Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In an infamous 2009 incident, the state of Ohio tried to execute death-row inmate Broom by way of lethal injection but was forced to abandon the effort when the execution team concluded—two hours into the process—that it could not maintain a viable IV connection to Broom’s veins. The state then returned Broom to his cell, to await a second execution attempt. That second execution attempt has not yet happened. The parties have spent 11 years litigating whether the U.S. Constitution bars Ohio from ever trying to execute Broom again. Broom relies on both the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual” punishment and the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on “double jeopardy.” The state courts, including the Ohio Supreme Court, have rejected Broom’s contentions on the merits, as did the district court below on habeas review.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. While calling Ohio’s treatment of Broom “disturbing, to say the least,” the court reasoned that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 permits reversal of a state court merits decisions in only a narrow set of circumstances and the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision rejecting Broom’s constitutional claims on the merits does not fall within that set of circumstances. View "Broom v. Shoop" on Justia Law

In 2004, Flowers was charged with possessing with intent to distribute over 50 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A); because Flowers had two prior felony drug convictions, his minimum sentence was life in prison. Flowers pled guilty; the government agreed to allege only one prior drug offense, meaning his mandatory minimum would be 20 years. As a career offender, his Guidelines sentencing range was 262-327 months. The court found no basis supporting a departure and imposed a 262-month sentence. The Supreme Court subsequently held that the Guidelines are advisory. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 reduced the mandatory minimum for Flowers’ conviction to 10 years; the First Step Act of 2018 made those reductions retroactive if the 2010 law modified the statutory penalties.Flowers sought resentencing, arguing that the Act modified his statutory minimum and that if he were sentenced today, he would not qualify as a career offender. HIs Ohio conviction no longer qualifies as a felony drug offense. Flowers noted his educational accomplishments and limited disciplinary record in prison. The government argued that Flowers’ Guidelines range was unchanged. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Although it is unclear whether the district court indicated that Flowers was ineligible for a reduction because his Guidelines range did not change and the First Step Act only concerns statutory sentencing ranges, any error was harmless. The court considered all of his arguments and rejected them on the merits. View "United States v. Flowers" on Justia Law

Plain-clothes Euclid officers approached Wright’s parked SUV with weapons drawn. Thinking he was being robbed, Wright, an African-American, tried to back up. Officers flashed their badges. Wright stopped the SUV. Officers opened the driver’s door. Wright had no weapon. The officers simultaneously deployed a taser and pepper-sprayed him at point-blank range, while Wright remained seated. Wright had trouble getting out because of a colostomy bag stapled to his abdomen. He was recovering from an operation. The encounter caused bleeding. The officers arrested Wright “arising from a drug investigation,” although they found no drugs on him. Wright was detained for more than nine hours and subjected to an intrusive body scan after the officers knew of Wright’s medical condition. No drug-related charges were ever brought against him.The Sixth Circuit reinstated Wright's civil rights case. Even if the officers had no knowledge of Wright’s medical condition, other facts, construed in Wright’s favor, could support a reasonable juror’s finding that Wright did not actively resist. An officer may not tase a citizen not under arrest merely for failure to follow orders when the officer has no reasonable fear for his safety. With respect to the Monell claim, the evidence includes the Chris Rock video, played during the city's use-of-force training, in which the comedian talks about police misconduct. There was an offensive cartoon in Euclid’s police-training manual, showing an officer in riot gear beating a prone, unarmed civilian with a club, with the caption “protecting and serving the poop out of you.” Wright has sufficient evidence of municipal policy. View "Wright v. City of Euclid" on Justia Law

Each Domino’s pizza franchise is an independently owned and managed business with a separate legal identity. Domino’s allegedly required its franchisees to agree not to solicit or hire employees from other franchises without the prior consent of their employer. Piersing began working at a Domino’s franchise in 2014. Four years later, Piersing sought a second job from a different Domino’s franchise. When he was hired by the second franchise, Piersing signed an arbitration agreement, which requires him to resolve employment-related issues by arbitration conducted according to the American Arbitration Association National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes. Piersing was fired from the first franchise, which apparently thought that its franchise agreement required it to fire him in order to allow him to work at the second franchise. Months later, Piersing left the second franchise because of medical issues. Piersing filed a class action against Domino’s, alleging that the franchise agreement violated federal antitrust law and state law. Domino’s moved to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1. The plaintiffs argued that Domino’s could not enforce the arbitration agreements because only their franchises had signed the agreements. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the question of who should resolve the dispute, an arbitrator or a court, should itself be resolved by an arbitrator. View "Blanton v. Domino's Pizza Franchising LLC" on Justia Law

Detroit police discovered Ralston dead in her home, with multiple stab wounds, plus “defensive-type” cuts and bruises. Ralston was clutching long brown hair, which was never matched to any person. Blood was found throughout Ralston’s house. Days later, police arrested Smith. There was no physical evidence linking Smith to Ralston’s death. Smith’s acquaintances (Dennis and Evans) testified that Smith had confessed to killing a woman “at a safe house” that he had intended to rob. Ralston’s son confirmed that Smith was at the house the night before Ralston's death. Smith was convicted of first-degree felony murder and assault with intent to commit armed robbery. A juror reported that he and others had changed their votes based on a belief that Smith would receive a relatively light sentence for felony murder. The court declined to grant an evidentiary hearing and imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Michigan courts upheld the convictions.Smith returned to state court to (unsuccessfully) seek relief from judgment with an affidavit from Evans’s brother, attesting that he spoke with Evans and Dennis on the day that Smith allegedly confessed, that they said Smith had only said that the police wanted to speak with him, and they thought that they might receive a reward for providing information.The federal district court construed Smith’s habeas claim to be an actual innocence claim and denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the state court should have granted a post-trial evidentiary hearing to determine whether the jury improperly relied on prejudicial information; there was insufficient evidence for conviction; and the courts erred in refusing to consider new evidence of Smith’s innocence. View "Smith v. Nagy" on Justia Law

