Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 allocated $29 billion for grants to help restaurant owners. The Small Business Administration (SBA) processed applications and distributed funds on a first-come, first-served basis. During the first 21 days, it gave grants only to priority applicants--restaurants at least 51% owned and controlled by women, veterans, or the “socially and economically disadvantaged,” defined by reference to the Small Business Act, which refers to those who have been “subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice” or “cultural bias” based solely on immutable characteristics, 15 U.S.C. 637(a)(5). A person is considered “economically disadvantaged” if he is socially disadvantaged and he faces “diminished capital and credit opportunities” compared to non-socially disadvantaged people who operate in the same industry. Under a pre-pandemic regulation, the SBA presumes certain applicants are socially disadvantaged including: “Black Americans,” “Hispanic Americans,” “Asian Pacific Americans,” “Native Americans,” and “Subcontinent Asian Americans.” After reviewing evidence, the SBA will consider an applicant a victim of “individual social disadvantage” based on specific findings.Vitolo (white) and his wife (Hispanic) own a restaurant and submitted an application. Vitolo sued, seeking a preliminary injunction to prohibit the government from disbursing grants based on race or sex. The Sixth Circuit ordered the government to fund the plaintiffs’ application, if approved, before all later-filed applications, without regard to processing time or the applicants’ race or sex. The government failed to provide an exceedingly persuasive justification that would allow the classification to stand. The government may continue the preference for veteran-owned restaurants. View "Vitolo v. Guzman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court declared the issue of partisan gerrymandering a nonjusticiable political question in “Rucho,” in 2019. Michigan had already established its Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission by ballot initiative in the state’s 2018 general election. The Commission is composed of 13 registered voters: eight who affiliate with the state’s two major political parties (four per party) and five who are unaffiliated with those parties, who must satisfy various eligibility criteria designed to ensure that they lack certain political ties. Plaintiffs are Michigan citizens who allege that they are unconstitutionally excluded from serving on the Commission by its eligibility criteria, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of their complaint. Plaintiffs do not have a federal constitutional right to be considered for the Commission. While at least some of the partisan activities enumerated by the eligibility criteria involve the exercise of constitutionally protected interests, Michigan’s compelling interest in cleansing its redistricting process of partisan influence justifies the limited burden imposed by the eligibility criteria. Although claims of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering may be nonjusticiable, Michigan is free to employ its political process to address the issue head-on. View "Daunt v. Benson" on Justia Law

Jackson, an African American woman, was GCRC's Human Resources Director. Daly, GCRC’s chief administrative officer, was Jackson’s supervisor. There were pending internal discrimination complaints when Jackson started, including a complaint by African American employees about Bennett. Jackson ultimately negotiated a severance agreement with Bennett. A second issue involved McClane’s complaints about Williams, GCRC’s finance director, who subsequently resigned. Jackson was also responsible for approving Equal Employment Opportunity Plans submitted by vendors and contractors. Jackson realized that several vendors’ EEOPs had expired and became concerned that some GCRC directors were conducting business with vendors before their EEOPs were approved. Jackson implemented several changes in GCRC’s EEOP approval process. Several employees, vendors, board members, and union representatives complained to Daly about Jackson’s “abrasiveness” and communication style. Other employees reported having good experiences with Jackson. Daly fired Jackson without giving a reason other than she was an at-will employee. Jackson filed a retaliation claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Michigan’s Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act. The district court granted GCRC summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Jackson engaged in protected activity and there remains a genuine factual dispute as to causation. Jackson’s actions could reasonably be viewed as steps to ensure there was no discrimination in hiring both within GCRC and among its vendors, and were protected activity under Title VII. A reasonable juror could find that Jackson has established a prima facie case of causation through circumstantial evidence including the temporal proximity between Jackson’s protected activity and termination. View "Jackson v. Genesee County Road Commission" on Justia Law

