Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Cagayat alleges that UCB sent her two consumer debt collection letters that “featured a large glassine window, through which a paper page with [Cagayat]’s name and address is visible.” Written on the inward side of the paper page inside the envelopes are the words “Collection Bureau.” According to Cagayat, those words “bleed through the paper page and are clearly visible . . . to the naked eye.” She claims that someone looking at the envelopes in normal lighting can clearly read, without unusual strain or effort, the message: “United Collection Bureau, Inc. Compliance Department.” Cagayat claims that her daughter saw the letters and recognized that a debt collector sent them. Cagayat sought damages under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692- 1692p, and the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act.The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit, finding that the exhibits Cagayat attached to her complaint (copies of the letters) do not utterly discredit the factual allegations central to her claim and that her factual allegations give rise to a plausible violation. Applying the least sophisticated consumer standard, the fact that the words “Collection Bureau” are upside-down and backward does not discredit Cagayat’s assertion that the language can be clearly read without unusual effort. View "Cagayat v. United Collection Bureau, Inc." on Justia Law

Tchankpa suffered a serious shoulder injury while employed by Ascena Retail Group. Tchankpa contends that Ascena violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by not accommodating his injury and constructively discharging him. Tchankpa’s claim centers on his request for a work-from-home accommodation. He argues that Ascena failed to accommodate his disability by not allowing him to work from home three days per week. Tchankpa did not provide documentation outlining his medical restrictions for several months and no documentation explained why Tchankpa needed to work from home. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of Tchankpa’s claims. Employees cannot mandate a particular accommodation and an employer may request medical records supporting the employee’s requested accommodation. After finally providing a doctor’s note, Tchankpa resigned before Ascena fully responded. “The ADA is not a weapon that employees can wield to pressure employers into granting unnecessary accommodations or reconfiguring their business operations." View "Tchankpa v. Ascena Retail Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Hamm, addicted to opioids, drove from Mt. Sterling, Kentucky to Cincinnati daily, to buy fentanyl. In Mt. Sterling, he and his wife used some of the drugs and gave the rest to their roommate, Myers, a drug dealer. Myers diluted, divided, and sold her share. Hamm found a new Cincinnati supplier: Shields. A few hours after Hamm returned from visiting Shields and giving Myers her share, Myers sold three packets of opioids. The customer died that night from an overdose. Police traced the drugs to Myers and arrested her and Hamm. After her arrest, Myers smuggled her remaining drugs into the jail and gave them to her cellmates, who lost consciousness but survived. Myers died by suicide a week later.A jury convicted Hamm and Shields of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and two counts of distributing carfentanil, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846. On the latter two counts, the jury applied a statutory sentencing enhancement for distribution resulting in death or serious bodily injury, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C), triggering a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years for Hamm and a mandatory life sentence for Shields (who had a prior felony drug conviction). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, rejecting challenges to a remark in the prosecutor’s closing argument and to the sufficiency of the evidence. The court vacated the sentences. The jury instructions on section 841(b)(1)(C)’s sentencing enhancement misstated the law. View "United States v. Hamm" on Justia Law

Paulus, a cardiologist at KDMC, was first in the nation in billing Medicare for angiograms. Audits indicated that in multiple cases Paulus reported a higher degree of blockage in his patients’ arteries than their angiograms reflected, inserted a stent, and billed insurers. Before Paulus was indicted, the government informed him that its consultants had reviewed 496 of Paulus’s procedures and concluded that 146 were unnecessary and that KDMC’s consultants had reviewed a random selection of Paulus’ procedures and found 75 angiographic films with minimal blockage. A jury convicted Paulus of healthcare fraud and making false statements relating to healthcare.Before sentencing, the government disclosed to Paulus for the first time the “Shields Letter,” indicating that KDMC's independent experts had reviewed 1,049 of Paulus’s cases and flagged 75 procedures as unnecessary. KDMC offered to refund Medicare for those procedures. Paulus knew that KDMC had identified 75 of his procedures as problematic but did not know that KDMC had reviewed 974 other procedures that it apparently found non-problematic. The government had planned to use the Letter at trial but KDMC objected. After an ex parte hearing, the district court held that the information was inadmissible and ordered that the parties not disclose any more information about the KDMC Review. The district court denied Paulus’s motion for a new trial, sentenced Paulus to five years’ imprisonment, and ordered him to pay $1,156,102.23 in restitution.The Sixth Circuit vacated. KDMC's attorney-client privilege claims did not justify and ex parte hearings and the evidence withheld from Paulus violated his Fifth Amendment rights under “Brady.” The Letter had “potential exculpatory value” and Paulus lacked a readily available means to get the missing details. Paulus was prejudiced and “it doesn’t matter how blameless” the prosecution was. View "United States v. Paulus" on Justia Law

