Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Rembert, a nurse, routinely worked more than 40 hours per week for A Plus but did not receive overtime. Rembert filed a purported class action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The Department of Labor investigated. The court certified a class and ordered A-Plus to provide a list of persons potentially fitting within the class. The deadline passed. A magistrate scheduled a phone conference; defense counsel failed to appear. A Plus provided responsive information about five weeks after the deadline. The parties began discovery, which was notable for defense counsel’s repeated failure to comply. Rembert’s counsel finally filed a motion to compel. The magistrate granted the motion and ordered A Plus to pay “reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.” Defense counsel failed to respond. Rembert filed another motion. As a result of the DOL investigation, some class members received full payment of the amounts owed to them. The parties ultimately agreed to the entry of judgment in favor of Rembert and the remaining class members, $18,961.Rembert moved for an award of fees and costs under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 216(b). Her lawyers requested hourly rates of $350 and $300, respectively, and submitted detailed records for 21.2 hours of work for the motion to compel and 98.7 hours on the remainder of the case. The court approved the rates but reduced counsel’s total compensable hours to 46.2 and cut the fee award an additional $1,660. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The plaintiffs obtained 100% of the recovery due to them. The court did not explain which hours it rejected and apparently did not consider the impact of delays caused by defense counsel. The court remanded with instructions to grant the petition for fees and costs in the amount of $38,765.00. View "Rembert v. A Plus Home Health Care Agency, LLC" on Justia Law

The 1936 Randolph-Sheppard Vending Stand Act (RSA), 20 U.S.C. 107(a), authorizes blind persons to operate vending facilities on federal property. The Department of Education prescribes RSA regulations and designates the state agency for issuing RSA licenses. Ohio expands the RSA to state properties. Ohio’s Bureau of Services for the Visually Impaired (BSVI) implements the RSA and Ohio-RSA.Cyrus, a blind vendor, has participated in the Ohio RSA program since 1989. Pursuant to Grantor Agreements with Lucas County and the University of Toledo, Cyrus paid $504,000 in commissions to the university and county. In 2014, the Ohio Attorney General issued a formal opinion that conditioning RSA-vending at state-affiliated universities on commission payments was illegal. Cyrus filed a grievance and stopped making payments to the university. BSVI notified the university that the commission requirement "is void.” BSVI denied Cyrus’s grievance and took no action on the county commissions. A state hearing officer denied relief. Cyrus filed an arbitration complaint under the RSA’.An RSA panel found that BSVI breached its duties by requiring commission payments to both locations The Sixth Circuit held that the RSA prohibits commissions, even for facilities on county-owned properties; prospective relief was appropriate. RSA arbitration panels are enough like civil litigation in Article III courts that sovereign immunity applies. Ohio has not waived its immunity from RSA damages awards imposed by federal arbitration panels. The panel, therefore, exceeded its authority in awarding damages and interest. View "Ohio v. United States Department of Education" on Justia Law

Nelson pleaded guilty to distributing visual depictions of real minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2). At sentencing, the parties disputed whether Nelson’s prior Ohio conviction for attempted rape of a minor qualified as a predicate offense for a sentencing enhancement. The district court sentenced Nelson to the enhanced statutory minimum term of 180 months of imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Nelson’s argument that his attempted rape conviction under a statute that does not require that the defendant have physical contact with the victim, did not trigger the section 2252(b)(1) enhancement, which applies to prior convictions “relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor.” Sexual abuse covers actions that “injure, hurt, or damage for the purpose of sexual or libidinal gratification.” Applying the categorical approach, the court examined the elements of the Ohio statute, not the specific facts underlying the conviction, and reasoned that the ordinary meaning of the phrase “relating to” is broad. An attempt conviction “clearly stands in some relation to or pertains to the crimes of aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor” and qualifies as a predicate offense for the enhancement. View "United States v. Nelson" on Justia Law

