Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, Michigan inmates adhere to a religion called Christian Identity. Plaintiffs believe that their religion requires the observance of seven “Biblical Holy Days,” weekly group worship on the Sabbath, baptism by full-body immersion, and that Caucasians not mix with other races “in marriage and worship” and that people of different races not cohabitate. In other areas of life, plaintiffs apparently have no objection to interacting with people of other races. Plaintiffs contend they cannot engage in group worship because the Department of Corrections does not recognize Christian Identity as a religion. While they are allowed to attend the services of other religions that have been recognized, they do not because of the differences between Christian Identity and other faiths. One inmate believes that not being baptized “affects [his] salvation of [his] eternal soul." The district court rejected a challenged under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc (RLUIPA).The Sixth Circuit reversed. The sincerity of the plaintiffs’ beliefs is not at issue. Under RLUIPA’s second step, the plaintiffs have established that the policy substantially burdens their exercise of religion. At step three, the burden shifts to the Department to prove that the imposition of the substantial burden on plaintiffs’ religious exercise was “in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and that it used “the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” The district court made no findings on those questions. View "Fox v. Washington" on Justia Law

More than a decade ago, the Bank began foreclosure proceedings against the Ackermans. In 2010, an Ohio court entered judgment in the Bank’s favor. The Ackermans have sought to thwart the foreclosure sale. They tried to remove their case to federal court. The district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and remanded their case to state court. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the Ackermans' appeal for lack of jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1447(d); Later, the Ackermans moved the district court to reconsider its remand order. The district court denied their motion, reasoning that it lacked jurisdiction to reconsider its order. The Sixth Circuit again dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court cited multiple cases that have construed section 1447(d) as precluding further reconsideration or review of a district court’s order remanding a case back to state court because a remand divests the district court of any further jurisdiction over the case. To review an order denying a motion to reconsider a remand order would “circumvent the jurisdiction-stripping function of section 1447(d).” View "The Bank of New York Mellon v. Ackerman" on Justia Law

McClain sued Hanna and Hanna’s two law firms under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, and an analogous Michigan statute, Mich. Comp. Laws 445.251, asserting both individual and class claims. Within a week, Hanna offered McClain a settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. That settlement allowed judgment to be entered in McClain’s favor “as to all counts” of his complaint and gave McClain his full damages (both actual and statutory) plus his litigation costs and reasonable attorney’s fees. Four days later, McClain accepted the settlement offer but simultaneously filed a “placeholder” motion for class certification, apparently to preempt a mootness ruling. Even so, the district court found the class claims to be moot and dismissed both the individual and class claims. McClain noted that the settlement called for judgment in his favor; the court entered an amended judgment “for Plaintiff Theodore McClain as to all counts in Plaintiff’s complaint[.]” The Sixth Circuit affirmed, declining to address mootness because the judgment did not declare any of the claims moot. Parties may not challenge a judgment to which they have consented. McClain waived his right to pursue the class claims. View "McClain v. Hanna" on Justia Law

In 2008, Marshall pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute oxycodone and was sentenced to 118 months of prison plus six years of supervised release. After completing his sentence, Marshall began supervised release. Although required to stay in Kentucky, Marshall moved to Illinois, violating a release condition. The district court briefly revoked Marshall’s release. Marshall moved, with permission, to Michigan. For the next year, Marshall made progress. The probation office recommended an early end to his supervised release. Marshall filed an unopposed motion to end the supervision. The court denied his request, reasoning that Marshall had completed little of the release term and had violated the conditions before. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. There is no statute authorizing the review of a district court’s decision to deny a motion for early termination of supervised release. The court reviewed the challenges available under 18 U.S.C. 3742(a) and concluded that none of the four categories applies. Marshall never appealed his original or his new sentence; the district court did not issue a new sentence or an amended sentence before this appeal. It merely denied Marshall’s request to reduce the supervised release provision in his sentence. View "United States v. Marshall" on Justia Law

In 2001, Woods pled guilty to possessing and conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute cocaine and to distribute marijuana, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The parties stipulated to Woods’s possession of 125 grams of crack cocaine, .73 grams of powder cocaine, and 660.1 grams of marijuana. Under the then-Guidelines, the PSR recommended a range of 121-151 months of imprisonment and an additional mandatory 60-month consecutive term for the firearm charge. The district court sentenced Woods to 121 months plus the consecutive 60- month sentence. In 2008, in response to Guidelines amendments, the district court reduced Woods’s sentence from 181 months to 120 months. Woods began his supervised release in 2015. While on release, he tested positive for cocaine and marijuana and pled guilty to new felony state charges—trafficking in controlled substances, possessing a handgun, and tampering with physical evidence. The court revoked Woods’s supervised release and imposed a 37-month sentence. Woods moved, under the 2018 First Step Act, 132 Stat. 5194, to reduce his sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Woods’s motion. Although he is currently serving a post-revocation sentence, Woods is eligible for consideration of a reduction but is not entitled to one. The court adequately considered factors warranting denial of a reduction: respecting the law, protecting the public, and adequately deterring similar conduct. View "United States v. Woods" on Justia Law

