Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A physician was recruited by staffing and telehealth companies to perform “chart reviews” for patients who were purportedly in need of durable medical equipment (DME) such as braces. She believed she was reviewing and approving charts for patients already evaluated by other providers. The companies she worked with were later found to be engaged in a scheme to defraud Medicare by using physicians’ signatures to order DME and submit claims. The physician never personally examined the patients, and there was no evidence she submitted claims to Medicare or knew the amounts billed. She received approximately $78,000 in compensation for her work over three years.A grand jury indicted her on six counts of healthcare fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1347. At trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, the government argued she defrauded Medicare by signing DME orders for patients she had not personally evaluated. The jury heard testimony from patients, Medicare investigators, and a physician, none of whom were qualified as expert witnesses. The district court excluded exculpatory statements the physician made to an insurance investigator about her belief that patients had been previously examined. The jury found her guilty on all counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court erred in three ways: by failing to instruct the jury that the government must prove the defendant knew her conduct was unlawful; by excluding the physician’s statements reflecting her contemporaneous state of mind; and by allowing lay witnesses to testify about medical necessity without expert qualification. The court found these errors were not harmless, vacated the convictions, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Singh" on Justia Law

A man in Michigan was found by sheriff’s deputies shooting a rifle in his backyard while intoxicated and under the influence of marijuana. Upon investigation, deputies discovered multiple firearms, three pipe bombs, and a large amount of ammunition in his home. The man admitted to regularly using marijuana and building the pipe bombs himself. He was convicted under state law for possessing a firearm while intoxicated and later pleaded guilty in federal court to possessing unregistered firearms (the pipe bombs).The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, following the Sentencing Guidelines, determined that the defendant was a “prohibited person” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) due to his unlawful drug use and firearm possession. This resulted in a higher base offense level and a sentencing range of 46 to 57 months; the court imposed a 52-month sentence. The defendant objected, arguing that applying § 922(g)(3) to him violated the Second Amendment, but the district court rejected this argument, finding that he posed a threat to the public.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether § 922(g)(3) could constitutionally be applied to the defendant. The court held that, under its precedent and Supreme Court guidance, Congress may disarm groups it deems dangerous, provided individuals have an opportunity to show they are not actually dangerous. The court found that the defendant’s conduct—firing a rifle while drunk and high in a residential area—demonstrated he was dangerous. Therefore, the application of § 922(g)(3) to him was constitutional, and the district court’s sentence was affirmed. View "United States v. VanOchten" on Justia Law

Dorothy Bivens worked as a territory sales representative for a company that manufactures and distributes cleaning products. During a visit to a client’s motel, the client locked the office door and propositioned her, making her uncomfortable. Bivens reported the incident to her supervisor, who reassigned the client so she would not have further contact. Around the same period, the company’s president decided to reduce staff due to cost concerns, targeting positions in low-revenue territories, including Bivens’s. She was subsequently terminated.After her termination, Bivens filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging a hostile work environment, retaliation for reporting harassment, and racial discrimination under both Title VII and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. The district court denied her motion to compel production of certain documents and granted summary judgment to the employer on all claims, finding insufficient evidence to support her allegations.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment decision de novo. The appellate court held that, under Title VII, an employer can only be held liable for harassment by a non-employee (such as a client) if the employer itself intentionally caused or was substantially certain harassment would occur, rejecting the negligence standard adopted by most other circuits and the EEOC. The court found no evidence that the employer intended for Bivens to be harassed. The court also found that Bivens’s retaliation claim failed because the decisionmaker who terminated her was unaware of her complaint, and her racial discrimination claim failed due to lack of evidence that she was singled out because of her race. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "Bivens v. Zep, Inc." on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, while driving in Memphis, Tennessee, nearly collided with a police vehicle. When officers attempted to stop him, he fired several shots at them, with one bullet striking the police car and narrowly missing an officer. After a pursuit that ended in a crash, the defendant was arrested. A search of his vehicle revealed a loaded Glock 23 handgun equipped with a device that converted it into a machinegun, as defined by federal law. The defendant did not have a valid registration for the machinegun and did not dispute that the weapon met the statutory definition.A grand jury indicted the defendant for possessing a machinegun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, both facially and as applied to him, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen. The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee denied the motion, holding that § 922(o) was constitutional. The defendant then pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 108 months in prison, after which he appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that its prior decision in Hamblen v. United States, which upheld the constitutionality of § 922(o) under District of Columbia v. Heller, remained binding after Bruen because Bruen did not alter the relevant aspects of Heller. The court further conducted an independent analysis under the text-and-history methodology set forth in Heller and Bruen, concluding that § 922(o) is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of prohibiting private possession of dangerous and unusual weapons. The court therefore affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that § 922(o) is constitutional both on its face and as applied to the defendant. View "United States v. Bridges" on Justia Law

