Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Guzman crossed the border as a teenager in 1998 and has never returned to Mexico. In 2014, Guzman was served with notice of removal proceedings. Guzman applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. Guzman testified that another family had murdered his father and grandfather; Guzman later suffered physical abuse by his stepfather. No one reported that abuse because of his political position. Guzman testified that he fears returning to Mexico because his stepfather, who still has police connections, would kill him and that the individuals who murdered his relatives would believe that he had come to avenge his father’s death and would try to kill him.The IJ found Guzman “generally credible,” but that his testimony alone was insufficient without corroboration and that Guzman could not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA upheld the denials of relief, reasoning that Guzman did not adequately explain why he could not obtain affidavits from his aunt, sister, or mother “since he remains in contact” and that even with adequate corroboration, the persecution “was not based on his membership in [a particular social group].” The Sixth Circuit vacated. Substantial evidence does not support the determinations regarding the unavailability of evidence to corroborate Guzman’s claims. The BIA incorrectly required Guzman to demonstrate that his membership in a particular social group was “at least one central reason” for his persecution. View "Guzman-Vazquez v. Barr" on Justia Law

In October 2013, Lexington police tracked the source of a child pornography video to a Clark County IP address. Deputy Murray obtained a subpoena and identified Jones as the subscriber associated with the IP address. Murray secured a search warrant for Jones’ address, noting that Jones was not yet a “suspect” and did not necessarily have “possession” of devices connected to child pornography. Murray and others executed the warrant and seized devices. Jones was home alone; after completing the search, officers him to the Sheriff’s Office. Several officers later acknowledged that they knew an individual’s IP address could be hacked by a third party.After Jones was indicted, Murray received forensic testing results that failed to yield a copy of the pornographic video. It is unclear whether the prosecutors or Jones’ public defender were informed. The prosecution continued. In November 2014, the defense commissioned a forensic analysis of Jones’ phone and tablet that also found no evidence of child pornography. Unlike the first report, it reported no evidence that Jones ever used a peer-to-peer file-sharing program. After posting a reduced bond, Jones was released from jail 14 months after his arrest. In April 2015, the charges were dismissed without prejudice, on the Commonwealth’s motion.Jones sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to qualified immunity for Murray but otherwise affirmed. While there was probable cause for Jones' initial arrest. Murray knew by January 2014 that there was no evidence of child pornography on Jones’ devices. Because there is a factual dispute as to whether Murray informed the prosecutors of these results, a genuine issue exists as to whether Murray “knowingly or recklessly” withheld exculpatory evidence. View "Jones v. Clark County" on Justia Law

Stermer was charged with killing her husband by setting him and their house on fire. At trial, the Michigan prosecutor used a fire expert to support its claim but Stermer’s counsel never retained or consulted with an expert. In his closing arguments, the prosecutor repeatedly branded Stermer a liar, misrepresented her testimony, and disparaged her while bolstering other witnesses. Stermer’s counsel did not object. Stermer was convicted of felony murder in the course of committing arson and was sentenced to life in prison.Stermer sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and granted Stermer’s petition, citing prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that the district court improperly held an evidentiary hearing and applied an incorrect standard of review. Even with significant deference under habeas review, Stermer is entitled to a new trial. It was unreasonable for the state court to conclude that the fairness of Stermer’s trial was not irreparably harmed by the prosecutor’s closing. The state’s case was relatively weak, the prosecutor relied heavily on Stermer’s statements and repeatedly called her a liar while misstating her own testimony; Stermer was clearly denied due process. Trial counsel stood by while the prosecutor bolstered the credibility of other witnesses and called her a “diabolical, scheming, manipulative liar and a murderer.” The record clearly establishes that Stermer’s trial counsel was deficient in refusing to call a fire expert. View "Stermer v. Warren" on Justia Law

