Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Mohlman became a licensed securities professional in 2001. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, a not-for-profit member organization, regulates practice in the securities industry and enforces disciplinary actions against its members. In 2012, Mohlman had conversations with several individuals concerning WMA. Mohlman did not attempt to sell WMA investments and did not receive compensation from WMA. Mohlman learned in 2014 that WMA was a Ponzi scheme and immediately informed all persons who had invested in WMA. Mohlman appeared for testimony as part of FINRA’s investigation. Another day of testimony was scheduled but instead of appearing, Mohlman and his counsel signed a Letter of Acceptance, Waiver, and Consent, agreeing to a permanent ban from the securities industry. FINRA agreed to refrain from filing a formal complaint against him. Mohlman waived his procedural rights under FINRA’s Code of Procedure and the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78a and agreed to “not take any position in any proceeding brought by or on behalf of FINRA, or to which FINRA is a party, that is inconsistent with any part of [the Letter].” FINRA accepted the Letter in 2015.In 2019, Mohlman filed suit, alleging that FINRA fraudulently avoided considering mitigating factors in administering the sanction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit without addressing the merits. Mohlman failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the Exchange Act by appealing to the National Adjudicatory Council and petitioning the SEC for review. View "Mohlman v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law

The warrant to search Blomquist's father's property permitted a full search of the property, including outbuildings. Officers encountered Blomquist walking out of a chicken coop. He waived his rights, took the officers to the garage, and gave them paperwork, which he said authorized a medical-marijuana operation. They returned to the chicken coop. Blomquist took them inside and showed them several rooms full of marijuana plants, explaining that he moved the plants to nearby greenhouses in warmer weather, then took the officers there. Blomquist never suggested that the structures were on someone else’s property, nor was there any visible evidence indicating as much. Blomquist took the officers back to his father’s garage and let them into a locked attic room that contained 37 pounds of pre-packaged marijuana. Blomquist’s medical-marijuana operation was not legal because he had a federal drug felony on his record and he stored more marijuana than distributors were allowed to possess. He admitted to selling marijuana to a drug dealer (who lacked a medical marijuana card). Blomquist had also broken several federal laws.Charged with manufacturing, possessing, distributing, and conspiring to distribute marijuana. 21 U.S.C. 841, 846. Blomquist moved to suppress the evidence. Blomquist established that the chicken coop and greenhouses were on his cousin’s property, which was not covered by the search warrant. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Blomquist consented to the more expansive search. View "United States v. Blomquist" on Justia Law

Bennett worked at the Metro Government Emergency Communications Center (ECC) for 16 years. On November 9, 2016, Bennett, a white woman, responded to someone else's comment on her public-facing Facebook profile, using some of the commenter’s words: “Thank god we have more America loving rednecks. Red spread across all America. Even niggaz and latinos voted for trump too!” Bennett identified herself as an employee of Metro, the police department, and ECC in her Facebook profile. A constituent reposted part of Bennett’s statement and commented: If your skin is too dark your call may have just been placed on the back burner. Several employees and an outsider complained to ECC leadership. Bennett failed to show remorse. ECC officials determined that Bennett violated three Civil Service Rules and, after paid administrative leave and a due process hearing, fired her.Bennett sued Metro for First Amendment retaliation. The Sixth Circuit reversed a judgment in favor of Bennett, finding that the district court improperly analyzed the “Pickering” factors. The record indicated that the harmony of the office was disrupted; the court erred in discounting the importance of harmonious relationships at ECC. It is possible that inaction on ECC’s part could have been seen as an endorsement of the speech and impaired future discipline of similar derogatory statements. It is also possible that a damaged relationship with her colleagues could affect the quality and quantity of Bennett's work. Bennett’s comment detracted from ECC's mission. View "Bennett v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County" on Justia Law

