Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Voter-advocacy organizations challenged Michigan statutes regulating absentee ballots and mandating that no one “hire a motor vehicle or other conveyance or cause the same to be done, for conveying voters, other than voters physically unable to walk, to an election." Michigan Attorney General Nessel was the named defendant; permissive intervenor status was granted to both houses of the Michigan Legislature, and the Republican Party. The court rejected challenges to the absentee-ballot statute but preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the voter-transportation law. When the intervenors sought an emergency stay of the injunction pending appeal, Nessel declined to take a position. The district court denied the intervenors’ motion.The Sixth Circuit granted an emergency stay. The legislature has standing to appeal. The state statute is likely not preempted by federal law, the Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. 30143. The balance of equities weighs in favor of staying the order. The harm to the legislature without a stay would be irreparable: election day will only happen once, and the legislature will lose its ability to regulate paid voter transportation for that election. The harm to the voter-advocacy organizations appears modest. There are other ways, without violating Michigan’s statute, to take voters to the polls. With the expansion of mailed ballots in Michigan, there are likely fewer voters who need to be driven to the polls. The public interest lies in elections conducted with a minimum of fraud and in free elections, in which as many eligible voters can vote as desire to. View "Priorities USA v. Nessel" on Justia Law

Keahey and McGill lived with their daughter and two boys, the product of McGill’s prior relationship with Hampton. Hampton came to the house, pulled out a knife, charged Keahey, and stabbed him in the back. Keahey and McGill never identified Hampton as the assailant. McGill and the children moved in with her mother, Joyce. Despite a criminal history that prohibited firearm possession, Keahey got a gun. Weeks later, Keahey and McGill planned to meet at the doctor’s office for their daughter’s appointment. Keahey decided to instead go to Joyce's house. Joyce testified that when Hampton arrived with his boys, Keahey fired at an unarmed Hampton and chased Hampton down the sidewalk. A knife found at the scene was locked and closed. Keahey testified that he shot Hampton in self-defense because Hampton had charged at him with a knife. Keahey claims that, as he retreated, he heard a gunshot and saw Hampton, gun in hand, coming toward him. After shooting Hampton twice, Keahey fled.An Ohio trial judge found Keahey failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant a self-defense instruction. State courts rejected his arguments on appeal and on collateral review. Keahey filed a federal habeas petition, citing the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, finding that the state court’s decision was not contrary to, and did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent. View "Keahey v. Marquis" on Justia Law

Organizations involved in voter outreach in Tennessee and one individual Tennessee voter sued Tennessee government officials involved in election enforcement, challenging the Tennessee statutory scheme that governs absentee voting. On September 9, the district court granted a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the enforcement of Tenn. Code 2-2-115(b)(7), which prevents individuals who registered to vote by submitting a registration form online or by mail from voting absentee during the first election after they had registered.The Sixth Circuit denied a motion to stay that injunction. Disrupting the new rules at this point would pose a significant risk of harm to the public interest in orderly elections, while there is no substantial harm to defendants in continuing to comply with rules they are currently following. The defendants did not file their appeal of the preliminary injunction until nearly one month after it went into effect. During the period between September 9, the day of issuance of the preliminary injunction, and October 15, the day the plaintiffs’ response was filed, both absentee voting and early in-person voting had begun in Tennessee. View "Memphis A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Hargett" on Justia Law