Several individuals from five different states purchased ovens with front-mounted burner knobs manufactured by a major appliance company. They allege that these ovens have a defect causing the stovetop burners to turn on unintentionally, sometimes resulting in gas leaks. The plaintiffs claim they were unaware of this defect at the time of purchase, but that the manufacturer had prior knowledge of the issue through consumer complaints sent to the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) and reviews posted on the company’s website. The plaintiffs assert that, had they known about the defect, they would have paid less for the ovens or not purchased them at all.The plaintiffs filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, alleging violations of federal warranty law, fraud by omission, breach of express and implied warranties, unjust enrichment, and violations of state consumer protection statutes. The district court found that the plaintiffs had Article III standing, as they alleged a concrete injury, but dismissed all claims for failure to state a plausible claim for relief. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their state common law fraud and statutory consumer protection claims, while the manufacturer argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing because they plausibly alleged economic injury from overpaying for a defective product. The court further held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged the manufacturer’s knowledge of the defect and its safety risks, particularly because the CPSC had sent incident reports directly to the manufacturer. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of most state law fraud and consumer protection claims, except for the Illinois common law fraud claim, which failed for lack of a duty to disclose under Illinois law. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Tapply v. Whirlpool Corp." on Justia Law

Several chambers of commerce, including regional and national organizations, brought a lawsuit on behalf of their pharmaceutical-manufacturer members challenging the constitutionality of the Drug Price Negotiation Program established by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022. This federal program authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services to negotiate prices for certain high-expenditure drugs sold to Medicare and Medicaid. Among the plaintiffs’ members were AbbVie Inc. and its subsidiary Pharmacyclics LLC, manufacturers of a drug selected for the first round of negotiations. Notably, Pharmacyclics joined the Dayton and Ohio Chambers only after the litigation began, while AbbVie had longstanding membership in several chambers.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio reviewed the case after the government moved to dismiss, arguing that the Dayton Chamber lacked associational standing and that venue was therefore improper. The district court allowed limited discovery and permitted the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. Ultimately, the district court dismissed the case, holding that the regional chambers’ purposes were not sufficiently related to the interests at stake in the lawsuit, and thus they lacked associational standing. The court also found that, without standing for the Dayton and Ohio Chambers, venue in the Southern District of Ohio was improper and declined to transfer the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Sixth Circuit held that the interests asserted in the lawsuit were not germane to the purposes of the Dayton, Ohio, or Michigan Chambers, as their regional missions were too remote from the national pharmaceutical issues at stake. The court further concluded that, with no plaintiff residing in the district, venue was improper. The judgment of dismissal for improper venue was therefore affirmed. View "Dayton Area Chamber of Commerce v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

After completing a prison sentence for a prior conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm, the defendant began a term of supervised release. Less than two months later, he was arrested after police responded to a report that he had threatened someone with a gun. Officers found a firearm at the scene, and the defendant admitted to possessing it. He was initially charged in state court, but the state charges were dismissed after a federal indictment for being a felon in possession of a firearm was issued. The conduct also constituted a violation of the conditions of his supervised release from the earlier federal conviction.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio handled both the new substantive offense and the supervised-release violation in joint proceedings. The defendant pleaded guilty to the new firearm charge and, at a subsequent hearing, admitted to the supervised-release violation. The district court sentenced him to 96 months for the new offense and 24 months for the supervised-release violation, to be served consecutively. The defendant appealed, arguing that he did not knowingly waive his right to a revocation hearing, that the district court misapplied sentencing factors for the supervised-release violation, and that his sentence for the substantive offense was based on an improper application of the career-offender enhancement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a revocation hearing and that the district court properly applied the career-offender enhancement for the substantive offense. However, the appellate court held that the district court erred by considering retributive and punishment factors, which are not permitted under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) as clarified by the Supreme Court’s decision in Esteras v. United States, when sentencing for the supervised-release violation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the substantive offense sentence, reversed the revocation sentence, and remanded for resentencing on the supervised-release violation. View "United States v. Hoyle" on Justia Law