In 2007, Hudson was shot and killed in his Louisville apartment. Detective Roberts sought DNA testing for items at the murder scene. DNA on a hat came back “consistent with a mixture” from Lester, Baker, and an unknown person. Lester and Baker had been implicated by a witness. The case went cold. In 2012, Roberts interviewed Sullivan, an inmate who had contacted the police years before about the murder. Sullivan had dated Hudson and had been friends with Jasmine (the woman living with Baker,). She stated that Jasmine had told her that Baker killed Hudson “over money.” Roberts then interviewed Jasmine, who stated that, on the day of the murder, she, Baker, and “Desean” went to Hudson’s apartment. The men emerged from the apartment with bandanas covering their faces. Baker confessed that he murdered Hudson. Jasmine could not recall “Desean’s” last name and pronounced his first name differently from how Lester pronounces it. She identified Lester’s photo array picture as “Desean.”At trial, Jasmine distanced herself from her identification of Lester. The jury acquitted Lester. Baker was convicted after a second trial. Lester had spent 20 months in jail and three months in home confinement. After his acquittal, he sued Roberts and the Louisville Metro Government.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the summary-judgment rejection of malicious-prosecution claims against Roberts. The Fourth Amendment and Kentucky law required only probable cause for Lester’s pretrial detention and prosecution. Jasmine’s earlier identification of Lester, combined with corroborating evidence like DNA, met that standard. View "Lester v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Hampton pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine and aiding and abetting possession of a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy. His 204-month sentence was eventually reduced to 180 months based on an amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines. Hampton sought a further reduction by way of compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Hampton had to exhaust all administrative rights, or, alternatively, wait 30 days after the warden’s first “receipt of [his] request.” Hampton sought administrative relief but filed his motion with the district court before the warden’s 30-day response period had run. The court opted to hold the motion “until the 30-day window ran” and later denied Hampton’s motion “for the reasons stated” in the government’s brief, without further explanation.The Sixth Circuit remanded. Following enactment of the First Step Act, district courts facing defendant-filed motions seeking release under section 3582(c)(1)(A) should analyze whether extraordinary and compelling circumstances merit a sentence reduction and whether the applicable section 3553(a) factors warrant such a reduction. It is not clear whether the court denied Hampton’s motion based upon permissible grounds advanced by the government under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)—that Hampton failed to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling circumstances—or instead denied Hampton release due to a strict application of U.S.S.G. 1B1.13, which the government invoked, but which is no longer a mandatory step Hampton must satisfy. View "United States v. Hampton" on Justia Law

Thompson, an African-American, has arthritis in her knees, back, and neck. Her doctor gave her lifting restrictions at a previous job. She was approved for Social Security Disability payments in 2014 based on a primary disability of morbid obesity and a secondary disability of arthritis. She is no longer morbidly obese. Fresh hired Thompson, age 52, as a production worker in 2016. Thompson did not mention her arthritis diagnosis and did not have restrictions on her ability to work; she performed her job duties without accommodations. Thompson later decided she would like to work part-time “to get some work done on [her] back.” Her supervisors do not recall any conversations about her pain or desire to work part-time. She did not provide medical documentation. Fresh began experiencing a reduction in sales and changed its shift schedule. Thompson indicated that she was unable to work the new schedule but did not provide an explanation. Thompson later asked about part-time hours. As one of five employees who indicated that she could not work proposed shift changes, Thompson was laid off.Thompson sued, alleging disability discrimination, under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101–12117, age discrimination, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621–634, and race discrimination, under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2–2000e-5. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Fresh. Thompson has not established a prima facie case of discrimination. View "Thompson v. Fresh Products, LLC" on Justia Law

E.A., a citizen of El Salvador unlawfully entered the U.S. in 2016, at age 12, as an unaccompanied minor and was released to her mother, who resided in New York. Shortly thereafter, the family relocated to Arkansas, where E.A. filed a successful Motion to Change Venue to Memphis and a Change of Address Form. Latino Memphis (LM) represented E.A. pro bono. In January 2018. LM appeared on behalf of E.A. in a telephonic hearing. E.A.'s master-calendar hearing was scheduled for June 2018 in Memphis. In April 2018, LM moved to withdraw, stating that E.A. had moved out of its covered geographic area to New York. E.A. failed to appear and was ordered removed in absentia. In November, E.A., moved to reopen, represented by Catholic Charities. E.A. asserted that she was unable to obtain legal counsel to assist her in changing her hearing location after returning to New York. E.A.’s mother had given birth 10 days before E.A.’s hearing. E.A. asserted that she was eligible for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS). The IJ denied E.A.’s request to reopen and did not address SIJS. The BIA affirmed.The Sixth Circuit vacated the removal order and remanded. Based on the totality of the circumstances, including E.A. mother’s recent childbirth, E.A.’s age, E.A.’s mother’s failed attempts to obtain counsel to help change the hearing address, and E.A.’s inability to travel alone for the hearing, E.A. established exceptional circumstances. View "E. A. C. A. v. Rosen" on Justia Law

