Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A woman identified as E.J. was carjacked by two masked men in a Detroit store parking lot. She observed the men in the store, noting one was light-skinned and the other dark-skinned. After the incident, a store customer who knew the light-skinned man from school provided E.J. with his name and later sent both E.J. and the investigating officer photos and information from his Facebook profile. Before a police-arranged photo lineup, the customer sent E.J. a picture of the suspect, Kyrrah Radaker-Carter, despite police instructions not to do so. E.J. confirmed to the customer that the man in the photo was the carjacker. The next day, E.J. participated in a six-photo lineup and immediately identified Radaker-Carter, who was later arrested while driving the stolen car.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied Radaker-Carter’s motion to suppress E.J.’s identification, finding that due process did not require exclusion because the suggestive circumstances were not arranged by law enforcement and the photo array itself was not unduly suggestive. Radaker-Carter subsequently pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 122 months’ imprisonment, then appealed the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court held that E.J.’s identification was constitutionally admissible because the suggestive circumstances—E.J. seeing Radaker-Carter’s photo before the lineup—were not orchestrated by law enforcement. The court also found that the police-arranged photo lineup was not unduly suggestive, as the differences in the photos were minor and did not improperly single out Radaker-Carter. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress. View "United States v. Radaker-Carter" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of possessing a machinegun conversion device, known as a Glock switch, which both parties agreed qualified as a machinegun under federal law. He had pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement but subsequently moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute criminalizing possession of machineguns, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), violated his Second Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that his plea agreement did not bar his constitutional challenge and rejecting his Second Amendment argument. The defendant then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, maintaining that the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen had undermined prior circuit precedent upholding § 922(o).The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial de novo, as the case involved the constitutionality of a federal statute. The appellate court held that its prior decision in Hamblen v. United States, which relied on District of Columbia v. Heller, remained binding after Bruen. The court explained that Bruen did not overrule Heller or Hamblen, and that the tradition of prohibiting “dangerous and unusual weapons” such as machineguns was reaffirmed. The court concluded that the Second Amendment does not protect the possession of machineguns covered by § 922(o). Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s conviction. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Two men were arrested in Louisville, Kentucky, in 2020 and charged with being felons in possession of firearms. Both had prior convictions for crimes punishable by more than a year in prison. One defendant pleaded guilty, while the other was convicted by a jury. At sentencing, the government sought to apply the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which imposes a mandatory minimum fifteen-year sentence for offenders with at least three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses, provided those offenses were committed on different occasions.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, following then-binding Sixth Circuit precedent, determined that the judge—not a jury—should decide whether the prior offenses occurred on different occasions. The court found that both defendants qualified for the ACCA enhancement and sentenced each to fifteen years in prison. Both defendants appealed, arguing that, in light of the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Erlinger v. United States, the question of whether their offenses occurred on different occasions should have been decided by a jury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the cases. Applying a harmless error analysis as required by recent precedent, the court found that, for one defendant, the record established beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found his offenses occurred on different occasions, so his sentence was affirmed. For the other defendant, the court concluded that the government had not met its burden to show the error was harmless, given similarities among the offenses and gaps in the record. As a result, the court vacated his sentence and remanded for further proceedings. The main holding is that failure to submit the ACCA “different occasions” question to a jury is subject to harmless error review, and the outcome depends on the specific facts of each case. View "United States v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Between 2017 and 2020, a major energy company and its senior executives allegedly orchestrated a large-scale bribery scheme, funneling approximately $60 million to key Ohio political figures and regulators through a network of shell companies and political action committees. In exchange, the company secured favorable legislation (Ohio House Bill 6), which provided substantial financial benefits, including a $2 billion bailout for its nuclear power plants. The scheme was concealed from shareholders and the public, with the company issuing public statements and regulatory filings that failed to disclose the true nature and risks of its political activities. When the bribery was exposed in 2020, the company’s stock and debt securities plummeted, resulting in significant losses for investors.After the scheme was revealed, investors filed multiple class actions in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, which were consolidated. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, specifically section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, claiming that the company and its executives made material misstatements and omissions that artificially inflated the value of its securities. The district court denied motions to dismiss and later certified a class of investors, holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to a presumption of reliance under Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, and that their damages methodology satisfied the predominance requirement for class certification.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the class certification order. The court held that the district court erred in applying the Affiliated Ute presumption of reliance because the case was primarily based on misrepresentations, not omissions. The Sixth Circuit established a framework for distinguishing between omission- and misrepresentation-based cases and clarified that the Affiliated Ute presumption applies only if a case is primarily based on omissions. The court also found that the district court failed to conduct the required “rigorous analysis” of the plaintiffs’ damages methodology under Comcast Corp. v. Behrend. The Sixth Circuit vacated the class certification order to the extent it relied on the Affiliated Ute presumption and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Owens v. FirstEnergy Corp." on Justia Law

