Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2010, Hill, a principal of Meridian and the other principals sold Meridian to CMCO; the former Meridian principals were to work for CMCO. In 2012, Hill accepted employment with CMCO’s competitor, Peoples. CMCO filed suit, alleging that he breached his contract and shared trade secrets. CMCO settled its claims against Peoples. Hill proceeded pro se. Hill failed to attend a pretrial conference. The state court granted a default judgment. Hill also declined to appear for the damages trial. Hill asserts that he never received the order scheduling a pretrial conference but admits that he was initially aware of the date. Hill further acknowledged that he knew of the trial date because he spoke with the judge by phone and was warned that if he did not appear “adverse things [were] likely [to] happen.” He contends that a bankruptcy attorney he was consulting advised him that he need not participate because any judgments would “go away” in bankruptcy. The court granted CMCO judgment, finding Hill’s actions willful, intentional, in bad faith, egregious, and done with malice. The court awarded $3,417,477.Hill then filed his Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy court lifted the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. 362(d), with respect to CMCO’s judgment.CMCO filed an adversary proceeding. The court found the damages judgment nondischargeable, 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4), (a)(6), applying collateral estoppel based on the state court finding that Hill’s actions caused “willful and malicious injury.” Hill unsuccessfully sought to vacate the state court judgment. The district and Sixth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment to CMCO. ” The state court damages judgment provided preclusive effect to the determination of the nondischargeability of Hill’s debt. View "In re: Hill" on Justia Law

In 1960, the Everly Brothers (Don and Phil) recorded, released, and copyrighted "Cathy’s Clown" and two other songs (the Compositions), granting the copyrights to Acuff-Rose. The original copyrights listed Phil and Don as authors; both received royalties. They were both credited as authors of Cathy’s Clown in 1961 and 1975 awards. They took joint credit for authoring the song in a 1972 television interview. In a 1980 “Release and Assignment,” Phil agreed to release to Don all of his rights to the Compositions, including “every claim of every nature by him as to the compositions of said songs.” Don subsequently received all royalty payments and public credit as the author; Acuff-Rose changed its business records to reflect Don as sole author. Licenses and credits for Cathy’s Clown and a 1988 copyright renewal listed Don as the only author. Both brothers nonetheless made public statements continuing to credit Phil as a co-author. In 2011, Don sought to execute his 17 U.S.C. 304(c) right to termination to regain copyright ownership from Acuff-Rose, claiming exclusive copyright ownership. Phil exercised termination rights as to other compositions, in 2007 and 2012, but never attempted to terminate any grant related to the 1960 Compositions.After Phil’s 2014 death, his children filed notices of termination as to the 1960 Grants, seeking to regain Phil’s rights to Cathy’s Clown. In 2016, they served a notice of termination as to Phil’s 1980 Assignment to Don. The district court granted Don summary judgment, finding that the claim of Phil’s co-authorship was barred by the statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding a genuine factual dispute as to whether Don expressly repudiated Phil’s co-authorship, and thus triggered the statute of limitations, no later than 2011. View "Everly v. Everly" on Justia Law

Cincinnati officers Scott and Moore responded to a reported incident of menacing. Two people alleged that Quandavier had driven by their home that night and threatened to kill them and that Quandavier carried guns. Officer Loreaux identified a vehicle fitting the description. Officers Scott, Moore, Schneider, and Loreaux, standing where the vehicle was parked, heard a voice. Thinking that it was likely Quandavier, they knocked on the exterior door of the residence. It swung open. Three officers entered without a warrant or exigent circumstances. Loreaux remained outside. Neither Scott nor Moore recall announcing their presence or identifying themselves. Inside and upstairs, Scott knocked on a closed door. As it opened, Scott “saw the barrel of a rifle pointed at [her] face.” Moore and Schneider also saw Quandavier “nonchalantly” panning the rifle from left to right. Moore reached for its barrel as Scott fired her weapon. Moore did not instruct Quandavier to drop his rifle nor did Scott issue any commands before firing. Quandavier collapsed. The officers immediately radioed for paramedics. Before the officers applied handcuffs or provided first aid, they heard another voice and conducted a sweep. Quandavier died at the scene without receiving medical attention.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for unlawful entry, excessive force, and deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, plus state claims, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment, citing qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The district court erred by granting qualified immunity to Scott, Moore, and Schneider on the unlawful entry claim. The court affirmed as to the excessive force, deliberate indifference, and state-law battery claims, and remanded for evaluation of municipal liability and wrongful death claims. View "Hicks v. Scott" on Justia Law

