Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s “three-strikes rule,” 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), provides that a prisoner accrues a strike when he brings a frivolous lawsuit. After three strikes, the Act prohibits inmates from filing those lawsuits without paying the initial court fee. Simons, a Michigan prisoner, broke a prison window. Prison officials removed money from his commissary account to make repairs. Simons filed a pro se complaint, targeting this seizure of funds as a violation of state and federal law. The district court allowed Simons to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. 1915(b)(1), then screened Simons’s lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. 1915A and rejected Simons’s federal claims on the merits. The court stated the dismissal would count as a “strike.”The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Simon’s challenges to the underlying dismissal lacked merit. The court’s “opinion” calling the dismissal a strike is not a judgment, and will not, alone, prohibit Simons from filing a free lawsuit in the future. Section 1915(g) calls on a later court that has before it a civil action brought by the prisoner to engage in a backward-looking inquiry and determine whether the prisoner “on 3 or more prior occasions” has brought an action or appeal that was “dismissed on the grounds that [it was] frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim.” View "Simons v. Washington" on Justia Law

The government uncovered substantial evidence that Sheckles was a Louisville distributor for a large drug trafficking ring. Sheckles pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the district court’s refusal to suppress much of this evidence.The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction, rejecting arguments that officers did not have “probable cause” for the warrants to track his phone and search his apartments, engaged in an “unreasonable” “seizure” when they stopped his car and detained him, and engaged in an “unreasonable” “search” when they looked through his storage unit. Information in the officers’ affidavit provided a “substantial basis” for the state judge’s finding that probable cause existed to obtain the phone’s location data. The totality of the circumstances permitted the state judge to find probable cause to search this apartment. Officers at least had a “reasonable suspicion” to initiate the stop, after seeing Sheckles leaving an apartment they were about to search, and the handgun they later discovered gave them probable cause to arrest Sheckles at that point. Handcuffing “does not affect the legitimacy of the Terry stop” as long as the facts justify the precaution. The court concluded that a third party had actual authority to consent to the search of the storage unit. View "United States v. Sheckles" on Justia Law

Memphis previously maintained an email Media Advisory List to alert members of the media about newsworthy events and activities. The List included Thomas, the founder, editor, and publisher of MLK50: Justice Through Journalism, an online news website covering issues at “the intersection of poverty, power, and public policy.” Thomas claims that in 2018, she was excluded from the List in retaliation for her news coverage of Mayor Strickland. Thomas alleges that she made multiple requests to be returned to the List and that, at one point, the City’s Chief Communications Officer (Madden) stated: “You have demonstrated, particularly on social media, that you are not objective when it comes to Mayor Strickland.” Thomas’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserted violations of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed Thomas’ claims against Strickland and Madden on other grounds, and later dismissed as moot her claims against the city, finding that the city had ceased relying upon the List to disseminate media advisories and that the process that led to the new media relations policy was “not ad hoc or discretionary.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The city demonstrated that there is no reasonable expectation that it will re-implement the List and established that its change in media relations policy completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the challenged conduct. The change in media relations policy was “legislative-like.” View "Thomas v. City of Memphis" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Kentucky’s Attorney General opened civil price-gouging investigations into Kentucky-based merchants, including at least one member of the Guild that was selling goods to Kentuckians through Amazon’s online marketplace. The Guild challenged the constitutionality of Kentucky’s price-gouging laws as applied to sellers on Amazon, invoking the extraterritoriality doctrine of the dormant commerce clause. Accepting that the Attorney General sought only to enforce the Commonwealth’s price-gouging laws against Kentucky-based sellers in connection with sales to Kentucky consumers through Amazon’s platform, the district court nevertheless granted the Guild a preliminary injunction, concluding that enforcing the laws in connection with Amazon sales would have impermissible extraterritorial effects.The Sixth Circuit vacated, first holding that the Guild is likely to establish direct organizational standing and standing on behalf of its members. This enforcement of Kentucky’s price-gouging laws is unlikely to run afoul of the dormant commerce clause’s extraterritoriality doctrine, which invalidates state laws as per se unconstitutional in the narrow instances where a state expressly or inevitably exceeds its authority and seeks to control wholly out-of-state commerce. The effect on out-of-state commerce of Kentucky’s price-gouging laws depends entirely upon Amazon’s independent decision-making with regard to the structure of its online marketplace, so the application of those laws to Kentucky-based third-party sellers on Amazon in connection with sales to Kentucky consumers is unlikely to offend the extraterritoriality doctrine. View "Online Merchants Guild v. Cameron" on Justia Law

An agency within the Department of Agriculture summarily approved a proposed plan for dry-bean crop insurance in Michigan based upon the mistaken belief that the terms of the proposed endorsement for the Michigan policy were identical to the terms of the endorsement for a Minnesota policy that it had approved the year before. The terms of the two endorsements were different because the Michigan endorsement contained a different pricing mechanism for determining the beans’ “harvest price” than the mechanism the agency had approved as part of the Minnesota endorsement. That difference later caused significant harm to Michigan farmers who had purchased the coverage, some of whom filed suit. In the district court, the government compounded the agency’s mistake when it mistakenly told the district court that the pricing mechanisms in the Michigan and Minnesota endorsements were the same. Based in part upon that representation, the district court granted the government summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that “the government’s brief unhelpfully elides both mistakes rather than acknowledge them but Plaintiffs’ counsel on appeal has made the existence of those mistakes clear enough.” The agency violated 7 C.F.R. 400.701 when it found that the Michigan proposal presented only “non-significant changes” to the Minnesota one; the mistake was apparently inadvertent. View "Ackerman v. United States Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

