Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Emard, age 33, was injured in a 2010 motorcycle accident. Emard had previously worked as a truck driver, assembler, and packager. He ceased working after the accident. His application for Social Security disability-insurance benefits claimed chronic low-back pain, chronic neck pain, cervical radiculopathy, lumbar radiculopathy, chronic migraine headaches, fatigue, mood swings, anxiety, and Crohn’s disease. An ALJ determined that Emard had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during his insured period; that Emard’s degenerative disc disease, asthma, obstructive sleep apnea, anxiety, and depression were severe impairments, but that his other conditions were mild impairments; that none of Emard’s impairments or any combination thereof met the criteria of any listed impairment; that Emard had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work; that Emard’s “subjective complaints exceed the available objective records,” particularly in light of Emard’s conservative course of treatment; that Emard could not perform past relevant work; and that Emard could perform jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy.The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of benefits. The ALJ made no procedural error by declining to give weight to the opinion of a treating source offered after the claimant’s date last insured that did not relate back to the insured period. The ALJ complied with requirements to view Emard’s impairments in combination and to consider Emard’s ability to work on a sustained basis. View "Emard v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

Perry’s home suffered water damage and required extensive repairs. She filed a claim with her insurer, Allstate, which did not dispute that Perry’s home was seriously damaged, or that it was required to pay for repairs or replacement. The parties agreed that the total estimated cost to repair or replace Perry’s home is $32,965.09. After making deductions for “depreciation,” Allstate provided Perry with a net payment of $28,394.74. Perry’s Allstate policy provides, “If you do not repair or replace the damaged, destroyed or stolen property, payment will be on an actual cash value basis. This means there may be a deduction for depreciation.” The policy does not define “depreciation.” Allstate contends that “depreciation” must account for the cost of both materials and labor. Perry claims that “depreciation” is ambiguous with respect to labor costs. The district court reversed the dismissal of Perry’s lawsuit. Under Ohio law, when an insurance policy is ambiguous, courts must interpret the policy strictly against the insurer, so long as the insured’s interpretation is reasonable. Perry’s reading of the term “depreciation” is a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous policy, so Allstate may not include the cost of labor in calculating depreciation. View "Perry v. Allstate Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

Howse claims Officers Hodous and Middaugh stopped in front of his home in an unmarked vehicle. Middaugh asked Howse if he lived there, got out of the vehicle, and told Howse to put his hands behind his back. Howse disobeyed and began screaming. Howse claims Middaugh grabbed Howse and threw him down. The officers tried to handcuff Howse, who resisted, “stiffening up” his body.The officers claim they saw Howse lingering suspiciously at a house that appeared to be boarded up. Middaugh suspected that Howse might be engaged in criminal activity and, when Middaugh reached the porch, Howse clenched his fists and assumed a fighting stance. The officers allege that Howse struck Hodous in the chest and tried to rip off Middaugh’s flashlight and handcuff case, so Middaugh used a leg sweep to take Howse down to arrest him.Middaugh charged Howse with assaulting a police officer. The stated eventually dismissed the charges. Howse sued the officers and the city, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. It is not clearly established that officers cannot tackle a non-compliant suspect and use additional force if he resists arrest, so the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Howse admitted that he tried to make it difficult for the officers to arrest him, which provided probable cause. View "Howse v. Hodous" on Justia Law

For many years, Small worked as an electrician at Memphis Light (ML). In 2013, he suffered an on-the-job injury that required him to change positions. Small expressed interest in becoming a revenue inspector. ML offered him work as a service dispatcher. Without another offer, Small accepted that position. Small raised concerns that the position would conflict with the practice of his religion (Jehovah’s Witness). Small had Wednesday evening and Sunday services and community work on Saturdays. ML denied his requests for reassignment, explaining that the accommodations would impose undue hardship and that its union required shifts to be assigned based on seniority. ML suggested that Small swap shifts with his co-workers or use paid time off. Later, ML offered Small the option to “blanket swap” shifts for an entire quarter. Small remained in the dispatcher position.In 2017, Small sued for disability and religious discrimination. The district court granted ML summary judgment. Small moved to enforce an alleged settlement agreement between the parties. The court found that the parties had never agreed to a settlement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. ML offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not giving Small a position as an inspector--its determination that Small physically could not do the work. ML did not have to offer any accommodation of his religion that would impose “undue hardship” on its business. The evidence indicated that the parties never agreed on the material terms of a settlement. View "Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water" on Justia Law

Jones worked as a FedEx security officer, watching an X-ray monitor to detect weapons in packages being loaded on aircraft. Jones failed to detect a weapon. FedEx terminated his employment 12 days later, allegedly because he failed to detect that weapon. According to Jones, an African American, the consequences for failing to detect a weapon were harsher for him and another African American than they were for white officers. Jones filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC on April 25, 2018, 252 days after his termination. The EEOC issued a right-to-sue notice. Jones filed a Title VII action. FedEx argued that Jones failed to file his race-discrimination charge within 180 days of his termination as required by 42 U.S.C. 2000e5(e). Jones argued that the “filing deadline is extended to 300 calendar days if a state or local agency enforces a law that prohibits employment discrimination on the same basis” and that the Tennessee Human Rights Commission categorically prohibits racial discrimination.The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of his case, citing the Supreme Court’s 1988 decision, EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Company concerning states that have “fair employment practices agencies” in work-sharing agreements with the EEOC. Jones, a pro se litigant, was excused for not raising that argument before the district court; the court noted that Jones allegedly relied on the EEOC's advice that the 300-day filing period would apply. View "Jones v. Federal Express Corp." on Justia Law

