Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Meriwether, a Shawnee State University professor, is a devout Christian. In 2016, Shawnee told faculty to refer to students by their preferred pronouns. Meriwether’s department chair was dismissive of Meriwether’s concerns and religious beliefs. In 2018, Meriwether called on “Doe,” saying "Yes, sir." According to Meriwether, “no one . . . would have assumed that [Doe] was female.” Doe demanded that Meriwether “refer to [Doe] as a woman.” Meriwether believed that his sincerely-held religious beliefs prevented him from communicating messages about gender identity that he believes to be false. Doe became threatening. Meriwether reported the incident. Meriwether was advised to “eliminate all sex-based references.” Meriwether later accidentally referred to Doe as “Mr.” before immediately correcting himself. Doe again complained. Meriwether subsequently used only Doe’s last name, and awarded Doe a high grade. Meriwether continued to seek accommodation of his religious views; Shawnee would not compromise. The Title IX office concluded that Meriwether created a hostile environment without mentioning Meriwether’s religious beliefs. Shawnee placed a warning in Meriwether’s file. The faculty union filed an unsuccessful grievance.The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Meriwether’s suit. Meriwether has plausibly alleged that Shawnee violated his First Amendment rights by compelling his speech or silence and casting a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. Meriwether was speaking on a matter of public concern; Shawnee’s interest in punishing Meriwether’s speech is comparatively weak. Shawnee exhibited hostility to his religious beliefs and irregularities in its adjudication and investigation processes permit a plausible inference of non-neutrality. View "Meriwether v. Hartop" on Justia Law

In 2018, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) promulgated a rule that classified bump stocks as machine guns, reversing its previous position. Bump stocks are devices designed to assist the shooter in “bump firing,” a technique that increases a semiautomatic firearm’s rate of fire. In a challenge to the rule, the district court held that the ATF’s interpretation was entitled to Chevron deference and that the classification of bump stocks as machine guns was “a permissible interpretation” of 26 U.S.C. 5845(b). The court denied a preliminary injunction.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Section 5845(b)'s definition of a machine gun applies to a machine-gun ban carrying criminal culpability and penalties; an agency’s interpretation of a criminal statute is not entitled to Chevron deference. Deference to an agency’s interpretation of a criminal statute directly conflicts with the rule of lenity, would violate the Constitution’s separation of powers, and would raise individual liberty and fair notice concerns. ATF’s rule is not the best interpretation of section 5845(b); “single function of the trigger” refers to the mechanical process of the trigger and a bump stock does not enable a semiautomatic firearm to fire more than one shot each time the trigger is pulled. View "Gun Owners of America, Inc. v. Garland" on Justia Law

Curaden AG, a Swiss entity, manufactures toothbrushes. Curaden USA, an Ohio corporation headquartered in Arizona, is a Curaden AG subsidiary and promotes Curaden AG products throughout the U.S. The two companies had not executed the standard written distribution agreement that typically governs the practices of Curaden AG’s subsidiary distributors. Curaden USA never presented its advertising materials to Curaden AG for review. Curaden USA purchased a list of thousands of dental professionals’ fax numbers and created the fax advertisements at issue, which displayed Curaden USA’s contact information without mention of Curaden AG. Curaden USA hired companies to send the faxes and paid for the transmission. Lyngaas, a Livonia dentist who had received two Curaden USA faxes, filed a purported class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that Lyngaas could not pierce the corporate veil to hold Curaden AG liable for Curaden USA’s action, that faxes received by a computer over a telephone line violated the TCPA, that it had personal jurisdiction over both Curaden entities, that Curaden USA violated the TCPA but that Curaden AG was not liable as a “sender,” and that Lyngaas’s evidence and expert-witness testimony concerning the total number of faxes successfully sent were inadmissible due to unauthenticated fax records. A claims-administration process was established for class members to verify their receipt of the unsolicited fax advertisements. View "Lyngaas v. Curaden AG" on Justia Law

