Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2009, Carhartt contracted with Innovative to create a flame-resistant fleece fabric for use in its line of flame-resistant garments. The fabric that Innovative developed for Carhartt, “Style 2015," contained a modacrylic fiber, “Protex-C.” Innovative agreed that it would conduct flame-resistance testing on the Style 2015 fabric before shipping it to Carhartt, using the industry-standard test, ASTM D6413. Carhartt sent Innovative emails in 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 stating that Carhartt would do “regular, random testing on the product that is received.” Carhartt performed visual inspections but did not conduct flame-resistance testing until 2016. The Style 2015 fabric failed the D6413 test. Carhartt notified Innovative, which then conducted its own testing and concluded that Style 2015 fabrics dating back to 2014 did not pass flame-resistance testing. In 2013, Innovative stopped using Protex-C and began using a different modacrylic fiber without notice to Carhartt.The district court granted Innovative summary judgment on Carhartt’s negligence, fraud, misrepresentation, false advertising claims. breach of contract and warranty claims. The court reasoned that Carhartt did not notify Innovative of the suspected breach within a reasonable amount of time after Carhartt should have discovered the defect, as required by Michigan’s Uniform Commercial Code. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Reasonable minds could differ as to whether Carhartt should have discovered the breach sooner by performing regular, destructive fire-resistance testing on the fabric. View "Carhartt, Inc. v. Innovative Textiles, Inc." on Justia Law

The FCC's orders, together with Title VI of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 521, establish rules by which state and local governments may regulate cable providers. A cable operator may provide cable services only if a franchising authority—usually a local body, but sometimes a unit of state government—grants the operator a franchise. Franchising authorities often require that cable operators pay fees, provide free cable service for public buildings, and set aside channel capacity for public, educational, and governmental use. The Act limits “franchise fees” to five percent of a cable operator’s gross revenues for cable services for any 12-month period.The FCC's 2007 “First Order” announced the “mixed-use rule,” under which franchisors could not regulate the non-cable services of cable operators who were “common carriers” under the Act. A “Second Order” interpreted “franchise fee” to include noncash exactions except those exempted by statute; counted the value of those exactions toward the fee cap; and extended the “mixed-use rule” to “incumbent” cable operators, who generally were not common carriers.The 2019 Third Order concluded that most cable-related noncash exactions are franchise fees; explained why the Act does not allow franchising authorities to regulate the non-cable services of cable operators who are not common carriers; and extended FCC rulings to state (rather than just local) franchising authorities.The Sixth Circuit denied, in part, challenges by franchising authorities, upholding the FCC’s interpretation of “franchise fee” but holding that noncash cable-related exactions should be assigned a value equal to the cable operator’s marginal cost in providing them. A fee on broadband services is not imposed based on the operator’s provision of cable services and is not a “franchise fee” under section 542(g)(1); it does not count toward the cap and its imposition is not preempted. The extension to state franchisors was not arbitrary. View "City of Chicago v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

Bradley and Falkowski pressed thousands of pills containing a mixture of alprazolam, acetaminophen, and fentanyl, which were marked “A333” and looked like Percocet pills. On July 5, 2016, a large quantity of those counterfeit pills was distributed in Murfreesboro. On July 6, several victims overdosed, thinking the pills were Percocet. One individual died from the overdose; seven had to be hospitalized.An investigation led to Barrett, Davis, Dogonoski, and Williams. Officers executed a search warrant for Barrett’s home and found approximately 70 Xanax pills. Barrett explained that he had purchased and distributed 150 counterfeit Percocet pills, and had traded (with the overdose victim who died) counterfeit pills for the Xanax found in his home. Williams admitted that he sold the counterfeit pills. In executing a search warrant at Davis’ home, officers found fentanyl, a pill press, and a pill die-stamped with “A333.”Falkowski, Davis, Dogonski, and others made plea deals. Convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing a detectible amount of fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 846, eight counts of distribution of a substance containing a detectible amount of fentanyl, the use of which resulted in serious bodily injury or death, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. 2, Williams was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment, Barrett to 276 months, and Bradley to 360 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, to the jury instructions, and to the denials of motions to suppress. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