Since 1997, Willard (born in 1953) has worked in automobile sales. Nationally, he performed within the top 125 of 3,500 Ford salespeople. Willard asserts that he faced “relentless” inappropriate statements about his age and the imminence of his retirement at Huntington Ford, where Willard was the oldest full-time new-car salesperson. When Willard complained, sales manager Calhoun told Willard that if he did not like it, he could leave. Willard reported the comments to general manager Schiller, who told Willard to stop taking new customers. Willard had minor disciplinary incidents in 2011, 2012, and 2014. In December 2016, Willard made a sarcastic remark to Duley, who lost her temper and “shoved” him. Duley resigned. Scoggin and Schiller suspended Willard for a week. After the suspension, they informed him that he had been terminated because he did not call in or show up for work and because of the Duley incident. Willard sued, alleging that Huntington misled him about the length of his suspension so that it could terminate him because of his age, citing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621–634, and Michigan’s Civil Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit reinstated the case. The district court failed to view the record in the light most favorable to Willard, leading it to conclude erroneously that he did not offer indirect evidence of age discrimination. View "Willard v. Huntington Ford, Inc." on Justia Law

Foster and the respondent were classmates an off-site executive MBA program based in Los Angeles through the University of Michigan. Students participated in once-a-month, weekend sessions at the Beverly Wilshire hotel. Foster developed a friendship with the respondent but the two did not have a dating or sexual relationship. The respondent began sending complimentary texts, giving Foster unsolicited gifts, expressing romantic interest. and making unwanted physical contact. He came to her hotel room and removed his clothing. Foster reported that the respondent had sexually harassed her to the University, which made arrangements so that the two would not stay in the same hotel, eat together, attend social functions together, or interact in class. Foster was not satisfied with the arrangements. During the next “residency,” the respondent sent vulgar text messages to administrators, violated the restrictions, and was barred from the second day of classes. His communications became increasingly aggressive. Foster obtained a restraining order but the respondent appeared at graduation in Michigan. The district court rejected Foster’s deliberate-indifference claim under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681–1688, on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Foster established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the University was deliberately indifferent by alleging that the University’s response to the respondent’s unwillingness to comply with its orders was clearly unreasonable and caused her to undergo further harassment. View "Foster v. Board of Regents of University of Michigan" on Justia Law

Detective Yasenchack saw Williams enter and then exit Gilbert's Jeep Cherokee within a few seconds at an intersection known for drug activity, shoving a plastic bag into his shorts as he exited. Yasenchack stopped Williams and recovered half a pound of cocaine. Williams pleaded guilty to state drug-trafficking charges. Two weeks later, Yasenchack saw Gilbert driving the Jeep and conducted a traffic stop. He smelled marijuana but his search only turned up a large amount of cash. Yasenchack later learned that Gilbert had convictions for drug possession, trafficking, and possessing a weapon while under disability. Yasenchack began surveilling Gilbert and searching the trash outside Gilbert’s residence. He found scale weights, a vacuum-sealed bag and zip-lock bags. Gilbert moved. Yasenchack searched the trash at Gilbert’s new residence but found nothing suggestive of trafficking. Yasenchack again searched Gilbert’s trash and discovered a vacuum-sealed bag containing “crumbs” later confirmed to be marijuana.An Ohio judge authorized a warrant for Gilbert’s home, which officers executed the following day. Officers discovered four kilograms of heroin (some laced with fentanyl), a handgun, $119,000 in cash, and drug-trafficking tools. After a Franks hearing and denial of his motion to suppress, Gilbert pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute heroin, possession with intent to distribute a mixed drug and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A reasonably well-trained officer in these circumstances would not know to disregard a judicial determination that probable cause existed, so the good-faith exception applies. View "United States v. Gilbert" on Justia Law

Holland, a songwriter, sold his song-rights to music companies, in exchange for royalty payments. Holland failed fully to report his income. In 1986-1990, the IRS levied Holland’s royalty assets and recovered $1.5 million. In 1997, the IRS informed him that it intended again to levy those assets. Holland converted his interest in future royalty payments into a lump sum and created a partnership wholly owned by him, to which he transferred title to the royalty assets ($23.3 million). The partnership borrowed $15 million, for which the royalty assets served as collateral. Bankers Trust paid $8.4 million directly to Holland, $5 million in fees, and $1.7 million for Holland’s debts, including his taxes. The IRS did not assess any additional amounts against Holland until 2003. In 2005, the partnership refinanced the 1998 deal, using Royal Bank. In 2012, the IRS concluded that the partnership held the royalty assets as Holland’s alter ego or fraudulent transferee and recorded a $20 million lien against the partnership.In an enforcement suit, the partnership sold the royalty assets. The proceeds ($21 million) went into an interpleader fund, to be distributed to the partnership’s creditors in order of priority. The government’s lien ($20 million), if valid against the partnership, would take priority over Royal Bank’s security interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a judgment for Royal Bank. Transactions to monetize future revenue, using a partnership or corporate form, are common and facially legitimate. Holland received adequate consideration in 1998. The IRS’s delay in making additional assessments rather than the 1998 transfer caused the government’s collection difficulties. View "United States v. Holland" on Justia Law

Viet bought used copiers for Le and Le’s corporation and shipped the copiers to Vietnam for resale. After the relationship dissolved, Le sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1), alleging that he had typically worked 60 hours each week and that Le failed to pay overtime and that Le had not reimbursed him for expenses. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of Viet’s claim on summary judgment. Even assuming that Viet was an employee covered by the Act, he offered few details and no corroboration to support his estimate of his work hours. It is not clear that Viet was an employee. Le treated Viet as an independent contractor, using a 1099 tax form; Le did not set a work schedule or keep track of Viet’s hours. Le paid a fixed rate for each copier. View "Viet v. Le" on Justia Law