Kentucky Governor Beshear, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, prohibited “[a]ll mass gatherings,” including faith-based events.” The order excepts “normal operations at airports, bus and train stations, . . . shopping malls,” and “typical office environments, factories, or retail or grocery stores where large numbers of people are present, but maintain appropriate social distancing.” A subsequent order required organizations that are not “life-sustaining” to close. “Life-sustaining” exempt entities include laundromats, accounting services, law firms, hardware stores, airlines, mining operations, funeral homes, landscaping businesses, and grocery stores. Religious organizations are not “life-sustaining,” except when they provide “food, shelter, and social services.” The order prohibited even drive-in services.Maryville Baptist held an Easter service. Some congregants went into the church. Others parked outside and listened to the service over a loudspeaker. Police issued notices that their attendance, whether in the church or outdoors, amounted to a criminal act, recorded congregants’ license plate numbers, and sent letters requiring self-quarantine for 14 days. Congregants who attended the service sued, claiming that the orders and their enforcement violated their free-exercise and interstate-travel rights.The Sixth Circuit previously granted injunctions pending appeal, reasoning that the treatment of comparable religious and non-religious activities does not suggest the least restrictive way of regulating the churches. The Sixth Circuit later dismissed the appeals. On remand, the district court(s) should consider whether these cases are moot in light of the Governor’s new orders, permitting indoor worship at limited capacity. View "Roberts v. Neace" on Justia Law

A 1998 Kentucky law requires abortion facilities to obtain transfer agreements with local hospitals and transport agreements with local ambulance services, Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 216B.0435; 2017 regulations imposed stricter conditions on the agreements but also allowed successive, 90-day waivers for facilities unable to comply. EMW, at the time, Kentucky’s only licensed abortion facility, challenged the requirements as imposing an undue burden on abortion access. They argued that it had become impossible for them to obtain the required agreements and that the law’s enforcement would leave Kentucky without a licensed abortion facility. The district court found Kentucky’s requirements were facially invalid and permanently enjoined them.The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, vacating the injunction. The district court erred in attempting to weigh the benefits of the Kentucky laws against their burdens; a court need only consider whether the laws are reasonably related to a legitimate state interest and whether they impose a substantial obstacle. The laws are reasonably related to a legitimate government end. The court noted that Planned Parenthood received a provisional license for its Louisville facility in 2020 and currently performs abortions. To establish a substantial burden, the plaintiffs had to establish that both EMW and Planned Parenthood would be unable to operate on the basis of waivers even if they could reasonably expect to renew the waiver every 90 days. They failed to make that showing. View "EMW Women's Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Friedlander" on Justia Law

Police searched Palos’s residence on suspicion of drug trafficking and found narcotics, drug paraphernalia, and a firearm. Palos admitted that he had purchased the firearm “off the streets.” It was later confirmed to be stolen. Palos, previously convicted of two separate drug trafficking offenses in state court, pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). With a Guidelines range of 87-108 months, he was sentenced to 63 months’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit vacated his sentence, in part. Palos's 2010 conviction under Ohio Revised Code 2925.03(A)(1), which criminalizes “knowingly . . . “sell[ing] or offer[ing] to sell a controlled substance” no longer qualifies as a “controlled substance offense” so that his Guidelines base offense level was miscalculated. Statutes that criminalize offers to sell controlled substances are too broad to categorically qualify as predicate ‘controlled substance offenses.’” The court upheld a sentencing enhancement for possession of a stolen firearm, rejecting an argument that Palos had no knowledge that the firearm was stolen. The court noted the absence of a scienter requirement in U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(4). Palos’s firearm was stolen at the time Palos unlawfully possessed it and section 2K2.1(b)(4) is a strict liability enhancement. View "United States v. Palos" on Justia Law

Tennessee voters must apply to vote absentee. The county administrator of elections determines whether the voter has established eligibility to vote absentee, and compares the signature of the voter on the request with the signature on the voter’s registration record. Voters who qualify to vote absentee receive a ballot, an inner envelope and an outer envelope, and instructions. The inner envelope has an affidavit; the voter must verify that he is eligible to vote in the election. The ballot must be received no later than when the polls close. Upon receipt by mail of the absentee ballot, the administrator "shall open only the outer envelope and compare the voter’s signature on the [affidavit] with the voter’s signature" on the registration record. If the administrator determines the signatures do not match, the ballot is rejected; the voter is “immediately” notified in writing. Voters who are concerned that their absentee ballot might be rejected may cast a provisional ballot before being notified of a rejection.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction to prohibit the enforcement of the signature verification procedures. The plaintiffs cannot cite with certainty or specification any past erroneous rejection of an absentee ballot; their speculative allegations of harm are insufficient to establish standing. The plaintiffs have not demonstrated that anyone whose ballot may be erroneously rejected will ultimately be unable to vote, either absentee or by provisional ballot; there is no evidence that anyone’s constitutional rights are likely to be infringed. View "Memphis A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Hargett" on Justia Law

