Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of petitioner's second Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court granted petitioner a certificate of appealability (COA) on five of his requested grounds for relief, and the court granted an expansion of the COA to include two additional claims.The court concluded that petitioner is entitled to relief on his claim that his constitutional rights under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), were violated. In this case, the trial court never conducted a Faretta-complaint hearing and, on both May 14, 1998 and April 23, 1999, petitioner properly invoked his constitutional right to self-representation and is therefore entitled to relief. The court explained that none of the Ohio Supreme Court's reasons for holding that petitioner's April 23, 1999 statement did not properly invoke his constitutional right to conduct his own defense at trial are entitled to Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act deference. Furthermore, when viewed in context, "Is there any possibility I could represent myself?" was a clear and unequivocal reinvocation of petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to represent himself. Therefore, in addition to granting the petition based on the trial court's denial of his May 14, 1998 Waiver of Counsel, petitioner's conviction also cannot stand due to the trial court's denial of his April 23, 1999 invocation of his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. The panel conditionally granted the petition for a writ of habeas relief. View "Cassano v. Shoop" on Justia Law

In 2001, Flores-Perez was detained on the belief that he was in the country illegally. Flores-Perez produced two forms of state-issued identification, each containing his address. Officials served Flores-Perez with a Notice to Appear (NTA), alleging that Flores-Perez was a citizen of Mexico who had illegally entered the U.S. Immigration officials wrote an incorrect address—Apartment 132—on the NTA, which Flores-Perez nonetheless signed. No interpreter assisted with the initial processing. As Flores-Perez left, he was given several relevant documents, including a copy of the NTA he had signed, and told, in Spanish, that he would receive another document in the mail. The immigration court sent a Notice of Hearing to the incorrect address; it was returned because “no such number” existed. When Flores-Perez did not attend the hearing, the IJ proceeded in absentia and ordered Flores-Perez removed. The removal order was also returned. In 2009, immigration officials arrested Flores-Perez and deported him days later. Flores-Perez unlawfully returned to the U.S. that year.In 2018, he was arrested while attempting to break into an apartment and charged with reentry after deportation, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). Flores-Perez argued that his indictment should be dismissed because he did not receive adequate notice of his 2003 removal hearing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of his claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Flores-Perez failed to challenge his removal order until filing this collateral challenge, nearly 20 years later, and after he was deported due. View "United States v. Flores-Perez" on Justia Law

Leggett Elementary School principal Vincente called a child’s mother to pick him up. The mother stated that her “boyfriend who is a policeman” (Hendon) would come. Because of another emergency situation, police were at the school. Vincente saw Hendon speaking with Akron officers. Hendon wore all black, with a vest and badge that said “officer,” and his name on his uniform. When Hendon entered the office, the secretaries assumed he was a police officer. Hendon and Vincente talked briefly about Hendon’s efforts to restart the Scared Straight Program.The next morning, Hendon reappeared, uninvited, dressed in what looked like SWAT gear. He and Vincente spoke again about the Scared Straight Program. Later, when a teacher had a problem student, (M.J.) Hendon took M.J. out of the classroom and threw M.J. against a wall, verbally abusing him, then returned M.J. to class, Later another education teacher summoned Hendon, who took two misbehaving students inside and forced them to perform exercises. There were additional incidents, during which school staff, believing Hendon to be a police officer, allowed him to discipline children. Interacting with parents, Hendon stated that he was an officer with the Scared Straight program.Eventually, the Akron police arrested Hendon. Parents and children sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, and Title VI. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, rejecting “state-created danger” claims. The actual harm that M.J. experienced because of Vincente’s affirmative action is not the type that Vincente could have inferred from known facts. The plaintiffs had no evidence of discrimination. View "M.J. v. Akron City School District Board of Education" on Justia Law

