Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Sixth Circuit denied the consolidated petition for review brought by three coal mine operators challenging the Benefits Review Board's adverse black lung benefits determination. Honoring the Board's customary requirement that issues be raised first with the ALJ, the court held that the operators failed to preserve their Appointments Clause challenge.In this case, the court's review of the Department of Labor's regulations reveals a regulatory exhaustion requirement applicable to ALJ proceedings. The court explained that black lung benefits adjudication regulations require that litigants raise issues before the ALJ as a prerequisite to review by the Benefits Review Board. Moreover, the Board's longstanding practice of treating issues not raised below as forfeited confirms this conclusion. The court also concluded that by failing to comply with the Board's timeliness requirements, the operators failed to preserve their Appointments Clause challenges. Furthermore, the operators failed to identify an applicable exception that would excuse failure. Finally, the panel noted that, while it did not see evidence that the operators acted with a nefarious motive, the court is nonetheless mindful not to invite "sandbagging" or "judge-shopping" in future black lung proceedings. View "Joseph Forrester Trucking v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs" on Justia Law

After plaintiffs filed suit against Ocwen Loan Servicing and Deutsche Bank to prevent the lenders from foreclosing on their home, the district court granted summary judgment to Ocwen and Deutsche Bank. The lenders filed a motion to dismiss the appeal based on lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs then sought an injunction to prevent Deutsche Bank and Ocwen from taking possession of their home. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the lenders. Plaintiffs, through their counsel, appealed by placing a paper notice of appeal and a cashier's check for the filing fee into the drop box provided by the district court.The Sixth Circuit held that plaintiffs met the 30-day filing deadline to file a notice of appeal and denied the lenders' motion to dismiss. In this case, the lenders do not dispute that counsel for plaintiffs placed the notice of appeal into the district court's drop box on September 11, and the lenders cannot dispute that the drop box served as an acceptable way to deliver documents to the court. The court explained that a court's drop box serves as an invitation to file court documents, precluding a court from treating its use by a party as a trespass or a non-event. Furthermore, the lenders' contention that plaintiffs missed the September 11 filing deadline because they did not file electronically until September 14 is foreclosed by precedent. View "Pierce v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

For many years, attorney Conn obtained social security benefits for his clients by submitting fraudulent reports and bribing an Administrative Law Judge. After the government discovered this fraud, the SSA decided to redetermine whether each of Conn’s 1,500 claimants was actually eligible for disability benefits. The SSA held hearings and allowed the claimants to submit evidence but categorically excluded medical reports created by the doctors with whom Conn had conspired because it had “reason to believe” fraud was involved in the creation of the reports (42 U.S.C. 1383(e)(7)(A)(ii))). The claimants were not permitted to challenge that finding. After the denials of their claims, 57 plaintiffs filed suit.The Sixth Circuit held that the exclusion of the reports violated the Due Process Clause and the APA. On remand, the district courts concluded that remand to the SSA was proper because “the Commissioner erred in some respect in reaching the decision to deny benefits.”The Sixth Circuit affirmed the subsequent denial of the plaintiffs’ motions for attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. The government’s position in the litigation was “substantially justified,” in light of the precedent cited by the government, the rationale for the decision, and the fact that district courts across the country have split on this issue. The case involved numerous issues of first impression. Despite the fact that the government’s arguments were rejected, a reasonable person could have believed them to be correct. View "Wireman v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

During the early morning hours of October 20, 2017, McShann was asleep in the driver’s seat of a locked, running car with his right hand resting on a pistol in his lap and music blaring from the car stereo. Officers, responding to a complaint, determined that the car was registered to a woman whom they were unable to contact. Seconds after officers roused him from sleep, McShann stopped complying with their orders that he keep his hands up and away from the gun. He grabbed the gun and swung it toward the driver-side door, where two officers were positioned. Fearing for their safety and that of their fellow officers, the officers opened fire, killing McShann. After the shooting, the officers immediately called for medical assistance and attempted first aid.The district court concluded the use of deadly force was reasonable and granted the officers summary judgment on excessive force claims, 42 U.S.C. 1983, by McShann’s estate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The plaintiff’s expert’s testimony that “[t]he lack of damage to the gun provides clear evidence that Mr. McShann was not holding the gun when he was shot in the hand” did not create a genuine issue of material fact. Such speculation is not enough to controvert consistent officer testimony. View "Jordan v. Howard" on Justia Law

