Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Furstenau managed Radiant’ Detroit office. When he joined a competitor, BTX, Radiant sued him for misappropriation of trade secrets. The district court entered a preliminary injunction, prohibiting Furstenau and other former Radiant employees who had joined BTX from using Radiant’s trade secrets and from contacting certain customers and carriers for a six-month period. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal as moot because the six months have passed. BTX never objected to the injunction’s ongoing restriction on the use of Radiant’s trade secrets. The six-month noncompete restrictions expired and today requires nothing; a court has no way to grant relief as to that part of the order. A mootness exception for disputes “capable of repetition, yet evading review” does not apply. A live controversy remains as to the merits of Radiant’s claims, so BTX will still have the opportunity for its day in court—including an appeal —once the district court enters a final judgment. The court declined to vacate the district court’s order; BTX did not even request vacatur until after oral argument and “slept on its rights,” and a preliminary injunction has no preclusive effect—no formal effect at all—on the judge’s decision whether to issue a permanent injunction. View "Radiant Global Logistics, Inc. v. Furstenau" on Justia Law

Lee, a public-school teacher, was required to either join the union or pay fair-share fees as a non-member because the collective bargaining agreement between the school district and the union included a fair-share clause. Lee paid fair-share fees. Anticipating that the Supreme Court would overrule its precedent endorsing fair-share fees (Abood), Lee filed a putative class action, asserting that the union and state actors had violated her constitutional rights by imposing compulsory fair-share fees as a condition of employment. She sought a declaration that provisions of Ohio law were unconstitutional and damages. Two days later, the Supreme Court issued its "Janus" decision, reasoning that fair-share fees resulted in non-members being “forced to subsidize a union, even if they choose not to join and strongly object to the positions the union takes in collective bargaining and related activities,” thereby violating the free speech rights of non-members. Lee dismissed her claims against the state officials and the school district. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the union. The union, as a private actor sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, was entitled to rely on its good faith in following existing Ohio law and Supreme Court precedent. The state-law conversion count failed to state a plausible claim for relief. View "Lee v. Ohio Education Association" on Justia Law

Since 1997, the Social Security Administration has found Madej completely disabled and entitled to benefits. In addition to her other ailments, her doctors say she has “multiple chemical sensitivity,” which is not a disease recognized by the World Health Organization or the American Medical Association. She goes to great lengths to avoid everyday materials that she believes will trigger harmful reactions like burning eyes and throat, dizziness, or nausea. Madej fears that the use of asphalt on a road near her home will cause more harm. She sued to stop the roadwork, alleging violations of the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Applying the “Daubert” standard, the district court excluded the opinions of Madej’s experts that the asphalt would injure her. Without expert causation evidence, the claims could not withstand summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that “as far as we are aware, no district court has ever found a diagnosis of multiple chemical sensitivity to be sufficiently reliable to pass muster under Daubert.” The court also questioned whether Madej had cognizable claims under the cited federal statutes. It is not obvious that the roadwork amounts to a “provision of services” “in connection with” the Madej home under 42 U.S.C. 3604(f)(2) View "Madej v. Maiden" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchase KYB shock absorbers from KAC through “buying groups.” There is no arbitration provision in the buying group agreements nor in the invoices reflecting specific purchases between the plaintiffs and KAC. Beginning in 2016, the buying group agreements provided that the individual plaintiffs agreed to accept a rebate from KAC in exchange for servicing consumer warranty issues. The agreement requires the plaintiffs, in exchange for that allowance, to honor the terms of the KYB limited warranty, which mandates arbitration in accordance with American Arbitration Association Commercial Rule 7(1), which delegates to the arbitrator the power to determine his jurisdiction. The plaintiffs filed a putative class action, alleging anticompetitive activities in the auto parts industry. The defendants move to dismiss, citing the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Before referring a dispute to arbitration, the court must determine whether a valid arbitration agreement exists; if a valid agreement exists and delegates the arbitrability issue to the arbitrator, the court may not decide arbitrability. In this case, the parties did not form an agreement to arbitrate. The warranty’s arbitration provision applies only to original retail purchasers, a group that does not include the plaintiffs. View "VIP, Inc. v. KYB Corp." on Justia Law

Four men from Miami drove to Louisville to set up chiropractic clinics. Lezcano, the mastermind, decided to file false claims with the patients’ insurers and get paid for treatments that never happened. The others, Chavez, Betancourt, and Diaz joined in. The plan worked due to aggressive marketing. The conspirators recruited and paid patients both to come to the clinics and to recruit others. Many of the patients worked at the Jeffboat shipyard. Jeffboat (through its claim administrator, United Healthcare) paid the clinics more than $1 million for fake injections of a muscle relaxant. The government discovered the scheme and brought criminal charges. Chavez went to trial, claiming he had no idea that Lezcano was cooking the books. Convicted of healthcare fraud, conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, aggravated identity theft, and conspiracy to commit money laundering for purposes of concealment. Chavez was sentenced to 74 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and a related challenge to the prosecutor’s closing argument; two hearsay arguments; three objections to the jury instructions; and a sentencing argument. View "United States v. Chavez" on Justia Law

