Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Federal prisoner Grant was detained at the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center NEOCC while awaiting sentencing for armed robbery. NEOCC, a privately owned and operated prison, contracts with the U.S. Marshals Service to house federal detainees before trial and/or sentencing. Grant punched a prison guard and ultimately pleaded guilty under 18 U.S.C. 111, which criminalizes assaulting federal officers and those who assist them. Grant contends that section 111 does not apply because the assault victim was a private contractor, not a federal employee, and, at the time of the assault, the contractor was not assisting a federal employee.The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction. Section 111 encompasses circumstances where a private employee performs the same federal duties a federal employee would otherwise fulfill. View "United States v. Grant" on Justia Law

Clancy and a partner went to rob a Memphis store. Clancy wore a white hoodie, red pants with white letters, red shoes, a black mask, black gloves, and had a gun. His partner wore a black hoodie, black pants, a black mask, and also carried a gun. Clancy aimed his weapon and said: “You know what time it is.” Within seconds, shots rang out. The manager and another employee grabbed their guns and returned fire. The robbers fled. One employee was shot in the knee. Within 15 minutes of the robbery, a car arrived at the hospital. Two men dressed in black summoned an emergency technician, who found Clancy laying across the backseat with a gunshot wound. The other men left. Clancy wore a light-colored jacket, red pants with a white lettering, red shoes, and a black glove. Officers, walking into the emergency department, found Clancy, and saw his clothing on the floor, visible from the hallway. Crime scene investigators arrived and found Clancy’s bloodied clothes in a plastic bag.Clancy was convicted of attempted Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951, and use of a firearm related to a crime of violence, section 924(c). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding the denial of a motion to suppress the clothing evidence, citing the plain-view doctrine. The court also upheld an instruction that required the jury to find that Clancy, “while being aided and abetted by others unknown,” used a firearm. View "United States v. Clancy" on Justia Law

Hall was convicted of 11 counts of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344(1), and one count of identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1). During her trial, Hall admitted that she signed her children’s, niece’s, and sister’s names and altered her sister’s paystubs to obtain student loan money. She maintained that she thought all her actions did not violate the law and that her family members orally gave her permission to apply for the loans.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. Even if the indictment was duplicitous because it included both sections 1344(1) and (2) in each count related to one loan, rather than separating out section 1344(1) as one count for a particular loan and section 1344(2) as another count for that same loan, the government elected to rely on section 1344(1), and the district court only instructed on the elements for section 1344(1). Challenged statements made by the prosecutor were not so flagrant to merit reversal; the defense did not object to the remarks and overwhelming proof of guilt existed. View "United States v. Hall" on Justia Law

Glenview, a Glasgow, Kentucky nursing home, jointly owned by Bush and Howlett for over 30 years, filed a voluntary chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. The Official Creditors Committee was formed and filed an application to retain DBG, with a declaration from DGB's managing partner, disclosing that DBG had previously represented Howlett in estate planning matters, unrelated to the Chapter 11 case, that the representation concluded in 2017, and that the professionals who represented Howlett would not represent the Committee. Glenview filed an objection, although Howlett did not, asserting that DBG assisted Glenview and Howlett with the preparation of a buy-sell agreement for Glenview and all its assets, attaching an invoice from DBG for a period in 2016. DBG asserted that no buy-sell agreement was consummated, and that the representation related only to estate planning. The bankruptcy court heard arguments but did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, then denied the Committee’s application to employ DBG.The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel vacated, finding that the court abused its discretion under 11 U.S.C. 1103. State and federal courts jealously guard the attorney-client relationship and that solicitude extends to a committee’s choice of counsel in bankruptcy. View "In re Glenview Health Care Facility, Inc." on Justia Law

FBI agents arrested Alebbini, a Jordanian national who immigrated to the U.S. in 2009 and became a permanent resident in 2014, at the Cincinnati Airport, suspecting that he was attempting to travel to Turkey and then Syria to join ISIS, a designated foreign terrorist organization. Alebbini had previously shouted a threat while being escorted away from the Turkish Embassy and, during the ensuing investigation, told FBI agents that Facebook deactivated his account because he had posted pro-ISIS videos, that he agreed with ISIS’s overall goals but not necessarily with their means, that he attempted to join the U.S. Military to fight Syrian forces, and that he was not a terrorist, but that he “would be the perfect recruit for ISIS.” An informant had recorded conversations in which he expressed pro-ISIS views. His relatives believed he was planning to travel to join ISIS.Alebbini was convicted of attempting and conspiring to provide material support and resources to ISIS, 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for both of his convictions. A rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. The court noted evidence contradicting Alebbini’s assertion that he had disavowed his plan. View "United States v. Alebbini" on Justia Law

Pogue, believing that he had a severe anxiety disorder that prevented him from practicing as a family doctor, submitted a disability claim to his long-term disability insurers: Northwestern Mutual and Principal Life. Pogue failed to disclose that the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners had suspended his license for mis-prescribing painkillers. His insurers found out and denied both of his claims. Pogue sued, alleging breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.In Pogue’s lawsuit against Northwestern, the district court granted Northwestern summary judgment on two alternative grounds: the suspension occurred before Pogue became disabled, and the suspension caused stress and anxiety and thus contributed to his disability. The Sixth Circuit court affirmed on the first ground and declined to consider the second ground. When Pogue’s lawsuit against Principal reached summary judgment, the district court applied issue preclusion and relied on the Northwestern district court’s holding that the suspension of Pogue’s license contributed to his disability. The court did not address whether the suspension occurred before Pogue became disabled and also granted summary judgment on Pogue’s bad-faith claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court erred by giving preclusive effect to an alternative holding on which the Sixth Circuit declined to rule. View "Pogue v. Principal Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