In 2016, Harvey pleaded guilty to distributing a controlled substance. He was sentenced to 156 months’ imprisonment. Harvey filed an unsuccessful section 2255 motion for habeas corpus relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. On June 12, 2020, Harvey sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that “[t]he ongoing coronavirus pandemic presents extraordinary and compelling reasons where a defendant is susceptible to infection,” he cited his “chronic bronchitis” and the spread of COVID-19 cases at the facility in which he was incarcerated.The district court denied Harvey’s motion without holding a hearing. The one-page form stated that the court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and applicable Sentencing Commission policy statement. A checked box stated: “DENIED after complete review of the motion on the merits.” Weeks later, the court filed a five-page “OPINION." The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The form order was not necessarily procedurally defective; the facts in the record provide a reasonable basis for the denial of Harvey’s motion. Harvey admitted “that he had been selling drugs for over a year”; the prosecutor asserted at sentencing that Harvey’s house contained “a gun” and “ammunition”; Harvey had earlier drug-related convictions and had served only about 25% of his custodial sentence. The record can be read to support the conclusion that section 3553(a) did not favor Harvey’s release. View "United States v. Harvey" on Justia Law

In May 2017, Jackson was convicted of three counts of carjacking and three counts of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). While Jackson’s appeal was pending, Congress enacted the First Step Act. Three months later, the Sixth Circuit vacated one of his section 924(c) convictions and remanded for resentencing. The district court determined that the First Step Act’s amendments to section 924(c) apply retroactively to someone who, like Jackson, had his sentence vacated after the Act became law and sentenced him accordingly, reducing the 32-year mandatory minimum sentences he faced under section 924(c) to 14 years. Because Jackson no longer faced 57 years of mandatory minimum sentences, the district court increased his sentence for the three carjackings from 87 months’ imprisonment to 108 months.The Sixth Circuit vacated. The district court should not have applied the amended section 924(c), which applies for a defendant on whom “a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of” December 21, 2018. As of that day, a sentence had been imposed on Jackson. That the first sentence was later vacated does not alter Jackson’s status on the day the First Step Act became law. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Torres started working for Precision in 2011. He was not then legally authorized to work in the U.S. but obtained work authorization about five months later. Torres listed a fake Social Security number on a tax form when he started the job. In May 2012, Torres injured his back at work. Precision did not pay all of the doctor's bills. Torres pursued a workers’ compensation claim. After receiving a September 2011 call from Torres’s lawyer, supervisors confronted Torres. Torres recorded their threatening and profanity-laced statements. Torres was immediately terminated.Torres sued, claiming Precision violated Tennessee law by firing him in retaliation for making a workers’ compensation claim. The district court rejected the claim, citing the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. On remand, the district court found Precision liable for retaliatory discharge and held that federal law did not preempt a damage award. The court awarded Torres backpay, compensatory damages for emotional distress, and punitive damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Federal law makes it illegal to employ undocumented aliens, but Tennessee’s workers’ compensation law protects them. Because of federal law, the company cannot be required to pay lost wages that the alien was not allowed to earn; the employer is liable for wages the employee could have lawfully received, and for damages unrelated to the employee’s immigration status. View "Torres v. Precision Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

Jackson and Combs pleaded guilty to participating in a cocaine distribution ring. Jackson was sentenced to 192 months’ imprisonment due to his role as a leader in the drug-distribution conspiracy, U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a).. Combs was sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment due to his career-offender status, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to Jackson, who recruited and supervised participants and held a substantial amount of the cash proceeds. The court also rejected Jackson's challenge to the mandatory-minimum 20-year sentence he received in accordance with 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), due to his prior marijuana-trafficking conviction.The court initially held that Combs’s Kentucky trafficking offense categorically qualified as a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines; U.S.S.G. 4B1.2 and Combs’s designation as a career offender. The court rejected Combs’s argument that distribution requires a commercial aspect. In an amended opinion, the Sixth Circuit cited intervening circuit precedent and reversed the career-offender finding for Combs. Conspiracy to distribute controlled substances is not a controlled substances offense under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(b). View "United States v. Combs" on Justia Law

Strickland, an African-American Detroit Police Officer since 2008, claims that he has been subjected to race-based harassment throughout his tenure. He cited several incidents, social media posts, and Department reports and having been denied desired shift assignments and training in favor of white officers. A Committee on Race and Equality report concluded that “the department has a growing racial problem” and that African-American officers who complained were retaliated against. On January 22, 2017, off-duty, Strickland pulled into a gas station that, unbeknownst to him, was the site of an active police investigation of a reported incendiary device. He could not see the firetrucks or police cars. When Strickland saw a uniformed sergeant emerge from the fog, he immediately identified himself as an officer but was handcuffed in a way that was extremely tight. A sergeant led him away, belittling him in front of other officers. Strickland was later diagnosed with a bilateral wrist contusion and was suspended for three days without pay. Strickland complained. After an investigation, Strickland was charged with three code of conduct violations.Strickland sued, alleging hostile workplace and illegal retaliation (Title VII), and under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming an unlawful search and seizure and excessive force. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the hostile work environment claim but reversed the grant of qualified immunity to one officer on the excessive force claim and summary judgment in favor of the city on the retaliation claim. View "Strickland v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law