Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

For more than 60 years, Line 5 has carried oil from northwestern Wisconsin, across Michigan's Upper Peninsula, across the Straits of Mackinac, through the Lower Peninsula, ending in southwestern Ontario. The Clean Water Act requires oil pipeline operators to submit response plans to address the risk of a potential oil spill, 33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(5)(A)(i). The Act provides that the administering agency “shall . . . approve any plan” that satisfies six enumerated criteria. Over the past five years, Line 5’s operator (Enbridge) has submitted two response plans. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration evaluated the plans, determined each met the enumerated criteria, and approved both. The National Wildlife Federation sued. The district court found that the response plans satisfied the enumerated criteria but granted the Foundation summary judgment, holding that the agency had to comply with the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).The Sixth Circuit reversed. ESA's requirement that federal agencies consult with the appropriate environmental authorities in order to ensure that the action is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered or threatened species, 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2), and NEPA's requirement that federal agencies prepare an environmental impact statement for major federal actions that will affect the environment, 42 U.S.C. 4332(C), apply only to discretionary actions. Although the agency exercises “judgment” in applying the Clean Water Act criteria, its actions are not discretionary. View "National Wildlife Federation v. Secretary of the United States Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Smith was indicted for knowingly and intentionally distributing a mixture of heroin, fentanyl, and carfentanil, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). The government filed a notice that Smith was subject to an increased statutory maximum sentence under section 841(b)(1)(C) due to a prior state felony drug-trafficking offense. Pleading guilty, Smith waived his right to appeal the conviction and sentence save for five enumerated circumstances, including the right to appeal the determination that he was a career offender. The PSR indicated that Smith was a career offender based upon one prior state felony drug trafficking conviction and a state felony conviction for five counts of aggravated robbery. Smith argued that the First Step Act rendered his section 841(b)(1)(C) statutory enhancement invalid and that his state convictions were no longer predicate offenses for determining career-offender status. Smith asked to withdraw his guilty plea, citing the First Step Act and his contention that his state aggravated-robbery conviction was not a crime of violence.The district court rejected Smith’s request to withdraw his plea and imposed a within-Guidelines 150-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Arguments regarding the First Step Act’s application to section 841(b)(1)(C) were not among the five issues Smith preserved for appeal. Employing the categorical approach, Smith’s violation of Ohio Revised Code 2925.03(A)(2) is a controlled substance offense under the Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Confidential informants told Grand Rapids DEA agents that brothers Phillips and Lee bought and sold kilogram-level quantities of heroin and cocaine in Grand Rapids, Benton Harbor, and Kalamazoo. The investigators conducted surveillance of the brothers moving packages between “stash houses,” recovered drug-related products from “trash pulls” at those locations, and made controlled buys of drugs from their associates, and concluded that they got their drugs from interstate semi-truck shipments. They obtained authorization to tap the brothers' cell phones. Based on the wiretaps, the government observed the brothers arranging additional shipments of drugs and ultimately arrested 17 members of the alleged conspiracy and executed 20 search warrants, uncovering approximately $1,300,000, 13 kilograms of cocaine, 19 kilograms of heroin, 1.5 kilograms of fentanyl, 50 pounds of marijuana, three handguns, and an assault rifle. The brothers cooperated and provided evidence against Castro, Howard, and Tatum. Castro sold Phillips heroin, cocaine, and marijuana in kilogram-level quantities and used long-haul truck drivers to move drugs from California to Grand Rapids. A truck driver also agreed to cooperate. The brothers sold drugs to Howard and Tatum.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Castro, Howard, and Tatum for conspiring to distribute heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. The district court properly authorized the wiretaps, properly admitted evidence obtained from them, properly concluded that the evidence supported the convictions, and properly sentenced Castro to 504 months’ imprisonment, Howard to 120 months, and Tatum to 84 months. View "United States v. Tatum" on Justia Law