An informant told the DEA that Ruffin planned to drive to Columbus to purchase heroin from Mexican drug traffickers. She described the SUV, provided the license plate number, and stayed in contact throughout the trip. Agents watched Ruffin and the informant enter the house. Two Hispanic men entered the house briefly. The informant messaged the agents from inside the house that Ruffin had purchased a plastic bag of heroin, and, holding a plastic bag, had gone into the bathroom, where he stayed for about 20 minutes. Agents followed Ruffin until he committed a traffic infraction, then pulled him over. A drug dog alerted on the car. Searches of the car and Ruffin’s person yielded no evidence. The agents suspected that Ruffin had concealed the drugs inside his body. An Ohio magistrate issued a warrant for a body cavity search. Police took Ruffin to the hospital where a nurse conducted a finger-search of Ruffin’s rectum, with Ruffin shackled at the legs and one agent remaining in the room. The nurse’s notes say that she felt something in the anal cavity. The nurse then inserted an instrument to visually examine the inside of Ruffin’s rectum. The nurse’s notes indicate that she saw a foreign object. The physician ordered an X-ray, saw three objects, and ordered soap suds enemas until Ruffin released three bags of heroin and fentanyl.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Ruffin’s motion to suppress the drugs. The facts created a “fair probability” that Ruffin had concealed the drugs in his body, so the magistrate did not “arbitrarily exercise” his discretion in finding probable cause. Although the search could have been handled better, the presence of a warrant, the absence of any safety risk, and the police’s need for evidence make this search reasonable. View "United States v. Ruffin" on Justia Law

Ryan, a tenured professor of journalism at the University of Kentucky, was accused of misusing department resources to make a larger profit off a textbook he had authored. He was asked to resign but refused to do so. Ryan brought suit alleging that the defendants retaliated against him for asserting his due process and First Amendment rights after he refused to resign.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Ryan’s claim. Ryan’s due process rights were not violated; a faculty committee conducted an investigation into his conduct and made its recommendation not to terminate Ryan’s employment. A statement to the press by the University’s provost was not sufficiently chilling that it would deter a person of ordinary firmness from refusing to resign, and cannot be considered retaliation. Ryan failed to state a claim for First Amendment retaliation because the facts alleged do not implicate a matter of public concern. Furthermore, because Ryan failed to allege a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, he is not able to overcome qualified immunity. View "Ryan v. Blackwell" on Justia Law

Williamson County District Attorney Helper told other officials that she distrusted Fairview Police officers Stockdale and Dunning and that she would not “take their cases.” Helper wrote to the city manager (Collins): “per our discussion, this Office has concerns about reports initiated/investigated solely by” Dunning or Stockdale and that defense counsel would be entitled to a copy of an earlier investigation report concerning the officers. Helper stated, “[w]ithout independent corroboration from another law enforcement officer and/or independent witness, the[ir] testimony . . . may be impeached.” Collins disputed Helper’s assessment but Helper refused to back down. Collins fired the officers, explaining the email provided the “sole reason.”Stockdale and Dunning sued. They settled their claims against the city, leaving a First Amendment claim and state law claims against Helper. The district court denied Helper’s claim of absolute immunity and her claim for qualified immunity from the federal First Amendment retaliation claim. It also denied her summary judgment with respect to state law claims for official oppression and tortious interference with a business relationship. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Because Helper’s actions were not closely tied to the judicial process, absolute immunity does not apply; because her conduct did not violate any clearly established law, qualified immunity protects her. View "Stockdale v. Helper" on Justia Law

Morales became a lawful U.S. permanent resident in 2001. In 2006 she traveled to Guadalajara and stayed for several months. She flew to Tijuana and called her cousin, Guadalupe, a U.S. citizen living in California. Guadalupe agreed to pick Morales up in Tijuana. Guadalupe arrived with her boyfriend, Ruiz, a U.S. citizen, and a Los Angeles police officer. Morales was with her cousin Alisa and Alisa’s sons. Jorge, age five, was to travel to Los Angeles. Alisa gave Morales an envelope with a birth certificate inside. Morales claims she never examined it. At the border, Customs Officers determined the identities and citizenship of the three adults. Guadalupe said the boy was her cousin and presented a birth certificate, which had been issued in California for Jonathan Clemente. Officer Banuelos testified later that Morales had “insist[ed] that the birth certificate belonged to the child” and that the four had traveled from Los Angeles and back together; “I couldn’t get a straight answer" concerning the parents. Jorge spoke no English and stated that his name was Jorge Navarro. Another officer completed an “I-213” form, indicating that Morales had admitted that she had obtained a fraudulent birth certificate and attempted to smuggle Jorge into the U.S.Morales was charged as ineligible for admission, having knowingly encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided an undocumented alien, to enter or try to enter the U.S, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(E)(i). An IJ found that the officers’ testimony was credible, that Morales’s testimony was not, and that Morales was removable “by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.” The BIA dismissed her appeal. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "Bribiesca v. Barr" on Justia Law