Fuerst fell at a military base, which left her disabled. She returned to work part-time. The Air Force removed Fuerst from service after determining that her ability to work only part-time was affecting the office’s mission. The Department of Labor subsequently determined that Fuerst was no longer disabled. Fuerst applied to participate in a fast-track reemployment program for civil-service employees who were removed from service because of a disability but have recovered, 5 U.S.C. 8151(b). The Air Force did not place her on the priority reemployment list. Fuerst appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, which found that her removal was not improper or motivated by discrimination, but ordered the Air Force to rehire her. The Air Force offered Fuerst two jobs at her pay grade. Fuerst did not accept the offers. The Board ruled that the Air Force had complied. Fuerst appealed to a federal district court.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Employees must generally appeal Board decisions to the Federal Circuit. Fuerst’s case could not qualify as a “mixed case” within the district court’s jurisdiction; it was not an appeal of an agency's action, but a petition for enforcement, although Fuerst sought to enforce an order issued in a mixed case. In a mixed case, the Board decides "both the issue of discrimination and the appealable action[s].” When Fuerst petitioned for enforcement, the Board had decided those issues already. Fuerst had a chance to ask a district court to review those decisions but did not do so. View "Fuerst v. Secretary of the Air Force" on Justia Law

Beginning in‌ ‌‌2017,‌ ‌DaVita‌ ‌provided‌ ‌dialysis‌ ‌treatment‌ ‌to‌ ‌Patient‌ ‌A,‌ ‌who was ‌diagnosed‌ ‌ with‌ ‌end-stage‌ ‌renal‌ ‌disease‌ ‌(ESRD).‌ ‌‌Patient‌ ‌A‌ assigned his‌ ‌insurance‌ ‌rights‌ ‌to‌ ‌DaVita.‌ ‌Through‌ August‌ ‌2018,‌ ‌the‌ ‌costs‌ ‌of‌ ‌Patient‌ ‌A’s‌ ‌dialysis‌ ‌were‌ ‌reimbursed‌ ‌by‌ ‌the‌ ‌Employee‌ ‌Health‌ ‌Benefit‌ ‌Plan,‌ ‌governed‌ ‌by‌ ‌the‌ ‌Employee‌ ‌Retirement‌ ‌Income‌ ‌Security‌ ‌Act‌ ‌(ERISA), ‌at‌ ‌its‌ ‌bottom‌ ‌tier,‌ ‌which‌ ‌applied‌ ‌to‌ ‌providers‌ ‌who‌ ‌are‌ ‌“out-of-network.”‌ ‌All‌ ‌dialysis‌ ‌providers‌ were‌ ‌out-of-network.‌ ‌While‌ ‌most‌ ‌out-of-network‌ ‌providers‌ ‌are‌ ‌reimbursed‌ ‌in‌ ‌the‌ ‌bottom‌ ‌tier‌ ‌based‌ ‌on‌ ‌a‌ ‌“reasonable‌ ‌and‌ ‌customary”‌ ‌fee‌ ‌as‌ ‌understood‌ ‌in‌ ‌the‌ ‌healthcare‌ ‌industry,‌ ‌dialysis‌ ‌providers‌ ‌are‌ ‌subject‌ ‌to‌ ‌an‌ ‌“alternative‌ ‌basis‌ ‌for‌ ‌payment”;‌‌‌ ‌the‌ ‌Plan‌ ‌reimburses‌ ‌at‌ 87.5%‌ ‌of‌ ‌the‌ ‌Medicare‌ ‌rate.