Over four months, Woodson and his accomplices targeted 14 Jared stores in Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Illinois, and New Jersey. While inside a Jared store, Woodson would ask a clerk to see a diamond. An accomplice would then cause a disturbance, drawing the clerk’s attention. With the clerk distracted, Woodson would replace the diamond with cubic zirconia, leave the store with the diamond, and then fence the stolen item to a buyer in Toledo, Cleveland, or New York. The group stole roughly $90,000 worth of diamonds before targeting multiple Grand Rapids area Jared stores on the same day and diverting from their routine, to pry open a display case. A clerk called 911. Officers broadcast descriptions of the men to law enforcement and jewelry stores. Later that day, Woodson was identified leaving another Jared store. When police stopped his vehicle, they found Woodson and his accomplices plus several pieces of diamond jewelry. Woodson pled guilty to conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371, 2314, 2315. The district court calculated Woodson’s Guidelines range as 21-27 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 24-month sentence, upholding the imposition of a two-level sentencing enhancement based on a finding that a central part of Woodson’s scheme was perpetual relocation to avoid law enforcement (U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(10)(A). The court rejected Woodson’s argument that his practice of returning to his “home base” in Toledo meant he never “relocated” the scheme. View "United States v. Woodson" on Justia Law

Holloway, the qui tam relator, sued Heartland Hospice and related entities under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, for orchestrating a corporate-wide scheme to submit false claims for payments from Medicare and Medicaid to cover hospice care. Heartland allegedly enrolled patients in hospice when they were not terminally ill and kept them there, even when employees like Holloway urged their release and allegedly paid bonuses for the recruitment of hospice patients. Heartland argued that Holloway is not a genuine whistleblower, that her claims are drawn from prior allegations against Heartland so that her qui tam action is prohibited by the FCA’s public-disclosure bar. In the alternative, Heartland argued that Holloway has not satisfied the FCA’s heightened pleading standard for allegations of fraud or the limited exception to that standard.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Holloway’s action as barred in light of prior public disclosures. Even if South Carolina complaints, dismissed in 2008, were focused on a single hospice facility, the allegations against Heartland as a whole were sufficiently general and alike to those alleged here such that the government was put on notice of the corporate-wide conduct alleged in this case. Holloway’s claims are barred by the pre-amendment public-disclosure bar. View "Holloway v. Heartland Hospice, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2016, Alam pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit health care and wire fraud for his role in a roughly $8,000,000 Medicare kickback scheme. He received a 101-month sentence. Alam, now 64, suffers from obesity, poorly controlled diabetes, sleep apnea, coronary artery disease, kidney stones, and bladder issues. In March 2020, fearing the health risks created by the COVID-19 pandemic, Alam sent a letter to the prison warden requesting compassionate release. Without waiting for a response, Alam sought emergency relief in federal court. Alam had not complied with the compassionate-release statute’s administrative exhaustion requirement, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A).The district court dismissed Alam’s claims without prejudice. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The exhaustion requirement serves valuable purposes (there is no other way to ensure orderly processing of applications for early release) and it is mandatory, with no exception. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons did not move for compassionate release and Alam waited just 10 days after the warden’s receipt of his request to file his motion, not the required 30 days. While nothing in the administrative exhaustion requirement clearly limits the court’s jurisdiction, it remains a mandatory condition. View "United States v. Alam" on Justia Law

In the first trimester of pregnancy, an abortion may be performed by using medication or by using suction to remove the contents of the uterus. Starting around 15 weeks of pregnancy, physicians must use the dilation and evacuation (D&E) method, first dilating the patient’s cervix, and then using instruments and suction to remove the contents of the uterus. Kentucky’s House Bill 454 provides: No person shall intentionally perform or induce or attempt to perform or induce an abortion ... [t]hat will result in the bodily dismemberment, crushing, or human vivisection of the unborn child . . . [w]hen the probable post-fertilization age of the unborn child is eleven (11) weeks or greater.” H.B. 454 forbids D&E abortions on “living unborn” fetuses but does not suggest that physicians induce fetal demise before a D&E.Enforcement of the law was stayed pending resolution of a constitutional challenge. The state argued that H.B. 454 simply required individuals seeking a D&E abortion to first undergo a procedure to induce fetal demise by injecting digoxin into the fetus or amniotic sac, by injecting potassium chloride into the fetal heart, or by cutting the umbilical cord. The district court permanently enjoined the enforcement of H.B. 454, finding that it imposed an undue burden on one’s right to elect an abortion prior to viability, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court concluded that none of the identified procedures was a feasible option for inducing fetal demise and, therefore, H.B. 454 effectively banned D&E abortions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The burdens imposed by H.B. 454 dramatically outweigh any benefits. H.B. 454 imposes an undue burden on all of the individuals it restricts; facial relief is appropriate. View "EMW Women's Surgical Center P.S.C. v. Friedlander" on Justia Law

