Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Harrises filed a voluntary Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy court issued an automatic stay. The Harrises’ neighbors, the Cooleys, subsequently filed a lawsuit, seeking removal of an encroaching fence. While the state court case remained pending, the Harrises filed an adversary proceeding against the Cooleys, alleging violation of the bankruptcy court order by filing the state court complaint and that the Cooleys “continue to pursue to take control of" property of the bankruptcy estate (the fence) to which, the Harrises alleged, they were entitled by adverse possession.The bankruptcy court dismissed the Harrises’ adversary proceeding on abstention grounds. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion: the adverse possession claim is governed by state law, and in Ohio, such a claim is “disfavored.” The property at issue is not a part of the bankruptcy estate and the disposition of the Harrises’ adverse possession claim will not impact the administration of the bankruptcy proceeding. Rejecting an argument that the Cooleys knowingly violated the bankruptcy court order, the court noted that they are not creditors of the bankruptcy estate and the Harrises do not allege that they were injured by the state court action. The automatic stay provision provides that only “an individual injured by any willful violation of a stay” may recover damages, 11 U.S.C. 362(k)(1). View "In re Harris" on Justia Law

Bourquin called the FBI to report a fabricated story, stating that “Raymond,” with whom he had been incarcerated, had described a plot to abduct, rape, sodomize, and set on fire a former federal prosecutor on August 10, 2017. The “hit” came from Bowman, a gang leader, who was serving a life sentence. FBI employees spent several hours transcribing, reviewing, and correcting the transcript of Bourquin's call. FBI agents had Bowman placed into segregation and traveled to interview Bowman, who said he had never heard of B.M. The U.S. Marshals Service deployed deputies to B.M.’s residence to provide 24-hour surveillance. FBI agents traveled to interview Bourquin. After video footage contradicted the story about "Raymond, agents transported Bourquin to a polygraph examiner (three hours away) for a four-hour test that indicated that Bourquin had fabricated his story.Bourquin pleaded guilty to maliciously conveying false information concerning an attempt to kill, injure or intimidate B.M., 18 U.S.C. 844(e). Although the government supplied no accounting of its expenses, the court applied a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2A6.1(b)(4), based on the government’s substantial expenditure of funds and imposed a 40-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence. Section 2A6.1(b)(4)(B) requires more, such as a full accounting of expenditures or some accounting of expenditures coupled with facts that allow a sentencing court to reasonably assess the full expenditure of funds required to respond to an offense and whether those funds are substantial. View "United States v. Bourquin" on Justia Law

Federal prison officials seized one of Callahan’s paintings and some mail-order photos on the ground that they violated the prison’s rules against possessing sexually explicit materials. After filing internal grievances without success, Callahan sued for money damages and other relief under the First Amendment’s right to freedom of speech. The district court declined to create an implied cause of action, often called a Bivens claim, under the First Amendment for Callahan’s claim.The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the Supreme Court has not recognized a new Bivens action in 40 years and has repeatedly declined to do so. The Court has rejected the Bivens inclination that a private right of action exists when Congress is silent and has adopted the opposite approach in statutory and constitutional cases. The Court has even cut back on the three constitutional claims once covered and has never recognized a Bivens action for any First Amendment right. The court noted that Callahan is in prison based on serious child pornography convictions. His lawsuit challenges the prison’s determination that his painting project and pictures were sexually explicit enough to increase the risks of harassment of female personnel and disorder among prisoners. View "Callahan v. Federal Bureau of Prisons" on Justia Law

Malone was adjusting the blade on his Craftsman table saw when the guard came off, causing injury to his fingers. Malone was later notified of a safety recall on the saw. Malone filed suit in an Ohio state court, against several Sears and Craftsman entities and Rexon, a Taiwanese company. Rexon removed the case to a federal district court, citing diversity jurisdiction, then moved to dismiss, arguing that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction. Rexon admitted that it manufactured the saw in question and conceded, for the purpose of its motion, that it had purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections offered by the State of Ohio. The district court dismissed the case.The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court noted that the injury occurred in Ohio and that Rexon has a “high volume of business activity” in Ohio, so Malone “could plausibly show, with additional discovery, that Rexon derived ‘substantial revenue’ from table saw sales in Ohio.” Jurisdictional discovery is necessary to determine whether Rexon had sufficient contacts with the state to satisfy due process. View "Malone v. Stanley Black & Decker, Inc." on Justia Law

Weser and Goodson met while working with an animal rescue organization, Loudon County Friends of Animals (LCFOA). Weser allowed LCFORA to use her farm as a cat-rescue facility. After Weser and Goodson had a falling out, LCFOA ceased its operations on Weser’s farm. On November 7, 2016, 12 of LCFOA’s cats and kittens remained on Weser’s property. Weser put the animals in a large crate, drove to Goodson’s house, and placed the crate on Goodson’s driveway. Goodson responded by calling Loudon County 911, causing Deputy Anderson and another officer to be sent to the scene. Anderson arrested Weser for criminal trespass. The charge was later dismissed.Weser’s suit against Anderson and Goodson was rejected on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to all claims against Goodson and as to the malicious prosecution claims against Deputy Anderson. The court vacated as to the state-law claims for false arrest and false imprisonment against Anderson, with instructions that the district court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction as to those claims. The court noted that Tennessee law is unclear regarding situations in which an officer had probable cause to believe that an individual had committed a criminal offense, but not an arrestable offense. View "Weser v. Goodson" on Justia Law

