Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Wilson recruited people near Escanaba and taught them how to package, transport, price, and sell heroin and crack cocaine. One or two women would travel as passengers to pick up the drugs from Wilson and would conceal the drugs in their vaginal cavities until returning to the Upper Peninsula. The drugs were then removed and sold. Eventually, a member of the conspiracy went to the police with information. They set up controlled buys that confirmed the trafficking of drugs. Subsequent police raids turned up heroin and crack cocaine, cash, a drug ledger, cell phones, and MoneyGram receipts that listed who sent and received money. The police extracted the phones’ call logs and contact lists and obtained call records and subscriber information from the phone companies by subpoena. The phone records revealed a network of coconspirators, including Smith-Kilpatrick, Wilson, his mother, and two others. Wilson and another pleaded guilty. Smith-Kilpatrick and two others were convicted. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Smith-Kilpatrick’s conviction, rejecting arguments that the trial court made evidentiary errors; no rational jury could have convicted her based on the evidence, and her 96-month sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The court upheld the admission of records of phone calls and wire transfers, hotel records, and car rental documents and of out-of-court statements by co-conspirators. View "United States v. Smith-Kilpatrick" on Justia Law

The Gaetanos run a cannabis dispensary. After a failed business transaction, a third party sued the Gaetanos and their attorney, Goodman, and filed a disciplinary complaint against Goodman. An ethics inquiry uncovered multiple violations. Goodman lost his license to practice law. The Gaetanos severed their relationship with him. The IRS later audited the Gaetanos’ tax returns and contacted Goodman for assistance. Goodman threatened the Gaetanos that unless they gave him a “significant down-payment” he would see them “take[n] down”. They did not oblige, Goodman sent menacing emails. The Gaetanos contacted the IRS. Goodman assured the IRS that his information was not privileged but was obtained through on-line searches and a private investigator; he discussed several aspects of the Gaetanos’ business. Goodman then taunted the Gaetanos, who again notified the IRS. The Gaetanos filed suit, seeking to stop the government from discussing privileged information with Goodman and requiring it to destroy attorney-client confidences. The IRS asserted that the court lacked jurisdiction, citing the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. 7421(a). The Sixth Circuit agreed that the Act bars the lawsuit; the “Williams Packing” exception does not apply. The exception requires that the taxpayer show that under no circumstances could the government prevail against their claims and that “equity jurisdiction otherwise exists.” The Gaetanos have not identified any privileged information that Goodman provided to the IRS and have adequate remedies at law. View "Gaetano v. United States" on Justia Law

Babb worked as a Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist at Maryville, a small practice group. Approximately a month into her employment, one of Maryville’s physician-owners observed Babb “placing her face very close to a computer screen.” Babb stated that she suffered from a “degenerative retinal condition” that made it hard for her to read certain screens and medical records but that this disorder did not affect her ability to do her job. Other Maryville physician-owners later raised similar concerns regarding Babb’s vision. At a meeting, Babb explained her diagnosis and insisted that the disorder did not affect her ability to do her job, One doctor asked Babb if she had “disability insurance.” Others requested a report by an ophthalmologist. One opined that they might have to “talk to [their] attorney.” Babb’s annual evaluations mentioned Babb’s vision problems. Babb subsequently committed clinical errors unrelated to her vision. In communicating its decision to terminate Babb, Maryville focused exclusively on her clinical errors. Babb claims nobody had criticized her anesthesiology techniques before her termination. An internal email focused on Babb’s worsening vision problems. Babb sued Maryville under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibition on discrimination against employees “regarded as” disabled, 42 U.S.C. 12102(1)(C). The district court granted Maryville summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court overlooked too many genuine factual disputes and improperly excluded expert testimony favorable to Babb. View "Babb v. Maryville Anesthesiologists, P.C." on Justia Law

