Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Michigan Department of Health and Human Services contracts out most of its fostering and adoption services to private child-placing agencies (CPAs), which perform home evaluations of prospective adoptive and foster parent(s). One CPA, St. Vincent Catholic Charities, shares the religious teachings of the Roman Catholic Church regarding same-sex marriage. It “cannot provide a written recommendation ... endorsing a family situation that would conflict with [its] religious beliefs” so St. Vincent refers out home evaluations for same-sex or unmarried couples to other CPAs. In 2015, Michigan codified this practice. M.C.L. 722.124e(1)(g) provides that “[t]o the fullest extent permitted by state and federal law," a CPA shall not be required to provide any services if those services conflict with, or provide any services under circumstances that conflict with," the CPA’s "sincerely held religious beliefs.”The Dumonts alleged that they were a same-sex couple interested in fostering and adoption, but that St. Vincent refused to assist them with the licensing process because of their sexual orientation. Michigan settled that suit by agreeing to enforce, against CPAs, a policy prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. St. Vincent then claimed that the state violated its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by directing it to perform its duties in a manner that violates its sincerely held religious beliefs. The district court denied the Dumonts’ motions, seeking intervention. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to permissive intervention. Citing FRCP 24(b)(3), the court held that the Dumonts’ motion was timely, that it presented a common question of law, and that there is little risk of undue delay or prejudice to the existing parties. View "Buck v. Gordon" on Justia Law

Babcock joined the Michigan National Guard in 1970 and became a dual-status technician “a Federal civilian employee” who “is assigned to a civilian position as a technician” while maintaining membership in the National Guard, 10 U.S.C. 10216(a)(1); 32 U.S.C. 709(e). Babcock served as a National Guard pilot, held the appropriate military grade, wore a uniform that displayed his rank while working, and attended weekend drills. In 2004-2005, Babcock was deployed to Iraq on active duty. Babcock received military pay for his active-duty service and his inactive-duty training, including weekend drills. Otherwise, he received civil pay and participated in the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS), 5 U.S.C. 5301. Babcock paid Social Security taxes on the wages for his active-duty service and his inactive-duty training from 1988 onwards, 42 U.S.C. 410(l)(1). He did not pay Social Security taxes on his wages for inactive-duty training before 1988 or on his civil-service wages.In 2009, Babcock retired and began receiving monthly CSRS payments and separate military retirement pay. For several years after his retirement, Babcock flew medical-evacuation helicopters for hospitals. This private-sector income was subject to Social Security taxes. Babcock fully retired in 2014. The government reduced his Social Security benefits under the Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP) because of his CSRS pension. Babcock cited a WEP exception for payments “based wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service.” While Babcock's case was pending, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Eighth Circuit’s contrary analysis and held that the uniformed-services exception does not apply to dual-status technicians. The Sixth Circuit subsequently agreed that a federal civil-service pension based on work as a National Guard dual-status technician does not qualify as “a payment based wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service.” View "Babcock v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

Police officers discovered J.H. deceased in her home with drug paraphernalia and .58 grams of fentanyl. Text messages in J.H.’s cellphone indicated that she had attempted to buy or had bought drugs from Jeffries earlier that day. Officers, impersonating J.H., texted Jeffries and requested more drugs. Jeffries went to J.H.’s home. A search of Jeffries’s car revealed 1.69 grams of fentanyl and a cellphone containing J.H.'s text messages. In Jeffries’s pocket, the officers found $446 and 36.14 grams of fentanyl.Jeffries was charged with possessing fentanyl with intent to distribute and distributing fentanyl, the use of which resulted in death, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). Two medical experts testified that the amount of fentanyl in J.H.’s system was “significantly above the lethal level” and that no other “anatomical issues” could have caused J.H.’s death. Jeffries asked the court to instruct the jury that, to impose section 841(b)(1)(C)’s sentencing enhancement, the government was required to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the death of J.H. was the natural and foreseeable result of the defendant’s actions.” The instructed the jury that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that but for the use of the drugs that Jeffries distributed, J.H. would not have died; there is “but for” causation where use of the drugs, combined with other factors to produce death and death would not have occurred without the incremental effect of the drugs. After the jury convicted Jeffries, the court held that it had erred by failing to include the proximate-cause jury instruction and granted a new trial. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for sentencing. Section 841(b)(1)(C) requires proof of only but-for causation. View "United States v. Jeffries" on Justia Law

