Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Michigan filed suit, alleging that AmeriGas, Michigan's largest provider of residential propane, violated the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). Section 10 of the MCPA, Mich. Comp. Laws 445.910, titled “class actions by attorney general,” 10 states that: The attorney general may bring a class action on behalf of persons residing in or injured in this state for the actual damages caused by any of the following: (a) A method, act or practice in trade or commerce defined as unlawful under section 3 [unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive methods, acts, or practices].AmeriGas removed the case to federal court, citing the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 119 Stat. 4. The district court remanded to state court, finding that the lawsuit did not qualify as a “class action” because Section 10 “lacks the core requirements of typicality, commonality, adequacy, and numerosity that are necessary to certify a class under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 23.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Section 10 is not a state statute “similar” to Rule 23 for purposes of CAFA removability, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(1)(B). The court declined “to effectively invalidate the Michigan Legislature’s determination that an Attorney General should be able to sue for injuries to consumers pursuant to Section 10.” View "Nessel v. AmeriGas Partners. L.P." on Justia Law

Recover Agents went to the home of Jiries and Yasmeen Abu-Joudeh to repossess their car. An altercation ensued. According to Yasmeen, an agent pushed her. The agents say that Jiries asked Yasmeen to get a gun and hit her when she refused. The agents called the police. The Abu-Joudehs moved their car into the garage and shut the door. Capac Police Chief Schneider and Michigan State Trooper Sebring arrived. Yasmeen let the officers into the house. More police cars arrived. One officer, whom Yasmeen called the “third officer,” entered the house and kept her seated. Schneider’s police report suggests that this third officer was Memphis Police Chief Sheets. Yasmeen’s physical description of the third officer fit Sheets. The third officer, with the repossession agents, attempted to pry open the garage's main electric door, then went around to the side door, which one of them opened. The agents loaded the vehicle onto their tow truck and hauled it away.AbuJoudeh filed suit, claiming Sheets broke into the garage, violating his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Sheets submitted an affidavit saying he “did not open Plaintiff’s garage without consent, did not enter Plaintiff’s garage without consent, and did not enter Plaintiff’s vehicle or participate in its repossession.” The district court granted Sheets summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The evidence suggesting that Sheets was the officer who broke into his garage creates a genuine issue of material fact. View "Abu-Joudeh v. Schneider" on Justia Law

Marshall pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute oxycodone and was sentenced to 118 months of prison plus six years of supervised release. Although required to serve his supervised release in Kentucky, Marshall moved to Illinois, violating a release condition. The district court briefly revoked Marshall’s release. Marshall moved, with permission, to Michigan. For the next year, Marshall made progress. The probation office recommended an early end to his supervised release. Marshall filed an unopposed motion to end the supervision. The court denied his request, reasoning that Marshall had completed little of the release term and had violated the conditions before. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Marshall never appealed his original or his new sentence; the district court did not issue a new sentence or an amended sentence before this appeal. On rehearing, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, which provides a general grant of appellate jurisdiction to review “final” judgments. The court affirmed the denial of the motion on the merits. View "United States v. Marshall" on Justia Law

Armes pled guilty to five counts of producing, two counts of distributing, and one count of possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), 2252A(a)(2), 2252A(a)(5)(B). The images showed him molesting two members of his family--an infant and a toddler. The presentence report related that in 2005 Armes pled guilty to two counts of Kentucky third-degree rape: “According to the Indictment, the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with a victim that was less than 16 years old . . . while the defendant was over 21 years old.” Armes did not object to those statements. Normally, the minimum prison terms for producing, distributing, and possessing child pornography are 15, five, and zero years (respectively). Those numbers rise to 25, 15, and 10 years for repeat sex offenders, including those with a past conviction under state law “relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, [or] abusive sexual contact involving a minor or ward.” The district court applied the enhancement, making Armes’s minimum sentence 25 years. The Sentencing Guidelines recommended the maximum possible sentence—350 years. The government asked for 75 years. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Armes’s 50-year sentence as reasonable. His Kentucky rape convictions triggered the sentencing enhancement; the district court had enough information to determine the particular crime of conviction; that crime categorically qualifies for the enhancement. View "United States v. Armes" on Justia Law

Allen was convicted of aggravated robbery and murder for the death of 84-year-old English, whom he knew through a prison ministry. Allen’s thumbprint was found on England’s glasses. Cigarette butts consistent with Allen’s brand and saliva were found in English’s trash. The coroner put English’s time of death between before six a.m. on January 25, 1991. A bus driver remembered picking up Allen near English’s home around six a.m. that day. Allen was sentenced to death. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. State courts denied post-conviction relief.Allen claimed he was denied due process because a juror, Worthington, initially indicated that she was not sure that she could be impartial. Worthington stated her brother had been killed two years earlier, that the man charged with the murder was acquitted, and she did not feel justice was done. The judge asked whether she could reach a verdict based solely on the evidence; Worthington said she could. Allen’s counsel stated that witnesses from the coroner’s office who testified at her brother’s trial would testify at Allen’s trial. Worthington stated that she was a bit anxious but denied that her reaction might substantially impact her ability to concentrate on Allen’s case. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the finding that Worthington was unbiased was supported by her testimony and that the judge could legitimately validate her statements because he saw and heard her.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. The determination of whether to seat a juror is an exercise of discretion by the trial court. The Ohio Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply established Supreme Court precedent. View "Allen v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

