Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The companies (Louisville) own and operate electric generation, transmission, and distribution facilities in Kentucky and Virginia; about 20 years ago, they joined MISO, which operates across 15 states (including Kentucky). Customers pay a single rate for access to transmission lines throughout the MISO service territory even if those lines are owned by multiple utilities. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approved a merger between the companies.The Commission later approved Louisville's withdrawal from MISO, requiring Louisville to provide its wholesale customers protections like those they enjoyed through MISO so that a transmission of energy from a within-MISO generator to the customer’s facilities would incur only one charge. Once Louisville withdrew, its wholesale customers could face two charges (pancaking): one from MISO for the trip from the power plant to the MISO/Louisville border, then another from Louisville for the trip to the final destination. Louisville contracted with its wholesale customers accordingly, including Owensboro’s municipally-owned utility. To secure backup service in case its coal-fired plant suffered outages, Owensboro bought reservations of transmission rights from MISO and another within-MISO generator and asked Louisville to absorb the costs, citing Louisville’s promise to “shield” wholesale customers from pancaking of transmission charges for certain transactions in which they purchased electricity from a within-MISO source for delivery in Louisville’s territory. Louisville refused,Owensboro brought a complaint before the Commission, 16 U.S.C. 825e. The Commission agreed that the contract required Louisville to absorb all the costs. The Sixth Circuit vacated. In "a straightforward case of contract interpretation," the Commission did not address the operative text but treated the matter as an invitation to make complex policy choices. View "Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

To advertise its nearby adult bookstore, Lion’s Den displays a billboard, affixed to a tractor-trailer, on a neighbor’s property. Kentucky’s Billboard Act prohibits such off-site billboards if the advertisement is not securely affixed to the ground, the sign is attached to a mobile structure, and no permit has been obtained. None of these requirements applies to an on-site billboard advertisement. The Act applies equally to commercial and non-commercial speech on billboards.In a First Amendment challenge to the Act, the Sixth Circuit affirmed an injunction, prohibiting the Commonwealth from enforcing its law. The Act regulates commercial and non-commercial speech on content-based grounds by distinguishing between messages concerning on-site activities and those concerning off-site activities. The court applied strict scrutiny and held that the Act is not tailored to achieve Kentucky’s purported interests in safety and aesthetics. Kentucky has offered no reason to believe that on-site signs pose a greater threat to safety than do off-site signs and billboards are a "greater eyesore." View "L.D. Management Co. v. Gray" on Justia Law

Reels operated a Cleveland drug-trafficking ring and regularly purchased large amounts of heroin, reselling the drug in smaller quantities. Reels and Wheat were social acquaintances. By phone, Wheat told Reels that he had come across “something” in Reels’s “field.” They met at a gas station; Wheat gave Reels a free “sample” of about .3 grams of heroin. Reels had a customer test the sample but ultimately did not purchase any heroin from Wheat. The two had no further interactions.Before that meeting, Reels had unwittingly sold large amounts of drugs to DEA confidential informants. DEA was tracking Reels’s movements and conversations. Weeks after Reels’s interaction with Wheat, officers executed search warrants at Reels’s properties, recovered large amounts of drugs, and charged Reels and others, including Wheat. Wheat was charged with a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute at least 100 grams of heroin and 40 grams of fentanyl (with a minimum five-year sentence. 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 846) and with using a communication facility in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The government withdrew the drug-quantity allegation. Convicted on both counts, Wheat received an above-guidelines 27-month sentence.The Sixth Circuit reversed Wheat’s conspiracy conviction. A buyer-seller agreement alone does not establish a section 846 “conspiracy.” The government presented overwhelming evidence that Reels operated a drug distribution scheme but Reels was not on trial. The logic underlying the buyer-seller exception extends to Wheat’s agreement to distribute a sample to Reels. The government did not present additional evidence of a broader agreement between the two to distribute heroin to third parties. The court upheld the “communication facility” conviction. View "United States v. Wheat" on Justia Law

