Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

When Anders purchased Star in 2015, Star had been contracted to conduct tows for the Michigan State Police for 15 years and was on the state’s non-preference tow rotation list for Monroe County. The state police’s internal affairs division approached Anders regarding tickets to sporting events that Anders had provided to state troopers. Anders supplied a list of 18 state troopers to whom he had given tickets. Each trooper who accepted tickets was reprimanded. The troopers and others were unhappy that Anders disclosed the names. Cuevas, the commander for the Monroe County Post, informed Anders that he was removing Star from the non-preference tow rotation list. Trooper Hall pressured the Area Towing (Anders's other company) staff to reschedule its auctions. Sollars, the mayor of Taylor, Michigan, required that Area use Fiore, which was under federal investigation, for heavy-duty tows, or lose the contract. Anders was recorded on a federal wiretap speaking to Fiore. Anders revealed to federal agents that he had to work with Fiore to avoid losing the Taylor contract. Sollars vetoed a resolution to allow Area to remain on a month-to-month contract, allegedly because Anders provided information to the FBI. Ramik, a city council member, contacted Fox News, which aired a story in which Ramik accused Anders of stealing from the city.Anders and his companies filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation and Equal Protection violations. The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of qualified immunity on Area’s claim against Hall. Hall’s alleged “constant pressure” was not an adverse action. The court vacated the denial of qualified immunity on Anders’ Equal Protection claim against Cuevas as insufficiently pleaded but affirmed the denial as to the retaliation claim. The court affirmed the denial of immunity for Sollars and Ramik. View "Anders v. Cuevas" on Justia Law

Kubala worked for Trumbull County as a “fiduciary” employee; he was not under civil-service rules and could participate in partisan political activities. Kubala reported to Smith, who holds an elected position. Kubala claims that Smith sexually harassed him and created a hostile work environment related to Kubala’s supposed homosexuality. Kubala told Laukart, the office manager, about Smith’s comments. Laukart replied that Smith could not be controlled. Kubala claims that Kubala running for political office against Smith’s wife and his attendance at certain political functions triggered an adverse employment action. Smith allegedly told Kubala not to attend certain political functions. Kubala testified that Smith’s attorney asked Kubala if he wanted to change his job status to “classified” because he would be “protected.” Kubala interpreted it as a threat of retaliation because the change would end his involvement in local politics. Kubala’s resignation letter stated he was resigning because the work environment was harming his physical and mental health. Kubala was under the care of a physician and a therapist to cope with the harassment and high blood pressure, which Kubala attributed to his harassment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Kubala’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims. Kubala failed to show that Smith violated his First Amendment rights because the alleged threat is too ambiguous. The district court lacked supplemental jurisdiction over Kubala’s state sexual-harassment claim, which shares no common nucleus of operative fact with his constitutional claim. View "Kubala v. Smith" on Justia Law

Singh, a citizen of India, came to the U.S. in 1991, then 22 years old. He obtained a temporary transit visa for work on a ship, Singh drove cabs instead. He has taken periodic trips back to India. In 1997 and 2005 he entered into "sham" marriages. Charged as removable for remaining in the country illegally, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B), Singh sought cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1), arguing that his removal would harm his children (U.S. citizens), born in 2011 and 2013, and mother, a legal permanent resident, who owns a convenience store and has a good relationship with his U.S.-citizen brothers,The IJ denied Singh’s application finding that Singh failed to prove that he had continuously been present in the U.S. for a 10-year period immediately prior to the date that he was served with his “notice to appear” and failed to prove “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship." The BIA affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied relief. Reviewing the hardship claim as a mixed question of law and fact, the court noted that Singh did not dispute that his mother’s and children’s health conditions were insufficiently serious to create that hardship; BIA precedent holds that diminished educational options alone do not establish the required hardship. Singh did not show that his children would be deprived of all opportunity to obtain any education. Singh failed to exhaust his remedies with respect to a claim of unconstitutional bias by the IJ. View "Singh v. Rosen" on Justia Law

