Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs retired from the Louisville Metropolitan police department and received free health insurance, administered by Kentucky Retirement Systems. Kentucky initially paid all of their healthcare costs. After the officers turned 65, Medicare became the primary payer, leaving Kentucky to cover secondary expenses. Each officer came out of retirement, joining county agencies different from the ones they served before retiring. They became eligible for healthcare benefits in their new positions. Kentucky notified them that federal law “mandate[d]” that it “cannot offer coverage secondary to Medicare” for retirees “eligible to be on [their] employer’s group health plan” as “active employees.” Some of the officers then paid for insurance through their new employers; others kept their retirement insurance by quitting or going part-time. The officers sued.The district court granted summary judgment to the officers, ordered Kentucky to reinstate their retirement health insurance, and awarded the officers some of the monetary damages requested. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The officers have a cognizable breach-of-contract claim. Under Kentucky law, the Kentucky Retirement Systems formed an “inviolable contract” with the officers to provide free retirement health insurance and to refrain from reducing their benefits, then breached that contract. The Medicare Secondary Payer Act of 1980 did not bar Kentucky from providing Medicare-eligible police officers with state retirement insurance after they reentered the workforce and became eligible again for employer-based insurance coverage, 42 U.S.C. 1395y. View "River City Fraternal Order of Police v. Kentucky Retirement Systems" on Justia Law

Tobias-Chaves and her daughter traveled from Honduras and entered the U.S. in 2014, to escape from Tobias-Chaves’s abusive husband. DHS filed charges against them in Houston, where they were then living. That Immigration Court attempted to send Tobias-Chaves a Notice to Appear but because of a clerical error, she never received it. The court ordered the women removed in absentia. Two years later, Tobias-Chaves learned (and informed the courts) of the error. Her case was reopened in Houston. Tobias-Chaves applied for asylum. Her case was transferred to Memphis. There was then no immigration court in Louisville. An immigration court was created in Louisville in 2018, and the “Louisville docket” was transferred, including Tobias-Chaves’s case. There was no formal change of venue. Tobias-Chaves was not given an opportunity to dispute the change. The Louisville court held a hearing, at which her attorney argued that venue had never properly been transferred.The IJ denied Tobias-Chaves’s application for asylum and ordered her removed. The BIA affirmed, finding the “sua sponte change of venue” harmless error; Tobias-Chaves lived 75 miles from the Louisville location but more than 400 miles from the Memphis building. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Although the court violated procedural rules in transferring the proceeding, that violation was a procedural question relating to venue, not jurisdiction. In order to successfully challenge a procedural error such as an improper change of venue, a petitioner must show prejudice. Tobias-Chaves failed to do so. View "Tobias-Chaves v. Garland" on Justia Law

Officer Dickens submitted an affidavit, seeking a search warrant for 10318 Dove Avenue, a single-family Cleveland residence. Dickens averred that earlier that month a confidential informant disclosed to him that a dealer, Moore, was selling cocaine out of that residence. He described Moore’s race, height, weight, age, and date of birth and disclosed that Moore deployed an extensive electronic surveillance system. Moore had been charged with several past drug crimes, including one prior conviction for drug trafficking. Dickens also described a controlled drug buy between the informant and Moore that occurred earlier that month at the Dove residence, under surveillance. The state court issued the search warrant. Officers detained Moore and found two firearms, two kilograms of cocaine, 100 grams of cocaine base, and materials used to facilitate large-scale drug trafficking. An ATF officer arrived, advised Moore of his Miranda rights, and interviewed Moore.Moore was indicted on five federal counts involving conspiracy, possessing and intending to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, possessing firearms while a felon, and possessing firearms to further a drug trafficking crime. Moore unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the affidavit lacked indicia that the confidential informant was reliable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Collectively, the information provided demonstrated a fair probability that evidence of drug trafficking would be found at Dove. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

