Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two former players for the St. Marys (Ohio) Memorial High School Football Team brought claims for federal Title IX violations and state-law intentional infliction of emotional distress against their coach, Frye. The players claim that Frye harassed them by using numerous derogatory terms—most notably, the term “pussy”—with the intent to insult (and presumably to motivate) the two in front of their teammates. The plaintiffs also sued the school board, superintendent, and athletic director for failing to address Frye’s conduct. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. As a matter of decency, Frye’s conduct was distasteful and offensive to many but as a matter of law, his conduct did not constitute sex-based discrimination, in violation of Title IX, nor was it conduct intolerable in a civilized society, in violation of Ohio tort law. Frye did not make sexual advances or act out of sexual desire. Frye was not motivated by general hostility to the presence of men. Frye did not treat men and women differently in a mixed-sex environment. View "Lininger v. St. Marys City School District Board of Education" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Dr. Chalhoub of defrauding health care benefit programs under 18 U.S.C. 1347. A Kentucky cardiologist, Chalhoub implanted permanent pacemakers in patients who did not need the devices or the tests that he ordered before and after surgery. On appeal, Chalhoub claimed that the district court repeatedly admitted evidence unduly prejudicial to him—and to which he could not effectively respond. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that “some of the government’s tactics here leave something to be desired.” Noting Chaloub’s failure to cross-examine, the court rejected a due process challenge to the admission of testimony by a doctor who claimed to have examined 20 of former Chaloub’s patients but could not name those patients. Chalhoub was not denied a right to be heard and the government did not base its case solely on allegations about those 20 victims. Chalhoub argued that he was severely prejudiced by testimony that he misbilled insurers for other unspecified procedures, but he did not seek clarification or additional information at trial. The court upheld the admission of testimony about Chaloub’s income and expenditures and testimony about his installation of a pacemaker in a former patient. View "United States v. Chalhoub" on Justia Law

Johnson rented her restaurant to a private party. For unknown reasons, individuals unaffiliated with her or the party emerged from a vehicle that night and shot at the restaurant. Police were called during the shooting but never apprehended the shooters. Less than two days later, Saginaw City Manager Morales issued Johnson a notice ordering the suspension of all business activity related to her restaurant under an ordinance that permits such suspensions “in the interest of the public health, morals, safety, or welfare[.]” There was hearing three days later. More than two months after the hearing, Human Resources Director Jordan upheld the suspension. Johnson filed suit with a motion for a temporary restraining order and, alternatively, a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent Morales from sitting on the appeal panel expected to review Jordan’s decision. The district court denied that motion. The appeal panel, which did not include Morales, held a hearing and affirmed Jordan’s decision upholding the suspension. The Sixth Circuit reversed, in part, the dismissal of Johnson’s burden-shifting, substantive due process, and equal-protection claims. Johnson adequately alleged selective enforcement and pled that the city lacked a rational basis to suspend her license. Johnson has plausibly alleged that the procedures afforded to Johnson fell short of constitutional requirements. View "Johnson v. Morales" on Justia Law

In 1982, Miles began working with SCHRA, a Tennessee public nonprofit organization that provides services to low-income individuals. After promotions and reassignments, Miles became Community Services Director in 2012, reporting directly to the Executive Director and responsible for overseeing six programs. Each of these programs, except for DUI school, has its own Director. In 2011, the Tennessee Comptroller, Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, and U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Inspector General investigated SCHRA and discovered several deficiencies, including some within programs directly supervised by Miles. The Executive Director resigned. Two employees admitted to wrongdoing and were terminated. The new Executive Director, Rosson, subsequently terminated Miles, “at-will,” “without notice and without reason.” Miles sent emails to Rosson and other SCHRA employees saying that she believed SCHRA fired her because of the nefarious efforts of her subordinates and that she intended vindictively to sue SCHRA to impose legal defense costs on the agency and the individuals. Miles filed a charge of age discrimination with the EEOC. SCHRA then provided Miles with reasons for her termination: her implication in misconduct by the Comptroller’s report and her toxic relationship with her subordinates. Miles sued. During discovery, SCHRA reaffirmed those reasons. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act only prevents employers from terminating an employee because of such individual’s age, 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1). Miles failed to establish a genuine dispute as to pretext. View "Miles v. South Central Human Resource Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