Garth pled guilty to possessing crack cocaine with the intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). His sentencing guidelines range was originally 70-87 months’ imprisonment. Garth’s prior Tennessee convictions for aggravated assault and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver triggered the “career-offender enhancement,” which applies when a defendant has more than one prior conviction for either crimes of violence or controlled substance offenses, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, which resulted in a range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a sentence of 110 months’ imprisonment. Garth’s Tennessee conviction for possessing marijuana with intent to deliver counts as a sentence-enhancing controlled-substance offense. View "United States v. Garth" on Justia Law

Lorain Police Department officers, responding after hearing gunshots, spotted the man (Raymore) that McCollough (victim) had seen. They recovered a gun near where McCollough heard a “gun hitting the concrete,” ammunition in that gun, and a magazine with more ammunition in the black Nissan that rolled over McCollough’s hand earlier that night. Testing and DNA evidence connected that evidence with Raymore, who was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). Raymore had previous convictions for crimes punishable by imprisonment for terms exceeding one year: possession of drugs, assault, aggravated robbery, felon in possession of a firearm, and aggravated burglary.Raymore was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment for violating his supervised release, consecutive to 110 months for the firearm possession. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was evidence that allowed a jury to conclude Raymore constructively possessed the gun and the ammunition in that gun. Rejecting an argument that the indictment failed to allege a mens rea element required after the Supreme Court’s “Rehaif” decision and that the jury instructions were erroneous for the same reason, the court noted that Raymore stipulated to his felony convictions. The court appropriately enhanced Raymore's Sentencing Guidelines range because Raymore’s prior Ohio assault and aggravated robbery convictions qualified as crimes of violence. View "United States v. Raymore" on Justia Law

Kilic, a national of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was a lawful permanent U.S. resident. A Michigan court sentenced Kilic to five to 20 years of imprisonment for conspiracy to commit armed robbery, making her deportable, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), (U), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the UJ’s denial of relief.The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. Kilic was not entitled to a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. 1182(h) (section 212(h)) or deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. To benefit from a section 212(h) waiver, a deportable alien must first “assimilate[] to the position of an applicant for admission”—either by voluntarily leaving the country and then seeking readmission or applying for adjustment of status. Kilic did neither. The court rejected an argument that the conditions for 212(h) relief violate equal protection by irrationally favoring aliens who have left the country over those who apply for the waiver while in the U.S. Under the Convention Against Torture, an alien may not be removed to a country where she would probably be tortured, 8 C.F.R. 208.16(c), 208.17(a). The immigration judge found that Kilic failed to show that she was likely to be tortured in Bosnia. View "Kilic v. Barr" on Justia Law

Fugate sold stolen firearms and other property that he acquired from co-defendants conducting thefts from automobiles across Kentucky, Ohio, Tennessee, and West Virginia. Authorities recovered 25 firearms from Fugate’s residence. Fugate’s wife turned over an additional seven firearms. Fugate admitted that he sold firearms to drug traffickers and gang members and that he knew that some of the firearms were stolen. Fugate pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), The government dropped a charge of receipt, possession, or trafficking of firearms and ammunition, “knowing and having reasonable cause to believe the firearms and ammunition were stolen.” Fugate had a prior conviction for felony possession of firearms by an unlawful user of controlled substances. The court applied a six-level sentencing enhancement because the offense involved at least 25 firearms; a two-level enhancement because some firearms were stolen; a four-level enhancement because Fugate engaged in the trafficking of firearms; and a four-level enhancement because Fugate possessed or trafficked the firearms “in connection with another felony offense.” The calculated Guidelines range was 78-97 months’ imprisonment. The court sentenced him to 97 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the sentence. Applying an enhancement for possessing or trafficking firearms in connection with another felony—knowingly trafficking stolen firearms was impermissible double-counting under the Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Fugate" on Justia Law

Under its replacement-cost homeowner insurance contracts, State Farm calculated its payment obligations by estimating the amount it would cost to repair or replace damaged property and subtracting depreciation and the deductible. During the class period, State Farm depreciated costs for both materials and labor.Policyholders filed a putative class action. The Sixth Circuit held that in an insurance contract that incorporates Kentucky’s “replacement cost minus depreciation” formula, the insurer cannot depreciate the costs of labor when determining payments. State Farm changed its practice and created a refund program for those who had received payments between the decision and the date State Farm stopped deducting labor depreciation. Most policyholders received refunds of less than $1,000. The court certified the class as: All persons and entities that received “actual cash value” payments ... from State Farm … for loss or damage to a dwelling or other structure in … Kentucky ... where the cost of labor was depreciated," excluding those that received payment in the full amount of insurance.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The claims share a common legal question central to the validity of each claim: whether State Farm breached the standard form contracts by deducting labor depreciation. No individualized proof is necessary to resolve this question on a classwide basis. That common question predominates over individual questions, although damages will vary. The court did not abuse its discretion in finding class litigation to be the superior method of adjudication and class membership is ascertainable View "Hicks v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co." on Justia Law