In 2006, Foreman pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute 50 or more grams of cocaine base, possession with intent to distribute cocaine powder, and possession of a firearm during and in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Foreman admitted that he was responsible for approximately 135 grams of crack cocaine and 250 grams of cocaine powder. Foreman had a final Guidelines range of 322-387 months; he was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment with respect to each drug conviction, to run concurrently, and 60 months’ imprisonment for the firearms conviction, to run consecutively. When the First Step Act of 2018 made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive, Foreman sought relief.The district court held that Foreman was not entitled to a plenary resentencing and declined to revisit his career offender status or hold an in-person hearing, then weighed the new statutory range applicable to Foreman’s drug offenses, his recalculated Guidelines range, and the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, and reduced Foreman’s total sentence to 172 months on each drug offense, to run concurrently, plus the mandatory consecutive 60 months on the firearms offense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Nothing in the First Step Act entitles a defendant to a plenary resentencing. First Step Act resentencings are not shielded from review for reasonableness; the district court thoroughly explained its rationale, carefully examining Foreman’s circumstances, the amended penalty provisions, and the resulting changes to Foreman’s Guidelines range. View "United States v. Foreman" on Justia Law

In 2006, Smith was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of powder or 50 grams or more of cocaine base (crack cocaine); possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base (crack cocaine); possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine powder; and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court imposed a mandatory minimum life sentence. The Fair Sentencing Act subsequently lowered the penalty for cocaine-base offenses, made retroactive through the First Step Act. Smith moved for relief and received a reduced sentence of 360 months, the bottom of the new Guideline range for the counts impacted by the Fair Sentencing Act, to run concurrent to his existing 360-month sentence for his powder cocaine count that was not affected by the Fair Sentencing Act.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court should have imposed a below-Guideline sentence for all counts. The First Step Act is a limited grant of authority to impose a reduced sentence for certain offenses and does not require a plenary resentencing proceeding. Even assuming the court’s obligation to explain its reasons for imposing the modified sentence was akin to that which applies in initial sentencing, the court's use of a modified AO 247 form order to explain its decision was not procedurally unreasonable. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Lake manufactures steel-framed buildings. In June 2016, in Akron, two Lake employees were working atop the steel frame of a partially completed building, 28 feet above the ground. The employees were wearing safety harnesses that, if anchored to the building, would prevent them from falling; they had chosen to remain unanchored while they worked with a crane to place bundles of steel decking. An OSHA compliance officer cited their failure to anchor their harnesses as a violation of OSHA’s fall-protection regulations. The on-site foreman disagreed, asserting that those workers were “connectors.” An ALJ upheld the citation, reasoning that the workers were only “placing” the decking bundles, rather than “placing and connecting” them, 29 C.F.R. 1926.751. OSHA’s regulations generally require ironworkers to use fall protection whenever working above a height of 15 feet, but there is an exception to that rule for “connectors,” who are specially trained to work with incoming loads from hoisting equipment and need to remain unencumbered to escape collapses and incoming steel. A “connector,” is defined as “an employee who, working with hoisting equipment, is placing and connecting structural members and/or components.” The Sixth Circuit granted Lake’s petition for review. The court agreed with the Commission’s interpretation of the regulation but concluded on this record that Lake lacked fair notice of that interpretation. View "Lake Building Products, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

At Moody’s trial, the government produced a video of Moody cooking crack on his stove and waving a handgun while he mused about life in “the game” (drug trafficking). The court ruled that most of the video was admissible. Moody then tried to persuade the jury that the video was filmed more than five years before his indictment, putting it outside the statute of limitations. The jury convicted Moody. Due to prior felony drug convictions, Moody received enhanced, mandatory-minimum life sentences on several counts. He appealed on evidentiary grounds relating to the video. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.Later, Moody raised new claims on collateral review, 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court found each claim meritless; most were also procedurally defaulted. The court authorized Moody to appeal. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal, stating that none of the claims should have been certified. Reasonable jurists could not doubt that the district court properly denied relief on Moody’s claims that he was deprived of his statute-of-limitations defense (violating due process); that the past convictions for his sentencing enhancements were not charged in the indictment or found by the jury; and that his previous lawyers failed to raise the first two claims sooner, violating his right to effective assistance of counsel. View "Moody v. United States" on Justia Law