A multiemployer pension fund managed by the Operating Engineers Local 324 Pension Fund assessed withdrawal liability against Ace-Saginaw Paving Company after Ace partially withdrew from the fund in December 2018. The dispute centered on the interest rate assumption used to calculate the withdrawal liability. Ace argued that the rate should match the fund’s minimum funding interest rate of 7.75%, resulting in a lower liability, while the fund’s actuary used a much lower rate of 2.27% (the PBGC rate), resulting in a significantly higher liability. The actuary’s choice of rate was based on policy considerations and a desire to protect the fund’s remaining employers, rather than his best estimate of the fund’s anticipated investment experience.The parties proceeded to arbitration, as required by ERISA. The arbitrator found that the actuary’s use of the 2.27% rate violated 29 U.S.C. § 1393(a)(1) because it was not the actuary’s best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan. The arbitrator ordered the fund to recalculate Ace’s withdrawal liability using a rate that complied with the statutory requirements. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan affirmed the arbitrator’s findings and granted summary judgment to Ace on the statutory violation, but declined Ace’s request to require use of the minimum funding rate as the remedy, instead allowing the fund’s actuary another opportunity to select a compliant rate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the actuary’s use of the PBGC rate was not his best estimate and thus violated ERISA. The court also held that, on remand, the actuary may use a different rate from the minimum funding rate only if it is justified by factors that improve the accuracy of the withdrawal liability calculation, not by policy considerations. The court denied both parties’ requests for attorney’s fees. View "Ace-Saginaw Paving Co. v. Operating Engineers Local 324" on Justia Law

A Michigan landlord who owns several rental properties in Oak Park challenged the city’s housing code, specifically its requirement that landlords consent to property inspections as a condition for obtaining a rental license. The city’s code mandates that landlords apply for a license and certificate of compliance, which involves an initial inspection and periodic re-inspections. The landlord refused to sign the consent form for inspections, resulting in the city withholding his license and issuing fines for renting without one. Despite these penalties, he continued to rent out his properties.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The district court found that the landlord lacked standing to bring a Fourth Amendment claim because there had been no warrantless, nonconsensual inspection. It also ruled that the city’s licensing and inspection regime did not violate the Fourth Amendment or impose unconstitutional conditions, and that the landlord’s Equal Protection claim was without merit.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the landlord did have standing to challenge the licensing scheme under the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, as the denial of a license for refusing to consent to inspections constituted a cognizable injury. However, the court concluded that the city’s requirement of consent to an initial inspection as a condition of licensing was reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment, drawing on Supreme Court precedent distinguishing between reasonable conditions for public benefits and coercive mandates. The court also found that the city’s inspection requirements for one- and two-family rentals did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, as the classification was rationally related to legitimate public health and safety goals. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Herschfus v. City of Oak Park" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, after being excluded from Medicare and Medicaid as part of a civil False Claims Act settlement, purchased a Medicare-participating home healthcare company using an alias and forged documents. The company then submitted hundreds of fraudulent claims to Medicare, resulting in over $2.7 million in payments for services that were never provided. The defendant transferred the proceeds to India, where they remain unrecovered. During the criminal investigation, the defendant also attempted to prevent a former employee from testifying by impersonating another person and making false reports to U.S. authorities, which led to the employee’s visa being denied.A grand jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan indicted the defendant on charges including health care fraud, money laundering, conspiracy, aggravated identity theft, and witness tampering. The trial was delayed, and shortly before it began, the defendant’s counsel experienced internal conflict, leading to motions to withdraw and requests for a mistrial, all of which the district court denied. During trial, the defense sought to call a surprise witness, an unindicted co-conspirator, on the last day. The district court excluded this witness, citing a violation of a discovery order and concerns about delay, prejudice, and the likelihood the witness would invoke the Fifth Amendment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether the district court violated the defendant’s constitutional rights by excluding the witness, denying counsel’s motion to withdraw, and excluding the defendant from an in-chambers conference. The Sixth Circuit held that the exclusion of the witness did not violate the Sixth Amendment, as the district court reasonably balanced the defendant’s right to present a defense against countervailing interests, and the defendant failed to show what exculpatory evidence the witness would have provided. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to withdraw and no reversible error in excluding the defendant from the conference. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Pancholi" on Justia Law