Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Garcia, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. without inspection in 2000 and was placed in removal proceedings in 2011. Garcia sought Cancellation of Removal or voluntary departure in the alternative. In 2018, Garcia married a U.S. citizen, who filed an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative. An IJ denied Garcia’s request for a continuance pending adjudication of his I-130 petition, noting that even if USCIS approved his I-130 petition, Garcia would have to leave and be processed at the American consulate in Mexico because he had not been “admitted or paroled following inspection.” The IJ found Garcia ineligible for Cancellation of Removal but granted voluntary departure.While his BIA appeal was pending, USCIS approved Garcia's I-130 petition, which required Garcia, to travel to a U.S. consulate but by leaving the U.S., noncitizens who have been unlawfully present for more than one year become inadmissible for 10 years. The Attorney General may waive this bar for immigrant-spouses of U.S. citizens. USCIS could take over a year to process the waiver, during which a noncitizen remains abroad. USCIS amended its regulations in 2013 to permit applicants to apply for a provisional unlawful presence waiver before departing the U.S.; this workaround did not extend to noncitizens in removal proceedings, unless those proceedings are administratively closed. In 2018, then-Attorney General Sessions issued the “Castro-Tum” decision, holding that IJs and the BIA did not have general authority to grant administrative closure. The BIA, citing Castro-Tum, denied Garcia’s request for administrative closure and upheld the denial of Cancellation of Removal.The Sixth Circuit vacated. IJs and the BIA have the authority for administrative closure to permit noncitizens to seek provisional unlawful presence waivers. Administrative closure is “appropriate and necessary” for the disposition of Garcia’scase. View "Garcia-DeLeon v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 2013, Hack pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud, mortgage fraud, and wire fraud. The plea agreement contained an appeal waiver. In addition to terms of imprisonment and supervised release, the court ordered Hack to pay $803,420 in restitution to two mortgage companies, as required by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3664(f)(1)(A). The court set a payment schedule during Hack’s imprisonment and stated: Upon commencement of the term of supervised release, the probation officer shall review your financial circumstances and recommend a payment schedule on any outstanding balance... Within the first 60 days of release, the probation officer shall submit a recommendation to the court for a payment schedule, for ... final approval. The record does not reflect that the court ever set a post-release payment schedule or that the probation officer ever recommended one.During his period of supervised release, Hack moved to modify the restitution order, citing “a one-time opportunity” to obtain financing and proposing to pay the mortgage companies $100,000 and $28,000 in lump sums, attaching declarations from the companies stating that they preferred lump-sum payments over incremental payments. The district court denied the motion, concluding that it did “not have the authority under the MVRA to modify its final Restitution Order into two reduced lump-sum restitution payments.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that Hack’s plea agreement barred the appeal. View "United States v. Hack" on Justia Law

In 1994, Jarvis was convicted of four counts of armed bank robbery, conspiracy, and five counts of using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 2113, 371, 924(c). The court determined that his first 924(c) firearm conviction generated a statutory minimum sentence of five years and that his other four 924(c) convictions, repeat offenses, were each subject to a statutory minimum of 20 consecutive years and sentenced Jarvis to 85 years plus 11 years on his other convictions. In 2014, the Supreme Court clarified that for aiding-and-abetting liability under 924(c) a defendant must have “advance knowledge” that a firearm would be used. Jarvis successfully moved to have three 924(c) convictions vacated for insufficient evidence of advance knowledge. The district court resentenced Jarvis to five years for his first 924(c) conviction, 20 for his second, and 15 for his other convictions.The 2018 First Step Act amended 924(c), limiting the firearm convictions that count as repeat offenses. Were Jarvis sentenced today, his second 924(c) conviction would generate a statutory minimum of five years. Congress expressly chose not to apply this change to defendants sentenced before the Act's passage, Jarvis moved for a sentence reduction under the “compassionate release” statute, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), citing as “extraordinary and compelling reasons” the COVID-19 pandemic and the amendments, The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. The statute excludes non-retroactive First Step Act amendments from the category of extraordinary or compelling reasons, whether a defendant relies on the amendments alone or in combination with other factors. View "United States v. Jarvis" on Justia Law