In 2002, Nolan’s employer, DTE, created a cash balance pension plan and invited its existing employees to transfer from their traditional defined benefit plan to the new plan. Nolan accepted. When she retired in 2017, DTE told Nolan that her monthly pension benefit would be what she had accrued as of 2002 under the old plan, despite her participation in the new cash balance plan. Nolan brought a class action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001(a)–(b), alleging that DTE made misleading promises and failed to explain the new plan’s risks. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, finding Nolan’s procedural claim untimely. Even accepting Nolan’s allegations as true, Nolan failed to state a claim under ERISA section 204(h); DTE satisfied the requirement to make a good faith effort to comply even though the notice provided to employees was ultimately inadequate under ERISA section 102. Reversing in part, the court found that Nolan stated a plausible claim that DTE’s notice was defective under section 102 because it failed to describe the plan in a manner understandable to the average participant that employees transferring to the new plan would not actually receive any new benefits if the benefit accrued under the new plan did not catch up to their frozen traditional plan benefit or the effect that interest rates could have on depreciating the already-earned benefits during conversion. View "Nolan v. Detroit Edison Co." on Justia Law

Wright, a member of a motorcycle gang, distributed cocaine. When Wright’s co-conspirator, Moore, fought with other members of the conspiracy, Wright agreed to kill him for $50,000, drove to Ohio, and shot Moore in the head while he slept. Wright and his co-conspirators used a welding torch to destroy evidence, which they dumped into Lake Huron. Wright later helped steal several airplanes because he and his co-conspirators had stolen drugs belonging to the Medellín Cartel and needed to repay them. One plane belonged to the U.S. Forestry Service. Federal agents eventually arrested Wright and his co-conspirators. The co-conspirators cooperated; Wright was convicted of murder for hire, interstate travel in aid of a violent crime, and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine and was sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment, plus five years.Nineteen years into his sentence, Wright sought compassionate release, citing the COVID-19 pandemic and health problems, including obesity, cataracts, diabetes, end-stage renal disease, and peripheral vascular disease, which has led to several amputations. Collectively, the illnesses are terminal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors did not warrant relief. The district court acknowledged Wright’s recent remorse, health problems, and rehabilitative efforts, but found that other considerations— his criminal history and disciplinary violations—outweighed these factors. View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law

In 2012, Manso-Zamora was convicted of conspiring to commit Hobbs Act robbery, three Hobbs Act robberies, and three counts of possessing and brandishing or discharging a firearm in furtherance of those robberies, and was sentenced to 776 months' imprisonment. In 2020, Manso-Zamora sought release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1), asserting that he was at high risk of severe illness or death from COVID-19. He was hospitalized for several weeks in 2019 for bone marrow aplastic anemia, inflammatory bowel disease, and low white blood cells and platelets. He noted his rehabilitation efforts and that, had he been sentenced under the 2018 First Step Act, he would not have been subject to mandatory consecutive 300-month sentences for his firearm convictions. The district court denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit allowed appointed counsel to withdraw and directed the clerk to appoint new counsel, then declined to consider Manso-Zamora’s pro se motions to voluntarily dismiss his appeal and to appoint a medical expert. Prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel in collateral post-conviction proceedings or in section 3582(c) proceedings. The "Anders" procedures are not required in section 3582(c) proceedings. Counsel is entitled to withdraw to honor his ethical obligation not to pursue a claim that he honestly believes to be frivolous. Given that Manso-Zamora and his attorney “disagree” about his medical conditions, it would be “unreasonable” to compel that attorney to continue providing services. View "United States v. Manso-Zamora" on Justia Law