In 1974, a clerk was killed at a store near Toledo. According to Bailey, he entered the store, robbed the cash register at gunpoint, then shot the clerk in the neck and head. The Ohio Parole Board described the crime differently: Bailey entered the store, robbed Cannon, forced him to the ground, “told him . . . exactly what he was planning on doing,” placed the gun to the back of his head and shot him “execution-style” because “he was in need of money and ... the only way he was going to be successful was to kill all witnesses.” In 2014, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that Ohio prisoners had a right to a factually accurate parole record. Bailey challenged the Board’s version of events. Bailey ordered a transcript to show that trial testimony contradicted the Board's description and moved to correct his parole record. The Board and state courts denied his request. Bailey sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging due process violations by the Board’s refusal to investigate and correct inaccuracies in its description of his crime. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his petition. Bailey is in custody but does not purport to be in custody in violation of federal law. Bailey cannot argue that, but for the allegedly inaccurate description, the Board would grant him parole. View "Bailey v. Wainwright" on Justia Law

Faber pled guilty to receiving pornographic images of minors and was sentenced to prison. Faber transitioned to supervised release, with conditions barring him from possessing sexually explicit images and from possessing or using digital devices. Faber eventually moved into an apartment with Gieszer. Probation officers visited their apartment and discovered that Faber had electronic devices without permission, containing sexually explicit material. Gieszer denied that either he or Faber had any digital devices and tried to hide the devices. The district court sentenced Faber to another prison term followed by supervised release, with a condition that Faber not have contact with Gieszer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Meanwhile, Faber filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against his probation officer, alleging violation of his religious freedom by separating him from Gieszer (Faber’s spouse in their Wicca religion). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Faber unsuccessfully filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 and a second section 1983 suit. The district court again revoked Faber’s supervised release because he communicated with Gieszer by email and sentenced him to imprisonment with supervised release, continuing the “no contact” condition. Faber did not appeal but later moved to eliminate the no-contact order under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(2), citing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The Sixth Circuit ordered the dismissal of the motion for lack of jurisdiction. Section 3583(e)(2) allows a court to modify or rescind a condition of supervised release only within 14 days. View "United States v. Faber" on Justia Law

Hendricks was convicted conspiracy to provide and attempt to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization, 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1), in the form of personnel and services to ISIS. At trial, four witnesses had testified that Hendricks approached them about forming a group for the purpose of waging jihad in the U.S. Hendricks shared that he had purchased land and weapons for his group, occasionally asking whether they owned guns or suggesting that they should be trained to fight or operate weapons. Hendricks also exhorted each to recruit other like-minded individuals. The witnesses perceived Hendricks to be “build[ing] . . . an extension of [ISIS] in America.” Hendricks had similar interactions with an undercover FBI agent. An expert on terrorism testified that Hendricks’s interactions were consistent with the ISIS strategy at the time. Hendricks did not present any witnesses or evidence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, rejecting arguments that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he attempted or conspired to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization and that the district court abused its discretion by partially closing the courtroom during testimony from an undercover FBI agent. View "United States v. Hendricks" on Justia Law

On November 8, 2019, the district court entered judgment dismissing Young’s prisoner civil-rights complaint. A notice of appeal was due to be filed by December 9. Young’s notice of appeal was dated December 17 and filed on December 30. Young claimed that he did not see the judgment until November 21, because “he was placed on dry cell protocol” on October 22, and was transferred on October 30, and placed in the prison’s psychiatric unit. An attached exhibit confirmed the transfer. Young stated that inmates in the psychiatric unit are not permitted to have property in their possession.The Sixth Circuit remanded for a determination of whether Young has shown excusable neglect or good cause to warrant an extension of time for filing a notice of appeal. Both 28 U.S.C. 2107(c) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) provide for an extension of time where the party seeking such an extension files a motion asking for more time. While no particular form of words is necessary, a simple notice of appeal does not suffice. However, district courts must liberally construe a document that could reasonably be interpreted as a motion for an extension of time. Young’s notice of appeal effectively reads as a motion for an extension of time to file and will be treated as such. View "Young v. Kenney" on Justia Law

Zeon fired Jenkins on the ground that he violated the company’s attendance policy. Jenkins had missed work because of a 30-day jail sentence based on a felony conviction. The company had refused to suspend him for 30 days, something his 22 years of service made him eligible for, because it did not want to send the message that employees could commit crimes without consequences and nd it declined to let him use vacation days for the time because other employees had already scheduled their days for the relevant weeks. Consistent with the collective bargaining agreement, the local union took Jenkins’ discharge to arbitration. The arbitrator reinstated Jenkins. In a suit under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185(c), the district court vacated the award on the ground that the arbitrator misread the agreement and exceeded his authority in doing so. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting the deferential standard for arbitration awards. Although the arbitrator’s merits analysis “has some eyesores,” it does not defeat the conclusion that he arguably construed the contract. View "Zeon Chemicals, L.P. v. United Food & Commercial Workers" on Justia Law