The Labor Management Relations Act forbids employers from directly giving money to unions, 29 U.S.C. 186(a); an exception allows an employer and a union to operate a trust fund for the benefit of employees. Section 186(c)(5)(B) requires the trust agreement to provide that an arbitrator will resolve any “deadlock on the administration of such fund.” Several construction companies and one union established a trust fund to subsidize employee vacations. Six trustees oversaw the fund, which is a tax-exempt entity under ERISA 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(9). A disagreement arose over whether the trust needed to amend a tax return. Three trustees, those selected by the companies, filed suit, seeking authority to amend the tax return. The three union-appointed trustees intervened, arguing that the dispute belongs in arbitration.The court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. While ERISA plan participants or beneficiaries may sue for a breach of statutory fiduciary duty in federal court without exhausting internal remedial procedures, this complaint did not allege a breach of fiduciary duties but rather alleges that the employer trustees’ own fiduciary duties compelled them to file the action to maintain the trust’s compliance with tax laws. These claims were “not directly adversarial to the [union trustees] or to the Fund.” View "Baker v. Iron Workers Local 25" on Justia Law

Wyatt began working as a Nissan project manager in 2013. For two years she received positive annual performance reviews. During those years, Wyatt twice had medical leave. Nissan restored Wyatt to her position and granted nearly all the work accommodations recommended by Wyatt’s doctor. In 2015, Wyatt began working on a project headed by Mullen who sexually harassed and assaulted her. Wyatt’s complaints led to Mullen leaving the company. At the same time, Wyatt took medical leave for back surgery. Upon her return, she and her doctors requested workplace accommodations, similar to those she had previously requested. Nissan denied her request for a 40-hour workweek. Wyatt claims that managers harassed her about her requests and gave Wyatt her first “below expectations” annual evaluation, Wyatt filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Her managers later issued Wyatt a Performance Improvement Plan. Wyatt refused to sign the PIP, believing that it was retaliatory. In February 2017, Wyatt took medical leave and continues to be on leave.Wyatt filed suit, alleging hostile work environment, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; failure-to-accommodate, Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101l and retaliation claims under Title VII, the ADA, and the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601. The district court granted Nissan summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to Wyatt’s ADA discrimination claim and claims that were based on retaliatory harassment but reversed with respect to Wyatt’s hostile work environment and retaliation claims based on adverse employment actions. View "Wyatt v. Nissan North America, Inc." on Justia Law

The Orlans law firm, sent a letter on law-firm letterhead, stating that Wells Fargo had referred the Garland loan to Orlans for foreclosure but that “[w]hile the foreclosure process ha[d] begun,” “foreclosure prevention alternatives” might still be available if Garland contacted Wells Fargo. The letter explained how to contact Wells Fargo “to attempt to be reviewed for possible alternatives,” the signature was typed and said, “Orlans PC.”Garland says that the letter confused him because he was unsure if it was from an attorney and “raised [his] anxiety” by suggesting “that an attorney may have conducted an independent investigation and substantive legal review ... such that his prospects for avoiding foreclosure were diminished.” Garland alleges that Orlans sent a form of this letter to thousands of homeowners, without a meaningful review of the homeowners’ foreclosure files, so the communications deceptively implied they were from an attorney. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) prohibits misleading debt-collection communications that falsely imply they are from an attorney.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the purported class action for lack of jurisdiction. Garland lacks standing. That a statute purports to create a cause of action does not alone create standing. A plaintiff asserting a procedural claim must have suffered a concrete injury; bare allegations of confusion and anxiety do not qualify. Whether from an attorney or not, the letter said nothing implying Garland’s chance of avoiding foreclosure was “diminished.” View "Garland v. Orlans, PC" on Justia Law

A man wearing a cap, sunglasses, and a jacket entered a bank with an opaque bag across his body. Approaching a teller, he displayed a note, stating that if he got money, “I’ll let Everyone live.” The man placed his right hand into his shoulder bag in a manner that led the teller to believe he was about to pull out a gun. The teller turned over $12,000. The man fled with the cash. Officers retrieved the suspect’s cap, jacket, and sunglasses and matched a fingerprint found on the sunglasses to one in an FBI database, belonging to Tate, who lived close to the bank. Tate’s age and physical characteristics also matched those of the robber. With a warrant, officers confirmed that Tate’s DNA was found on the cap and jacket.Tate pleaded guilty under 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), the federal bank robbery statute. The court added three levels to Tate’s total offense level (U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)) due to Tate having “brandished or possessed” a “dangerous weapon” during the robbery. Tate argued that he did not possess a dangerous weapon during the robbery. The court cited a Guidelines application note indicating that a dangerous weapon can include using an object in a manner that creates the impression that the object was capable of inflicting serious injury. From the resulting Guidelines range of 41-51 months, the court imposed a sentence of 41 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A robber that uses his concealed hand to reasonably suggest the existence of a weapon as having committed an act sufficient to satisfy section 2B3.1(b)(2)(E). View "United States v. Tate" on Justia Law

