Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A neighbor called 911, telling the dispatcher that Gissantaner, a convicted felon, had a gun. Responding officers found a pistol in Gissantaner’s house, inside a chest belonging to Gissantaner’s roommate. When the government charged Gissantaner with possessing a firearm as a felon, it used DNA-sorting evidence, "STRmix," to link Gissantaner to the gun. Gissantaner moved to exclude the evidence as unreliable under Evidence Rule 702. Gissantaner and the government retained experts, who took competing positions. The district court appointed two experts of its own: One said that STRmix evidence is reliable in general and as applied to this case; the other said it is reliable in general but not as applied to this case.In an interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit applied the “Daubert” factors and held that the evidence should be admitted. The record in this case provides a long proof that STRmix is testable and refutable. At the time of the Daubert hearing in the district court, more than 50 published peer-reviewed articles had addressed STRmix. According to one expert, STRmix is the “most tested and most . . . peer reviewed” probabilistic genotyping software available. STRmix has a low error rate and has garnered wide use in forensic laboratories across the country. View "United States v. Gissantaner" on Justia Law

Stewart, a co-owner of RRL and president of its subsidiary, IHT, formed a potential competitor. She was removed from the presidency, then launched a smear campaign against her replacement. RRL's other members voted to buy out her ownership interest. Stewart refused to sell her membership units. RRL sued. Stewart counterclaimed. As part of the buyout, RRL cut off Stewart’s health- and life insurance benefits. Stewart alleged that she remained an active member of RRL and was entitled to those benefits. An arbitration panel sided with RRL on all issues and ordered Stewart to sell her membership units and to release all claims against RRL and its affiliates “from the beginning of the world” to that day. The state court affirmed.During the arbitration, Stewart and her son filed this lawsuit, claiming that IHT violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1161–1163. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice on alternative grounds: Stewart had released all her claims and res judicata barred her from relitigating her removal from RRL and discontinued benefits. On appeal, the Stewarts challenged only whether Stewart released all of her claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Stewarts forfeited any right to challenge the res judicata ruling. Even if Stewart’s claims were not released, the res judicata conclusion would still stand. The Stewarts needed to win two arguments for reversal of the dismissal. View "Stewart v. IHT Insurance Agency Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Swiger accepted a $1200 loan from online lender Plain Green, an entity owned by and organized under the laws of the Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy’s Reservation, Montana. She describes Rees as the “mastermind” behind a "rent-a-tribe" scheme, alleging that he and his company used Plain Green's tribal sovereign immunity as a front to shield them from state and federal law. When Swiger signed the loan contract, she affirmed that Plain Green enjoys “immun[ity] from suit in any court,” and that the loan “shall be governed by the laws of the tribe,” not the laws of any state. She agreed to binding arbitration under tribal law, subject to review only in tribal court. The provision covers “any issue concerning the validity, enforceability, or scope of this Agreement or this Agreement to Arbitrate.” Seven months after accepting the loan, Swiger alleged that she repaid $1170.54 but still owed $1922.37.Swiger sued, citing Michigan and federal law, including the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and consumer protection laws. The district court concluded that the enforceability of the arbitration agreement “has already been litigated, and decided against Rees, in a similar case commenced in Vermont.” The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to stay the case pending arbitration. Swiger’s arbitration agreement includes an unchallenged provision delegating the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator. The district court exceeded its authority when it found the agreement unenforceable View "Swiger v. Rosette" on Justia Law