In September-October 2019, Benton Harbor Detective Kovac, undercover, initiated six controlled purchases of methamphetamine, calling the same telephone number each time. The first two transactions involved Davis. The third transaction involved a different individual. Kovac recorded the license plate number on the individual’s truck, determined that it was registered to Burris at an Agard Avenue address, and used the driver’s license photo to confirm Burris's identity. During the following three transactions, officers saw Davis go to and from the Agard address to meet Kovac. At the fifth meeting, Kovac asked for extra methamphetamine. Officers watched Davis walk to the Agard Avenue address, and enter the residence.After the final controlled purchase, Davis was arrested in the yard of Burris’s Agard residence. Officers saw Burris exit from the backdoor and flee, clutching something. Burris crossed an alley, jumped a fence, and crossed Union Street. Burris was apprehended, carrying cash, a cell phone, and a loaded firearm. When the officers searched the path that Burris had followed, they found a bag containing methamphetamine at the location where Burris had jumped the fence. In Burris’s residence, officers found two additional firearms and a digital scale. Convicted of three counts related to methamphetamine and of being a felon in possession of a firearm, Burris was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Sufficient evidence supported the drug convictions under any standard. View "United States v. Burris" on Justia Law

In 2007, Montgomery was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine or cocaine base, distribution of cocaine base, and witness tampering. The conspiracy conviction required a mandatory life sentence; he received a separate 360-month sentence for the distribution count. The 2018 First Step Act made the Fair Sentencing Act’s changes to sentencing for crack-cocaine offenses retroactive. In reviewing Montgomery’s motion for a sentence reduction under the Act, the district court calculated lower Guidelines ranges of 292–365 months for the conspiracy count and 151–88 for the distribution count, considered the relevant sentencing factors, and varied downwards, imposing sentences of 275 months for the conspiracy conviction and 145 months for the distribution conviction.Montgomery argued that the district court plainly erred when it placed him in Criminal History Category VI instead of Category V. The sentencing enhancement for committing the crimes within two years of being released from prison had been eliminated. The government argued that Montgomery waived that challenge and that any error was not plain because the court’s obligation to sentence Montgomery under the correct Guidelines range was not clear. The Sixth Circuit vacated, classifying the mistake as “invited error,” which is subject to review. Montgomery did not intentionally relinquish a known right (waiver) but he did more than passively stand by as the court erred (forfeiture). Montgomery was no more culpable for the error than the government. View "United States v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

In April 2017, a tax foreclosure action was commenced against the then-owner of the Cincinnati property, Davis. The city was named as a defendant. Notice of a May 2018 order for a sheriff’s sale was served on the city on June 1, 2018. During 2017-2018, a building on the property was also the subject of administrative condemnation proceedings. The condemnation decision, dated July 16, 2018, was sent by certified mail to the then-owner, Davis. After the public hearing, but before the decision to demolish the building was made, Plaintiff was the successful bidder at the July 5 sheriff’s sale. A decree confirming the sale entered on July 17. A sheriff’s deed was issued and was recorded in August.Plaintiff was not aware of the demolition decision. On November 14, 2018, the city sent letters to Plaintiff summarizing the public nuisance proceedings and the decision to raze the building, requesting that Plaintiff respond within 10 days The letters were sent via certified mail but were never delivered to Plaintiff. The city made no subsequent efforts to provide notice to Plaintiff.The building was demolished on April 8, 2019. The city demanded $10,515.00 from Plaintiff for the costs of the demolition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and for trespass. Plaintiff was provided with “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,” of the pendency of the condemnation proceedings. The city did not need to obtain a warrant to demolish a vacant building that had been condemned by administrative proceedings which met due process requirements. View "Keene Group, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati" on Justia Law

Jacob and Genetta Clark, fundamentalist Christians, believe that their religion requires them to use corporal punishment with their children, ages 16, 14, and 12. Their son went to school with marks from being hit with a belt and reported being abused. Social workers from the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services (CHFS) investigated. The children confirmed the use of corporal punishment but stated that they were not abused and felt safe at home.The Clarks allege that they were not timely informed of the first hearing, at which the judge issued an order: “no physical discipline, parents to cooperate w/ CHFS” without making findings of abuse. A judge later told Jacob that he did not have a Fourth Amendment right to stop the CHFS visits and that if he failed to cooperate, the children could be removed. Jacob alleges that the abuse charges continued as retaliation for his videotaping of a home visit. After several months the abuse cases were dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Clarks's Substantive Due Process, Fourth Amendment, First Amendment, and Free Exercise claims. They failed to demonstrate false prosecution. Social workers have absolute immunity for initiating judicial proceedings. While there is a general right to use reasonable corporal punishment at home and in schools, the Clarks offered no authority that imposing corporal punishment that leaves marks is reasonable. Given the existence of a court order, a reasonable social worker in the defendants' position would not have understood that he was violating the Clarks’ Fourth Amendment rights. The Clarks failed to state plausible First Amendment retaliation or Free Exercise claims. View "Clark v. Stone" on Justia Law