Attorney Boland was a technology expert for defendants charged with possessing child pornography. Boland started with innocuous online stock photographs of young girls (Doe and Roe) and manipulated the photographs on his computer to create images of the girls engaged in sex acts, to support arguments that it was possible the pornography his clients downloaded was also doctored. An Oklahoma federal prosecutor claimed that the exhibits were actionable. The judge told Boland to delete the images. Boland instead shipped his computer to Ohio and continued using the exhibits in court although 18 U.S.C. 2256(8)(C) defines “child pornography” as any image which is morphed to make it appear that a real minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Ohio federal prosecutors offered Boland pre-trial diversion in lieu of prosecution; Boland admitted he violated federal law. Federal prosecutors identified the girls and told their parents what Boland had done. They sued Boland under 18 U.S.C. 2255, which provides minimum damages of $150,000 to child pornography victims. They won a combined $300,000 judgment. Boland filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The Sixth Circuit reversed the discharge of the debt, citing 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6). The debt arose from “willful and malicious injury by the debtor.” The court rejected Boland’s “implausible pleas of ignorance.” The act itself is the injury. Doe and Roe had to prove only that Boland knew he was dealing with child pornography and knew the girls' images depicted real minors. View "In re: Boland" on Justia Law

The federal government entered final removal orders against about 1,000 Iraqi nationals in 2017, and has detained them or will detain them. Most remain in the U.S. due to diplomatic difficulties preventing their return to Iraq. The district court certified three subclasses: (1) primary class members without individual habeas petitions who are or will be detained by ICE, (2) those in the first subclass who are also subject to final removal orders, and (3) those in the first subclass whose motions to reopen their removal proceedings have been granted and who are being held under a statute mandating their detention. The Sixth Circuit previously vacated two preliminary injunctions, citing lack of jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 1252(g) and (f)(1). One prevented the removal of certain Iraqi nationals; another required bond hearings for each class member who had been detained for at least six months. A third injunction requires the government to release all primary subclass members, those in the first subclass, once the government has detained them for six months, no matter the statutory authority under which they were held. The district court concluded that the class members showed that the government was unlikely to repatriate them to Iraq in the reasonably foreseeable future and that the government “acted ignobly.” The Sixth Circuit vacated the injunction. Congress stripped all courts, except the Supreme Court, of jurisdiction to enjoin or restrain the operation of 8 U.S.C. 1221–1232 on a class-wide basis. View "Hamama v. Adducci" on Justia Law

Buchholz received two letters about overdue payments he owed on credit accounts. The letters came from MNT law firm, on MNT’s letterhead. Each referred to a specific account but the content is identical except for information regarding that specific account. MNT attorney Harms signed both letters; Buchholz alleges that MNT must have inserted “some sort of pre-populated or stock signature.” The letters do not threaten legal action but purport to be communications from a debt collector and explain that MNT has been retained to collect the above-referenced debts. Buchholz alleges that he felt anxiety that he would be subjected to legal action if prompt payment was not made and sued under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692e, e(3), and e(10), asserting that MNT processes such a high volume of debt-collection letters that MNT attorneys cannot engage in meaningful review of the underlying accounts. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint for lack of standing. Buchholz has shown no injury-in-fact that is traceable to MNT’s challenged conduct. Buchholz’s allegation of anxiety falls short of the injury-in-fact requirement; it amounts to an allegation of fear of something that may or may not occur in the future. Buchholz is anxious about the consequences of his decision to not pay the debts that he does not dispute he owes; if the plaintiff caused his own injury, he cannot draw a connection between that injury and the defendant’s conduct. View "Buchholz v. Meyer Njus Tanick, PA" on Justia Law