Elias pled guilty to drug possession and distribution conspiracy; in 2017, she was sentenced to 108 months' imprisonment. She is confined at FPC Alderson, with a projected release date of November 2024. Elias filed a pro se “Emergency Motion for Immediate Release Due to COVID-19” in April 2020. In June, with appointed counsel, she filed a supplemental motion for a reduction of her sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), arguing that her hypertension exacerbated her risk of serious injury or death if she were to contract COVID-19. Elias requested that the warden file a compassionate-release motion and appealed the denial, satisfying the exhaustion requirements.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. U.S.S.G. 1B1.13 is not applicable to inmate-filed compassionate release motions under the First Step Act. In determining that there were not “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” the district court properly considered the CDC guidance, which then did not include hypertension; reviewed a scientific journal which stated that “there is as yet no evidence that hypertension is related to outcomes of COVID-19”; examined the BOP’s webpage and noted there were no reported cases at FPC Alderson; and concluded that speculation that COVID-19 could spread to FPC Alderson was insufficient to justify Elias’s release. View "United States v. Elias" on Justia Law

Jackson and Combs pleaded guilty to participating in a cocaine distribution ring. Both received elevated sentences. Jackson was sentenced to 192 months’ imprisonment due to his role as a leader in the drug-distribution conspiracy, U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a).. Combs was sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment due to his career-offender status, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Combs’s Kentucky trafficking offense categorically qualifies as a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines; U.S.S.G. 4B1.2 covers all the conduct under the Kentucky statute and the district court properly deemed Combs to be a career offender. The court rejected Combs’s argument that distribution requires a commercial aspect. Jackson recruited and supervised participants, he held a substantial amount of the cash proceeds, and the conspiracy involved seven individuals. The court also rejected Jackson's challenge to the mandatory-minimum 20-year sentence he received in accordance with 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), due to his prior marijuana-trafficking conviction. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

In 2007, GM sold a power plant to DTEPN, which leased the land under the plant for 10 years. DTEPN agreed to sell utilities produced at the plant to GM, to maintain the plant according to specific criteria, and to address any environmental issues. DTEPN’s parent company, Energy, guaranteed DTEPN’s utility, environmental, and maintenance obligations. Two years later, GM filed for bankruptcy. GM and DTEPN agreed to GM’s rejection of the contracts. DTEPN exercised its right to continue occupying the property. An environmental trust (RACER) assumed ownership of some GM industrial property, including the DTEPN land. DTEPN remained in possession until the lease expired. RACER then discovered that DTEPN had allowed the power plant to fall into disrepair and contaminate the property.The district court dismissed the claims against Energy, reasoning that RACER’s allegations did not support piercing the corporate veil and Energy’s guaranty terminated after GM rejected the contracts in bankruptcy.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Michigan courts have held that a breach of contract can justify piercing a corporate veil if the corporate form has been abused. By allegedly directing its wholly-owned subsidiary to stop maintaining the property, Energy exercised control over DTEPN in a way that wronged RACER. DTEPN is now judgment-proof because it was not adequately capitalized by Energy. RACER would suffer an unjust loss if the corporate veil is not pierced. Rejection in bankruptcy does not terminate the contract; the contract is considered breached, 11 U.S.C. 365(g). The utility services agreement and the lease are not severable from each other. Energy guaranteed DTEPN’s obligations under the utility agreement concerning maintenance, environmental costs, and remediation, so Energy’s guaranty is joined to DTEPN’s section 365(h) election. View "EPLET, LLC v. DTE Pontiac North, LLC" on Justia Law

CHKRS leased Friedman’s property and paid $8,500 for an option to purchase by giving 30 days’ notice. With respect to eminent-domain, the lease stated that any money from the City of Dublin was payable to Friedman “until [CHKRS] has procured on the purchase option.” Dublin was constructing a roundabout near the property. Weeks later, Dublin notified the residents that workers would be entering to construct a bike path through the leased property. Dublin initiated a “quick-take” action, adding CHKRS to the suit, and deposited $25,080. with the court. CHKRS emailed Friedman, indicating that CHKRS intended to buy the property. Ohio courts ruled that the email did not “procure” the purchase option and that Friedman was entitled to Dublin’s funds. Dublin began construction. CHKRS sued, citing the driveway's removal. In 2016, the city constructed a new driveway, which CHKRS asserts suffers from design flaws, violates building and traffic codes, creates a hazard, and limits access. CHKRS completed its purchase of the property.CHKRS filed federal litigation, asserting takings and due-process claims, seeking payment for the defective replacement driveway. CHKRS disavowed any attempt to again seek payment for the appropriation of the bike-path easements. The court held that CHKRS lacked Article III standing, reasoning that the state courts had already held that CHKRS lacked a protectable interest in the property.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Article III standing was not the correct doctrine. CHKRS established its standing by alleging a colorable interest in the property for its takings claim. The district court misread Ohio issue-preclusion law in reaching the contrary result. The court affirmed the dismissal of CHKRS’s due-process claims as forfeited. View "CHKRS, LLC v. City of Dublin, Ohio" on Justia Law