In 2009, Carhartt contracted with Innovative to create a flame-resistant fleece fabric for use in its line of flame-resistant garments. The fabric that Innovative developed for Carhartt, “Style 2015," contained a modacrylic fiber, “Protex-C.” Innovative agreed that it would conduct flame-resistance testing on the Style 2015 fabric before shipping it to Carhartt, using the industry-standard test, ASTM D6413. Carhartt sent Innovative emails in 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 stating that Carhartt would do “regular, random testing on the product that is received.” Carhartt performed visual inspections but did not conduct flame-resistance testing until 2016. The Style 2015 fabric failed the D6413 test. Carhartt notified Innovative, which then conducted its own testing and concluded that Style 2015 fabrics dating back to 2014 did not pass flame-resistance testing. In 2013, Innovative stopped using Protex-C and began using a different modacrylic fiber without notice to Carhartt.The district court granted Innovative summary judgment on Carhartt’s negligence, fraud, misrepresentation, false advertising claims. breach of contract and warranty claims. The court reasoned that Carhartt did not notify Innovative of the suspected breach within a reasonable amount of time after Carhartt should have discovered the defect, as required by Michigan’s Uniform Commercial Code. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Reasonable minds could differ as to whether Carhartt should have discovered the breach sooner by performing regular, destructive fire-resistance testing on the fabric. View "Carhartt, Inc. v. Innovative Textiles, Inc." on Justia Law

The FCC's orders, together with Title VI of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 521, establish rules by which state and local governments may regulate cable providers. A cable operator may provide cable services only if a franchising authority—usually a local body, but sometimes a unit of state government—grants the operator a franchise. Franchising authorities often require that cable operators pay fees, provide free cable service for public buildings, and set aside channel capacity for public, educational, and governmental use. The Act limits “franchise fees” to five percent of a cable operator’s gross revenues for cable services for any 12-month period.The FCC's 2007 “First Order” announced the “mixed-use rule,” under which franchisors could not regulate the non-cable services of cable operators who were “common carriers” under the Act. A “Second Order” interpreted “franchise fee” to include noncash exactions except those exempted by statute; counted the value of those exactions toward the fee cap; and extended the “mixed-use rule” to “incumbent” cable operators, who generally were not common carriers.The 2019 Third Order concluded that most cable-related noncash exactions are franchise fees; explained why the Act does not allow franchising authorities to regulate the non-cable services of cable operators who are not common carriers; and extended FCC rulings to state (rather than just local) franchising authorities.The Sixth Circuit denied, in part, challenges by franchising authorities, upholding the FCC’s interpretation of “franchise fee” but holding that noncash cable-related exactions should be assigned a value equal to the cable operator’s marginal cost in providing them. A fee on broadband services is not imposed based on the operator’s provision of cable services and is not a “franchise fee” under section 542(g)(1); it does not count toward the cap and its imposition is not preempted. The extension to state franchisors was not arbitrary. View "City of Chicago v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

Bradley and Falkowski pressed thousands of pills containing a mixture of alprazolam, acetaminophen, and fentanyl, which were marked “A333” and looked like Percocet pills. On July 5, 2016, a large quantity of those counterfeit pills was distributed in Murfreesboro. On July 6, several victims overdosed, thinking the pills were Percocet. One individual died from the overdose; seven had to be hospitalized.An investigation led to Barrett, Davis, Dogonoski, and Williams. Officers executed a search warrant for Barrett’s home and found approximately 70 Xanax pills. Barrett explained that he had purchased and distributed 150 counterfeit Percocet pills, and had traded (with the overdose victim who died) counterfeit pills for the Xanax found in his home. Williams admitted that he sold the counterfeit pills. In executing a search warrant at Davis’ home, officers found fentanyl, a pill press, and a pill die-stamped with “A333.”Falkowski, Davis, Dogonski, and others made plea deals. Convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing a detectible amount of fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 846, eight counts of distribution of a substance containing a detectible amount of fentanyl, the use of which resulted in serious bodily injury or death, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. 2, Williams was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment, Barrett to 276 months, and Bradley to 360 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, to the jury instructions, and to the denials of motions to suppress. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

In September-October 2019, Benton Harbor Detective Kovac, undercover, initiated six controlled purchases of methamphetamine, calling the same telephone number each time. The first two transactions involved Davis. The third transaction involved a different individual. Kovac recorded the license plate number on the individual’s truck, determined that it was registered to Burris at an Agard Avenue address, and used the driver’s license photo to confirm Burris's identity. During the following three transactions, officers saw Davis go to and from the Agard address to meet Kovac. At the fifth meeting, Kovac asked for extra methamphetamine. Officers watched Davis walk to the Agard Avenue address, and enter the residence.After the final controlled purchase, Davis was arrested in the yard of Burris’s Agard residence. Officers saw Burris exit from the backdoor and flee, clutching something. Burris crossed an alley, jumped a fence, and crossed Union Street. Burris was apprehended, carrying cash, a cell phone, and a loaded firearm. When the officers searched the path that Burris had followed, they found a bag containing methamphetamine at the location where Burris had jumped the fence. In Burris’s residence, officers found two additional firearms and a digital scale. Convicted of three counts related to methamphetamine and of being a felon in possession of a firearm, Burris was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Sufficient evidence supported the drug convictions under any standard. View "United States v. Burris" on Justia Law