The DEA had been surveilling Benton and Merida. Merida went inside Benton’s home carrying four kilograms of powder cocaine. Moments later, Merida exited and drove away. DEA agents stopped and searched Merida’s car and executed a search warrant on Benton’s home. In Merida’s car, agents found $94,190. In Benton’s home, they found the four kilograms of powder cocaine and three kilograms of crack cocaine in a safe, with a handgun lying nearby. Benton pled guilty to conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute and conspiring to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), & 846. The government dropped a charge of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute. The PSR calculated Benton’s offense level as 33 based on the underlying drug quantity calculation, which added the four kilograms of powder cocaine and the three kilograms of crack cocaine, deemed to be “relevant conduct” under U.S.S.G. 1B1.3(a)(2). Benton had 30 prior convictions, including prior offenses for cocaine possession and trafficking, resulting in a Guidelines range of 235-293 months.The Sixth Circuit upheld his 260-month sentence. The court upheld the “relevant conduct” determination and rejected arguments the district court should have granted a downward departure because Benton’s criminal history category overrepresented the seriousness of his past crimes and that Benton should not have received a considerably higher sentence than his co-defendant, Merida, who received 84 months of incarceration. View "United States v. Benton" on Justia Law

Lemon asked a coworker for an Advil, explaining that he hurt his neck by “turn[ing] his head.” Later, he asked another coworker to cover his shift, stating that he hurt his neck at home. From the hospital, Lemon texted another coworker that he “tweaked” his neck at home. He first told the doctor that he hurt himself at home, then stated that he hurt himself at work. Later, he reported to his supervisor, claiming he slipped walking up the stairs at work and that he did not discuss the injury with any coworkers. In his formal injury report the next day, Lemon said that he stumbled on the stairs at work. Norfolk has a policy of firing workers who make false statements at work. Norfolk held a hearing and fired Lemon. Lemon claimed Norfolk violated the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. 20101, by retaliating against him for reporting a workplace injury. OSHA dismissed his complaint.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Norfolk. To prevail, Lemon was required to show that his injury report was a “contributing factor” in the railroad’s decision to fire him; he could not prevail if the railroad would have fired him anyway. Lemon’s injury report was not a contributing factor in Norfolk’s decision to fire him. Even if Lemon provided admissible evidence of a policy of pretextual retaliation, Lemon did not establish retaliation against him. Lemon admits no one at Norfolk ever discouraged him from reporting his injury or threatened him with retaliation. View "Lemon v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law

Witnesses told Memphis police that Ward had pulled up in a car, had fired shots at individuals gathered outside, then got out of the car and continued shooting. People returned fire. The witnesses directed the officers to another house, where they found Ward with a gunshot wound to his leg. Officers subsequently found an empty (stolen) pistol and shell casings on the lawn of the house next to the house where they found Ward. Two weeks later, Ward, on crutches, was arrested for trying to rob a pharmacy. Ward has a 2007 state conviction for aggravated robbery and a 2011 federal conviction for brandishing a firearm during a robbery. Charged as a felon in possession of a firearm based on the shooting, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); for attempted robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951; and for brandishing a firearm during that robbery, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), Ward pleaded guilty to robberyl the government dropped the section 924(c) count. At trial on the felon-in-possession count, Ward stipulated that he had a prior felony. Convicted, Ward was sentenced to 115 months of imprisonment The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Ward’s argument that his conviction was improper under the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Rehaif” holding because neither the indictment nor the jury instructions charged that he “knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” There was clear evidence that Ward knew he was a felon and that the government could prove it. View "United States v. Ward" on Justia Law