Riccardi, a postal employee, pleaded guilty to stealing 1,505 gift cards from the mail. The cards had an average value of about $35, a total value of about $47,000. The Sentencing Guidelines directed an increase in Riccardi’s guidelines range based on the amount of the “loss,” U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1) but does not define “loss.” The court used a $500 minimum loss amount for each gift card no matter its actual value or the victim’s actual harm, based on the Sentencing Commission’s commentary to section 2B1.1, providing that the loss “shall be not less than $500” for each “unauthorized access device." The calculation resulted in a loss amount of $752,500, and a guidelines range of 46-57 months’ imprisonment. The court imposed a 56-month sentence and ordered Riccardi to pay $89,102 in restitution, representing $42,102 in cash found at her home and the value of the gift cards.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Guidelines commentary may only interpret, not add to, the guidelines; even if there is some ambiguity in the use of the word “loss,” the commentary’s bright-line rule requiring a $500 loss amount for every gift card does not fall “within the zone of ambiguity.” This bright-line rule is not a reasonable interpretation of, as opposed to an improper expansion beyond, section 2B1.1’s text. View "United States v. Riccardi" on Justia Law

Kentucky Governor Beshear’s COVID-19 response included a “Mass Gathering Order” that prevented groups of more than 10 people from assembling for purposes including community, civic, public, leisure, faith-based, or sporting events; parades; concerts; festivals; conventions; fundraisers; and similar activities.” Locations permitted to operate normally included airports, bus and train stations, medical facilities, libraries, shopping centers, or "other spaces where persons may be in transit” and “typical office environments, factories, or retail or grocery stores.” The ban on faith-based gatherings was enjoined in previous litigation.Plaintiffs alleged that the Order, facially and as applied, violated their First Amendment rights to free speech and assembly. While Governor Beshear threatened the plaintiffs with prosecution for holding a mass gathering at the state capitol to express their opposition to his COVID-19-related restrictions, he welcomed a large group of Black Lives Matter protestors to the capitol and addressed those protestors, despite their violation of the Order. The district court preliminarily enjoined the Order's enforcement. Governor Beshear withdrew the Order. The Sixth Circuit held that the withdrawal rendered the appeal moot. To the extent that the plaintiffs claim that a threat of prosecution for their past violations keeps the case alive, the court remanded for the district court to determine whether further relief is proper. View "Ramsek v. Beshear" on Justia Law

Braden and Strong used the Tennessee state courts to resolve the dissolution of their business partnership. During that process, Strong believed she was the victim of legal malpractice. She hired the Parrish Law Firm to represent her in a lawsuit against her original attorney. Strong’s malpractice case was later dismissed when the Parrish Firm did not comply with discovery deadlines. Strong assigned some of her rights in the partnership dissolution action to the Parrish Firm for costs and expenses in the malpractice action. When the Parrish Firm sued to recover $116,316 under the assignment, Strong filed counterclaims, which were resolved in state court. A jury awarded Strong $2,293,878.70. The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed. The Firm filed suit in federal court, seeking a declaratory judgment, alleging that the Tennessee Court of Appeals judges made false statements in a judicial opinion violating its rights to a “fair trial” under the Due Process Clause and “to access justice” under the Equal Protection Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit and directed the Firm and its counsel to show cause why sanctions should not be assessed. The suit is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; the complaint essentially sought another round of state appellate review. The complaint failed to present a justiciable case or controversy. Federal courts “are not in the business of pronouncing that past actions which have no demonstrable continuing effect were right or wrong.” View "Larry E. Parrish, P.C. v. Bennett" on Justia Law

In 1994, Kendrick fatally shot his wife outside a Chattanooga gas station. He insisted that his rifle had malfunctioned and fired without Kendrick pulling the trigger. Before trial, officer Miller accidentally shot himself in the foot while handling the rifle, A jury convicted Kendrick of first-degree murder. In his petition for state post-conviction relief, Kendrick raised 77 claims alleging either ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) or prosecutorial misconduct. He succeeded in the Court of Criminal Appeals on two IAC claims. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed as to both, holding that counsel’s decision not to adduce the testimony of a firearms expert was not constitutionally deficient performance nor was counsel’s failure to introduce Miller's favorable hearsay statements under the excited utterance exception.In federal habeas proceedings, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The Tennessee Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent. Kendrick’s counsel was not constitutionally deficient in failing to admit Miller’s “excited utterance” statements that he did not pull the trigger when he shot himself but “took great pains to inform the jury that the weapon apparently misfired’ for Miller. It was within the bounds of a reasonable judicial determination for the state court to conclude that defense counsel could follow a strategy that did not require the use of firearms experts. View "Kendrick v. Parris" on Justia Law