In 2007, Montgomery was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine or cocaine base, distribution of cocaine base, and witness tampering. The conspiracy conviction required a mandatory life sentence; he received a separate 360-month sentence for the distribution count. The 2018 First Step Act made the Fair Sentencing Act’s changes to sentencing for crack-cocaine offenses retroactive. In reviewing Montgomery’s motion for a sentence reduction under the Act, the district court calculated lower Guidelines ranges of 292–365 months for the conspiracy count and 151–88 for the distribution count, considered the relevant sentencing factors, and varied downwards, imposing sentences of 275 months for the conspiracy conviction and 145 months for the distribution conviction.Montgomery argued that the district court plainly erred when it placed him in Criminal History Category VI instead of Category V. The sentencing enhancement for committing the crimes within two years of being released from prison had been eliminated. The government argued that Montgomery waived that challenge and that any error was not plain because the court’s obligation to sentence Montgomery under the correct Guidelines range was not clear. The Sixth Circuit vacated, classifying the mistake as “invited error,” which is subject to review. Montgomery did not intentionally relinquish a known right (waiver) but he did more than passively stand by as the court erred (forfeiture). Montgomery was no more culpable for the error than the government. View "United States v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

In April 2017, a tax foreclosure action was commenced against the then-owner of the Cincinnati property, Davis. The city was named as a defendant. Notice of a May 2018 order for a sheriff’s sale was served on the city on June 1, 2018. During 2017-2018, a building on the property was also the subject of administrative condemnation proceedings. The condemnation decision, dated July 16, 2018, was sent by certified mail to the then-owner, Davis. After the public hearing, but before the decision to demolish the building was made, Plaintiff was the successful bidder at the July 5 sheriff’s sale. A decree confirming the sale entered on July 17. A sheriff’s deed was issued and was recorded in August.Plaintiff was not aware of the demolition decision. On November 14, 2018, the city sent letters to Plaintiff summarizing the public nuisance proceedings and the decision to raze the building, requesting that Plaintiff respond within 10 days The letters were sent via certified mail but were never delivered to Plaintiff. The city made no subsequent efforts to provide notice to Plaintiff.The building was demolished on April 8, 2019. The city demanded $10,515.00 from Plaintiff for the costs of the demolition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and for trespass. Plaintiff was provided with “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,” of the pendency of the condemnation proceedings. The city did not need to obtain a warrant to demolish a vacant building that had been condemned by administrative proceedings which met due process requirements. View "Keene Group, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati" on Justia Law

Jacob and Genetta Clark, fundamentalist Christians, believe that their religion requires them to use corporal punishment with their children, ages 16, 14, and 12. Their son went to school with marks from being hit with a belt and reported being abused. Social workers from the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services (CHFS) investigated. The children confirmed the use of corporal punishment but stated that they were not abused and felt safe at home.The Clarks allege that they were not timely informed of the first hearing, at which the judge issued an order: “no physical discipline, parents to cooperate w/ CHFS” without making findings of abuse. A judge later told Jacob that he did not have a Fourth Amendment right to stop the CHFS visits and that if he failed to cooperate, the children could be removed. Jacob alleges that the abuse charges continued as retaliation for his videotaping of a home visit. After several months the abuse cases were dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Clarks's Substantive Due Process, Fourth Amendment, First Amendment, and Free Exercise claims. They failed to demonstrate false prosecution. Social workers have absolute immunity for initiating judicial proceedings. While there is a general right to use reasonable corporal punishment at home and in schools, the Clarks offered no authority that imposing corporal punishment that leaves marks is reasonable. Given the existence of a court order, a reasonable social worker in the defendants' position would not have understood that he was violating the Clarks’ Fourth Amendment rights. The Clarks failed to state plausible First Amendment retaliation or Free Exercise claims. View "Clark v. Stone" on Justia Law