Kentucky Governor Beshear issued a COVID-19 order, prohibiting “[a]ll mass gatherings,” including "community, civic, public, leisure, faith-based, or sporting events.” It excepts “normal operations at airports, bus and train stations, . . . shopping malls and centers,” and “typical office environments, factories, or retail or grocery stores where large numbers of people are present, but maintain appropriate social distancing.” A subsequent order required organizations that are not “life-sustaining” to close. Religious organizations are not “life-sustaining,” except in providing “food, shelter, and social services.” Laundromats, accounting services, law firms, hardware stores, and many other entities count as life-sustaining.Maryville held a drive-in Easter service. Congregants parked their cars in the church’s parking lot and listened to a sermon over a loudspeaker. State Police issued notices to the congregants that their attendance amounted to a criminal act, recorded congregants’ license plate numbers, and sent letters, requiring them to self-quarantine for 14 days. The Church filed suit, citing its congregants’ rights under Kentucky’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the U.S. Constitution’s free-exercise guarantee.The Sixth Circuit granted, in part, a request for an injunction. The Church is likely to succeed on its claims, especially with respect to the ban’s application to drive-in services. The treatment of comparable religious and non-religious activities does not suggest the least restrictive way of regulating the churches. The prohibition on attending any worship service inflicts irreparable harm; an injunction appropriately permits religious services with the same risk-minimizing precautions as similar secular activities and enforcement of social-distancing rules. Treatment of similarly situated entities in comparable ways serves public health interests while preserving bedrock free-exercise guarantees. View "Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear" on Justia Law

Canton Police received a 911 call from Andrews, who stated that his fiance, White, had physically attacked him. Officers arrested White. Andrews later took White's medications to the jail; a “KOP” policy allows inmates to keep certain drugs for self-administration. During an intake interview, White admitted to attempting to harm herself or commit suicide in the past but said she was not thinking of harming herself or having suicidal thoughts. An R.N. later evaluated White for nearly two hours, reported White’s chief complaints were “anxiety and depression,” and contacted a pharmacy to verify White’s prescriptions. The R.N. claims White did not exhibit any psychotic behavior, suicidal ideation, or psychiatric distress but ordered further evaluation. The next day, White was found on the floor with vomit on her face. She stated repeatedly that she took too many pills. The next day, White died in the hospital. The cause of death was Verapamil toxicity.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. A pretrial detainee does not have an automatic right to a suicide screening. The court rejected an argument that the KOP Policy was deficient because it allows inmates in need of a psychological evaluation to participate before a psychiatrist’s assessment of proper housing. The County had no history of suicides relative to the program, so any purported failure to train its employees in suicide risk assessment did not cause White’s death. View "Andrews v. Wayne County" on Justia Law

The Bateses lost their condominium through a nonjudicial foreclosure. They claim the condo complex’s management company and its law firm violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, which generally defines “debt collectors” to cover parties who operate a “business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts” or who “regularly collect[] or attempt[] to collect” debts owed another, 15 U.S.C. 1692a(6). The Act contains a separate debt-collector definition for subsection 1692f(6), regulating parties who operate a “business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests.” General debt collectors must comply with all of the Act’s protections; security-interest enforcers need only comply with section 1692f(6). In 2019, the Supreme Court held (Obduskey) that parties who assist creditors with the nonjudicial foreclosure of a home fall within the separate definition, not the general one. Obduskey left open the possibility that these parties might engage in “other conduct” that would transform them from security interest enforcers into general debt collectors, subject to all of the Act’s regulations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a judgment on the pleadings for the defendants. The Bateses’ complaint did not plead enough facts to take the defendants outside the separate definition for security-interest enforcers and bring them within the general debt-collector definition; there were almost no well-pleaded allegations about the principal business or regular activities of either. View "Bates v. Green Farms Condominium Association" on Justia Law