Telecommunications industry groups and associations challenged a rule issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that imposed new data breach reporting requirements on telecommunications carriers and telecommunications relay service (TRS) providers. The rule expanded the definition of a reportable breach to include inadvertent disclosures of customer information and required notification to customers and government entities when breaches involved either customer proprietary network information (CPNI) or personally identifiable information (PII), such as names, Social Security numbers, and biometric data. The petitioners argued that the FCC exceeded its statutory authority and violated the Congressional Review Act (CRA) by issuing a rule they claimed was substantially the same as a prior rule Congress had disapproved.Previously, the FCC had issued a similar privacy rule in 2016, which Congress disapproved under the CRA in 2017, leading the FCC to revert to its earlier, narrower 2007 rules. In 2023, the FCC proposed and, after notice and comment, adopted the new 2024 rule. Multiple industry groups filed petitions for review in several circuit courts, which were consolidated in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.The Sixth Circuit held that the FCC did not have authority under 47 U.S.C. § 222(a) to regulate PII, as that section’s text and structure did not encompass PII. However, the court found that 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) independently authorized the FCC to regulate unjust or unreasonable practices, including data breach notification requirements for PII, as such practices are directly connected to the provision of communication services. The court also held that the FCC had authority under 47 U.S.C. § 225 to apply these requirements to TRS providers. Addressing the CRA, the court concluded that the 2024 rule was not “substantially the same” as the disapproved 2016 rule and thus did not violate the CRA. The court denied the petitions for review, upholding the FCC’s 2024 rule. View "Ohio Telecom Association v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

The defendant was previously convicted of transporting child pornography and, after serving most of his sentence, was released to a halfway house. While there, he engaged in a series of text conversations with his preteen daughter, asking her about his past conviction, her views on sex, and whether she thought there was anything wrong with adults or children engaging in sexual acts, as depicted in pictures or videos. He also instructed her to keep their conversations secret. The defendant’s ex-sister-in-law, who had access to the daughter's phone records, became concerned and forwarded the messages to the FBI. A subsequent investigation of the defendant’s phone, despite his attempts to delete its contents, revealed incriminating text messages, bookmarks to websites with suggestive titles, and 163 images sexualizing children, seven of which were alleged to be child pornography.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied the defendant’s pretrial motions to exclude most of the images and the website bookmarks, finding them relevant to knowledge and intent. The court also denied his motion to dismiss the indictment on First Amendment grounds. At trial, the government presented evidence including the images, text messages, and testimony from the investigating agent and the ex-sister-in-law. The defendant argued that others at the halfway house could have accessed his phone and that he only sought “child erotica,” not child pornography. The jury found him guilty of knowing receipt of child pornography and specifically found the seven images met the statutory definition.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo and held that a rational jury could find the images constituted child pornography. The court also found no error in admitting the website bookmarks or the text messages with the defendant’s daughter, as they were relevant to intent and not unfairly prejudicial. The court rejected both facial and as-applied First Amendment challenges to the statute. The conviction was affirmed. View "United States v. Mercer-Kinser" on Justia Law

An orthopedic surgeon was convicted by a jury in Ohio of two counts of gross sexual imposition and one count of tampering with records, following allegations by two patients of inappropriate conduct during medical examinations. The prosecution’s case included testimony from the alleged victims, peer physicians, and investigators, as well as various exhibits such as interview recordings and medical records. The trial court admitted these exhibits, and the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, resulting in a sentence of jail time, work release, community control, a fine, and sex offender registration.The defendant appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, specifically challenging the proof of sexual gratification and intent to defraud. The appellate court affirmed the convictions, finding that a rational juror could infer the necessary elements from the evidence presented. The Ohio Supreme Court declined to review the case further. The defendant then filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, raising several claims and seeking to supplement the record with additional documents, including trial exhibits. The magistrate judge allowed some supplementation but excluded certain trial exhibits. The district court denied both the motion to expand the record and the habeas petition, concluding that the state court record, including the trial transcript, was sufficient for review.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered whether the district court erred by adjudicating the habeas petition without including all trial exhibits in the record. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court was not required to review every trial exhibit, as long as it had the relevant portions of the record necessary to evaluate the claims. The court found no error in the district court’s process and affirmed the denial of the motion to expand the record. View "Heiney v. Moore" on Justia Law