In 1994, Ahmed and Wahasi allegedly were married. Ahmed lives in the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident. Wahasi and their sons, all Yemeni citizens, live in Malaysia. In 2008, Ahmed filed an I-130 petition on behalf of his wife and sons, which was approved. Ahmed’s wife and children visited the U.S. consulate in Yemen to apply for visas. Consular officials grew suspicious that they were not who they said they were, requested additional proof of identification, and placed the applications into “administrative processing.” In 2017, Presidential Proclamation 9645 made it more difficult for Yemeni nationals to receive visas to enter the U.S. Ahmed and his family joined a lawsuit that challenged the validity of the Proclamation and the way in which the government handled their visas. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld Proclamation 9645. The U.S. consulate denied the family’s visa applications due to lingering concerns about their identities and sent Ahmed’s I-130 petition to USCIS for “review and possible revocation.”Ahmed and his family moved to amend their complaint to challenge the visa denials and the potential revocation of Ahmed’s I-130 petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, stating it has no authority to second guess the visa decisions of the American consulate. Noncitizens living abroad do not have any American constitutional rights. American residents, whether citizens or legal residents, do not have a constitutional right to require the government to admit non-citizen family members. View "Baaghil v. Miller" on Justia Law

Pruitt pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). His PSR recommended a six-level enhancement, U.S.S.G. 3A1.2(c)(1), for “assault[ing]” a police officer “in a manner creating a substantial risk of serious bodily injury.” Officer Morton testified that he stopped the car in which Pruitt was a passenger. Pruitt, with a firearm visible in his hand, began to run. When Morton caught him, Pruitt attempted to grab Morton’s service weapon while holding his own firearm, then broke free and ran, turning back toward Morton. Morton, believing that Pruitt was about to shoot, fired his weapon, striking Pruitt in the hand. Although Morton's body-camera footage shows that Pruitt was holding his gun by the barrel, Morton testified that he believed Pruitt was holding the gun “the way you traditionally hold the gun.” It is not clear from the video if Pruitt ever pointed his firearm at Morton.The court applied the enhancement and imposed a sentence of 92 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Bodily injury is not a prerequisite to the application of the enhancement but the decision does not make clear why the court found the enhancement applied. Although the district court referred to “assaultive behavior,” it is not clear what conduct the court determined constituted the assault element of the enhancement and why the court found that conduct met the definition of assault. View "United States v. Pruitt" on Justia Law

The Benalcazars purchased 43 acres in Genoa Township in 2001. The property sits at the northern end of the Township’s more developed areas and abuts the Hoover Reservoir. The parcel was zoned as Rural Residential; development would have required separate septic systems, clear-cutting, and multiple driveways. In 2018, the Benalcazars obtained rezoning of the property to a Planned Residential District, which permits higher density development. Township residents approved a referendum that prevented the amendment from taking effect, O.R.C. 519.12(H).The Benalcazars sued. In a settlement, the Township agreed to change the zoning designation; the Benalcazars agreed to reduce the proposed development from 64 homes to 56 homes, to provide more open space, and to increase the width of some lots. O.R.C. 505.07 provides “Notwithstanding . . . any vote of the electors on a petition for zoning referendum … a township may settle any court action by a consent decree or court-approved settlement agreement which may include an agreement to rezone.” The district court permitted objectors to intervene, dismissed the Benalcazars’ due process claims, but ruled that the Benalcazars stated a plausible equal protection claim, and approved the consent decree. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Benalcazars’ due process and equal protection claims are not “frivolous” but “arguable.” The district court had subject-matter jurisdiction and had the authority to approve a settlement. No other merits inquiry was required. View "Benalcazar v. Genoa Township" on Justia Law