Atlas Movers federally registered the “Atlas” mark for “transportation of household goods of others,” first using “Atlas” in 1948 when it formed Atlas Van Lines, providing transportation and logistics services, primarily moving household goods. Since 1970, its division, STG, has provided logistics services for non-household goods shipments. Atlas Movers eventually focused more on logistics, forming Atlas Relocation Services in 1995. In 2007, Atlas Movers began marketing its service as “Atlas Logistics.” and renamed its logistics company Atlas Logistics, which can ship, or arrange the shipment of, any commodity.Eaton manufactures and distributes steel. Eaton created Atlas Trucking in 1999, then expanded to ship goods other than steel and metal for companies in addition to its own. It developed Atlas Logistics in 2003 as an adjunct to Atlas Trucking. Eaton knew of Atlas Van Lines. Atlas Movers sued in 2017 for infringement. Eaton answered and counterclaimed that it owned the Atlas Logistics mark.The Sixth Circuit affirmed a judgment in favor of Atlas Movers, upholding findings that Atlas Movers marketed “Atlas” to an extent that the public recognized it, that the parties’ services are related because they engage in at least some of the same transportation services, that the marks were functionally identical, and that there was actual confusion. View "AWGI, LLC v. Atlas Trucking Co., LLC" on Justia Law

For centuries, the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians inhabited what is now northern Michigan. The federal government took tribal land for settlers. The Band was determined to stay in their territory. The Treaty of 1836 ceded almost 14 million acres of land to the government in exchange for a temporary reservation in Little Traverse Bay, and thereafter, land west of the Mississippi. The government promised the Band $200,000 “whenever their reservations shall be surrendered.” The Treaty expired in 1841, but the government abandoned its plan to move the Band west.The Treaty of 1855 described the specific tracts, provided certain tribal members with acreage, required them to make land selections within specific periods, and reserved ownership of land not timely selected for the government. The government delayed the land selections and failed to timely provide land titles. In 1949 and 1951, before the Indian Claims Commission (ICC), the Band alleged “grossly inadequate and unconscionable” consideration. ICC found that the tribes had ceded 12,044,934 acres and retained 401,971 acres, concluded that the Band was owed $10,109,003.55, and rejected a claim that the Band was owed compensation for land that was never allotted under the 1855 Treaty.In 2015, the Band sought a declaration that the 1855 Treaty created a reservation for the Band. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. The Treaty provided for allotments of land, which would not fall under federal superintendence, rather than a collective Indian reservation. Under the Treaty’s language, its precedent negotiations, and practical construction, the land cannot be said to be “validly set apart for the use of the Indians . . . under the superintendence of the [federal] [g]overnment.” View "Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians v. Whitmer" on Justia Law

The FBI began monitoring Pitts after he made social media posts encouraging Muslims to pursue military training. Pitts expressed a desire to meet with an al-Qaeda operative; the FBI deployed an undercover agent to play that role. The two planned a bombing in downtown Cleveland. The FBI arrested Pitts after he pitched follow-up attacks in Philadelphia and San Francisco. Pitts pleaded guilty to attempting to provide material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, threatening the President, and threatening the President’s family and was sentenced to 168 months’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit rejected, as meritless, arguments that the district court improperly accepted his plea because there was no factual basis for it in the record, because he was not competent to enter it, and because he did not understand its terms. The change-of-plea proceedings, the PSR, and the affidavit attached to the complaint provided a factual basis for Pitts’s guilty plea, establishing that Pitts intended to provide material support— including his personal efforts—to al-Qaeda, that Pitts knew al-Qaeda had engaged in terrorism, and that he had made substantial steps toward the commission of the crime. The only professional opinion in the record, arranged at Pitts’s counsel’s request, found Pitts competent. There was nothing that gave the court “reasonable cause” to consider Pitts incompetent. The court did not address sentencing arguments that were barred by the appellate waiver in Pitts’s valid plea agreement. View "United States v. Pitts" on Justia Law