Law enforcement executed a search warrant to gather evidence of the possession, receipt, and distribution of child pornography. The subject stated that he received and distributed child pornography through his Kik Messenger account and consented to the officers assuming his online identity. The operation led to a Kik user with an IP address registered Randall Hollon of Corbin, Kentucky. FBI agents executed a search warrant for Hollon’s residence and found pornographic images of prepubescent boys on Hollon’s electronic devices. Hollon was charged with distributing, possession of, and receiving child pornography each in violation of different provisions of 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2) and with engaging in a child exploitation enterprise, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(g)--the enterprise consisting of section 2252(a)(2) violations. Hollon pled guilty to engaging in a child exploitation enterprise, admitting that he was an administrator of a group, the purpose of which was the distribution and receipt of child pornography. The government then disclosed that Hollon’s nephew, “J.H.”, had reported that, years earlier, he discovered child pornography on Hollon’s electronic devices and that Hollon engaged in sexual behavior with J.H., then a child. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Hollon’s sentence of 270 months of incarceration, rejecting an argument that the district court erred in applying the covered sex crime enhancement under U.S.S.G. 4B1.5(b). Engaging in a child exploitation enterprise is a “covered sex crime” for purposes of the U.S.S.G. 4B1.5(b) sentencing enhancement. View "United States v. Hollon" on Justia Law

At 11:53, Tennessee Highway Troopers stopped Hernandez for speeding and ran a warrant-check Hernandez and Betancourt, the front seat passenger and the car's owner. The check came back negative at 11:59. Troopers were denied consent to search the car. At 12:13, Troopers searched the names of all four occupants of the car through a more comprehensive database. A K-9 unit arrived at 12:17. The dog sniffed the outside of the car, alerting to the odor of drugs. The dog did not alert again when allowed into the car. After checking with their supervisor, Troopers manually searched the car and found re-encoded gift cards and suspected amphetamines. The car's occupants were arrested and held for months before all charges were dropped. They filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The district court granted the Troopers qualified immunity on the car search based on caselaw existing at that time. A jury found that the car stop was not impermissibly prolonged. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs have not met the high burden of showing that the verdict was unreasonable as a matter of law. A reasonable jury could have concluded that, because the dog's first search was not sufficiently thorough, it did not dissipate the probable cause justifying a second search. At the time, a reasonable officer would not have been on notice that the dog’s failure to alert again to the car's interior was the kind of new information that dissipated the probable cause provided by its initial alert. View "Hernandez v. Boles" on Justia Law

Tolliver was charged with participating in a marijuana distribution ring that funneled money and drugs between a California supplier and a large-scale Memphis dealer. A jury acquitted him on the marijuana conspiracy but convicted Toliver of money laundering conspiracy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3162(a)(2). A defendant can only complain about a speedy trial violation after the violation has occurred; Tolliver’s objection was premature. A rational trier of fact could have found Tolliver guilty. Payment for drugs can constitute promotional money laundering. The prosecution presented the right type of evidence to prove promotional money laundering and showed that Tolliver made financial transactions with money from illegal marijuana sales. There was compelling circumstantial evidence showing he knew what he was doing. In ordering forfeiture of the money laundered and of property traceable to the crime, 21 U.S.C. 853(a), the district court properly included some of Tolliver’s gambling winnings. Tolliver gambled hundreds of thousands of dollars but apparently had no source of income besides the cuts he got from money-laundering. Tolliver filed no tax return for two years. He was a long-time gambler, but the amount of money he gambled skyrocketed once he joined the conspiracy. View "United States v. Tolliver" on Justia Law

While at Rhodes College, Bose was accepted into the George Washington University medical school early selection program. Bose completed Professor Bea’s course, Organic Chemistry I. The following summer, Bea approached Bose on campus, asking personal questions and inviting her to have dinner. Bose declined. Bose took Bea’s Organic Chemistry II class the following semester. Bose also took a corresponding lab course with a different professor. Bea regularly visited the lab, starting conversations with Bose and offering to help her; he did not give the same attention to other students. Bea gave his students the option to take tests early. Bose often used this option and took tests in Bea’s office while he taught another class. After Bose asked Bea, in the presence of a classmate, to stop asking about her boyfriend and “keep the relationship professional,” Bea’s behavior changed. Bose claims Bea misrecorded her test score and would not respond to Bose’s requests for help. Bea told a colleague that he suspected a student of cheating, then created a fake answer key and stayed logged in on his computer. Bea later testified that Bose took Quiz 5 in Bea’s office and that her answers matched the fake answer key precisely. The Honor Council voted to expel Bose. An investigator determined that her allegations of sexual harassment could not be sustained.Bose sued, alleging retaliation under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681–88, and defamation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of Bose’s Title IX claim. There is no individual liability under Title IX; the court declined to apply the cat’s paw theory, which imputes the discriminatory animus of another to the funding recipient, as inconsistent with Title IX principles. The district court erred by holding that Bea’s statements were subject to absolute privilege under Tennessee defamation law. View "Bose v. Bea" on Justia Law

Richardson participated in a series of Detroit-area armed robberies in 2010. In 2013, Richardson was convicted of five counts of aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951, five counts of aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c), and of being a felon in possession of a firearm, section 922(g). The district court sentenced Richardson to 1,494 months in prison. Richardson twice successfully persuaded the Supreme Court to vacate Sixth Circuit judgments affirming his conviction and sentence. The Court remanded for consideration of whether an intervening the Court’s 2015 “Johnson” holding that the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) residual clause was invalid or the First Step Act of 2018 affected his section 924(c) conviction. The Sixth Circuit again affirmed Richardson’s conviction. Johnson had no effect on Richardson’s conviction for aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery; that conviction satisfies ACCA’s elements clause, so the residual clause is irrelevant. The court also affirmed his sentence. Richardson cannot benefit from the First Step Act because the district court resentenced him more than one year before the Act became law. View "United States v. Richardson" on Justia Law