Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Shelby County Sheriff’s Department dispatcher alerted three deputies that a 911 caller, Nancy Lewellyn, had told the dispatcher that she was suicidal, that she had a gun (possibly a .45 caliber pistol), and that she would kill anyone who came to her residence. Each squad car was equipped with a dashboard camera, which recorded video, sound, and the time of day. At 12:14 p.m., Lewellyn walked outside and turned toward her driveway, carrying in her right hand a BB handgun that resembled a .45 caliber pistol. She began to raise that handgun. The deputies yelled to her then fired shots. Lewellyn continued walking with her right arm extended and the pistol pointing toward her car, Lewellyn leaned on its hood briefly, then turned back toward the house. The shooting continued. Llewellyn collapsed; 11 seconds had elapsed since she exited her house. Ten shots were fired. Lewellyn had deposited the handgun on the sedan’s hood before turning back. The deputies approached and discovered that she was unarmed. Lewellyn died at the scene.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court rejected the deputies’ claims of qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than in hindsight. The “facts and circumstances” support the deputies’ contention that reasonable officers would perceive that Lewellyn posed an immediate threat to their safety. View "Cunningham v. Shelby County" on Justia Law

On several occasions, an undercover officer purchased methamphetamine from Walker. Booker accompanied Walker to one of these sales, handed the officer Walker’s drugs, told the officer that he could offer methamphetamine at a better price, and gave the officer his cell phone number. During the next month, Booker sold methamphetamine to the officer on three separate occasions. At a fourth planned sale, Booker noticed police cars at the planned meeting location and fled, first by car, with a passenger and her two-year-old daughter, and then on foot. Police eventually apprehended him and dialed the phone number that was used to arrange sales with the undercover officer. Booker’s cell phone rang.Booker pled guilty to one count of distributing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); three counts were dismissed. The district court sentenced Booker as a career offender based on his prior state convictions for unarmed robbery and for the “deliver[y]/manufacture” of a controlled substance, which made his advisory Guidelines range 188-235 months’ imprisonment. The court sentenced Booker to 188 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding Booker’s classification as a career offender. The district court “manifestly designed” Booker's supervised release “conditions to steer Booker away from his prior criminal activities and to facilitate effective monitoring by his probation officer.” View "United States v. Booker" on Justia Law

Ohio H.B. 214, signed into law in 2017, prohibits any person from purposefully performing or inducing or attempting to perform or induce an abortion if the person has knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion, in whole or in part, because of a test result indicating or a prenatal diagnosis of Down Syndrome in an unborn child or “any other reason to believe” that an unborn child has Down Syndrome, Ohio Rev. Code 2919.10(B). Violations constitute fourth-degree felonies. The law requires the state medical board to revoke the license of a physician who violates it and makes that physician liable for damages. The performing physician must attest in writing that he is not aware that fetal Down Syndrome is a reason for the woman’s decision to terminate.The Sixth Circuit initially affirmed the entry of a preliminary injunction but, on rehearing, en banc, reversed, reasoning that the restrictions imposed, or burdens created, by H.B. 214 do not create a substantial obstacle to a woman’s ability to choose or obtain an abortion. The restrictions are reasonably related to, and further, Ohio’s legitimate interests. The right to an abortion, even before viability, is not absolute. The “right” actually implicated or affected here is not the woman’s right merely to obtain an abortion; the court focused on the doctor’s “knowing” participation in the Down-syndrome stigmatic decision-making. View "Preterm-Cleveland v. McCloud" on Justia Law