Pelcha began working as a bank teller in 2005. A new supervisor, Sonderman, began overseeing Pelcha in 2016 and required her direct reports to submit written requests for any time out of the office by the middle of the month before the month of the requested time off. In July 2016, Pelcha planned to take time off from work but did not use the written request form. She told Sonderman that she was “not filling [the request out] because [she didn’t] have to.” Pelcha nonetheless completed the form, placing it in Sonderman’s office on the day before her time off. The next day, Sonderman spoke with CEO Niesen, at a regularly scheduled management meeting, about Pelcha’s failure to submit the form, Pelcha's negative attitude, and failure to timely complete tasks. Niesen stated that he had no tolerance for insubordination and told everyone he intended to fire Pelcha. He asked Sonderman to memorialize the chain of events in a memo. Days later, Niesen terminated Pelcha’s employment and informed her that it was because of her insubordination.Pelcha, then 47 years old, sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her claims. Nielsen’s comments about another employee were irrelevant to Pelcha’s termination. Pelcha’s insubordination was a legitimate reason for the termination and was not pretextual. Pelcha failed to establish disparate treatment. View "Pelcha v. MW Bancorp, Inc." on Justia Law

U.S. Marshals searching for Milliron in Ohio, based on an outstanding Florida warrant, located Milliron driving his truck. Milliron led the Marshals and local police on a 35-mile chase, hurling glass bottles and makeshift plastic Molotov cocktails toward the officers' vehicles. Milliron eventually crashed into a building. Milliron’s truck was a mobile methamphetamine lab. Milliron's “one-pot methamphetamine” Molotov cocktails contained flammable liquid and chemicals used to manufacture methamphetamine. Milliron had 13 rounds of ammunition in his pocket. Milliron was charged with: using a dangerous weapon to forcibly interfere with federal officers performing official duties, 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1), (b); possession of a firearm not registered to him; carrying and using a destructive device in relation to a crime of violence; possession of products which may be used to manufacture methamphetamine; intent to manufacture approximately 4.7 grams of methamphetamine; possession with intent to distribute 4.7 grams of methamphetamine; and being a felon-in-possession of ammunition. Milliron pleaded guilty to Counts 1, 4, 5, and 7.Months later, Milliron unsuccessfully moved to withdraw his plea, arguing “counsel acknowledge[d] that his representation . . . was deficient” because he had failed to explain that an 18 U.S.C. 111(b) conviction “requires that the defendant intended to cause injury.” With a two-level enhancement for possessing a “dangerous weapon,” a three-level enhancement because a dangerous weapon was possessed and its use was threatened, and a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Milliron’s Guidelines range was 77-96 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 110-month sentence. The appeal waiver bars review of Milliron’s challenge to the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea. The district court correctly assigned the sentencing enhancements. The sentence was reasonable; Milliron “was a violent offender, both on the day in question and previously.” View "United States v. Milliron" on Justia Law

An unknown person flagged down Knoxville Officer Whitehead, claiming that Dibrell was selling drugs out of his Chrysler at a Walgreens. Whitehead relayed this tip to three officers who went to the Walgreens and blocked in the Chrysler. An officer patted Dibrell down for weapons and told him to “hang tight.” Officers conversed with Dibrell for about three minutes. Whitehead arrived with his police dog, which alerted to the smell of drugs. The officers searched the Chrysler and found bottles containing hydrocodone, oxycodone, and alprazolam pills. The drugs did not match the bottle labels. Officers searched Dibrell and found more oxycodone pills and $800. A Tennessee state trial court denied his motion to suppress the drugs and money, reasoning that the officers had not detained Dibrell before the dog sniff. An appellate court vacated Dibrell’s convictions, finding that the officers seized Dibrell before the dog sniff and that the anonymous tip did not give them reasonable suspicion to do so.In Dibrell’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted the city and the officers summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Although Dibrell was detained (seized) without probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that he committed a crime, Dibrell’s challenge to his initial seizure was untimely under rules governing the accrual of a section 1983 claim. His malicious-prosecution claim fails because the state had probable cause to initiate the criminal case once the officers found the drugs. View "Dibrell v. City of Knoxville" on Justia Law