Hanna was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. He exhausted state remedies, then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, which the district court denied in 2009. The Sixth Circuit rejected Hanna’s claim that he was deprived of effective assistance in mitigation because his counsel failed to present a psychologist to testify about organic neurological defects and his troubled childhood. In 2019, Hanna sought leave to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition and moved to remand his pending petition, arguing that his second-in-time petition is not successive under section 2244(b).The Sixth Circuit denied both requests, rejecting Hanna’s argument that his new claims could not have been raised in his first petition because his previous habeas counsel suffered a conflict of interest. Hanna’s underlying claims of ineffective assistance in mitigation were raised in the previous petition. Hanna seeks to add new evidence. Hanna has also not shown that he meets the requirements of section 2244(b)(2). Hanna does not claim that his new petition relies on a new rule of constitutional law; he seeks an evidentiary hearing to prove certain facts and all of his claims relate to trial counsel’s representation in mitigation. Mitigation evidence categorically does not meet section 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii)’s requirement that the new facts establish actual innocence. In addition, Hanna’s claims were procedurally defaulted or have been adjudicated in unchallenged state court decisions. View "In re Hanna" on Justia Law

The Laniers were charged with a scheme to fraudulently obtain government contracts. During deliberations, a juror contacted assistant district attorney Nelson—a social acquaintance, not involved with the Laniers's case. Nelson informed the district judge that Juror 11 called her and said that there was a “problem” with the deliberations. No juror alerted court personnel to any problems. Convicted, the Laniers unsuccessfully requested to interview the jurors and moved for a mistrial. No one interviewed the jurors nor questioned Nelson in open court. The Sixth Circuit remanded for a Remmer hearing in 2017.On remand, the district court summoned the jurors and Nelson, ordering them not to discuss or research the case. Juror 11 nonetheless texted Nelson, suggesting that the juror had researched the case online. Nelson reported the texts to the district judge, who failed to notify the Laniers but ordered Juror 11 to preserve her texts and web-browsing history. Weeks later, the court ordered Juror 11 to turn over her phone and laptop and asked his IT staffer and law clerk to examine the devices. They discovered that the web-browsing data had been deleted. The Laniers unsuccessfully sought a full forensic exam. After Sixth Circuit intervention, the court allowed the Laniers’ expert to forensically examine the devices. Juror 11 revealed that she had discarded her phone months earlier; any potentially deleted texts and web-browsing data are unrecoverable.The district court denied the Laniers’ motions for a new trial. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Laniers were deprived of a “meaningful opportunity” to demonstrate juror bias and are entitled to a new trial to be held before another district judge. View "United States v. Lanier" on Justia Law

Through several corporations, members of the Boersen family have farmed in Michigan for several generations. After 2016's poor crop, their corporate entities could not cover their debts. One creditor, Helena, obtained a nearly 15-million-dollar judgment against the Boersen entities and family members who ran them. Much of the farm equipment was repossessed and, unable to obtain financing, the Boersens discontinued farming until 1999, when family members Stacy and Nick formed new entities, secured financing to lease the land and remaining equipment, and resumed farming. Because the original defendants could not pay their debt, Helena sued Stacy and Nick and their new companies.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The leases do not transfer the debtors’ assets; none of the involved entities owes any money to Helena. Stacy and Nick’s use of the family farm’s production history to obtain crop insurance does not constitute a “transfer of assets.” Neither Stacy nor Nick was an owner, manager, or shareholder of any of the Boersen entities covered by the judgment; no Boersen legacy owner or guarantor serves as an officer of or is otherwise employed by, either new company. No original Boersen defendant received anything of value from the new companies other than fair market value payments on leases. Nor was either new company used to commit a wrong against Helena. View "Helena Agri-Enterprises, LLC v. Great Lakes Grain, LLC" on Justia Law