In a consolidated putative class action based on the Flint Water Crisis, the defendants include government officials from the State of Michigan, the City of Flint, state agencies, and private engineering companies. While government officials like former Governor Snyder and former Treasurer Dillon have been litigating the issue of qualified immunity, discovery against private parties has proceeded.In 2019, the district court granted the government officials’ motions to dismiss claims alleging 42 U.S.C. 1983 equal-protection violations, section 1985(3) conspiracy, Michigan’s Elliott Larsen Civil Rights Act, section 1983 state-created danger, and gross negligence. The court denied motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ section 1983 bodily-integrity claim on the bases of qualified and absolute immunity,. The court entered a comprehensive case management order.Snyder and Dillon claimed that they cannot be deposed as non-party fact witnesses with respect to other defendants, arguing that they are immune from all discovery until they have exhausted every opportunity for appeal from the denial of their motions to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit denied Snyder’s and Dillon’s request for a stay of non-party depositions pending resolution of their appeal from the order denying their request for a protective order, and dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, their appeal from the denial of a protective order. View "Waid v. Earley" on Justia Law

In 2008, Boulding was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute, 50 grams or more of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), and possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base. His PSR found Boulding responsible for 650.4 grams of crack cocaine. The district court accepted this finding over Boulding’s objection. The PSR also applied sentencing increases for possession of a dangerous weapon, for Boulding’s role as an organizer, and for obstruction of justice. Boulding’s attorney objected but did not seek a judicial determination because the statutory mandatory minimum (life in prison) controlled Boulding’s sentence. The court stated that the enhancements were justified. Boulding had two prior felony drug convictions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Boulding’s life sentence.In 2018, Boulding sought a reduction of his sentence under the First Step Act. The court imposed a reduced sentence of 324 months but denied Boulding a de novo resentencing hearing and an opportunity to address previously-frivolous objections to sentencing enhancements. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that Boulding is eligible for resentencing and remanded. Because the Act’s definition of a “covered offense” ties eligibility to the statute of conviction, the court held that eligibility for resentencing under the First Step Act is a categorical inquiry governed by the statute of conviction rather than the defendant's conduct. Eligible defendants are not entitled to plenary resentencing, but discretion to deny resentencing is not unfettered. An eligible defendant is entitled to an accurate amended guideline calculation and renewed consideration of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and must be allowed to raise objections. View "United States v. Boulding" on Justia Law

Davis sought relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. She had fewer than $39,000 in assets but more than $200,000 in debt--more than $189,000 was unsecured. Chapter 13 allows Davis to satisfy her unsecured debts by paying all her disposable income to her unsecured creditors during a 60-month period, 11 U.S.C. 1325(b)(1)(B). Davis proposed to pay her unsecured creditors a total of $19,380—60 monthly payments of $323. To obtain court approval, her plan needed to provide for payment of all her “projected disposable income” to her unsecured creditors. Although she reported gross monthly income of $5,627, Davis claimed $5,304 in allowable monthly expenses, including a $220.66 monthly 401(k) retirement contribution withheld from her monthly wages. The bankruptcy court concluded that wages withheld as voluntary 401(k) contributions are considered disposable income, even if the debtor began making those contributions before bankruptcy. Davis filed an amended bankruptcy plan that would pay her unsecured creditors $519 each month. The bankruptcy court confirmed the amended plan over Davis’s objection. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The statutory text excludes voluntary retirement contributions from disposable income View "In re: Davis" on Justia Law