In 2006, Smith pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine. Because he had a prior felony drug conviction, he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years of imprisonment, even though his Guidelines advisory sentencing range would otherwise have been 168-210 months. The district court sentenced him to 240 months of imprisonment. In 2018, Smith asked for review under the First Step Act, which empowers district courts to reduce a prisoner’s sentence by applying the Fair Sentencing Act, 21 U.S.C. 841, retroactively by increasing the amount of crack cocaine required to trigger mandatory minimum sentences. The district court concluded that Smith was eligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c) and the First Step Act, but declined to grant one, concluding that his original sentence remained appropriate. Smith’s guideline range after applying the retroactive amendments would be 77-96 months of imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit vacated. If the district court decides to impose or refuse to reduce a sentence outside the applicable guideline range, “the court must ‘ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.”’ This variance is major. The district court did not adequately explain why Smith should not receive at least some sentence reduction. Beyond relying on the court’s analysis at the original sentencing hearing, the court only briefly discussed the nature and circumstances of Smith’s offense and the need to protect the public. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Rutherford County, Tennessee law enforcement officials raided stores selling legal cannabidiol (CBD) products and arrested their owners. All charges against the owners were eventually dismissed and expunged. Plaintiffs, 17 store owners, alleged violations of their constitutional rights to be free from false arrest, unlawful seizure, and unlawful prosecution, and their right to equal protection. They also alleged a civil conspiracy to violate those rights and attached documents revealing communications between law enforcement officials, expressing doubts about the CBD products’ purported illegality and concerns regarding the planned arrests and raids.The District Attorney and Assistant District Attorney claimed absolute prosecutorial immunity or qualified immunity for their alleged misconduct during the investigation; the sheriff claimed quasi-judicial absolute immunity and qualified immunity for his actions related to the investigation and arrests. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of their motions to dismiss, except with respect to the denial of qualified immunity to the sheriff, concerning equal protection. The facts, taken as true and construed in the plaintiffs’ favor, support the inference that the prosecutors erroneously advised that the plaintiffs were selling illegal CBD products even though the prosecutors knew or should have known that they had no evidence of the products’ illegality. Their actions were objectively unreasonable because their probable cause determinations rested on the inconclusive lab results. The complaint did not establish that the sheriff engaged in selective enforcement. View "Rieves v. Town of Smyrna" on Justia Law

Enchant produces a holiday-themed light show, which it exhibits across the U.S. and Canada. “Enchant Christmas,” features large three-dimensional sculptures fitted with lights, including sculptures of polar bears, deer, and ice crystals. Enchant obtained copyright registrations for several sculptures. Wallain worked with Enchant and had access to design files used to construct Enchant’s light sculptures. Wallain and Glowco discussed producing an Enchant Christmas light show in Nashville. The parties could not strike an agreement. Wallain and Glowco decided to pursue a Nashville light show without Enchant, purchased some sculptures from Enchant, and solicited manufacturers in China to produce additional light sculptures. Wallain sent two-dimensional images of Enchant’s sculptures, obtained from Enchant’s files, to solicit bids.Enchant sued, alleging copyright infringement, misappropriation of trade secrets, and violation of the Tennessee Personal and Commercial Computer Act. The district court concluded, after comparing the designs of the disputed sculptures, that any copyright-protected interest in Enchant’s sculptures was “very thin” and that numerous differences between the sculptures would be clear to an ordinary observer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Qualities of Enchant’s sculptures that are inherent in the chosen subject—animal sculpture—are not subject to copyright protection. To the extent that Enchant’s sculptures contained some original work warranting protection, Enchant had "thin copyright at best." Most of the similarities identified by Enchant are inherent to the subject matter, including animal features and naturally occurring poses. View "Enchant Christmas Light Maze & Market, Inc. v. Glowco LLC" on Justia Law

T.R., in the seventh grade, met with the school principal, Gill-Williams. T.R. told Gill-Williams that she had been thinking about suicide for a month, stating. that “things at home like guns and knives" made her "want to hurt herself.” Gill-Williams called a police officer assigned to the school, Olney, who called T.R.’s father, Machan. Machan, at work about 90 minutes away, objected to Olney taking T.R. to the hospital, telling Olney to keep T.R. at the school until he got there. Olney took T.R. to the hospital. An emergency-room nurse conducted a mental-health assessment and concluded that T.R. needed treatment. Although T.R. did not appear intoxicated or disoriented, the physician, Dr. Friedman, ordered a blood draw as part of the standard procedure for a mental evaluation. T.R. resisted the blood draw, which tested negative for drugs. Friedman and other medical staff talked to T.R. about her suicidal thoughts. Machan arrived. After considerable discussion, the hospital released T.R. on a condition that she go to a mental health center. Machan took T.R. there, where they stayed for about 45 minutes.Machan filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied Olney qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit held that Olney was entitled to summary judgment. The existence of probable cause to fear that T.R. might hurt herself meant that Olney did not need Machan’s consent to take T.R. to the hospital. Olney did not violate the Fourth Amendment by taking T.R. to the hospital and authorizing the blood draw. View "Machan v. Olney" on Justia Law

