Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2015, Hernandez-Serrano, age 16, entered the U.S. without inspection and was placed in removal proceedings. A year later, a Tennessee juvenile court made findings that rendered Hernandez-Serrano potentially eligible for “Special Immigrant Juvenile” status, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J), for which he applied. Hernandez-Serrano unsuccessfully sought administrative closure of his removal case pending a decision. In 2018, the IJ ordered Hernandez-Serrano removed to El Salvador. Hernandez-Serrano appealed to the BIA. Weeks later, his application for Special Immigrant Juvenile status was granted. Hernandez-Serrano challenged only the IJ’s denial of his motion for administrative closure, The BIA denied his motion, holding that the IJ lacked authority to close Hernandez-Serrano’s case administratively under 8 C.F.R. 1003.10, 1003.1(d) as interpreted in a 2018 Attorney General decision that “immigration judges and the Board do not have the general authority to suspend indefinitely immigration proceedings by administrative closure.”The Sixth Circuit denied relief. The authority of IJs to take certain actions “[i]n deciding the individual cases before them” does not delegate general authority not to decide those cases at all. The court noted that in more than 400,000 cases in which an alien was charged with being subject to removal, IJs or the BIA have closed cases administratively, removing them from the docket without further proceedings absent some persuasive reason to reopen it. As of October 2018, more than 350,000 of those cases had not been reopened. “Adjudicatory default on that scale strikes directly at the rule of law.” View "Hernandez-Serrano v. Barr" on Justia Law

Rogers owned RJ Control. Elder owns Multiject, which engineers and sells accessories for plastic injection molding. In 2008, the parties entered into an oral agreement. Rogers developed a control system for injection molding. RJ updated that system design in 2013 (Design 3). The parties dispute the invoicing for Design 3. In 2014, Elder asked for copies of Design 3’s diagrams and software source code. Rogers disclosed that information. Days later, Elder indicated that Multiject would no longer need Rogers’s services and would instead use RSW for the assembly and wiring of the control systems. RSW's quote explicitly referenced Design 3’s software code and technical drawings without any changes. RSW apparently believed Multiject had permission to use the software and technical drawings.Almost two years later, Rogers obtained Copyright Certificates of Registration for the software code and the technical drawings. RJ filed suit. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. The use of the Design 3 drawing to manufacture a control system is not an act of copyright infringement. Copyright protection extends to the drawing itself, 17 U.S.C. 106, but does not extend to the use of those drawings to create the described useful article. Patent law, with stricter standards requiring novelty, governs use protection. The court reversed with respect to the software code, finding that material questions of fact remain concerning whether the complex technology is properly protected under the Copyright Act. View "RJ Control Consultants, Inc. v. Multiject, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2019, Jones pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine base and was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 10 years’ imprisonment. Jones filed a pro se emergency motion, seeking compassionate release because of the pandemic. Jones may have respiratory issues, is over 40 years old, and is obese. One out of every four prisoners has tested positive for COVID-19 in the prison where Jones is incarcerated.District courts may reduce the sentences of incarcerated persons in “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Previously, only the Bureau of Prisons could file motions for compassionate release. The Bureau rarely did so. The 2018 First Step Act allows incarcerated persons to file their own motions.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Jones’s motion. In making sentence-modification decisions under section 3582(c)(1)(A), district courts must find both that “extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant the reduction and that the "reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission” before considering relevant 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)sentencing factors. Sentencing Guideline 1B1.13, which has not been amended to reflect the First Step Act, is not an “applicable” policy statement in cases where prisoners file their own motions. District courts must supply specific factual reasons for their decisions. Here, the court found for the sake of argument that an extraordinary and compelling circumstance existed but that section 3553(a)'s factors counseled against granting release. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Davis, insured under a Hartford long-term disability policy, began missing work due to chronic back pain, neuropathy, and fatigue caused by multiple myeloma. Relying on the opinion of Davis’s oncologist, Dr. Reddy, Hartford approved Davis’s claim for short-term disability benefits through April 17, 2012. In June, Hartford approved Davis for long-term disability benefits, retroactive to April, for 24 months. Davis could continue to receive benefits beyond that time if he was unable to perform one or more of the essential duties of “Any Occupation” for which he was qualified by education, training, or experience and that has comparable “earnings potential.” Reddy's subsequent reports were inconsistent. An investigator found “discrepancies" based on surveillance. Davis’s primary care physician and neurologist both concluded that Davis could work full-time under described conditions. Reddy disagreed, but would not answer follow-up questions. An orthopedic surgeon conducted an independent review and performed an examination, and reported that Davis was physically capable of “light duty or sedentary work” within certain restrictions. Other doctors agreed. Hartford notified Davis that he would be ineligible for benefits after April 17, 2014.Davis filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a). The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Hartford. Hartford reasonably concluded that Davis could work full-time, under certain limitations; the decision was not arbitrary. View "Davis v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Alemarah sued her former employer, GM, in both state and federal court, claiming employment discrimination based upon identical factual allegations. The state suit asserted state claims, the federal suit, federal claims. The state court dismissed that case after a case evaluation ($400,000); the federal district court granted GM summary judgment. Alemarah challenged the court’s grant of summary judgment, its denial of her motion to recuse the judge, and an award ($4,715) of costs.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court properly granted summary judgment. Under Michigan law, the state court’s order dismissing her claims after acceptance of the case evaluation was a judgment on the merits, Alemarah and GM were parties in both case, and the matter in the second case could have been resolved in the first, so res judicata bars every claim arising from the same transaction that the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, could have raised. The court acknowledged that a reasonable observer could conclude that the district judge’s statement in a letter to Alemarah’s counsel expressed anger and another of the judge’s actions could be seen as punitive but those actions were not “so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment.” GM submitted as costs the amount it paid for deposition transcripts that it attached to its summary judgment motion; the costs were allowable. View "Alemarah v. General Motors, LLC" on Justia Law