Ohio law mandates that the Ohio Elections Commission (OEC) be composed of three members from each of the top two political parties in the state, and an additional seventh member who cannot have any political affiliation, Ohio Rev. Code 3517.152(A)(1). The Libertarian Party of Ohio and its former chairman challenged the law as violating their First Amendment right to associate for political purposes.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of the suit. The court applied the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, which prevents the government from denying a benefit on the basis of a person’s constitutionally protected speech or associations. Under precedent involving government employment, the issue is “whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.” OEC Commissioners fall within the category of positions that are filled by balancing out political party representation, or that are filled by balancing out selections made by different governmental agents or bodies. It is “appropriate” for Ohio to consider political affiliation to serve its stated interest in maintaining partisan balance among the members of the OEC. View "Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Wilhem" on Justia Law

Small and Johnson were indicted for aiding and abetting and conspiracy to commit kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1), (c). Spoon, age 73, testified that she was alone when she noticed a black Chevrolet Malibu pull into her driveway. Small and Johnson ran into her Tennessee home, held Spoon at gunpoint, bound her feet and hands together, and took Spoon’s valuables. Spoon was captive for 20-25 minutes before they left. Spoon freed herself and called the authorities. Mercer County, West Virginia Deputy Addair, having received reports regarding similar home invasions and an anonymous tip that the defendants were driving a black sedan with an out-of-state registration, obtained surveillance footage of Small at a pawnshop. Small had an active Tennessee arrest warrant. Police located the Chevrolet in West Virginia and arrested Small. Johnson fled in a truck, which Small had purchased in Tennessee. Days later, police arrested Johnson.During deliberations, the jury asked the court for definitions of the terms “confined,” “seized,” and “abducted.” The court provided the dictionary definitions. Convicted, Small was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment and Johnson to 300 months’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, to the court’s advice to the jury, and to the sentences. Although the defendants did not transport the victim across state lines, sufficient evidence proves that they used a rental car to cross state lines, travel to Spoon’s home, and escape. A reasonable jury could conclude that the interstate commerce element is met. View "United States v. Small" on Justia Law

Police officers pulled over the vehicle in which Brooks was riding for a seatbelt violation. The officers approached, smelled marijuana, and saw Brooks making a “stuffing motion” under his seat. The police found a gun partially hidden there. After a jury convicted Brooks of being a felon in possession of a firearm, the lone African-American juror emailed the court that the other jurors had pressured her into a guilty verdict.On appeal, Brooks claimed that the stop and search of the vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment, that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence that he “possessed” a gun, and that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, to investigate the racial biases of the other jurors.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Brooks’s conviction and 66-month sentence. The number of officers who conducted the traffic stop did not affect whether it was “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. The felon-in-possession statute does not require a defendant to control a gun for any significant period of time. Peña-Rodriguez does not permit an evidentiary hearing to impeach a jury verdict even when no jurors made race-based statements. View "United States v. Brooks" on Justia Law

OverDrive, a digital reading platform, belonged to International Digital Publishing Forum, a trade association dedicated to the development of electronic publishing standards. International’s members developed EPUB, the leading eBook format. International's intellectual-property policy, approved by all its members, states that International’s members retain any copyrights in their independent contributions to EPUB but grants International a license to “reproduce, adapt, distribute, perform, display, and create derivative works” of any copyrighted contributions to EPUB. International may sublicense others to do the same. By a vote of 88% to 12%, International agreed to transfer its assets to the Consortium and to grant the Consortium a license to use International's intellectual property to carry out Internationa;'s digital publishing activities. International would commence dissolution, after which its intellectual property rights would be owned by the Consortium. The Consortium began developing improvements to EPUB. A second agreement affirmed the first, explaining that the license included International’s sub-licensable rights to any copyrights its members retained.OverDrive sought a declaratory judgment that International had violated, and would violate in the future, its copyrights in EPUB. The district court granted International summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. International validly licensed its intellectual property and it would be premature to resolve any claim about future transfers. Under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 106, OverDrive granted International the right to use any copyrights OverDrive had in EPUB. International an unrestricted right to grant sublicenses with respect to those copyrights. View "OverDrive Inc. v. Open E-Book Forum" on Justia Law