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Governor of Tennessee issued “shelter-in-place” orders. On April 8, 2020, the Governor ordered that “[a]ll healthcare professionals and healthcare facilities ... postpone surgical and invasive procedures that are elective and non-urgent,” until April 30 in order to preserve personal protective equipment and prevent community spread of COVID-19 through nonessential patient-provider interactions. Elective and non-urgent procedures were defined as those that can be delayed because they are not required to provide life-sustaining treatment, to prevent death or risk of substantial impairment of a major bodily function, or to prevent rapid deterioration or serious adverse consequences to a patient’s physical condition … as reasonably determined by a licensed medical provider. A Tennessee woman may receive a “medication abortion” within 11 weeks from her last menstrual period or a “procedural abortion” within the first 20 weeks (aspiration or dilation and evacuation), subject to a 48-hour waiting period and in-person visitation requirements.On April 17, the district court enjoined Tennessee from enforcing that ban against doctors performing abortion procedures. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, acknowledging the challenges Tennessee faces in responding to the public health crisis,” but concluding that the “response, in this one respect, unduly curtailed constitutional liberty." The court ordered modification of the injunction so that it prohibits the state from enforcing the ban against plaintiffs to the extent they provide procedural abortions to specific patients, including women who, in the good-faith professional judgment of the provider, will likely be forced to undergo a D&E procedure instead of an aspiration if their procedures are delayed. View "Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery" on Justia Law

In 2007, a jury convicted Brown as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) The Armed Career Criminal Act increases the sentence for felons who possess firearms from a 10-year maximum to a 15-year minimum if the defendant has three prior convictions that qualify as “violent felonies,” 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(2), (e). Sixth Circuit precedent (Nance: then treated Brown’s three Tennessee aggravated-burglary convictions as violent felonies, so that court upheld his 180-month sentence under the Act. Years later the parties agreed that changes to precedent showed that Brown’s burglary convictions did not qualify as violent felonies. The district court granted Brown relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. He was resentenced and released from prison.The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision granting Brown relief under section 2255 and remanded for the court to reinstate his original sentence. The court concluded that, following the Supreme Court’s 2018 “Stitt” holding, the Sixth Circuit’s 2007 Nance’s holding that a Tennessee aggravated-burglary conviction categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act “is once again the law of this circuit.” View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Winburn represented himself at his trial for armed robbery, home invasion, and conspiracy. Based on Winburn’s disruptive behavior, the judge removed him from the courtroom and revoked Winburn’s permission to represent himself, then granted a competency evaluation and a mistrial. While Winburn awaited his second trial, the judge permitted Winburn’s stand-by attorney to withdraw because Winburn had sued her and enjoined Winburn from filing complaints or grievances against his new attorney, except to discharge her. Although represented by a new attorney, Winburn moved pro se to dismiss his charges on double jeopardy grounds. The trial judge denied the motion because Winburn’s attorney had not filed it. Winburn filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 challenging his retrial and another section 2241 petition challenging the injunction. The district judges denied both and declined to issue certificates of appealability. Winburn filed a notice of appeal for one petition and sought a certificate of appealability for the other. The Sixth Circuit held that state pretrial detainees proceeding under section 2241 may not appeal without certificates of appealability and granted Winburn a certificate on the injunction claim. A reasonable jurist could conclude that the unusual order was constitutionally infirm. The court denied relief with respect to double jeopardy. Winburn failed to exhaust his state-court remedies by a motion to dismiss. View "Winburn v. Nagy" on Justia Law

Students at several of Detroit’s worst-performing public schools were subject to poor conditions within their classrooms, missing or unqualified teachers, physically dangerous facilities, and inadequate books and materials. In 2016, the plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that these conditions deprive them of a basic minimum education that provides a chance at foundational literacy, in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses. They sought recognition of a fundamental right to a basic education. They argued that the schools they are forced to attend are schools in name only, so the state cannot justify the restriction on their liberty imposed by compulsory attendance. They sued state officials, rather than local entities, based on the state’s general supervision of all public education and the state’s specific interventions in Detroit’s public schools. The state argued that it recently returned control to local officials. The district court found that the state defendants were the proper parties to sue but dismissed the complaint on the merits.The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. Though the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead their equal protection and compulsory attendance claims, the court reinstated claims that they have been denied a basic minimum education, and have been deprived of access to literacy. Application of the principles in the Supreme Court’s education cases to a substantive due process framework demonstrates that a basic minimum education should be recognized as a fundamental right. View "Gary B. v. Whitmer" on Justia Law