The IRS began a criminal investigation of Gaetano, who owns Michigan cannabis dispensaries. Portal 42, a software company that provides the cannabis industry with point-of-sale systems, confirmed that Gaetano was a client. Agents served a summons, ordering Portal 42 to produce records “and other data relating to the tax liability or the collection of the tax liability or for the purpose of inquiring into any offense connected with the administration or enforcement of the internal revenue laws concerning [Gaetano] for the periods shown.” The IRS did not notify Gaetano about the summons. Portal 42 sent the IRS an email with a hyperlink to the requested records. An IRS computer specialist copied the documents. None of the personnel in the IRS’s Criminal Investigation Division have viewed the records.Gaetano filed a petition under 26 U.S.C. 7609, seeking to quash the summons, arguing that the IRS should have notified Gaetano about the summons and that it was issued in bad faith. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because Gaetano lacked standing. Section 7609 waives the government’s sovereign immunity to allow taxpayers to bring an action to quash certain third-party IRS summonses. An exception applies because the summons here was issued by an IRS criminal investigator “in connection” with an IRS criminal investigation and the summoned party is not a third-party recordkeeper. Without a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, subject-matter jurisdiction cannot obtain. View "Gaetano v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2005, Pouncy opted to represent himself and was convicted of four counts of carjacking, four counts of armed robbery, and three firearm counts. He was sentenced to 586-824 months' imprisonment. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Pouncy’s argument that he had not knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. In 2013, Pouncy filed a federal habeas corpus petition, arguing that the state courts erred in allowing him to represent himself. In 2016, the district court granted a conditional writ. While Michigan's appeal proceeded, the district court released Pouncy on bond. After his release, Pouncy tried to enter the chambers of the judge who presided over his trial; later Michigan charged him with possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon. The court revoked bail.In 2017, the Sixth Circuit reversed the grant of habeas relief and remanded for consideration of Pouncy’s other claims. A cell phone was subsequently found in Pouncy’s cell, containing messages, suggesting that Pouncy had paid $10,000 to secure false testimony in his federal habeas proceeding. The district court declined to dismiss the petition in full. When the COVID-19 pandemic began, Pouncy unsuccessfully sought release on bond pending review of his petition. When the pandemic worsened, Pouncy unsuccessfully asked for bail again. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court reasonably concluded that the “interests of justice” did not support Pouncy’s release, given the “looming reality” of his conduct, which included time-consuming collateral litigation. View "Pouncy v. Palmer" on Justia Law

At 1:20 a.m., Harden, an African-American, went to buy beer at a Thornton store, where a uniformed Heritage Creek police officer, Hillman, provided security. The clerk told Harden, “I think you’ve had too much to drink already.” Harden left but returned. Hillman allegedly slammed him down onto the floor. Harden requested medical attention and was transported to the hospital, where he was cited for disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and public intoxication, then released. The charges were dismissed after Hillman failed to appear.Harden's claims against Thornton and Heritage Creek were dismissed. Harden’s excessive force claim against Hillman was rejected by a jury. Harden first unsuccessfully sought a new trial based on the court’s refusal to order the Marshals Service to serve his subpoenas and on Hillman’s counsel allegedly making improper arguments to the jury.Harden’s counsel obtained permission to contact a juror post-trial. That juror claimed that Harden did not get a fair trial because of his race and that another juror concealed from the judge that he was related to a police officer. The court denied Harden’s second motion for a new trial.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on Harden’s claim that he was arrested without probable cause and the order denying Harden’s first motion for a new trial but vacated the denial of the second motion. The juror’s affidavit showed that jurors made statements exhibiting overt racial bias that cast serious doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury’s deliberations and resulting verdict. View "Harden v. Hillman" on Justia Law

Memphis Officers suspected Reed of distributing marijuana. Reed had prior drug convictions. Detective Evans filed affidavits seeking search warrants for OK Tire, Orchi Road, and Bond Road. At OK Tire, owned by Reed's girlfriend, a reliable confidential informant had made a controlled buy from Reed and had seen Reed “selling and storing marijuana.” Evans had surveilled the couple leaving their home (Bond Road) and traveling to OK. Each had keys to the business. Reed’s mother lived on Orchi Road. Reed’s driver’s license listed it; Evans had watched the informant make a controlled buy from Reed there. Evans sought a warrant to search Bond Road for financial records and drug proceeds (not for drugs).A state judge issued three search warrants. Officers seized nothing from OK and only baggies and a digital scale from Orchi Road. The search at Bond Road uncovered guns, ammunition, 18.7 grams of marijuana, 2.1 grams of THC wax, and $5,636 in cash. Reed confessed that the guns and drugs were his and that he had been selling marijuana. He later successfully moved to suppress the evidence obtained from at Bond Road, including his statements.The Sixth Circuit reversed, declining to address the constitutional question of whether, when officers have probable cause to arrest a suspect, they need additional evidence of a “nexus” between the drug dealing and the dealer’s home in order to search that home. Even when a search violates the Fourth Amendment, courts should not suppress evidence if the police reasonably relied on a judge’s decision that probable cause justified a warrant. View "United States v. Reed" on Justia Law

