Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A Michigan jury convicted Stewart of the premeditated murder of his estranged wife, Venus. At trial Stewart’s accomplice testified that Stewart persuaded him to help by claiming that Venus was harming the couple’s children and that, if she ended up killing them, Stewart would go on a “rampage” and “go after her family and the lawyers and prosecutors and jury[.]” Stewart moved for a mistrial based on his accomplice’s testimony about what he had said, arguing that its inflammatory nature prejudiced him in the eyes of the jury. A state appellate court rejected Stewart’s due-process challenge.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. The state court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). A habeas challenge to an evidentiary ruling cannot satisfy section 2254(d)(1) unless the petitioner identifies a Supreme Court case establishing a due process right with regard to the specific kind of evidence at issue. Stewart identifies no Supreme Court holding barring the “specific kind of evidence,” in this case Stewart’s out-of-court statements that allegedly inflamed the jury. The state appellate court reasonably concluded that Spencer’s testimony about Stewart’s statement was not unduly prejudicial. View "Stewart v. Winn" on Justia Law

Kesterson, a Kent State student-athlete, told her coach, Linder, that Linder’s son had raped her. Linder, a mandatory reporter under Kent State’s Title IX policy, never notified anyone. Linder stopped calling Kesterson by her nickname; chastised her in front of another coach for becoming emotional; removed Kesterson from her starting shortstop position and limited her playing time; and required Kesterson to attend events at the Linder home, where her accused rapist lived. Kenderson subsequently told other Kent State employees about the alleged rape, but none reported it. The university learned about the assault two years later when Kesterson made a complaint to the school’s Title IX office. An investigation led to Linder’s resignation. Kesterson sued Kent State, Linder, and another coach citing the free-speech retaliation protections of the First Amendment, her equal-protection rights, and Title IX. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. A reasonable coach would have known at the time Linder acted that she could not retaliate against a student-athlete for reporting a sexual assault. Rejecting the Title IX claim, the court stated that Kent State’s employees’ failure to follow policy did not amount to deliberate indifference by the school. View "Kesterson v. Kent State University" on Justia Law

The Tennessee Department of Health allowed two healthcare companies to merge into Ballad Health. Some of the board members of the resulting entity also had ties to another area healthcare organization, MEAC. The plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that Ballad, MEAC, and individual defendants had created an interlocking directorate in violation of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 19. The defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of standing. The plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint. Their proposed 29-page complaint included “allegations” that amounted to “colorful insults,” such as that MEAC “surrendered to [Ballad] much in the manner Marshal Petain surrendered France" to Hitler.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case. Plaintiffs must allege the elements of standing as they would any other element of their suit. The plaintiffs failed to alleged injury in fact by showing that they suffered “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” The plaintiffs alleged legal conclusions, speculative risks, and the interests of the general public, saying nothing about what medical services they have sought in the past, what services they will seek in the future, or how the dissolution of MEAC would affect their access to these services. Nothing in the Clayton Act purports to create a novel injury in fact or an exception to the case-or-controversy requirement. View "Bearden v. Ballad Health" on Justia Law

Trice entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, reserving the right to challenge the warrant issued to search his apartment. Officers had entered the common area of his apartment building and placed a camera disguised as a smoke detector on the wall across the hallway from the door of his unit. The camera was equipped with a motion detector and set to activate whenever the door to his apartment opened. The camera made several videos of Trice entering and exiting; the information was used in an affidavit in support of the search warrant. Law enforcement executed the warrant and seized drugs and other paraphernalia consistent with distribution.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting his Fourth Amendment arguments as “squarely foreclosed by two lines of authority.” Trice had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment’s unlocked common hallway where the camera recorded the footage. Law enforcement may use video to record what police could have seen from a publicly accessible location. The camera captured nothing beyond the fact of Trice’s entry and exit into the apartment and did not provide law enforcement any information they could not have learned through ordinary visual surveillance. View "United States v. Trice" on Justia Law

Police caught Maya and two accomplices smuggling 50 pounds of marijuana into Kentucky in a BMW transported on a car-hauling truck from another state. When they searched Maya’s home, police found a firearm in his bed near over $20,000 in cash and money orders. Maya admitted to a drug-trafficking conspiracy and to possessing the firearm but denied possessing the gun “in furtherance of” the conspiracy—an offense that triggers an additional five-year prison term, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i). A jury nonetheless convicted Maya of that offense.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A rational jury could conclude that Maya possessed the firearm “in furtherance of” the drug conspiracy based on evidence that he, among other things, kept his firearm near his drug proceeds. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting an officer’s testimony that drug dealers use guns for protection because they often have large amounts of cash and cannot rely on the police to protect them, that the gun’s placement under the mattress made it “easily accessible,” and that this location near the money was “consistent with the firearm being used to protect the funds.” View "United States v. Maya" on Justia Law

