Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Federal regulations require commercial truck drivers to undergo annual physicals to be “medically certified as physically qualified." A driver is not physically qualified if he has a clinical diagnosis of a respiratory dysfunction likely to interfere with his ability to drive a commercial motor vehicle safely. Respiratory dysfunction includes sleep apnea.Allman was diagnosed with apnea after a sleep study and was instructed to wear a CPAP machine when sleeping in his truck. Allman complained about the device, which was remotely monitored. Allman was suspended twice for noncompliance. Allman independently completed a second sleep study, which showed that Allman did not have sleep apnea. Allman stopped wearing the CPAP and obtained a new DOT certification card without another examination. Walmart instructed Allman to participate in another sleep study because the doctor who performed Allman’s independent study was not board certified. A third study resulted in a second diagnosis of sleep apnea. Allman refused to wear the CPAP machine. Rather than taking the conflicting sleep studies to a DOT medical examiner, Allman resigned and filed suit, asserting discrimination based on perceived disability and retaliation under Ohio law.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of both claims. Walmart offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its CPAP requirement; Allman failed to rebut that reason as pretextual. Walmart’s CPAP requirement was not an unsafe working condition but was a disability accommodation meant to promote public safety and to ensure compliance with federal law. View "Allman v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law

Marqus, a citizen of Iraq, was admitted to the U.S. as a refugee in 2012 and later adjusted his status to Lawful Permanent Resident. In 2017, he was convicted of attempted criminal sexual conduct. In removal proceedings, against the government’s objections, the IJ admitted three expert declarations concerning country conditions. Marqus believes that he would be tortured if he were to return to Iraq because he is Chaldean Christian; was previously tortured by and deserted from the Iraqi military; was previously targeted, abused, and threatened by the El Mahdi army; and lacks documentation to travel within Iraq without being stopped and tortured. The IJ determined that Marqus was ineligible for withholding of removal because the “particularly serious crime” bar applied, 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) or for protection under the Convention Against Torture. The BIA dismissed his appeal and denied his request to consider new evidence: an additional country-conditions expert declaration, the Department of State 2017 Human Rights Report on Iraq, and the 2017 International Religious Freedom Report on Iraq.The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part but remanded. It is not clear that the new evidence materially changes Marqus’s chances of obtaining CAT relief but that evidence, particularly the reports, could be significant. Without an analysis by the BIA of why this evidence is immaterial, it is impossible to determine whether the BIA abused its discretion. View "Marqus v. Barr" on Justia Law

Wilson, with the help of co-signer Allan, took out a student loan serviced by PHEAA. The two submitted a written request for forbearance on the loan and, in doing so, consented to calls to their cell phones. In October 2013, however, both requested that PHEAA stop calling about the loan. Despite their requests, PHEAA called Allan 219 times and Wilson 134 times, after they revoked consent. They claim that those calls violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227 (TCPA), which generally makes it a finable offense to use an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) to make unconsented-to calls or texts.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. Section 227(a) provides that a device that generates and dials random or sequential numbers qualifies as an ATDS. The Avaya system used by PHEAA dials from a stored list of numbers only. The court concluded that the plain text of section 227, read in its entirety, makes clear that devices that dial from a stored list of numbers are subject to the autodialer ban. View "Allan v. Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency" on Justia Law

In 1993, Snow was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, and conspiracy to kill a person while engaged in a conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base, sections 846 and 848(e)(1)(A). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 327 months as to Count 1 and life imprisonment as to Count 2. Snow sought reduction of his Count 2 sentence under the First Step Act, which allows district courts to apply retroactively certain sections of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 124 Stat. 2372.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Snow’s motion, finding Snow ineligible for relief. A First Step Act “covered offense” is “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified" by the Fair Sentencing Act.” The Fair Sentencing Act modified the statutory penalties for certain offenses involving cocaine base by increasing the drug quantities required to trigger certain sentencing ranges and generally requires only adjustment to a new, lower sentencing range. The Fair Sentencing Act did not reduce the sentencing range for Snow’s section 848(e)(1)(A) conviction. The elements of that conviction no longer amount to an offense under section 848; there is no applicable sentencing range. The elimination of statutory penalties is not a “modification” of statutory penalties. The Act states that a court may “impose a reduced sentence” for a covered offense “as if [the changes made by the Fair Sentencing Act] were in effect” when the offense was committed. If the district court revisited Snow’s Count 2 sentence as if the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect, it could not “impose” any sentence. View "United States v. Snow" on Justia Law

Police found Moore dead with a syringe in one hand, his cell phone beside him. Officers obtained a search warrant. The cellphone revealed text messages between Moore and “Joe,” indicating that Joe had delivered drugs to Moore’s address. Officers identified “Joe” through his cellular telephone number, 18 U.S.C. 2703(d). Moore’s death had “resulted from a mixture of cocaine and fentanyl toxicity,” consistent with the drugs purchased from Joe Ward. Six months later, officers searched Ward’s curbside trash and found mail addressed to Ward, “loose marihuana, cigar wrappers, and a plastic bag that appeared to contain illicit drugs at one time.” Ward “has an extensive criminal history which includes charges of felony drug possession, trafficking in drugs, and weapons violations.” Based on that information, a magistrate issued a warrant to search Ward’s residence. During the search, officers seized approximately a kilogram of heroin, some cocaine and some hashish, five firearms, ammunition, drug packaging material, a partial bag of syringes, and a digital scale.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the suppression of that evidence. The government failed to establish a sufficient nexus between Ward’s drug-dealing and his home. The “good faith” exception does not apply. Undated charges, without further information, plus the lone trash pull are not probative of whether Ward used his residence to traffic drugs. The affidavit was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” View "United States v. Ward" on Justia Law