Benton, a former schoolteacher, was convicted by a jury for having sex with a 12-year-old student. The judge sentenced her to 25-38 years’ imprisonment. With new appellate counsel, Benton raised constitutional and evidentiary arguments. Her conviction was affirmed. Months later, the Supreme Court handed down its “Lafler” decision, holding that defendants could establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by proving that their lawyer’s incompetence caused them to reject a favorable plea offer. Benton sought postconviction relief, alleging that her attorney told her she had 20 minutes to decide whether to accept a plea offer: a year in jail for a guilty plea to a lesser charge. Her lawyer allegedly told Benton she would lose custody of her infant children. She rejected the deal. Benton claims she would have accepted the plea had the attorney conveyed that the termination of her parental rights would not be automatic. Benton’s appellate counsel offered to stipulate to his own ineffectiveness in not raising the argument. Michigan courts and the federal district court rejected her petitions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Benton has no good excuse for not timely raising her claim. Although Lafler was decided in 2012, Benton did not lack the tools to construct her claim in her 2011 appeal. View "Benton v. Brewer" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were hourly workers at an Amazon fulfillment center. After clocking out, they were required to undergo an anti-theft security screening. They were not compensated for the time spent in the screening process. The district court rejected a purported class action under the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (PMWA), citing the Supreme Court’s 2014 “Busk” decision. Busk interpreted the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201, and the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. 250 to find post-shift security screening non-compensable. The Sixth Circuit certified two questions to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: Is the time spent on an employer’s premises waiting to undergo and undergoing mandatory security screening compensable as “hours worked” under the PMWA; Does the doctrine of de minimus non curat lex bar claims brought under the PMWA? The U.S. Supreme Court has applied the doctrine to the FLSA, to hold that employers are not required to compensate employees for small amounts of time that are administratively difficult to track. View "Heimbach v. Amazon.com" on Justia Law

Franklin County officers detected child pornography being downloaded via file-sharing software. They traced the downloads to Meckley's IP address. Meckley lived with Parrish. Parrish had a North Carolina conviction for “indecent liberties with children.” Days later, officers executed a warrant. Officers, wearing sidearms, asked Parrish to speak to them in their mobile forensic lab. Parrish agreed, told the agents he understood his Miranda rights, volunteered that he had nude pictures of his 12-year-old daughter on his cell phone, then surrendered the phone and its password. Parrish explained that he had discovered the videos on his daughter’s phone after she sent them to a man on Facebook, prompting Parrish to copy them to confront her. Parrish signed a consent form authorizing a search of his daughter’s phone. Forensic evidence confirmed that his daughter had sent the images on Facebook although Parrish had taken a separate inappropriate video of her. He had watched them repeatedly and had not confronted his daughter or her (custodial) grandparents. Convicted of receiving child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252, Parrish received a sentence of 180 months, the mandatory minimum for someone with a prior offense relating to “abusive sexual conduct involving a minor.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Even if the warrant technically did not permit a search of Parrish and the cell phone on him, the officers reasonably could have believed it did and Parrish consented to the seizure and search. The court rejected a constitutional challenge to the definition of “sexually explicit conduct” to include “lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person,” View "United States v. Parrish" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a management employee of the Summit County Board of Developmental Disabilities, worked under renewable one-year agreements that contained broad arbitration provisions. When Plaintiff joined the Ohio Army National Guard in 2008, his contract provided for “military leave in accordance with Board Policy.” Thereafter, there were several disputes about his entitlement military leave at full pay. Plaintiff refused to sign a proposed 2011–12 contract. Plaintiff filed his first complaint in 2011. In April 2012, shortly after returning from military leave, the Board delivered to Plaintiff a pre-disciplinary hearing notice. The Board subsequently notified Plaintiff of his termination. Plaintiff filed another complaint, alleging wrongful termination of employment, breaches of the employment contract, and discrimination and retaliation based on his military status. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, excluding two breach of contract claims. An arbitrator determined that all of the claims identified as possibly subject to arbitration were arbitrable, and granted the Defendants summary judgment. The court granted Defendants summary judgment regarding Plaintiff’s breach of contract claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The contract provided that the arbitrators could decide questions of arbitrability and, under Ohio law, the arbitrators did not exceed their powers by entering a decision on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff failed to show a breach of his contract with respect to military leave. View "McGee v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