Wills was indicted for various methamphetamine-trafficking offenses. The government gave notice under 21 U.S.C. 851(a)(1) of its intent to seek an enhanced sentence based on Wills’s prior felony drug conviction. Wills pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and 846. The district court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence, 240 months’ imprisonment.After exhausting his administrative remedies, Wills sought compassionate release or a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A) on the basis of “extraordinary or compelling circumstances.” Wills asserted that, if sentenced today, he would not be subject to the 20-year mandatory minimum sentence because his prior felony drug conviction would not qualify as a “serious drug felony” under section 401 of the First Step Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 5194. Denying Wills’s motion, the district court pointed out that section 401 does not apply retroactively. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that other courts have found that the First Step Act’s amendment of the sentence enhancement provisions constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason to warrant a sentence reduction. View "United States v. Wills" on Justia Law

Maxwell was convicted of conspiring to distribute crack cocaine and heroin. The crack-cocaine offense then generated a sentencing range of 20 years to life and the heroin offense generated a range of 10 years to life, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)–(B). Applying the 2009 Guidelines, the court treated Maxwell as a career offender and sentenced Maxwell to 30 years. While Maxwell’s appeal was pending, the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 increased the quantity of crack cocaine needed to trigger a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence but did not apply retroactively. Maxwell sought collateral relief. The Sixth Circuit ruled that his trial attorney violated Maxwell’s rights when he failed to argue that the two conspiracy counts were multiplicitous.On remand, the district court vacated Maxwell’s heroin conviction and imposed a 30-year sentence on the cocaine conviction alone. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In 2018, the First Step Act authorized courts to lower sentences imposed for crack-cocaine offenses “as if” the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act had been the law during the original sentencing. Maxwell unsuccessfully moved for a sentence reduction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Fair Sentencing Act does not require plenary resentencing hearings and does not expressly permit a court to reduce a sentence based on other intervening changes in the law, such as those concerning career offender status. Operating within its broad discretion, the court considered and rejected each of Maxwell’s arguments. View "United States v. Maxwell" on Justia Law

Lopez, a citizen of Guatemala, entered the U.S. in the 1990s without admission or parole. In 2003, the government charged her with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and sent Lopez a Notice to Appear that contained a warning in English that if she failed to attend the hearing, the IJ could order her removal, and she might be arrested as a result. Lopez failed to appear at her removal hearing. The IJ ordered her removal in absentia. Immigration officials detained Lopez a few years later. In 2017, Lopez moved to reopen her removal proceedings, claiming that she was the derivative beneficiary of her husband’s pending application for protection under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA).The IJ denied Lopez’s motion, finding Lopez’s NACARA-based claims untimely and that her motion failed to include required documents. The IJ also declined to exercise its discretionary authority to sua sponte reopen Lopez’s removal proceedings. The BIA affirmed, rejecting Lopez’s additional argument on appeal that the 2004 removal order should be rescinded because the Notice to Appear was delivered in English, not in her native language. The Seventh Circuit rejected a petition for review and dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, Lopez’s challenge to the BIA’s decision not to sua sponte reopen her case under its discretionary authority, View "Lopez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Duran transported drugs from California to Ohio on a bus. Duran carried 10 packages of methamphetamine, a total of 4,427 grams. The DEA intercepted Duran, who agreed to cooperate and allowed the government to copy calls, texts, and data from her cellphone. When officers surrounded Rosales, Duran’s contact, in a parking lot, Rosales destroyed his cell phone. Officers found cash totaling $6,962 in Rosales’ pocket. Officers searched his pickup truck and found money orders that matched details sent to Duran. In Rosales’ home, officers found $9,500 in cash. No controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, or drug ledgers were found. The court instructed the jury to find the quantity of drugs involved in the conspiracy as a whole, rather than just the amount that was foreseeable to Rosales. The jury convicted Rosales on conspiracy and attempt to possess counts and found that the conspiracy involved 4,427 grams of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1); 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). The court gave a two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice because Rosales threw his cellphone down during his arrest but departed down from the Guidelines range and imposed a sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions. There was sufficient evidence to convict on both counts. The court erred in failing to provide defendant-specific jury instructions but the error was harmless because it could not have contributed to a different result. The court remanded for the limited purpose of reconsidering whether the obstruction of justice enhancement applies after making the necessary factual findings. View "United States v. Rosales" on Justia Law