In 2010, Felten filed a qui tam complaint alleging that his then-employer, Beaumont Hospital, was violating the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3730(h), and the Michigan Medicaid False Claims Act by paying kickbacks to physicians and physicians’ groups in exchange for referrals of Medicare, Medicaid, and TRICARE patients. Felten also alleged that Beaumont had retaliated against him by threatening and “marginaliz[ing]” him for insisting on compliance with the law. After the government intervened and settled the case against Beaumont, the district court dismissed the remaining claims, except those for retaliation and attorneys’ fees and costs.Felten amended his complaint to add allegations of retaliation that took place after he filed his initial complaint: he was terminated after Beaumont falsely represented to him that an internal report suggested that he be replaced and that his position was subject to mandatory retirement. Felten further alleged that he had been unable to obtain a comparable position in academic medicine because Beaumont “intentionally maligned [him].”The district court dismissed the allegations of retaliatory conduct occurring after Felten’s termination. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The FCA’s anti-retaliation provision protects a relator from a defendant’s retaliation after the relator’s termination. View "Felten v. William Beaumont Hospital" on Justia Law

In 2008, State Bank, a Fentura subsidiary, hired Wollschlager to deal with “problem loans.” Wollschlager’s contract provided a golden parachute worth $175,000 if the Bank fired him early. In 2009, the FDIC deemed the Bank “troubled.” In 2010, Wollschlager negotiated an amended agreement worth $245,000. Wollschlager's 2011 separation agreement provided that the $245,000 payment would comprise $138,000 (one year’s salary) within 60 days of Wollschlager’s departure; $107,000 plus his base compensation through the end of the year ($28,000) would be paid once the Bank’s conditions improved. Fentura did not seek FDIC prior approval. The FDIC and the Federal Reserve subsequently approved the $138,000 installment. FDIC regulations “generally limit payments to no more than one year of annual salary.” In 2013, Fentura sought approval to pay the remainder, acknowledging that the agreements required prior approval. The FDIC refused, citing 12 U.S.C. 1828(k).The district court granted the FDIC judgment on the record. The Sixth Circuit affirmed The statute says that the agency should withhold golden parachute payments for misconduct and should also consider whether the employee “was in a position of managerial or fiduciary responsibility,” the “length of” the employment, and whether the “compensation involved represents a reasonable payment for” the employee’s services. The FDIC reasonably found that the payment would result in a windfall of two years’ salary for an employee who worked for just three years and that the Bank never sought initial approval. View "Wollschlager v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation" on Justia Law

Massey began working as a security guard in 2004. Massey alleges that her supervisors and co-workers commented on “her weight, the size of her breast, her looks and body [odor]”; and referred to her as the “Queen of FMLA.” She alleges she was denied medical leave. In 2015, Great Lakes became Massey’s employer. Supervisors told Massey that she looked “sloppy,” and that her breasts were “drooping.” Massey went to human resources; she claims the harassment continued. On October 29, 2017, Massey was driving a Great Lakes van when the van incurred damage. Massey claimed that she was not aware that she had been in an accident. Massey claims that she was approved for FMLA leave for breast reduction surgery through November 17: there is no record that anyone at Great Lakes knew about her FMLA leave for her surgery. On November 15, Massey was told that it had been determined that she falsified her incident report. Great Lakes terminated her employment on December 16, 2017.Massey filed an EEOC complaint, alleging sexual harassment and retaliation, and later sued, alleging sexual harassment, retaliation, and gender discrimination under Title VII and the Michigan Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act and FMLA retaliation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Great Lakes, finding insufficient evidence that the harassment Massey faced was “severe or pervasive.” Great Lakes established that it honestly believed that Massey falsified her report as a basis for her termination. View "Nathan v. Great Lakes Water Authority" on Justia Law