Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Franklin was convicted of arson (18 U.S.C. 844(i)), using a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c), possessing an unregistered firearm or destructive device; and possessing firearms while unlawfully using a controlled substance. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In 2010, Franklin filed an unsuccessful 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. Franklin later sought authorization to file a second section 2255 motion, in which he would argue that his section 924(c) conviction should be vacated because his arson conviction no longer qualifies as a crime of violence under the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Davis” decision.The Sixth Circuit granted the petition. Davis established a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. Lower courts may determine the retroactivity of new rules when “[m]ultiple cases . . . necessarily dictate" retroactivity. The Supreme Court’s 2016 “Welch” decision explained that decisions announce a substantive rule and are retroactive when they “alter[] the range of conduct . . . that the law punishes.” In Davis, the Court narrowed section 924(c)(3), concluding that its second clause was unconstitutional. Arson under 18 U.S.C. 844(i) does not qualify as a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A) because it can be committed against a building, including one owned by the arsonist, Franklin’s section 924 conviction must have been based on section 924(c)(3)(B), which Davis invalidated. View "In re: Franklin" on Justia Law

Tennessee inmate Adams filed a pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that Baker retaliated against him for his informal grievances about unfair workplace procedures in violation of his First Amendment rights. On January 17, 2018, the district court denied Adams’ request for a preliminary injunction. Adams filed this interlocutory appeal. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. While Adams’ appeal was pending, he took his case to trial and won. On August 15, 2019, the district court entered a final judgment, making his appellate request for a preliminary injunction moot. The point of a preliminary injunction is to maintain “the status quo” until the resolution of the case “on its merits.” A final decision on the merits extinguishes a preliminary injunction. Even if the court agreed with Adams on the merits of his interlocutory appeal, it could not provide “effectual relief” because any preliminary injunction would immediately “dissolve.” View "Adams v. Baker" on Justia Law

In 2005, Studio entered into a commercial lease with LFLP. The debtor signed the lease as Studio's president and signed a separate personal guaranty. In 2008, the debtor filed a Chapter 7 petition, listing LFLP as a creditor; LFLP received notice of the filing and of the discharge. In 2011, the debtor, on behalf of Studio, exercised a five-year lease extension option. Studio vacated the premises before the end of the extended term. LFLP sued in Ohio state court, based on the personal guaranty. The debtor included “Discharge in Bankruptcy” as an affirmative defense. The bankruptcy court reopened the bankruptcy; the debtor filed this adversary proceeding, asserting that the personal guaranty was discharged and that LFLP willfully violated the discharge injunction by filing the state court action. The defendants argued that the lease extension resurrected the personal guaranty and that the original lease and the extension contained a survivability clause that superseded the bankruptcy.The bankruptcy court concluded that the 2008 discharge meant that the debtor was no longer liable under the Guaranty and that filing and continuing the state court action were willful violations of the discharge injunction. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed in part. A pre-petition personal guaranty is a contingent debt that is discharged in bankruptcy. The court reversed the holding that the defendants willfully violated the discharge injunction and an award of damages in light of the Supreme Court’s 2019 Taggert decision. View "In re: Orlandi" on Justia Law

During a screening of Wells’ luggage, TSA officials discovered bundles of U.S. currency totaling $39,000.00. The government filed a forfeiture action. Wells filed a verified claim asserting that he is “the sole[] and absolute owner of the monies ... unlawfully removed from [his] exclusive possession and control.” Wells filed an answer to the forfeiture complaint, denying the government’s allegations on the grounds “that the answer could very well tend to, or actually, violate Claimant’s Fifth Amendment rights.” Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Civil Forfeiture Actions, the government served “special interrogatories” to Wells seeking information testing his assertion of ownership. In response to each interrogatory, Wells stated, “Claimant refuses to answer this interrogatory as he is asserting his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.” The government then moved for summary judgment, citing Wells’ failure to respond to discovery requests aimed at determining the legitimacy of his alleged ownership interests. The district court granted the government summary judgment, finding that Wells failed to establish standing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A blanket assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege does not excuse a claimant’s burden of establishing standing at the summary judgment stage, nor can a claimant use the privilege “to make one’s assertions of ownership impervious to attack.” View "United States v. $39,000.00 in U.S. Currency" on Justia Law

Straser built a carport in 2009, about 17 feet from the road. The zoning ordinance requires carports to be 30 feet from the road. The city notified Straser four times that his carport violated the rule. In 2016, the city cited Straser’s neighbor for violating the setback rule. The neighbor accused the city of targeting him for enforcement based on his race and Muslim religion. In 2017, the city cited Straser for his carport. City Attorney Trew stated that the city would enforce the rule, having “had trouble with a Muslim” who complained about a similar violation. Straser claimed he was fined because he is a Christian and the city did not want to favor him over his Muslim neighbor.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A government that enforces its laws equally against those of different faiths honors the neutrality imperative of the Fourteenth Amendment. Straser did not identify any cases in which the city refused to enforce the 30-foot rule against non-Christians nor did he show discriminatory purpose and effect. Straser’s own account of the conversation showed that Trew was committed to even-handed enforcement. Straser has no evidence that Trew knew of Straser’s religious beliefs. View "Straser v. City of Athens" on Justia Law

