuals who have engaged in dangerous conduct, such as Goins. Therefore, the court held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Goins and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Goins" on Justia Law