The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 allocated $29 billion for grants to help restaurant owners. The Small Business Administration (SBA) processed applications and distributed funds on a first-come, first-served basis. During the first 21 days, it gave grants only to priority applicants--restaurants at least 51% owned and controlled by women, veterans, or the “socially and economically disadvantaged,” defined by reference to the Small Business Act, which refers to those who have been “subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice” or “cultural bias” based solely on immutable characteristics, 15 U.S.C. 637(a)(5). A person is considered “economically disadvantaged” if he is socially disadvantaged and he faces “diminished capital and credit opportunities” compared to non-socially disadvantaged people who operate in the same industry. Under a pre-pandemic regulation, the SBA presumes certain applicants are socially disadvantaged including: “Black Americans,” “Hispanic Americans,” “Asian Pacific Americans,” “Native Americans,” and “Subcontinent Asian Americans.” After reviewing evidence, the SBA will consider an applicant a victim of “individual social disadvantage” based on specific findings.Vitolo (white) and his wife (Hispanic) own a restaurant and submitted an application. Vitolo sued, seeking a preliminary injunction to prohibit the government from disbursing grants based on race or sex. The Sixth Circuit ordered the government to fund the plaintiffs’ application, if approved, before all later-filed applications, without regard to processing time or the applicants’ race or sex. The government failed to provide an exceedingly persuasive justification that would allow the classification to stand. The government may continue the preference for veteran-owned restaurants. View "Vitolo v. Guzman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court declared the issue of partisan gerrymandering a nonjusticiable political question in “Rucho,” in 2019. Michigan had already established its Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission by ballot initiative in the state’s 2018 general election. The Commission is composed of 13 registered voters: eight who affiliate with the state’s two major political parties (four per party) and five who are unaffiliated with those parties, who must satisfy various eligibility criteria designed to ensure that they lack certain political ties. Plaintiffs are Michigan citizens who allege that they are unconstitutionally excluded from serving on the Commission by its eligibility criteria, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of their complaint. Plaintiffs do not have a federal constitutional right to be considered for the Commission. While at least some of the partisan activities enumerated by the eligibility criteria involve the exercise of constitutionally protected interests, Michigan’s compelling interest in cleansing its redistricting process of partisan influence justifies the limited burden imposed by the eligibility criteria. Although claims of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering may be nonjusticiable, Michigan is free to employ its political process to address the issue head-on. View "Daunt v. Benson" on Justia Law

Jackson, an African American woman, was GCRC's Human Resources Director. Daly, GCRC’s chief administrative officer, was Jackson’s supervisor. There were pending internal discrimination complaints when Jackson started, including a complaint by African American employees about Bennett. Jackson ultimately negotiated a severance agreement with Bennett. A second issue involved McClane’s complaints about Williams, GCRC’s finance director, who subsequently resigned. Jackson was also responsible for approving Equal Employment Opportunity Plans submitted by vendors and contractors. Jackson realized that several vendors’ EEOPs had expired and became concerned that some GCRC directors were conducting business with vendors before their EEOPs were approved. Jackson implemented several changes in GCRC’s EEOP approval process. Several employees, vendors, board members, and union representatives complained to Daly about Jackson’s “abrasiveness” and communication style. Other employees reported having good experiences with Jackson. Daly fired Jackson without giving a reason other than she was an at-will employee. Jackson filed a retaliation claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Michigan’s Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act. The district court granted GCRC summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Jackson engaged in protected activity and there remains a genuine factual dispute as to causation. Jackson’s actions could reasonably be viewed as steps to ensure there was no discrimination in hiring both within GCRC and among its vendors, and were protected activity under Title VII. A reasonable juror could find that Jackson has established a prima facie case of causation through circumstantial evidence including the temporal proximity between Jackson’s protected activity and termination. View "Jackson v. Genesee County Road Commission" on Justia Law