Richardson was convicted of first-degree murder for killing his wife by causing her to fall from a cliff in Pictured Rocks National Park in 2006. The district court denied a federal habeas petition that claimed prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel for failing to argue that a witness’s testimony was obtained as a result of an illegal, warrantless search. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Richardson failed to demonstrate that the Michigan Court of Appeals’ rejection of his claims was objectively unreasonable based on Supreme Court precedent. The prosecutor’s reference to the September 11 terrorist attacks in the context of explaining circumstantial evidence and his references to two notorious murders were unnecessarily provocative but did not so infect the trial as to violate Richardson’s due process rights. Although the prosecutor did elicit testimony that Richardson had called his attorney, the purpose of the questioning was to elicit testimony concerning Richardson’s consciousness of guilt. The court also rejected claims based on the prosecutor’s presentation of “overwhelming evidence” of Richardson’s bad character, denigration of defense counsel and witnesses, and allegedly improper objections. Even if Richardson could demonstrate that his counsel was deficient for failing to make an argument that may have been futile at the time of his trial, he cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel’s performance. View "Richardson v. Palmer" on Justia Law

In 2013, Flack pled guilty to receipt of child pornography and possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252A and was sentenced to 262 months’ imprisonment, the bottom of his Guidelines range. A year later, Flack unsuccessfully moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that his counsel had been ineffective. The Sixth Circuit held that Flack’s counsel had been ineffective for failing to argue that Flack’s convictions for both receipt and possession of the same child pornography violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court issued a “general remand,” with instructions to the district court to vacate one of the convictions. The order stated that, if the district court vacated Flack’s possession conviction, then “resentencing is not necessary” because his Guidelines range would remain the same. On remand, the district court vacated Flack’s possession conviction and imposed the same sentence of 262 months’ imprisonment. In its order, the court said it “need not conduct a resentencing hearing” because its previous sentence “properly account[ed]” for the sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 3553. The Sixth Circuit then vacated, acknowledging that it had “invited” the error. A resentencing pursuant to section 2255 must be conducted during a sentencing hearing. View "United States v. Flack" on Justia Law

Williams and another man armed with a rifle forced the occupants out of a vehicle. Williams fled to another vehicle driven by a getaway driver; his accomplice drove off in the victims' vehicle. Later that morning, Williams and a juvenile carrying an AR-15 entered a credit union and yelled that it was a robbery. When a security guard drew his weapon, the two fled. Police arrested them after a chase; Hill, their driver, was also arrested. Williams and Hill were charged with the attempted armed robbery of a credit union and with brandishing a firearm during and in relation to that attempted armed robbery. Williams was also charged with carjacking and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to that carjacking. Williams pleaded guilty to all four counts and was sentenced to 205 months' imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Williams’s arguments that the district court violated Federal Rule 11 because the plea colloquy failed to advise him as to the accomplice element of the crime and failed to provide a factual basis for the dangerous weapon element. Because aiding and abetting is a theory of liability embodied in every federal indictment, whether specifically charged or not, the court was not required to advise Williams about accomplice liability. The prosecutor, at the court’s direction, read the elements for attempted armed credit union robbery, which were also set out in the plea agreement. Williams affirmed that these elements matched his behavior. The court confirmed that Williams had read the plea agreement and discussed it with counsel. The court directed the prosecutor to summarize the factual basis for Williams’s guilty pleas. Williams agreed that this summary accurately reflected his behavior; the summary provided a sufficient factual basis for the dangerous-weapon element of attempted armed credit union robbery. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law