In February 2018, a confidential informant purchased 14.18 grams of methamphetamine from West for $300 in a Walmart restroom. Two months later, the same confidential informant met West inside a Meijer restroom and paid West $900 for 116.112 grams of simulated methamphetamine. Leaving Meijer, West entered the rear passenger side of a vehicle in which the driver’s seat was occupied by Johnson. Johnson’s girlfriend sat in the front passenger seat. Officers stopped and searched the vehicle, discovering a semi-automatic pistol under the front passenger seat. West was charged with knowingly and intentionally distributing methamphetamine in February 2018, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and for being a felon in possession of a firearm in April 2018, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1).West pleaded guilty to the drug charge; the government dismissed the felon-in-possession charge. The district court determined that West’s base offense level should be increased by two levels under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(1) because a firearm was possessed in relation to West’s drug-related offense, resulting in a Guidelines range of 37-46 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed West’s 40-month sentence. The court rejected arguments that the district court abused its discretion in determining that he possessed the gun found in the vehicle and that the transaction was not “relevant conduct” under U.S.S.G. 1B1.3(a)(2). The district court adequately considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. View "United States v. West" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Dunnican's convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g); possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute it, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(D); and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c).The court upheld the introduction of data extracted from Dunnican's cellular telephone and text messages. The stipulations of Federal Rule of Evidence 902 were met and the evidence was properly authenticated. Dunnican’s text messages are not hearsay because they are Dunnican’s own statements, regardless of the medium. Text messages regarding Dunnican's other drug transactions were relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to show a necessary element of the charge: Dunnican’s intent to distribute the drug. The court properly allowed a DEA agent to offer expert opinion testimony that the marijuana appeared to be packaged for distribution. The agent offered no opinion on Dunnican’s mental state or intent but, drawing upon his training, experience, and the evidence, simply shared his subjective assessment of the facts. Dunnican was not entitled to a new trial following the dismissal of the only African-American jury member for health reasons. Dunnican’s speculation that there was “documented misconduct” during jury deliberations had no basis. A 21-month upward variance on Dunnican’s sentence was appropriate; the court reasonably concluded that an above-Guidelines sentence was necessary to advance the objectives of protecting the public and deterring Dunnican from future criminal conduct View "United States v. Dunnican" on Justia Law

Cook sold variable annuities on behalf of Ohio National, under a contract between Ohio National and a broker-dealer, Triad. Ohio National paid commissions on the previously sold annuities to Triad, which in turn paid commissions to Cook pursuant to a separate agreement between Cook and Triad. After Ohio National terminated its agreement with Triad, Ohio National refused to pay further commissions on annuities sold during the term of the agreement. Cook sued Ohio National for breach of its agreement with Triad. Triad is not a party to the suit. Cook claimed that as a “third-party beneficiary” to the agreement between Ohio National and Triad, he had standing to bring suit. The district court found that, under Ohio law, Cook not an “intended” third-party beneficiary and could not maintain an alternative claim of unjust enrichment against Ohio National. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The plain language of the Selling Agreement makes it clear that plaintiff is not an intended third-party beneficiary under the Agreement. The Agreement unambiguously directs Ohio National to pay commissions to Triad; Cook is precluded from bringing an unjust enrichment claim against Ohio National. View "Cook v. Ohio National Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Inmates housed in the low-security Elkton Correctional Institution, on behalf of themselves and others, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 to obtain release from custody to limit their exposure to the COVID-19 virus. They sought to represent all current and future Elkton inmates, including a subclass of inmates who—through age and/or certain medical conditions—were particularly vulnerable to complications, including death, if they contracted COVID-19. The district court entered a preliminary injunction in April 2020, directing the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to evaluate each subclass member’s eligibility for transfer by any means, including compassionate release, parole or community supervision, transfer furlough, or non-transfer furlough within two weeks; transfer those deemed ineligible for compassionate release to another facility where testing is available and physical distancing is possible; and not allow transferees to return to Elkton until certain conditions were met.The Sixth Circuit vacated the injunction. While the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 2241, that section does not permit some of the relief the petitioners sought. The court rejected the BOP’s attempts to classify the claims as “conditions of confinement” claims, subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The district court erred in finding a likelihood of success on the merits of the Eighth Amendment claim. There was sufficient evidence that the petitioners are “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm” but the BOP responded reasonably to the known, serious risks posed by COVID-19. View "Wilson v. Williams" on Justia Law

Garcia illegally entered the U.S. days before his eighteenth birthday and was found to be an “unaccompanied alien child.” Over a year later, Garcia applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, claiming that he had been threatened by gangs in El Salvador. Based on his purported status as an “unaccompanied alien child,” he sought relief from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. An immigration judge (IJ) took jurisdiction over his case and denied his claims for relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed but remanded so that the IJ could determine whether to continue removal proceedings while Garcia pursued adjustment of status. The IJ denied the continuance. The Board affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied Garcia’s motion for a stay of removal. Garcia has been removedThe Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting a challenge to the IJ’s jurisdiction. Garcia cited 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(3)(C), which provides that USCIS “shall have initial jurisdiction over any asylum application filed by an unaccompanied alien child.” The provision requires that the alien be an “unaccompanied alien child” when he applies for asylum; it is not enough that the alien was an “unaccompanied alien child” when he first entered the U.S. In considering Garcia’s CAT application, the IJ applied the correct legal standard: that torture includes cases in which public officials show “willful blindness” to private torture. View "Garcia v. Barr" on Justia Law