Sergeant Faith of the Detroit Fugitive Apprehension Team, tasked with arresting “Marvin Seales a/k/a Roderick Siner,” met Officer Zberkot at a food processing plant. A manager led them to Seales. Seales protested, “You got the wrong guy.” Faith handcuffed Seales and drove him to the precinct. Zberkot drafted a report. Other officers handled the rest of the process. Seales repeatedly told Zberkot that he was innocent and asked Zberkot to check his identification. Seales spent two nights in the precinct. At his arraignment, the judge called People "versus Roderick Siner.” Asked for his name, Seales said “Marvin Seales.” He later thought “I better say, Roderick Siner, I understand these charges” to “get past that point.” Seales spent two weeks in the Wayne County Jail. Seales filed a grievance but signed a medical intake form “Siner” because he wanted to make sure he could get medical attention if needed. No one investigated his claims. At his preliminary examination, the victim stated that Seales was not the man who shot at him. The case was dismissed.Seales sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court rejected claims against Detroit and Wayne County. Zberkot unsuccessfully raised several immunities. The Sixth Circuit rejected Seales’ unlawful arrest claim as a matter of law due to the similarities between Seales and the true suspect but allowed the unlawful detention claim to proceed. A jury awarded Seales $3.5 million. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting its prior decision that there was probable cause to arrest Seales and that Zberkot handled the case for fewer than three hours. View "Seales v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

Freeman pleaded guilty to felony murder in 2001. An Ohio trial court sentenced Freeman to 15 years to life imprisonment, followed by post-release control for the maximum period allowable. Freeman failed to appeal. After four unsuccessful motions to withdraw his guilty plea, Freeman collaterally moved in state court to vacate his conviction and sentence in 2015. He argued the sentencing court’s imposition of post-release control was “contrary to law” and that his felony murder conviction was improper because there was no evidence he committed an underlying violent felony. The state appeals court granted Freeman relief in part, agreeing that Ohio law does not provide for post-release control for felony murder and stating that “a sentencing entry that incorrectly imposes postrelease control does not render the entire sentence void. Only that portion of the judgment that improperly imposes postrelease control is void.” On remand, in 2017, the trial court “vacated and replaced, nunc pro tunc” the journal entry from Freeman’s original sentencing, leaving intact its original sentencing journal entry except for the single sentence discussing post-release control. Freeman then filed a 28 U.S.C 2254 petition, challenging his conviction. The district court dismissed Freeman’s petition as time-barred. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A limited resentencing that results in a better-than-before sentence does not constitute a new “judgment” under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A), which imposes a one-year limitations period for habeas petitions. View "Freeman v. Wainwright" on Justia Law

Kentucky Governor Beshear, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, prohibited “[a]ll mass gatherings,” including faith-based events.” The order excepts “normal operations at airports, bus and train stations, . . . shopping malls,” and “typical office environments, factories, or retail or grocery stores where large numbers of people are present, but maintain appropriate social distancing.” A subsequent order required organizations that are not “life-sustaining” to close. Among the “life-sustaining” exempt entities are laundromats, accounting services, law firms, hardware stores, airlines, mining operations, funeral homes, landscaping businesses, and grocery stores. Religious organizations are not “life-sustaining,” except when they provide “food, shelter, and social services.” Maryville Baptist Church held an Easter service. Some congregants went into the church. Others parked in the church’s parking lot and listened to the service over a loudspeaker. State Police issued notices that their attendance, whether in the church or outdoors, amounted to a criminal act, recorded congregants’ license plate numbers, and sent letters requiring self-quarantine for 14 days. Congregants who attended the Easter service sued, claiming that the orders and their enforcement violated their free-exercise and interstate-travel rights. Two other federal district court cases, challenging the same ban, have resulted in preliminary relief.The Sixth Circuit granted an injunction pending appeal, Despite the lack of anti-religious animus and the legitimate health concerns, orders prohibiting religious gatherings, enforced by police officers telling congregants they violated a criminal law and taking down license plate numbers, will chill worship gatherings. Applying strict scrutiny, the court reasoned that there are many less restrictive ways to address these public health issues. View "Roberts v. Neace" on Justia Law