‌ ‌Patient‌ ‌A‌ ‌was exposed‌ ‌to‌ ‌higher‌ ‌copayments,‌ ‌coinsurance‌ ‌amounts,‌ ‌and‌ ‌deductibles and ‌was‌ ‌allegedly‌ ‌at‌ ‌risk‌ ‌of‌ ‌liability‌ ‌for‌ ‌the‌ ‌balance‌ ‌of‌ ‌what‌ ‌was‌ ‌not‌ ‌reimbursed‌ .‌ ‌The‌ ‌Plan‌ ‌identified‌ ‌dialysis‌ ‌as‌ ‌subject‌ ‌to‌ ‌heightened‌ ‌scrutiny,‌ ‌ ‌which‌ ‌allegedly‌ ‌incentivizes‌ ‌dialysis‌ ‌patients‌ ‌to‌ ‌switch‌ ‌to‌ ‌Medicare. Patient‌ ‌A‌ ‌switched‌ ‌to‌ ‌Medicare.‌ ‌DaVita‌ ‌and‌ ‌Patient‌ ‌A‌ ‌sued,‌ ‌alleging‌ ‌that‌ ‌the‌ ‌Plan‌ ‌treats‌ ‌dialysis‌ ‌providers‌ ‌differently‌ ‌from‌ ‌other‌ ‌medical‌ ‌providers‌ ‌in‌ ‌violation‌ ‌of‌ ‌the‌ ‌Medicare‌ ‌Secondary‌ ‌Payer‌ ‌Act‌ ‌(MSPA)‌ ‌and‌ ‌ERISA.‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ The‌ ‌Sixth‌ ‌Circuit‌ ‌reversed,‌ ‌in‌ ‌part,‌ ‌the‌ ‌dismissal‌ ‌of‌ ‌the‌ ‌claims.‌ ‌A‌ ‌conditional‌ ‌payment‌ ‌by‌ ‌Medicare‌ ‌is‌ ‌required‌ ‌as‌ ‌a‌ ‌precondition‌ ‌to‌ ‌suing‌ ‌under‌ ‌the‌ ‌MSPA’s‌ ‌private‌ ‌cause‌ ‌of‌ ‌action;‌ ‌the‌ ‌complaint‌ ‌sufficiently alleges ‌such‌ ‌a‌ ‌payment‌.‌ ‌DaVita‌ ‌plausibly‌ ‌alleged‌ ‌that‌ ‌the‌ ‌Plan‌ ‌violates‌ ‌the‌ ‌nondifferentiation‌ ‌provision‌ ‌of‌ ‌the‌ ‌MSPA,‌ ‌resulting‌ ‌in‌‌ ‌denials‌ ‌of‌ ‌benefits‌ ‌and‌ ‌unlawful‌ ‌discrimination‌ ‌under‌ ‌ERISA.‌ ‌ View "DaVita, Inc. v. Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan" on Justia Law

Pilot Flying J, headquartered in Knoxville, operates hundreds of truck stops nationwide and sells billions of gallons of diesel fuel annually to trucking companies. Employees in Pilot’s direct-sales division falsely promised discounted fuel prices, and then secretly shorted the customers through deceptive invoicing and rebate techniques. Several pled guilty.The Sixth Circuit reversed conspiracy to commit wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343) and mail fraud (section 1341) convictions of three defendants. The district court had allowed the government to play audio recordings in which one defendant, Pilot's President, is heard using deeply offensive racist and misogynistic language, reasoning that if the defendant was reckless enough to use language that could risk public outrage against the company, he was a “bad businessman,” and as a bad businessman, he was also reckless enough to commit fraud. “This is vintage bad character evidence—and precisely the type of reasoning the Federal Rules of Evidence forbid.” None of the Rules of Evidence support the recordings’ admissibility and, even if somehow otherwise admissible, the recordings are a “textbook violation” of Rule 403, because the risk of unfair prejudice eviscerates any purported probative value. View "United States v. Wombold" on Justia Law