A group of professional auctioneers in Tennessee, including both licensed and unlicensed individuals, challenged a state law requiring auctioneers to obtain a license before conducting extended-time online auctions. The law, originally enacted in 1967 and updated in 2019 to address online auction formats, exempts certain types of online sales, such as fixed-price listings and timed listings that do not extend based on bidding activity. The plaintiffs, who conduct extended-time online auctions, argued that the licensing requirement infringed on their First Amendment rights by restricting their ability to communicate with potential buyers and craft narratives about auction items.Previously, one of the plaintiffs, McLemore, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, challenging the law under both the First Amendment and the Dormant Commerce Clause. The district court granted summary judgment on the Dormant Commerce Clause claim but did not address the First Amendment issue. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated that decision for lack of standing and remanded with instructions to dismiss. Subsequently, McLemore and additional plaintiffs filed a new lawsuit, focusing on the First Amendment claim. The district court dismissed the case, holding that the law regulated professional conduct rather than speech and applied rational basis review, relying on the Sixth Circuit’s prior decision in Liberty Coins, LLC v. Goodman.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that Tennessee’s licensing requirement for auctioneers regulates economic activity and professional conduct, not speech, and that any burden on speech is incidental. The court applied rational basis review and concluded that the law is rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest in preventing fraud and incompetence in auctioneering. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "McLemore v. Gumucio" on Justia Law

After the collapse of a federally chartered credit union in Ohio in 2010, the National Credit Union Administration Board (the Board) was appointed as liquidating agent. The Board sued Eddy Zai, his wife Tina Zai, and related entities to recover tens of millions of dollars allegedly owed to the credit union. The parties settled, with the Zais agreeing to transfer a promissory note to the Board, which would collect $22 million and then transfer the note to Tina Zai. Years later, Tina Zai alleged that the Board breached the settlement by failing to timely transfer the note after collecting the agreed sum. She, along with Stretford, Ltd., filed suit against the Board for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, without reaching the merits of Zai’s claims. The district court reasoned that the Federal Credit Union Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provision barred the court from hearing the case, as Zai had not exhausted administrative remedies with the Board.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether the district court had jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit held that the Federal Credit Union Act’s jurisdiction-stripping and administrative-exhaustion provisions apply only to claims that arise before the Board’s claims-processing deadline. Because Zai’s claim for breach of the settlement agreement arose years after the deadline, she was not required to exhaust administrative remedies, and the jurisdictional bar did not apply. The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Zai v. National Credit Union Administration Board" on Justia Law

Michael and Susan Mockeridge purchased a remote 40-acre property in northern Michigan, where they installed five prefabricated mini-cabins near their main cabin for family use. After neighbors became concerned that the property was being operated as a public campground, they filed complaints with local authorities. In response, three government officials—Harry Harvey, David Schmidt, and Kenneth Gibson—entered the Mockeridges’ property without a warrant or consent, inspected the mini-cabins and their surroundings, and gathered information regarding potential code violations. The officials’ entry was not via the customary driveway but through adjacent private land and dense woods, and at the time, the cabins were unoccupied.The Mockeridges subsequently received a letter from the county classifying their property as a campground and requiring licensing. After applying for permits and being told they would face penalties for prior unpermitted work, the Mockeridges filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Mockeridges on liability, denied qualified immunity to the officials, and found the only remaining issue was damages. The officials appealed the denial of qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The court held that the officials’ warrantless entry into the curtilage of the Mockeridges’ mini-cabins for the purpose of gathering information about code compliance constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The court further held that the right to be free from such a warrantless search was clearly established at the time of the officials’ conduct. The court dismissed the Mockeridges’ cross-appeal and denied as moot a motion by Alcona County. View "Mockeridge v. Harvey" on Justia Law