Tisdale, Davis, and Hill held prominent positions in Detroit's "Playboy Gangster Crips," which committed hundreds of home invasions. On January 31, 2017, Tisdale and other gang members approached a house on Stout Street, threw a brick through the window, and left. They met with Davis and drove back to rob the house. As they exited their Jeep, someone shot at them from the house. Tisdale returned fire. A bullet from the house hit Tisdale’s leg. The gang members left. Federal agents obtained a warrant to search Tisdale’s home and discovered incriminating evidence. Tisdale, Hill, Davis, and 11 others were indicted. Many pleaded guilty; a jury convicted Tisdale, Hill, and Davis of racketeering conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), and convicted Tisdale of assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering and of using a firearm during a crime of violence, sections 1959(a)(3), 924(c). The district court sentenced Tisdale to 252 months, Hill to 246 months, and Davis to 144 months.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the affidavit used to support the search warrant lacked probable cause; that the court should have granted Davis’ motion to sever; that the court should have granted a mistrial after jurors inadvertently saw the defendants in the hallway escorted in handcuffs by marshals; that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense; and that the court erred by instructing the jury that firing a gun qualifies as “brandishing.” View "United States v. Tisdale" on Justia Law

Mukes was arrested after a dispute with his girlfriend, Davis. He pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Davis claimed that Mukes had fired the gun into the air four times. Mukes denied ever firing or threatening Davis. Officers had observed Mukes walking away, holding a handgun, and told Mukes to drop the gun. Mukes fled and was quickly caught. Officers recovered the loaded handgun. The arrest record stated that Mukes threw the weapon while fleeing. The affidavit of complaint stated that Mukes dropped the firearm before he ran. Mukes insisted that he dropped the gun in response to police commands before running. The PSR stated that Mukes dropped the firearm after he ran and recommended a four-point enhancement for using a firearm in connection with another felony offense, “Reckless Endangerment-Deadly Weapon,” and a two-point enhancement for recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person while fleeing from a law officer. Mukes argued that he should not be penalized for contesting the enhancements when he accepted responsibility for the crime.The district court applied both enhancements, declined to grant Mukes a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and sentenced Mukes to the statutory maximum, 120 months' imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The government failed to demonstrate that either enhancement was applicable; on remand, the court should consider whether Mukes may receive the two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility. View "United States v. Mukes" on Justia Law