In 2015, Sherwood pleaded guilty to transporting visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct and possessing child pornography and received a below-Guidelines sentence of 108 months’ imprisonment. In 2020, Sherwood moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), asserting that the COVID-19 pandemic coupled with his age and medical conditions together constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons and that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors weighed in favor of release. The district court denied Sherwood’s motion, stating: “[Sherwood] has failed to demonstrate that he is not a danger to the community. Not only was he convicted of possession of child pornography, but he was convicted of transportation as well.”The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. Following enactment of the First Step Act, the policy statement in U.S.S.G. 1B1.13 is no longer an independent basis upon which a court may deny a defendant-filed motion for release. Because Sherwood was denied relief exclusively due to his failure to satisfy section 1B1.13(2)’s requirement that a defendant not be a danger to the community, the district court must apply the remaining section 3582(c)(1)(A) factors. On remand, the court may consider Sherwood’s history and characteristics, including his propensity to be a danger to the community, and the nature and circumstances of his offense. View "United States v. Sherwood" on Justia Law

Coal companies (last signatory operators) must provide health and retiree benefits through individual employer plans (IEPs), 26 U.S.C. 9711(a), (b); the 1992 Plan provides benefits for retirees who do not receive benefits through a company’s IEP, section. Last signatory operators fund and provide security for the 1992 Plan. If the 1992 Plan assumes responsibility for IEP benefits, the Plan may assert that a prior employer must pay the benefits.A CONSOL entity sold mining operations to Debtors in 2013. Debtors provided healthcare and retiree benefits to about 2,200 Beneficiaries under an IEP. Debtors filed chapter 11 petitions in 2019, having negotiated agreements that compelled Debtors to minimize their liabilities to the Beneficiaries. To address the Coal Act obligations, the Trustee appointed a committee to represent Debtors’ retirees. Debtors and the Retiree Committee ultimately agreed that the parties would cooperate to transition the Beneficiaries from the IEP to the 1992 Plan to assure no coverage gap. The 1992 Plan would receive $12.5 million from the posted security. Debtors would cooperate in the Plan’s efforts to hold CONSOL responsible as the last signatory operator for those Beneficiaries who transferred to Debtors in 2013.The bankruptcy court approved the Settlement over CONSOL’s objection and confirmed Debtors’ Chapter 11 Plan. The order reserved CONSOL’s right to dispute its potential Coal Act liability for the Benefits, stating that its approval of the Settlement "in no way constitutes a finding that CONSOL is the last signatory operator.”The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel dismissed an appeal, finding that CONSOL lacks standing. Whether an order directly and adversely affects an appellant’s pecuniary interests is interpreted narrowly; “person aggrieved” standing does not arise from concerns about separate litigation unrelated to an interest protected by the Bankruptcy Code. View "In re Murray Energy Holdings Co." on Justia Law

In 2017, Quintanilla pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute and possessing with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and illegally reentering the U.S. after having been removed subsequent to a felony conviction. He was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment and did not appeal. In April 2020, Quintanilla sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Court-appointed counsel asserted that Quintanilla has underlying medical conditions that put him at high risk, including diabetes, obesity, and hypertension; that his facility, FCI Oakdale, was among those hardest hit by the pandemic; and that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors weighed in favor of release. The government argued that he had not demonstrated sufficiently extraordinary and compelling reasons and that he is a danger to the community, so his release would be inconsistent with section 3553(a).The district court denied the motion, stating on a form order that it had considered the applicable section 3553(a) factors and policy statements and conducted a “complete review” of the merits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Quintanilla’s request for compassionate release and the denial thereof reflects a “conceptually simple” matter suitable to resolution via a form order; the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Quintanilla’s motion. View "United States v. Quintanilla-Navarro" on Justia Law