The Health Department issued a resolution closing every school in the county—public, private, and parochial—for grades 7-12, effective December 4, to slow the spread of COVID-19. In the same county, gyms, tanning salons, office buildings, and a large casino remained open. Christian schools filed suit, arguing that the closure of their schools amounts to a prohibition of religious exercise in violation of the First Amendment.The Sixth Circuit, applying strict scrutiny, enjoined enforcement pending appeal, concluding that the closure burdens the plaintiffs' religious practices. The court noted that the schools employed “strict social distancing and hygiene standards” and that “little in-school transmission has been documented.” The court acknowledged that the resolution allowed schools to open for religious education classes or religious ceremonies and that the Department has not targeted the plaintiffs or acted with animus toward religion. The plaintiffs argued that the exercise of their faith is not compartmentalized and pervades each day of in-person schooling so that “a communal in-person environment” is critical to the exercise of their faith. The resolution treats the schools less favorably than it does “comparable secular facilities.” The court rejected an argument that it could consider only the secular actors (other schools) regulated by the resolution. The relevant inquiry is whether the “government, in pursuit of legitimate interests,” has imposed greater burdens on religious conduct than on analogous secular conduct, including gyms, salons, offices, and the Hollywood Casino, which remain open. View "Monclova Christian Academy v. Toledo-Lucas County. Health Department" on Justia Law

Dorsa, a Miraca executive, learned of a purported scheme to defraud the government. Dorsa filed a qui tam action, alleging violations of the False Claims Act (FCA). Dorsa was fired and added a claim for FCA retaliation, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h). The government intervened. Dorsa and the government dismissed the qui tam claims. Miraca unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the retaliation claim because Dorsa had agreed to binding arbitration in his employment agreement. The court found that the arbitration clause did not cover Dorsa’s claim, which did not "have any connection with, an employment agreement."The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. There was no final order and the narrow provision of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA, 9 U.S.C. 16) that authorizes immediate appeals of certain interlocutory orders does not apply. Miraca filed its motion to dismiss without asking the court for a stay or an order compelling arbitration. The FAA provides that “[a]n appeal may be taken from an order” either “refusing a stay of any action,” or “denying a petition ... to order arbitration.” Even if the denial of the motion to dismiss had the same impact as refusing to stay the action or denying a petition to order arbitration, there is no test for appealability that hinges on the practical effect of a court’s order. View "Dorsa v. Miraca Life Sciences, Inc." on Justia Law

Gabriel Taye, an eight-year-old Carson Elementary student, tied a necktie to his bunk bed and hung himself. Two days earlier, another Carson student attacked Taye in a school bathroom, knocking Taye unconscious for more than seven minutes. The incident was one of 12 "bullying" incidents spanning from Taye’s first-grade year at Carson until his death. The Plaintiffs allege that the then-principal and assistant principal (Jackson and McKenzie) misrepresented the severity of and outright concealed several bullying incidents involving Taye. The Plaintiffs uncovered information about these incidents after Taye’s death. The Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, also alleging state law tort claims of wrongful death, intentional infliction of serious emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, failure to report child abuse, and spoliation.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Jackson and McKenzie’s motion to dismiss. The Plaintiffs’ amended complaint sufficiently alleges that Jackson and McKenzie behaved recklessly; they are not entitled to governmental immunity under Ohio law. Jackson and McKenzie knew the full extent to which Taye was subjected to aggression and violence by his classmates. They had video footage of several of the violent incidents Taye experienced at school. Carson's behavior logs also document other routine aggressive and violent behavior among the student population. View "Meyers v. Cincinnati Board of Education" on Justia Law