Redbubble operates a global online marketplace. Around 600,000 independent artists, not employed by Redbubble, upload images onto Redbubble’s interface. Consumers scroll through those images and order customized items. Once a consumer places an order, Redbubble notifies the artist and arranges the manufacturing and shipping of the product with independent third parties. Redbubble never takes title to any product shown on its website and does not design, manufacture, or handle these products. The shipped packages bear Redbubble's logo. Redbubble handles customer service, including returns. Redbubble markets goods listed on its website as Redbubble products; for instance, it provides instructions on how to care for “Redbubble garments.” Customers often receive goods from Redbubble’s marketplace in Redbubble packaging.Some of Redbubble’s artists uploaded trademark-infringing images that appeared on Redbubble’s website; consumers paid Redbubble to receive products bearing images trademarked by OSU. Redbubble’s user agreement states that trademark holders, and not Redbubble, bear the burden of monitoring and redressing trademark violations. Redbubble did not remove the offending products from its website. OSU sued, alleging trademark infringement, counterfeiting, and unfair competition under the Lanham Act, and Ohio’s right-of-publicity law. The district court granted Redbubble summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Redbubble’s marketplace involves creating Redbubble products and garments that would not have existed but for Redbubble’s enterprise. The district court erred by entering summary judgment under an overly narrow reading of the Lanham Act. View "The Ohio State University v. Redbubble, Inc." on Justia Law

John Doe was expelled from the Michigan State University College of Human Medicine (CHM) for allegedly sexually assaulting two women, Roe 1 and Roe 2, on the night of the school’s formal dance. An outside consultant had determined that the evidence supported a finding that Doe had sexually assaulted the women. CHM convened a panel, which affirmed those findings without an in-person hearing. While this process was ongoing, the Sixth Circuit held that universities must offer an in-person hearing with cross-examination in cases where the fact-finder’s determination depends on witness credibility.CHM then gave Doe an in-person hearing, conducted over the course of three days before a Resolution Officer selected by the university. Doe was permitted to testify and, through his attorney, to cross-examine Roe 1 and Roe 2. The Resolution Officer did not require Roe 1 to answer every question that Doe’s attorney posed. Both Doe and his attorney were present throughout the entire hearing. After considering the credibility of the witnesses, the Resolution Officer again found that the evidence supported a finding that Doe had sexually assaulted the women.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Doe’s suit alleging violations of the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and Title IX. Doe received ample due process throughout the course of his three-day hearing. View "Doe v. Michigan State University" on Justia Law

In 2004, Kimball was convicted of multiple drug-trafficking, weapons, money-laundering offenses, soliciting murder, witness tampering, and obstruction of justice. He was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment plus 15 years. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In April 2020, Kimball sought compassionate release, asserting that there were extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting compassionate release because he is at high risk of severe illness or death from COVID-19 based on his age (67) and medical conditions (hypertension, heart problems, high cholesterol, and gout) and that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors weighed in favor of release.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, rejecting Kimball’s argument that the time he has already served—approximately 17 years—is sufficient to serve the section 3553(a) goals because his offense did not involve any “actual violence” and he is statistically unlikely to re-offend based on his age. The court noted that when it affirmed his effective life sentence, he was the “undisputed kingpin and mastermind” of a “massive cocaine-trafficking conspiracy.” The district court’s order noted that its decision rested at least in part on the section 3553(a) factors; courts may deny relief under those factors “even if ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reasons would otherwise justify relief.” Even if the district court “mistakenly limited itself to the commentary’s list of extraordinary and compelling reasons," that would not entitle him to relief. View "United States v. Kimball" on Justia Law