An undercover FBI analyst posted a photo of an “adult female in a provocative pose” with the text “Anybody into [child pornography]" on the Whisper social media application. In private messages, the analyst described herself as a 36-year-old female with a 12-year-old daughter and told Vinton that she was “into incest and young,” Vinton stated that he liked “incest and younger women” and asked “you want me to f*** your daughter . . . [a]nd you[?]” The analyst said that she and her daughter had done this before with her fictitious husband. Vinton asked what specific sexual acts the daughter would perform. At Vinton’s suggestion, the analyst sent a photo of the fictitious daughter. Vinton sent photos of himself and of male genitalia. Vinton stated “there is a lot of risk” but affirmed his desire to pursue a meeting. When Vinton arrived for that meeting, he was arrested and indicted for using a facility of interstate commerce to attempt to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce an individual under the age of 18 to engage in unlawful sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). The court dismissed the indictment concluding that, as a matter of law, a reasonable juror could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that Vinton had the requisite intent.The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for trial. Vinton argued that there was “insufficient evidence” that he had the “requisite intent to solicit a minor.” It was improper for the court to weigh the sufficiency of the evidence before trial; intent is a question of fact, reserved for the jury View "United States v. Antonio Vinton, Jr." on Justia Law

At 2:30 a.m., Bey and two friends went out to purchase space heaters. Bey had purchased his older minivan days earlier, so it had a temporary registration tag but no license plate. The three went to a Livonia store but came away empty-handed. They drove to a Canton Walmart, where they purchased space heaters. Undercover Livonia police Sergeant McKinley noticed the minivan. Livonia had recently experienced several retail break-ins. McKinley followed the minivan on “a hunch” that criminals often use stolen, older vehicles for retail crimes. The officers noted that the minivan’s passengers were black. McKinley observed the paper temporary registration taped to the window; he later testified that officers ran the registration through the Michigan state database but found no matching records. Another officer recalled that McKinley said over the radio that the problem was that “it was unreadable.” On the freeway, the officers thought the minivan executed an evasive driving tactic. An officer followed the men into the Walmart and watched them pay for their merchandise. At Livonia’s request, the Canton Police Department dispatched uniformed officers, who surrounded Bey’s van and ordered him out of the vehicle. Bey was carrying a concealed weapon; he properly stated that he was armed and produced a concealed weapon license. That license had expired; Bey was arrested him. The state court found the stop unconstitutional; the case was dismissed with prejudice. Bey then sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit: dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, McKinley’s appeal of the denial of qualified immunity as to Bey’s equal protection claim; affirmed the denial of as to Bey’s Fourth Amendment claim; and reversed the denial of qualified immunity to the other officers. View "Bey v. Falk" on Justia Law

Hershey started as a truck driver for Lou’s under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in July 2012. In January 2013, Hershey used a company radio to “discuss[] the poor working conditions.” Hershey began displaying hand-written signs in his truck regarding the working conditions and other matters.” At a safety meeting in March, Hershey “stated that the drivers were upset because of the dangerous road conditions.” Two days later, Lou’s managers searched Hershey’s truck, found 16 signs, and fired him. The Sixth Circuit upheld the Board’s finding that Hershey was terminated at least in part because of the January radio conversation, which was “concerted protected activity.” Ben’s did not contest that argument in administrative proceedings. More than three years later, Lou’s continued to dispute the amount of back pay that Hershey is owed. An ALJ entered a backpay order; the Board upheld the order. Lou’s appealed, raising numerous challenges to the NLRB’s calculations and order. The Sixth Circuit granted a petition for enforcement. The Board has broad discretion to resolve factual disputes and to select formulas to calculate uncertain figures and did not abuse that discretion. The Board correctly analyzed the sufficiency of the reinstatement offer; its factual findings were supported by substantial evidence. View "Lou's Transport, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law