Donna’s former husband, Carl, retired from Ford in 1998 and participated in Ford’s retirement plan. “In the event of an error” in calculating a pension, the plan requires a beneficiary to return the overpayment “without limitation.” A committee runs the plan, with “discretionary authority" to reduce the repayment. Carl and Donna divorced in 2009. Donna received half of the marital portion of Carl’s pension. Donna agreed to postpone drawing the pension. In 2013, Ford offered a lump sum payment in place of future monthly benefits and a $351,690 retroactive payment for the postponed monthly benefits. After paying taxes, Donna invested some of the money and gave some to her children. Ford audited Donna’s benefits. It discovered that the retroactive pension payment mistakenly included benefits from 1998, when Carl retired, instead of 2009. The payment should have been $108,500. Ford requested repayment; the committee invited Donna to apply for a hardship reduction. The application required disclosure of her finances, including her other substantial retirement funds and an inheritance. Donna did not apply; she sued.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Ford. The committee’s actions were neither wrong nor arbitrary. Donna did not establish that Ford’s inclusion of an incorrect retroactive-payment amount constituted constructive fraud. She knew that the retroactive payment was too high when she got it, the plan put her on notice that Ford could demand repayment, and she has the capacity to return the money. View "Zirbel v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Johnson’s Saginaw restaurant was rented out for a birthday party. A gang-related fight began inside Johnson’s building and became a gunfight in the street. City officials suspended Johnson's business license and water service to prevent her from hosting further events. The Michigan Building Code and local ordinance authorize disconnection in case of emergency, where necessary to eliminate an immediate hazard to life or property. Water has been disconnected from other businesses in response to shootings without pre-deprivation notice; “the notice of the suspension of the business license covers [water shutoffs] even though it doesn’t mention it.” Johnson sued. The police chief testified about a 2015 party at Johnson’s property that ended in a similar shooting. Johnson testified about damage attributable to the lack of water service and lost revenue and that she had called to request that her water service be restored but a representative told her no information regarding the shutoff could be provided.The district court denied qualified immunity to city officials. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. A license suspension hearing was held within three days of the shooting; it would not have been impractical to a hearing before suspending Johnson's license and water service. The deprivation was not random, unpredictable, or unauthorized. Given Johnson’s significant interest in continued water service, the high risk of erroneous deprivation, and the value and minimal burden of additional safeguards, the disconnection violated procedural due process rights that were clearly established. Once Johnson’s business license was suspended, the water shutoff served no rational purpose; Johnson made an adequate showing that the shutoff violated her substantive due process right but that right was not clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity. View "Johnson v. City of Saginaw" on Justia Law

Flowers worked as a pipefitter and welder for 30 years at Graphic before retiring. A few years later, WestRock was looking for pipefitters. WestRock’s online application included sections titled “Required Skills and Experience” and “Additional Requirements,” requiring that the applicant be able to read blueprints. Flowers applied. The application did not ask for a date of birth (Flowers was 71). WestRock HR forwarded the application to Klon, a team lead, and Bumgart, a supervisor. From his prior experience working with Flowers at Graphic, Klon felt that Flowers demonstrated a poor work ethic. Klon recalled specific incidents. Bumgart contacted a friend who had worked with Flowers at Graphic; that friend told Bumgart to “stay away” from hiring Flowers. Fecteau declined Flowers’ application. Flowers learned that a younger, less experienced worker was hired and sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. During discovery, Flowers admitted that he does not know how to read building blueprints nor does he have experiences listed in Required Skills. He had refused to get certified for certain welding activities because he “didn’t want to be a welder anyway.”The Sixth Circuit affirmed a judgment in favor of WestRock. Flowers failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination because he was not “otherwise qualified” for the position given his inability to read blueprints or select pipes and his unwillingness to weld. He failed to show that WestRock’s reasons for not hiring him were false. View "Flowers v. WestRock Services, Inc." on Justia Law