Ogle works for the Ohio Department of Taxation. He is not a member of the union that represents the Department’s employees in collective bargaining. Under state law, the union may require non-members to pay “fair share” fees to defray the cost of collective-bargaining activities, Ohio Rev. Code 4117.09(C). In 2016-2018, the state deducted these fees from his pay without consent. In 2018, the Supreme Court held, in “Janus,” that compulsory “fair share” fees violate the free-speech rights of public employees, overruling its 1977 “Abood” decision authorizing such fees. Ogle filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the union, seeking a refund of the fair share fees he and others paid. In the meantime, the Sixth Circuit joined two other circuits in holding that public-sector unions that collected “fair share” fees in reliance on Abood may assert a good-faith defense to section 1983 lawsuits that seek the return of those fees. The Sixth Circuit then affirmed the dismissal of Ogle’s suit. Despite section 1983’s silence about defenses or immunities, the historical context from which the statute emerged indicates that a narrow good-faith defense protects those who unwittingly cross a line in reliance on presumptively-valid state law. View "Ogle v. Ohio Civil Service Employees Association" on Justia Law

Ashford was driving while intoxicated, speeding at over 100 miles per hour and changing lanes without a turn signal. An officer followed him, using his lights to indicate that Ashford should pull over. Ashford did not comply. Backup cruisers arrived and forced him to stop. Ashford complied with instructions to show his hands but ignored instructions to turn his engine off. Officer Raby and his police dog, Ruger, arrived. Raby reached through the window, unlocked Ashford's door, and pulled it open. The officers told Ashford to step out of the vehicle. He did not comply. Ashford’s SUV was in drive and his foot on the brake was the only thing stopping it from lurching forward into a police cruiser. Ashford claims he was afraid to retract a hand into the passenger compartment to turn the key. Ashford tried to explain this to the officers. Officers warned him that Raby would use the dog. Raby commanded Ruger to attack. Raby stepped in, grabbing Ashford’s arm and lowering it for Ruger to bite. Raby and Ruger pulled Ashford out of the car. At a hospital, Ashford was treated for puncture wounds and superficial injuries to his forearm. Ashford sued Raby under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming excessive force. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Raby based on qualified immunity. Existing law did not clearly establish that the officer’s perspective was unreasonable, View "Ashford v. Raby" on Justia Law