Skripkov worked as an event planner for the Chelyabinsk (Russia) regional government and served on a commission that oversaw government procurement activities. In 2010, regional leadership directed Skripkov to accept bids from specified suppliers at inflated prices. Skripkov refused and received “[c]onstant threats,” causing him to resign. Skripkov continued to receive threats. Skripkov and his wife moved to a different town. In 2014, Skripkov learned about a bidding competition held by the government of Chelyabinsk, believed that the “staggering” amount at issue was unjustified, and reported to a prominent watchdog organization. Skripkov continued to experience threats; someone threw a rock through his window and a note found in the backyard stated: “[Y]ou d[ug] into our business, we will spoil your life.” In 2018, Skripkov assumed a more public role as an anti-corruption activist, which led to several arrests and physical violence, accompanied by more threats.Skripkov, on vacation in the U.S., received a call from his mother explaining that individuals had come by her house to ask about Skripkov’s adopted son. Skripkov feared that they would take his son. He and his wife sought asylum. The Russian government issued an indictment against Skripkov. An IJ and the BIA denied relief, finding that the officials were motivated solely by their pecuniary interest in furthering a corrupt scheme disrupted by Skripkov. The Seventh Circuit granted Skripkov’s petition for review. The BIA erred in disregarding evidence that Skripkov would be criminally prosecuted for his political opinion if he is returned to Russia. View "Skripkov v. Barr" on Justia Law

Carusone was convicted of felony murder exclusively on the theory—as the prosecution repeatedly emphasized in its closing argument at trial—that Carusone “plunged [a] knife into the victim’s heart.” That theory, as the state court of appeals later found, was “plainly discredit[ed]” by medical records that the state admits it wrongfully suppressed before trial. Those undisclosed hospital records contained a doctor’s affidavit that the victim “died as a result of cardiac arrest brought about by the combined effects of multiple drugs and alcohol and by heavy stress and exertion following a physical confrontation.” The state court of appeals denied Carusone relief.The Sixth Circuit granted habeas relief. The state court “plainly misapplied the governing Supreme Court precedent,” in Brady v. Maryland and Kyles v. Whitley, when it held that the undisclosed evidence does not undermine confidence in the verdict. The reasoning of the court of appeals amounted to speculation that a jury would go further than any expert did, and find that “stress” from the stab wounds was a proximate cause of the victim’s death. View "Carusone v. Warden, North Central Correctional Institution" on Justia Law

In 2008, after being denied tenure, George filed a discrimination lawsuit against Youngstown State University and was reinstated as part of a settlement agreement. As soon as the university’s obligations under the agreement expired, it declined to renew George’s contract and terminated his employment as a professor. George applied to several other positions within the university but was rejected. He then filed employment discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.Following discovery, the district court granted YSU summary judgment, finding that George either failed to show causation, failed to show he was qualified for the job, or failed to show that YSU’s claimed reasons for firing (or not hiring) him were pretextual. The court also dismissed one of George’s failure-to-hire claims— which arose after this lawsuit was filed—based on an administrative exhaustion requirement. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to George reveals a genuine dispute of material fact as to each of the claims and the district court further erred in enforcing the administrative exhaustion requirement because the defendants expressly waived it below. View "George v. Youngstown State University" on Justia Law

While incarcerated for a Kentucky state conviction, Dotson was convicted, in 1999, of federal crimes and sentenced to 322 months of imprisonment to run consecutively to his Kentucky sentence. The following year Dotson, still incarcerated in Kentucky, was convicted in a Georgia state court and sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment. In 2004, Kentucky paroled Dotson into custody in Georgia. In 2011, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) declined to designate the Georgia prison as the place where Dotson would serve his federal sentence. Dotson filed an unsuccessful habeas corpus action. In 2019, Georgia released Dotson to federal custody. Dotson sought to have the time he spent in custody in Georgia credited to his federal sentence.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. With respect to the transfer to Georgia, the federal government is permitted to waive its primary jurisdiction in favor of a state. Dotson’s argument that the BOP should have designated Georgia as his place of federal imprisonment is essentially an argument that his federal sentence should run concurrently with his Georgia sentence; 18 U.S.C. 3621(b) authorizes the BOP to designate a federal prisoner’s place of imprisonment, which effectively resolves whether sentences are served concurrently or consecutively; when the federal court is silent, the BOP decides. The BOP properly consulted the federal sentencing judge and considered the other pertinent factors including the seriousness of the offenses and Dotson’s criminal history. View "Dotson v. Kizziah" on Justia Law

Barber pled guilty to conspiring to possess 50 or more grams of a mixture or substance containing cocaine base with the intent to distribute it, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii), 846, and was sentenced to 210 months in prison (his guideline range was 262-327 months). Following enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 124 Stat. 2372, and the First Step Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 5194. Barber moved for a sentence reduction. The district court declined to reduce Barber’s term of imprisonment but reduced his term of supervised release.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, first finding Barber eligible for resentencing.Eligibility under the First Step Act “turns on the statute of conviction, not a defendant’s specific conduct.” The Act, however, commits the decision of whether to reduce a sentence to the discretion of district courts. Barber never asked the court to consider his post-sentencing conduct and cannot establish plain error. The court need not consider facts that no party enters into the record. Nor has Barber shown any effect on his substantial rights. The district court provided a more than adequate explanation, citing the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. The court discussed Barber’s three prior felony drug offenses and the large amount of cocaine base involved in his crime, View "United States v. Barber" on Justia Law