On three separate occasions, Smith filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition shortly before a scheduled foreclosure sale of his home, thereby preventing the sale, then moved for the dismissal of his bankruptcy case shortly afterward. The bankruptcy court dismissed Smith’s cases, notwithstanding his bad faith, because 11 U.S.C. 1307(b) plainly commanded the court to dismiss them. The bankruptcy court apparently did not exercise its power to sanction Smith for filing the petitions in patent bad faith, nor did the lender promptly seek relief from the stay on the ground that “the filing of the petition was part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors” 11 U.S.C. 362(d)(4)(B). A few months after the third filing, however, the bankruptcy court invoked its putative equitable powers and reinstated Smith’s most recent bankruptcy case, and lifted the automatic stay for a period of two years.The Sixth Circuit reversed. A court may exercise its equitable powers only in furtherance of the Bankruptcy Code’s provisions, not in circumvention of them. Nothing in section 1307 renders dismissal discretionary in cases where the debtor filed the bankruptcy petition in bad faith. View "Smith v. U.S. Bank National Association" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs retired from the Louisville Metropolitan police department and received free health insurance, administered by Kentucky Retirement Systems. Kentucky initially paid all of their healthcare costs. After the officers turned 65, Medicare became the primary payer, leaving Kentucky to cover secondary expenses. Each officer came out of retirement, joining county agencies different from the ones they served before retiring. They became eligible for healthcare benefits in their new positions. Kentucky notified them that federal law “mandate[d]” that it “cannot offer coverage secondary to Medicare” for retirees “eligible to be on [their] employer’s group health plan” as “active employees.” Some of the officers then paid for insurance through their new employers; others kept their retirement insurance by quitting or going part-time. The officers sued.The district court granted summary judgment to the officers, ordered Kentucky to reinstate their retirement health insurance, and awarded the officers some of the monetary damages requested. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The officers have a cognizable breach-of-contract claim. Under Kentucky law, the Kentucky Retirement Systems formed an “inviolable contract” with the officers to provide free retirement health insurance and to refrain from reducing their benefits, then breached that contract. The Medicare Secondary Payer Act of 1980 did not bar Kentucky from providing Medicare-eligible police officers with state retirement insurance after they reentered the workforce and became eligible again for employer-based insurance coverage, 42 U.S.C. 1395y. View "River City Fraternal Order of Police v. Kentucky Retirement Systems" on Justia Law

Tobias-Chaves and her daughter traveled from Honduras and entered the U.S. in 2014, to escape from Tobias-Chaves’s abusive husband. DHS filed charges against them in Houston, where they were then living. That Immigration Court attempted to send Tobias-Chaves a Notice to Appear but because of a clerical error, she never received it. The court ordered the women removed in absentia. Two years later, Tobias-Chaves learned (and informed the courts) of the error. Her case was reopened in Houston. Tobias-Chaves applied for asylum. Her case was transferred to Memphis. There was then no immigration court in Louisville. An immigration court was created in Louisville in 2018, and the “Louisville docket” was transferred, including Tobias-Chaves’s case. There was no formal change of venue. Tobias-Chaves was not given an opportunity to dispute the change. The Louisville court held a hearing, at which her attorney argued that venue had never properly been transferred.The IJ denied Tobias-Chaves’s application for asylum and ordered her removed. The BIA affirmed, finding the “sua sponte change of venue” harmless error; Tobias-Chaves lived 75 miles from the Louisville location but more than 400 miles from the Memphis building. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Although the court violated procedural rules in transferring the proceeding, that violation was a procedural question relating to venue, not jurisdiction. In order to successfully challenge a procedural error such as an improper change of venue, a petitioner must show prejudice. Tobias-Chaves failed to do so. View "Tobias-Chaves v. Garland" on Justia Law

Officer Dickens submitted an affidavit, seeking a search warrant for 10318 Dove Avenue, a single-family Cleveland residence. Dickens averred that earlier that month a confidential informant disclosed to him that a dealer, Moore, was selling cocaine out of that residence. He described Moore’s race, height, weight, age, and date of birth and disclosed that Moore deployed an extensive electronic surveillance system. Moore had been charged with several past drug crimes, including one prior conviction for drug trafficking. Dickens also described a controlled drug buy between the informant and Moore that occurred earlier that month at the Dove residence, under surveillance. The state court issued the search warrant. Officers detained Moore and found two firearms, two kilograms of cocaine, 100 grams of cocaine base, and materials used to facilitate large-scale drug trafficking. An ATF officer arrived, advised Moore of his Miranda rights, and interviewed Moore.Moore was indicted on five federal counts involving conspiracy, possessing and intending to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, possessing firearms while a felon, and possessing firearms to further a drug trafficking crime. Moore unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the affidavit lacked indicia that the confidential informant was reliable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Collectively, the information provided demonstrated a fair probability that evidence of drug trafficking would be found at Dove. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law