In 2014, a jury convicted Nassiri of the second-degree murder of his wife. In 2018, Nassiri filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. A magistrate determined that Nassiri’s limitations period expired on February 28, 2018—one day before his petition was submitted. Nassiri’s counsel had not recognized the petition’s untimeliness before submission and did not make any arguments in the petition about why his delay should be excused. The magistrate concluded that equitable tolling was not warranted. Nassiri’s objection to the magistrate’s report was prepared by the same counsel responsible for his untimely filing. Counsel explained that she had used a mechanical device, which wrongly indicated that the deadline was March 1, 2018. Counsel argued that she was “seriously negligent” when she “failed to use an alternative method ... after the Petitioner himself questioned the accuracy" of the deadline.” The district court denied the petition as untimely under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A). The court acknowledged that Nassiri’s counsel was “ineffective,” but concluded that her ineffectiveness did not merit tolling because counsel had not “abandoned” Nassiri.The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded to allow Nassiri an opportunity to develop and present his equitable tolling argument anew, while represented by unconflicted counsel. There is some evidence that Nassiri’s attorney did not present the “full picture” of her misconduct to the district court, so jurists of reason could debate whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. View "xNassiri v. Mackie" on Justia Law

In 2008, Melara, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the U.S. illegally and was removed after being apprehended. In 2016, Melara’s wife and children immigrated legally to the U.S. and became lawful permanent residents. Melara then experienced threats and violence from the MS-13 gang. In 2017, Melara illegally reentered the U.S. The government apprehended him and reinstated his 2008 removal order. An asylum officer found that he had established a reasonable possibility of future torture. An IJ found that Melara was not entitled to relief. The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Sixth Circuit remanded Melara’s withholding-only case and dismissed his other petitions for review. The BIA reinstated Melara’s appeal.Melara has remained in detention since December 2017. In June 2019, Melara filed a habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2241, seeking either release from detention or a bond hearing before a neutral decision-maker. The district court dismissed Melara’s petition, holding that 8 U.S.C. 1226 does not apply to his detention and under 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)'s indefinite-detention standard, his due process claims fail because his removal is reasonably foreseeable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Section 1231(a) provides the authority for detaining aliens in withholding-only proceedings. Because Melara’s removal is reasonably foreseeable, his continued detention does not violate due process under the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas v. Davis. View "Martinez v. LaRose" on Justia Law

A Michigan jury convicted Stewart of the premeditated murder of his estranged wife, Venus. At trial Stewart’s accomplice testified that Stewart persuaded him to help by claiming that Venus was harming the couple’s children and that, if she ended up killing them, Stewart would go on a “rampage” and “go after her family and the lawyers and prosecutors and jury[.]” Stewart moved for a mistrial based on his accomplice’s testimony about what he had said, arguing that its inflammatory nature prejudiced him in the eyes of the jury. A state appellate court rejected Stewart’s due-process challenge.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. The state court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). A habeas challenge to an evidentiary ruling cannot satisfy section 2254(d)(1) unless the petitioner identifies a Supreme Court case establishing a due process right with regard to the specific kind of evidence at issue. Stewart identifies no Supreme Court holding barring the “specific kind of evidence,” in this case Stewart’s out-of-court statements that allegedly inflamed the jury. The state appellate court reasonably concluded that Spencer’s testimony about Stewart’s statement was not unduly prejudicial. View "Stewart v. Winn" on Justia Law

Kesterson, a Kent State student-athlete, told her coach, Linder, that Linder’s son had raped her. Linder, a mandatory reporter under Kent State’s Title IX policy, never notified anyone. Linder stopped calling Kesterson by her nickname; chastised her in front of another coach for becoming emotional; removed Kesterson from her starting shortstop position and limited her playing time; and required Kesterson to attend events at the Linder home, where her accused rapist lived. Kenderson subsequently told other Kent State employees about the alleged rape, but none reported it. The university learned about the assault two years later when Kesterson made a complaint to the school’s Title IX office. An investigation led to Linder’s resignation. Kesterson sued Kent State, Linder, and another coach citing the free-speech retaliation protections of the First Amendment, her equal-protection rights, and Title IX. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. A reasonable coach would have known at the time Linder acted that she could not retaliate against a student-athlete for reporting a sexual assault. Rejecting the Title IX claim, the court stated that Kent State’s employees’ failure to follow policy did not amount to deliberate indifference by the school. View "Kesterson v. Kent State University" on Justia Law

The Tennessee Department of Health allowed two healthcare companies to merge into Ballad Health. Some of the board members of the resulting entity also had ties to another area healthcare organization, MEAC. The plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that Ballad, MEAC, and individual defendants had created an interlocking directorate in violation of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 19. The defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of standing. The plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint. Their proposed 29-page complaint included “allegations” that amounted to “colorful insults,” such as that MEAC “surrendered to [Ballad] much in the manner Marshal Petain surrendered France" to Hitler.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case. Plaintiffs must allege the elements of standing as they would any other element of their suit. The plaintiffs failed to alleged injury in fact by showing that they suffered “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” The plaintiffs alleged legal conclusions, speculative risks, and the interests of the general public, saying nothing about what medical services they have sought in the past, what services they will seek in the future, or how the dissolution of MEAC would affect their access to these services. Nothing in the Clayton Act purports to create a novel injury in fact or an exception to the case-or-controversy requirement. View "Bearden v. Ballad Health" on Justia Law