Garcia, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. without inspection in 2000 and was placed in removal proceedings in 2011. Garcia sought Cancellation of Removal or voluntary departure in the alternative. In 2018, Garcia married a U.S. citizen, who filed an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative. An IJ denied Garcia’s request for a continuance pending adjudication of his I-130 petition, noting that even if USCIS approved his I-130 petition, Garcia would have to leave and be processed at the American consulate in Mexico because he had not been “admitted or paroled following inspection.” The IJ found Garcia ineligible for Cancellation of Removal but granted voluntary departure.While his BIA appeal was pending, USCIS approved Garcia's I-130 petition, which required Garcia, to travel to a U.S. consulate but by leaving the U.S., noncitizens who have been unlawfully present for more than one year become inadmissible for 10 years. The Attorney General may waive this bar for immigrant-spouses of U.S. citizens. USCIS could take over a year to process the waiver, during which a noncitizen remains abroad. USCIS amended its regulations in 2013 to permit applicants to apply for a provisional unlawful presence waiver before departing the U.S.; this workaround did not extend to noncitizens in removal proceedings, unless those proceedings are administratively closed. In 2018, then-Attorney General Sessions issued the “Castro-Tum” decision, holding that IJs and the BIA did not have general authority to grant administrative closure. The BIA, citing Castro-Tum, denied Garcia’s request for administrative closure and upheld the denial of Cancellation of Removal.The Sixth Circuit vacated. IJs and the BIA have the authority for administrative closure to permit noncitizens to seek provisional unlawful presence waivers. Administrative closure is “appropriate and necessary” for the disposition of Garcia’scase. View "Garcia-DeLeon v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 2013, Hack pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud, mortgage fraud, and wire fraud. The plea agreement contained an appeal waiver. In addition to terms of imprisonment and supervised release, the court ordered Hack to pay $803,420 in restitution to two mortgage companies, as required by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3664(f)(1)(A). The court set a payment schedule during Hack’s imprisonment and stated: Upon commencement of the term of supervised release, the probation officer shall review your financial circumstances and recommend a payment schedule on any outstanding balance... Within the first 60 days of release, the probation officer shall submit a recommendation to the court for a payment schedule, for ... final approval. The record does not reflect that the court ever set a post-release payment schedule or that the probation officer ever recommended one.During his period of supervised release, Hack moved to modify the restitution order, citing “a one-time opportunity” to obtain financing and proposing to pay the mortgage companies $100,000 and $28,000 in lump sums, attaching declarations from the companies stating that they preferred lump-sum payments over incremental payments. The district court denied the motion, concluding that it did “not have the authority under the MVRA to modify its final Restitution Order into two reduced lump-sum restitution payments.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that Hack’s plea agreement barred the appeal. View "United States v. Hack" on Justia Law

In 1994, Jarvis was convicted of four counts of armed bank robbery, conspiracy, and five counts of using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 2113, 371, 924(c). The court determined that his first 924(c) firearm conviction generated a statutory minimum sentence of five years and that his other four 924(c) convictions, repeat offenses, were each subject to a statutory minimum of 20 consecutive years and sentenced Jarvis to 85 years plus 11 years on his other convictions. In 2014, the Supreme Court clarified that for aiding-and-abetting liability under 924(c) a defendant must have “advance knowledge” that a firearm would be used. Jarvis successfully moved to have three 924(c) convictions vacated for insufficient evidence of advance knowledge. The district court resentenced Jarvis to five years for his first 924(c) conviction, 20 for his second, and 15 for his other convictions.The 2018 First Step Act amended 924(c), limiting the firearm convictions that count as repeat offenses. Were Jarvis sentenced today, his second 924(c) conviction would generate a statutory minimum of five years. Congress expressly chose not to apply this change to defendants sentenced before the Act's passage, Jarvis moved for a sentence reduction under the “compassionate release” statute, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), citing as “extraordinary and compelling reasons” the COVID-19 pandemic and the amendments, The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. The statute excludes non-retroactive First Step Act amendments from the category of extraordinary or compelling reasons, whether a defendant relies on the amendments alone or in combination with other factors. View "United States v. Jarvis" on Justia Law

The Labor Management Relations Act forbids employers from directly giving money to unions, 29 U.S.C. 186(a); an exception allows an employer and a union to operate a trust fund for the benefit of employees. Section 186(c)(5)(B) requires the trust agreement to provide that an arbitrator will resolve any “deadlock on the administration of such fund.” Several construction companies and one union established a trust fund to subsidize employee vacations. Six trustees oversaw the fund, which is a tax-exempt entity under ERISA 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(9). A disagreement arose over whether the trust needed to amend a tax return. Three trustees, those selected by the companies, filed suit, seeking authority to amend the tax return. The three union-appointed trustees intervened, arguing that the dispute belongs in arbitration.The court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. While ERISA plan participants or beneficiaries may sue for a breach of statutory fiduciary duty in federal court without exhausting internal remedial procedures, this complaint did not allege a breach of fiduciary duties but rather alleges that the employer trustees’ own fiduciary duties compelled them to file the action to maintain the trust’s compliance with tax laws. These claims were “not directly adversarial to the [union trustees] or to the Fund.” View "Baker v. Iron Workers Local 25" on Justia Law