In 2011, McCormick was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, which carries a 10-year maximum sentence. The district court sentenced McCormick under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), which imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum on defendants with three prior violent felony convictions, citing McCormick’s prior convictions for Kentucky third-degree burglary. Those burglaries occurred during a 16-day period, 19 years earlier, just after McCormick turned 18. The court recognized that McCormick’s offenses did not categorically qualify as ACCA predicates. The district court examined more than the Kentucky statute to conclude that McCormick “pled guilty to each of the essential elements of [generic] burglary.” The court sentenced McCormick to the ACCA’s 15-year mandatory minimum, varying downward. McCormick’s conviction and sentence were affirmed.The Sixth Circuit vacated his sentence. The district court incorrectly concluded that McCormick could not bring a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 to challenge his illegal sentence based on the Supreme Court's 2016 "Mathis" decision, which explicated the “categorical approach” and requires courts to rely solely on the state statute's text to determine whether past convictions qualify as ACCA predicates where the state statute is divisible and lists alternative factual means by which a defendant can satisfy the listed elements. Based on Mathis, McCormick’s prior convictions no longer qualify as ACCA predicates. The 28 U.S.C. 2255(e) savings clause authorized him to seek relief from his unlawful sentence through a section 2241 petition. View "McCormick v. Butler" on Justia Law

Rudd alleged that his ex-wife abducted their sons with assistance from her attorney (Meyers), during a child custody dispute. Rudd called the police but alleges that they refused to help him because Meyers is married to the city manager. Rudd filed an official complaint with the police department. Rudd claims that officials subsequently helped Meyers obtain an ex parte personal protection order as “leverage” in the custody case, authorized officers to illegally disclose Rudd’s information on the Law Enforcement Information Network, and falsified reports. Rudd prevailed in the custody case. Norton Shores later hired a new police chief, Gale. Rudd thought that Gale might “objectively” address the way that the police had handled his sons’ abduction and filed an official complaint. Gale told Rudd that he would investigate and have the Michigan State Police investigate. Instead, Rudd alleges, Gale gave his complaint to Meyers, the city manager, and the former police chief; never internally investigated; and set up a sham outside investigation. Rudd claims that his complaint triggered retaliatory actions, including an effort to get him jailed.Rudd brought a pro se suit against everyone involved. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of his suit. The evidence may confirm Rudd’s allegations or it may disprove them but a court must accept his allegations as true at the pleading stage. View "Rudd v. City of Norton Shores" on Justia Law

The 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA) allows the FDA to regulate tobacco products. Tobacco products that were not on the market in February 2007 or that were modified after that date must obtain premarket authorization. The 2016 “Deeming Rule” subjected cigars, pipe tobacco, and electronic nicotine delivery systems to the TCA; about 25,000 existing products became subject to 21 U.S.C. 387j(a). The FDA planned to stagger compliance periods for deemed tobacco products.In 2018, public health organizations challenged FDA “guidance” issued under the TCA. The Maryland district court granted them summary judgment. Compliance deadlines had passed but the court concluded that it could impose a deadline because the case presented extraordinary circumstances. The court ordered the FDA to require that premarket applications be filed within 10 months (May 2020) but declined to require enforcement actions. The FDA issued new guidance in January 2020, stating that it intended to prioritize enforcement of the premarket-review requirements for e-cigarettes beginning in May 2020. Before the Fourth Circuit ruled, the district court amended its injunction, in light of the pandemic, to require that applications be submitted by September 2020. The FDA revised its guidance accordingly. The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal.An e-cigarette trade organization sought a declaration that FDA’s deadline was unlawful agency action under the APA in the Eastern District of Kentucky, arguing the FDA’s brief and an attached declaration motivated the Maryland court to impose that deadline, which significantly accelerated the original FDA deadline. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The Maryland court’s injunction was independent of the FDA’s brief and declaration; the allegedly unauthorized court submissions do not form a plausible legal basis for an injunction against subsequent, independently-caused FDA enforcement proceedings. View "Vapor Technology Association v. United States Food and Drug Administration" on Justia Law

Pineda visited a Cincinnati nightclub that used private bouncers and off-duty Hamilton County deputies for parking lot security. Three deputies worked that night, in uniform. Around 2:30 a.m., a fight broke out. Pineda saw individuals arguing with a bouncer near the door and told them to calm down. The bouncer hit Pineda in the face, chipping two teeth. According to Pineda, a deputy who was behind him knocked him unconscious by striking him on the back of the head with his baton. Pineda never identified the culprit. Three of Pineda’s friends generally corroborated his recollection. The deputies claim that they were in different areas and did not witness what happened to Pineda. Pineda’s injuries were significant. At the hospital, an officer wrote a report indicating that Pineda said that a bouncer assaulted him and did not mention a deputy.Pineda sued the deputies and the Sheriff’s Office under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force claim and that the Sheriff “ratified” the excessive force by failing to meaningfully investigate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of the claims. Pineda was required to produce evidence from which a reasonable jury could find it more likely than not that each defendant was “personally involved” in the excessive force. Pineda did not identify the deputy who struck him; there was no allegation of a causal connection between the unidentified deputy and any other defendant’s actions. The investigation did not contribute to Pineda’s injury. View "Pineda v. Hamilton County" on Justia Law

The Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services regulates the placement of at-risk children in the Commonwealth’s custody. Father Maloney’s Boys and Girls Haven, a private, non-profit entity, educates, treats, and provides day-to-day care to abused and neglected children at a residential campus. The Commonwealth hired Haven to provide care for neglected children. The Haven hired Howell to work with “horses and youth.” Howell had worked one-on-one with Lester, a Haven resident, for three months. Lester arrived early one day, grabbed Howell, choked her unconscious, dragged her into the bathroom, and sexually assaulted her. Howell, unable to return to work, sued Haven and the Kentucky agency, alleging state-law claims and a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim based on her Fourteenth Amendment interest to be free from unjustified personal intrusions.The district court dismissed the state agency from the case, dismissed the federal claim, and remanded the state-law claims to state court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Haven is not a state actor. Haven houses, educates, and provides day-to-day care to the children but has no power to remove children and place them under appropriate care or in juvenile correctional facilities—the kinds of things state actors traditionally do. Kentucky has not “traditionally and exclusively” performed Haven’s functions, and Haven is not standing in Kentucky’s shoes when offering eleemosynary services. Requiring private actors to follow statutory mandates, even if “extensive,” doesn’t transform them into public servants. View "Howell v. Father Maloney's Boys' Haven" on Justia Law

Freed owed $735.43 in taxes ($1,109.06 with penalties) on his property valued at about $97,000. Freed claims he did not know about the debt because he cannot read well. Gratiot County’s treasurer filed an in-rem action under Michigan's General Property Tax Act (GPTA), In a court-ordered foreclosure, the treasurer sold the property to a third party for $42,000. Freed lost his home and all its equity. Freed sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the Takings Clause and the Eighth Amendment.The district court first held that Michigan’s inverse condemnation process did not provide “reasonable, certain, and adequate” remedies and declined to dismiss the suit under the Tax Injunction Act, which tells district courts not to “enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had" in state court, 28 U.S.C. 1341. The court reasoned that the TIA did not apply to claims seeking to enjoin defendants from keeping the surplus equity and that Freed was not challenging his tax liability nor trying to stop the state from collecting. The TIA applied to claims seeking to enjoin enforcement of the GPTA and declare it unconstitutional but no adequate state court remedy existed. The court used the same reasoning to reject arguments that comity principles compelled dismissal. After discovery, the district court sua sponte dismissed Freed’s case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, despite recognizing that it was “doubtful” Freed could win in state court. The Supreme Court subsequently overturned the "exhaustion of state remedies" requirement for takings claims.The Sixth Circuit reversed without addressing the merits of Freed’s claims. Neither the TIA nor comity principles forestall Freed’s suit from proceeding in federal court. View "Freed v. Thomas" on Justia Law

French, with two others, confronted the victim at gunpoint as she was driving, demanded that she exit her car and after she complied, drove away in her vehicle. Weeks later, the three men committed a second carjacking, against an elderly man who lived in a retirement community. The victims and his co-defendants testified at French’s trial. French did not present any evidence. French was convicted of carjacking, 18 U.S.C. 2119, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The PSR recommended a sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment. The court imposed a sentence of 246 months: 78 months’ imprisonment on each carjacking count, to be served concurrently, and 84 months’ imprisonment on each section 924(c) count, to be served consecutively.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. French’s challenge to the credibility of witnesses is not a valid basis for overturning his conviction. The court also rejected French’s contention that he cannot be legally convicted of both offenses under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The district court properly applied the sentencing enhancement in U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice on the basis of French’s attempt to intimidate a witness by posting a Facebook message about his co-defendant's testimony. View "United States v. French" on Justia Law