Davis, an African American inmate, claims that officer Gallagher called him “Bubba” and “boy.” Davis stated he might file a grievance over Gallagher’s perceived racism. Later that day, Davis encountered Gallagher. According to Davis, Gallagher “searched” Davis and planted heroin in Davis’s pocket and wrote an incident report which falsely alleged that Davis possessed heroin. Davis was placed in administrative segregation and was tested for drug use. The test came back negative. Gallagher’s version is that he saw Davis put something in his pocket, “shook [Davis] down,” and discovered a rock-like substance, which proved to be heroin. Davis claims that Inspector Miller told him that he would be released from segregation only if he revealed who had supplied him with drugs and threatened to make Davis “suffer.” A jury found Davis not guilty of felony heroin possession by a prisoner.Davis filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging an Eighth Amendment violation for being placed in solitary confinement; First Amendment retaliation for threatening to file a grievance; malicious prosecution (Fourth Amendment); and substantive and procedural due process violations. The district court ultimately rejected all of his claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment to Gallagher on Davis’s malicious prosecution claim. When there is evidence to support each version of the parties’ dueling allegations, summary judgment is not appropriate—even when the evidence includes self-serving statements from the parties. View "Davis v. Gallagher" on Justia Law

Higgins refereed an Elite Eight game of the NCAA Basketball Tournament in 2017. The close contest between the Kentucky Wildcats and the North Carolina Tar Heels ended when the Tar Heels scored with less than a second on the clock. Kentucky’s coach thought the referees, Higgins in particular, had disfavored his team. Higgins’ roofing business suffered losses after he became the target of an online campaign orchestrated by Kentucky fans who pinned the loss on Higgins. Higgins sued Kentucky Sports Radio and some of its contributors, alleging that their post-game coverage incited the harassment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case. The First Amendment safeguards the radio station’s right to comment on Higgins’ performance and the fans’ reactions to it, even it "might have exercised their First Amendment rights more responsibly." Kentucky Sports Radio commented on a matter of public concern. Speech that does not “specifically advocate” for listeners to take unlawful action does not constitute incitement. Kentucky Sports Radio knew or should have known, the volatility of the situation but the station did more to fan the flames of discontent than to extinguish them. "The Constitution protects that choice. A conscience must do the rest." Merely repeating potentially false reviews generated by other users may be in bad taste but cannot by itself constitute defamation. View "Higgins v. Kentucky Sports Radio, LLC" on Justia Law

J.H., a 14-year-old pretrial detainee, was placed in segregated housing in Williamson County’s juvenile detention facility after other juveniles alleged that he threatened to assault them. J.H. suffers from Pediatric Autoimmune Neuropsychiatric Disorder Associated with Streptococcal Infections (PANDAS), which often manifests in psychiatric symptoms. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, J.H. alleged that his placement in segregated housing for a month in 2013 amounted to unconstitutional punishment; that a detention monitor, Cruz, sexually assaulted him during this period, as a result of Williamson County’s failure to train Cruz; and that during that period, officials failed to provide adequate medical care.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The official is entitled to qualified immunity. While the punishment imposed on J.H. was excessive in relation to the verbal threats he made, the right at issue was not established with sufficient specificity as to hold it clearly established as of 2013. J.H. met with and received medication from multiple medical professionals, none of whom requested that the facility make any accommodations for J.H.’s medical needs. J.H. has not shown a “direct causal connection” between the failure to train Cruz and his alleged assault; it is far from clear that any lack of training was the “moving force” behind Cruz’s decision to sexually assault a child. View "J.H. v. Williamson County" on Justia Law

Fisher began working on Nissan’s factory floor in 2003. At his 10-year evaluation, he met requirements in 16 categories and exceeded requirements in the remaining six; he had few disciplinary incidents. In 2015, Fisher went on extended leave for severe kidney disease and, ultimately, a kidney transplant. When he returned to work, he was still recovering from the transplant, and his attendance suffered. Fisher proposed several different accommodations, some of which were not provided. When he received a final written warning about his attendance, he left work and did not return. Fisher filed suit, claiming that Nissan failed to accommodate his disability and to engage in the interactive process, as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. The district court granted Nissan summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. Factual disputes as to Nissan’s policies regarding assignment to easier positions remain. A factfinder could conclude that Fisher was qualified for a vacant inspection position he identified and that he requested and was denied assistance in identifying other available positions and could conclude that Nissan bears the responsibility for its failure to respond to Fisher’s renewed requests for accommodation. The court affirmed the rejection of a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. View "Fisher v. Nissan N.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants bought consumer debts. Collection proceedings in Michigan state court suit resulted in a judgment against each plaintiff. The defendants employed Michigan’s simplified post-judgment garnishment procedure. None of the debtors timely objected. The rate of post-judgment interest “is calculated on the entire amount of the money judgment, including attorney fees and other costs,” using a complex formula. The Michigan Department of Treasury’s website lists every judgment interest rate calculated using this method. During the 11-year period at issue, it reached a peak of 4.033% and a valley of 0.687%. The plaintiffs’ debts were, instead, subjected to a rate of 13%, the maximum interest rate allowed for a judgment “rendered on a written instrument evidencing indebtedness with a specified [or variable] interest rate” although the underlying default judgments specify that they are “not based on a note or other written evidence of indebtedness,” and none of the judgments include any supporting written instrument.The plaintiffs alleged that using the 13% rate was improper and filed a federal suit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, and the Michigan Collection Practices Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the debtors’ suit. The suit “is not the rare one" subject to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, under which federal courts are prohibited from reviewing appeals of state-court decisions. The plaintiffs' injuries stemmed from the defendant’s conduct, not the state-court judgment. View "VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C." on Justia Law