Wyatt began working as a Nissan project manager in 2013. For two years she received positive annual performance reviews. During those years, Wyatt twice had medical leave. Nissan restored Wyatt to her position and granted nearly all the work accommodations recommended by Wyatt’s doctor. In 2015, Wyatt began working on a project headed by Mullen who sexually harassed and assaulted her. Wyatt’s complaints led to Mullen leaving the company. At the same time, Wyatt took medical leave for back surgery. Upon her return, she and her doctors requested workplace accommodations, similar to those she had previously requested. Nissan denied her request for a 40-hour workweek. Wyatt claims that managers harassed her about her requests and gave Wyatt her first “below expectations” annual evaluation, Wyatt filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Her managers later issued Wyatt a Performance Improvement Plan. Wyatt refused to sign the PIP, believing that it was retaliatory. In February 2017, Wyatt took medical leave and continues to be on leave.Wyatt filed suit, alleging hostile work environment, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; failure-to-accommodate, Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101l and retaliation claims under Title VII, the ADA, and the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601. The district court granted Nissan summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to Wyatt’s ADA discrimination claim and claims that were based on retaliatory harassment but reversed with respect to Wyatt’s hostile work environment and retaliation claims based on adverse employment actions. View "Wyatt v. Nissan North America, Inc." on Justia Law

The Orlans law firm, sent a letter on law-firm letterhead, stating that Wells Fargo had referred the Garland loan to Orlans for foreclosure but that “[w]hile the foreclosure process ha[d] begun,” “foreclosure prevention alternatives” might still be available if Garland contacted Wells Fargo. The letter explained how to contact Wells Fargo “to attempt to be reviewed for possible alternatives,” the signature was typed and said, “Orlans PC.”Garland says that the letter confused him because he was unsure if it was from an attorney and “raised [his] anxiety” by suggesting “that an attorney may have conducted an independent investigation and substantive legal review ... such that his prospects for avoiding foreclosure were diminished.” Garland alleges that Orlans sent a form of this letter to thousands of homeowners, without a meaningful review of the homeowners’ foreclosure files, so the communications deceptively implied they were from an attorney. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) prohibits misleading debt-collection communications that falsely imply they are from an attorney.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the purported class action for lack of jurisdiction. Garland lacks standing. That a statute purports to create a cause of action does not alone create standing. A plaintiff asserting a procedural claim must have suffered a concrete injury; bare allegations of confusion and anxiety do not qualify. Whether from an attorney or not, the letter said nothing implying Garland’s chance of avoiding foreclosure was “diminished.” View "Garland v. Orlans, PC" on Justia Law

A man wearing a cap, sunglasses, and a jacket entered a bank with an opaque bag across his body. Approaching a teller, he displayed a note, stating that if he got money, “I’ll let Everyone live.” The man placed his right hand into his shoulder bag in a manner that led the teller to believe he was about to pull out a gun. The teller turned over $12,000. The man fled with the cash. Officers retrieved the suspect’s cap, jacket, and sunglasses and matched a fingerprint found on the sunglasses to one in an FBI database, belonging to Tate, who lived close to the bank. Tate’s age and physical characteristics also matched those of the robber. With a warrant, officers confirmed that Tate’s DNA was found on the cap and jacket.Tate pleaded guilty under 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), the federal bank robbery statute. The court added three levels to Tate’s total offense level (U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)) due to Tate having “brandished or possessed” a “dangerous weapon” during the robbery. Tate argued that he did not possess a dangerous weapon during the robbery. The court cited a Guidelines application note indicating that a dangerous weapon can include using an object in a manner that creates the impression that the object was capable of inflicting serious injury. From the resulting Guidelines range of 41-51 months, the court imposed a sentence of 41 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A robber that uses his concealed hand to reasonably suggest the existence of a weapon as having committed an act sufficient to satisfy section 2B3.1(b)(2)(E). View "United States v. Tate" on Justia Law