In 1975, schoolteacher and drug dealer Ingram was robbed and shot dead in her Detroit home. Watkins’s 20-year-old high school classmate, Herndon, testified that he and Watkins robbed and murdered Ingram together. Detroit Evidence Technician Badaczewski testified that a hair found on Ingram’s clothing matched Watkins's hair sample. After Watkins’s conviction, Herndon repeatedly recanted. In sworn affidavits, letters, and testimony, Herndon attested that Wayne County Prosecutor Healy and Detective Schwartz threatened to charge him with Ingram’s murder and another murder if Herndon did not implicate Watkins and testify at Watkins’s trial. Watkins’s efforts to overturn his conviction had no success for four decades.In 2017, Watkins presented new evidence that Badaczewski’s hair analysis methods were seriously flawed. The Michigan court dismissed the case against Watkins without prejudice. Months later, Watkins filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against Healy, Schwartz's estate, Badaczewski, and Detroit.The district court denied Healy’s motion to dismiss. The Sixth Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider most of Healy’s arguments but held that Healy is not entitled to absolute immunity and that Healy forfeited the issue of qualified immunity at this stage. Even considering Healy’s equitable contentions that it would not be “fair” to hold him to today’s standards, the 1975-76 standards of prosecutorial immunity were the same: a prosecutor engaged in certain investigative activities enjoys, not the absolute immunity associated with the judicial process, but only a good-faith defense comparable to the policeman’s.” View "Watkins v. Healy" on Justia Law

X pleaded guilty in 2014 to possession with intent to distribute Oxycodone and was sentenced to 150 months’ imprisonment. While serving his sentence at a North Carolina federal correctional institution, X heard another inmate state that “if you ever want to get rid of a body, hogs is the way to go” and that “it was easy to kill someone without leaving evidence.” X told the FBI and police about the comments. X subsequently persuaded the inmate to confess to the murder of his adopted daughter. The inmate led the police to where he and his wife had disposed of the body. The inmate and his wife pleaded guilty to the murder. The government filed a motion to reduce X’s sentence pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) based on his substantial assistance and recommended that the court reduce X’s prison sentence by 12-18 months.The district court granted the motion the same day that the motion was filed and reduced X’s prison sentence by 12 months. The Sixth Circuit remanded and issued a redacted opinion. The district court erred in ruling without giving X the opportunity to present evidence and argument. View "United States v. ____ ____" on Justia Law

In 2008, the Blasingames met with attorneys Fullen and Grusin to discuss their financial situation and signed engagement agreements. The Blasingames filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition with Fullen as the attorney of record. Fullen constructed the bankruptcy schedules, obtaining the Blasingames’ financial information from Grusin. The Blasingames claimed less than $6,000 in assets. The bankruptcy court later found the Blasingames failed to disclose millions of dollars in assets that they controlled through a complex web of family trusts, shell companies, and shifting “clearing accounts.”In 2011, the bankruptcy court granted the Trustee summary judgment, denying the Blasingames’ discharge and disqualified the attorneys from further representation of the Blasingames. Although the Blasingames’ new counsel was able to obtain relief from the summary judgment order, their discharge was again denied in 2015. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) affirmed.A major creditor, CJV1, obtained derivative standing from the bankruptcy court to file a malpractice claim against the filing attorneys on behalf of the estate. CJV, in the bankruptcy court, and the Blasingames, in Tennessee state court, filed malpractice complaints. The bankruptcy court refused to approve the Blasingames’ settlement with the attorneys; the BAP and Sixth Circuit dismissed the Blasingame’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. CJV asserted that the malpractice claims are property of the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court, the BAP, and the Sixth Circuit ruled in favor of the Blasingames. Under Tennessee law, the legal malpractice claims accrued arose post-petition. View "Church Joint Venture, L.P. v. Blasingame" on Justia Law