McKinney reported that she had returned home to find her ex-boyfriend, Jones, inside her house, refusing to leave. Jones chased her outside, throwing items. McKinney was hit by a bottle of dish soap. McKinney saw Snipes drive Jones away in a white “Tahoelike vehicle.” Paducah Officer Parrish took steps to corroborate McKinney’s story. McKinney stated that Jones had threatened to kill her and could easily obtain a gun. She repeatedly stated that she planned to get an emergency protective order and that she feared Jones would return once the officers left. Parrish stayed in his car near the house and saw two black males in a white Chevy Suburban at the nearby intersection. Parrish stopped the vehicle. A pat-down of Jones revealed nothing. Parrish arrested him for assault (a fourth-degree misdemeanor) and placed him in the back of his squad car. Jones yelled that the cuffs were too tight. When Parrish checked the cuffs, he spotted a firearm in the back of his cruiser that he had not seen before.Jones, a convicted felon, was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm. The district court suppressed the firearm, reasoning that the Fourth Amendment bars investigatory stops prompted by a completed misdemeanor. The Sixth Circuit reversed: the Fourth Amendment contains no such rule. The court noted the problems inherent in requiring officers to make the bright-line distinction. The proper inquiry looks at the nature of the crime, how long ago it was committed, and the ongoing risk to public safety. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Hobbs pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which forbids felons to possess firearms. The indictment listed three predicate felonies: Assault on a Peace Officer, Attempted Felonious Assault, and Aggravated Robbery with Firearm Specification. Hobbs had served a six-year sentence for the aggravated robbery conviction. The district court determined that Hobbs was an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 924(e) and sentenced him to the statutory minimum, 15 years’ imprisonment. After Hobbs filed his appeal, the Supreme Court decided Rehaif (2019), which held that to obtain a conviction under section 922(g), “the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Hobbs’s indictment did not expressly allege the knowledge element and the district court did not advise him of it when taking his guilty plea. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence, rejecting arguments that the indictment was deficient and that the plea was not knowing and voluntary. Hobbs was unable to show a reasonable probability that he would not have entered his plea if he had been told of section 922(g)’s knowledge-of-status requirement. View "United States v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

In 1997, Leavy and friends broke into the home of 71-year-old Terry and waited for Terry to return from visiting his wife at a nursing home. The young men ambushed him, binding his hands and feet with duct tape and weighted him down in a bathtub they had filled with water and kerosene. Terry died. Leavy and his friends took $20 and some household items. A Tennessee jury convicted Leavy of first-degree murder and other crimes. He was sentenced to life in prison. Leavy's habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254, was denied in 2006. Leavy moved for relief from that judgment under Civil Rule 60(b) in 2017.The district court denied the motion and entered a formal judgment on September 12, 2018. The Sixth Circuit dismissed his appeal, filed on October 9, as untimely. Litigants generally have 30 days from the entry of a final judgment or final order to file a notice of appeal, 28 U.S.C. 2107(a). Leavy claimed that he mailed a timely notice of appeal in September but no record of this filing appears on the district court’s docket and Leavy’s application for a certificate of appealability makes no mention of it. He did not submit a copy of the purported document with his show-cause response and gave only a vague description of mailing the document, saying only that he handed it to prison officials, not that he paid for postage. View "Leavy v. Hutchison" on Justia Law

Emard, age 33, was injured in a 2010 motorcycle accident. Emard had previously worked as a truck driver, assembler, and packager. He ceased working after the accident. His application for Social Security disability-insurance benefits claimed chronic low-back pain, chronic neck pain, cervical radiculopathy, lumbar radiculopathy, chronic migraine headaches, fatigue, mood swings, anxiety, and Crohn’s disease. An ALJ determined that Emard had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during his insured period; that Emard’s degenerative disc disease, asthma, obstructive sleep apnea, anxiety, and depression were severe impairments, but that his other conditions were mild impairments; that none of Emard’s impairments or any combination thereof met the criteria of any listed impairment; that Emard had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work; that Emard’s “subjective complaints exceed the available objective records,” particularly in light of Emard’s conservative course of treatment; that Emard could not perform past relevant work; and that Emard could perform jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy.The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of benefits. The ALJ made no procedural error by declining to give weight to the opinion of a treating source offered after the claimant’s date last insured that did not relate back to the insured period. The ALJ complied with requirements to view Emard’s impairments in combination and to consider Emard’s ability to work on a sustained basis. View "Emard v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

Perry’s home suffered water damage and required extensive repairs. She filed a claim with her insurer, Allstate, which did not dispute that Perry’s home was seriously damaged, or that it was required to pay for repairs or replacement. The parties agreed that the total estimated cost to repair or replace Perry’s home is $32,965.09. After making deductions for “depreciation,” Allstate provided Perry with a net payment of $28,394.74. Perry’s Allstate policy provides, “If you do not repair or replace the damaged, destroyed or stolen property, payment will be on an actual cash value basis. This means there may be a deduction for depreciation.” The policy does not define “depreciation.” Allstate contends that “depreciation” must account for the cost of both materials and labor. Perry claims that “depreciation” is ambiguous with respect to labor costs. The district court reversed the dismissal of Perry’s lawsuit. Under Ohio law, when an insurance policy is ambiguous, courts must interpret the policy strictly against the insurer, so long as the insured’s interpretation is reasonable. Perry’s reading of the term “depreciation” is a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous policy, so Allstate may not include the cost of labor in calculating depreciation. View "Perry v. Allstate Indemnity Co." on Justia Law