In 2007, Alexander pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base; the offense carried a statutory penalty range of 10 years to life imprisonment. The PSR attributed to Alexander 258.58 grams of cocaine base and Alexander was designated a career offender. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a 360-month sentence. In 2019, Alexander filed a pro se motion for a reduced sentence, citing section 404 of the First Step Act, which made retroactive certain sections of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. Under the Fair Sentencing Act, an offense involving 50 grams of cocaine base carries a statutory maximum of 40 years of imprisonment, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) and his guidelines range became 262-327 months. Alexander asserted that “[a] sentence of 262 months would be reasonable.”The district court reduced his sentence to 262 months. Alexander appealed, arguing that the district court erred in failing to conduct a de novo resentencing hearing that would permit him to argue in support of a sentence outside the reduced guidelines range. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The First Step Act’s limited, discretionary authorization to impose a reduced sentence is inconsistent with a plenary resentencing. Alexander did not raise his arguments that he should have received a one-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and concerning his post-offense rehabilitation and serious medical condition in his motion for a sentence reduction. View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Wellfount, with its principal place of business in Indiana, contracted to provide services to Hennis nursing homes in Ohio. When the relationship soured, Wellfount sued Hennis in Indiana state court. Before Hennis filed a responsive pleading, Wellfount voluntarily dismissed its suit when Hennis questioned whether Indiana was a proper venue. The dismissal was without prejudice. Wellfount refiled in federal court. Hennis argued improper venue, based on a forum selection clause in the parties’ contract. Before Hennis filed a response, Wellfount moved for voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). Wellfount indicated that it planned to refile in Ohio state court. Hennis moved to convert Wellfount’s motion into a self-effectuating notice of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1). Hennis argued that no court order was necessary for Wellfount to dismiss its case because Hennis had yet to serve an answer or motion for summary judgment. Wellfount opposed Hennis’s motion; it sought a Rule 41(a)(2) court-ordered dismissal to avoid the claim-preclusive effect of Rule 41(a)(1)(B).The district court granted Wellfount’s motion, dismissing the case without prejudice. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; neither Rule 41(a)'s text nor the purpose of the Rule 41(a)(1)(B) two-dismissal clause indicate that a plaintiff is barred from seeking a court-ordered Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal if it is eligible to file a Rule 41(a)(1) notice of dismissal. The court rejected Hennis’s argument that allowing court-ordered dismissals at the earliest stages of a lawsuit will nullify the two-dismissal rule. View "Wellfount, Corp. v. Hennis Care Centre of Bolivar, Inc." on Justia Law

Any Ohio registered voter may cast an absentee ballot, starting about a month before election day, but the state requires voters to request an absentee ballot by noon, three days before election day. The lone exception is for unexpectedly hospitalized electors, who may request an absentee ballot until 3 p.m. on election day. Police arrested the plaintiffs the weekend before election day 2018. Foreseeing their confinement through the upcoming election, they sued for access to absentee ballots on behalf of themselves and a class of similar individuals, with an Equal Protection claim, challenging the disparate treatment of hospital-confined and jail-confined electors, and a First Amendment claim. The trial court permitted the plaintiffs to vote in November 2018 but declined to extend that relief to the class. The district court then granted the plaintiffs summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The burden on the plaintiffs’ right to vote is intermediate, somewhere “between slight and severe.” They are not totally denied a chance to vote by Ohio’s absentee ballot deadlines, so the laws survive if the state’s justifications outweigh this moderate burden. The state identified several counties that do not have adequate resources to process late absentee ballot requests from unexpectedly jail-confined electors without foregoing other duties necessary to ensure the orderly administration of Ohio’s elections. View "Mays v. LaRose" on Justia Law

When the Sieferts’ child started experiencing suicidal thoughts, they took the teenager to Children’s Hospital near Cincinnati. After about a week, the Sieferts’ insurance company determined that Minor Siefert had no medical problems and denied further coverage. The Sieferts decided to bring their child home but the doctors and social workers resisted. For four weeks, the Sieferts wrangled with the hospital and county about getting their child back. Only after the Sieferts signed a voluntary safety plan did the child leave the facility. The Sieferts sued the county, its employees, the hospital, and its doctors, alleging substantive and procedural due process violations. The district court dismissed the hospital and county defendants.The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The Sieferts adequately pled procedural due process violations “[e]ven a temporary deprivation of physical custody requires a hearing within a reasonable time.” The issue of their consent was not appropriate for summary judgment. The hospital may be considered a state actor in these circumstances. Children’s and Hamilton County worked together, collaborating and communicating about Minor Siefert’s situation. Rejecting substantive due process claims, the court stated that the defendants’ opting to err on the side of protecting the child at the expense of depriving the parents of their parental rights for a month is not conduct that shocks the conscience. The Sieferts’ claims against the county entities must fail under “Monell.” View "Siefert v. Hamilton County" on Justia Law