Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant, while on supervised release following a federal conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, was arrested in May 2023 for new state charges involving drug trafficking, possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia, and being a felon in possession of a handgun. These events occurred after violations that led to his second supervised release revocation but before the hearing for those violations, and were not discovered by the federal probation office until several months later. Upon learning of the May 2023 incident, after the defendant had completed his sentence and was again on supervised release, the probation office initiated the proceedings at issue, seeking a third revocation based on the new conduct.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky held a hearing to determine if the defendant could knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel in the revocation proceeding, ultimately allowing him to represent himself. After a subsequent hearing, the district court found violations of supervised release, classified the new conduct as a Grade A violation, and imposed a 24-month term of imprisonment, the statutory maximum. The defendant timely appealed, challenging the validity of his waiver of counsel, the sentencing procedure, and the constitutionality of his underlying conviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the right to counsel in a supervised release revocation is not derived from the Sixth Amendment but is governed by statutory and due process considerations. The court reviewed the waiver of counsel for abuse of discretion and found the district court’s inquiry sufficient under the totality of the circumstances. The court also found no procedural error in sentencing, concluding that the district court did not improperly rely on prohibited factors. Finally, the court declined to consider the challenge to the underlying conviction, holding that such arguments must be raised on direct appeal or collateral review. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Spence" on Justia Law

Two police officers responded to a report of an armed suspect in a Cleveland boarding house. While searching the darkened building, the officers encountered the suspect, leading to a confrontation and retreat down the stairs. One officer, Gannon, fired his weapon twice; the first, intentional shot struck his fellow officer, Kilnapp, causing significant injury. The officers did not identify themselves as police during the incident, and the body camera footage did not clearly depict critical moments. Both sides disputed details such as whether the suspect fired first, but agreed that Gannon’s first shot, meant to stop the suspect, hit Kilnapp as she followed behind him.Kilnapp sued Gannon, the City of Cleveland, and its Chief of Police, alleging excessive force under both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Gannon sought qualified immunity and dismissal, arguing his actions did not violate clearly established rights. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied his motion to dismiss and later his motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit previously affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss, but Gannon continued to challenge the denial of summary judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of summary judgment de novo. The court held that when an officer intentionally fires a weapon in circumstances objectively manifesting an intent to restrain, any person struck is seized under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether they were the officer’s specific intended target. However, because the Supreme Court’s decision in Torres v. Madrid (2021) clarified this principle after Kilnapp’s shooting, the law was not clearly established at the time. The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court’s decision and remanded with instructions to grant Gannon qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim and for further proceedings on the Fourteenth Amendment claim. View "Kilnapp v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

The case centers on an individual who immigrated to the United States and became involved in a transnational drug trafficking and money laundering conspiracy. His role was to travel across the country collecting large sums of drug proceeds, which he then laundered through a business that purchased used cell phones. These phones were sent to a contact in China as payment for precursor chemicals vital to the drug operation. During one such trip, law enforcement observed him receiving nearly $200,000 in cash and, upon stopping his vehicle, discovered an unloaded firearm and loaded magazine in the van. He admitted to bringing the gun for protection due to the large sums of money he was transporting.He was convicted of money laundering and conspiracy to launder money in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, receiving a 90-month prison sentence and three years of supervised release. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. While his appeal was pending, the U.S. Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines to allow certain first-time offenders a two-level reduction in offense level, with exceptions including possession of a firearm “in connection with” the offense. He moved for a sentence reduction under the new provision, but the district court denied the request, finding his possession of the firearm during the offense made him ineligible.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial. The appellate court held that the “in connection with” language should be interpreted broadly and that the close proximity of the firearm to the drug proceeds, along with the defendant’s own admission that the gun was for protection during his criminal activity, established the necessary nexus. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, finding no error in deeming him ineligible for the reduced sentence. View "United States v. Tajwar" on Justia Law

The defendant, a native and citizen of Jamaica, repeatedly entered the United States unlawfully after being removed several times due to criminal convictions, including firearms and drug offenses. In May 2023, he was apprehended at the Ambassador Bridge in Detroit and charged with unauthorized reentry following his removal subsequent to conviction for an aggravated felony, violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326. This constituted his eleventh felony conviction and fifth felony immigration conviction under § 1326.After being indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, the defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that § 1326 violates the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee by discriminating against Mexican and other Latino immigrants. The district court rejected his motion, finding that he failed to link the legislative history and intent of the 1929 Act and its predecessors to the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, which codified § 1326. The court also determined that he did not provide evidence of disparate impact or invidious discriminatory purpose regarding § 1326’s enforcement, and adopted the analysis from United States v. Carrillo-Lopez, 68 F.4th 1133 (9th Cir. 2023). The district court sentenced him to 51 months’ imprisonment and he timely appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s refusal to dismiss the indictment de novo and its factual findings for clear error. The appellate court held that the defendant failed to establish discriminatory intent or disparate impact under the Arlington Heights framework. The court emphasized that the legislative history of the 1929 Act is not controlling for § 1326, and Congress is not required to purge previous discriminatory intent when enacting new legislation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Myrie" on Justia Law

The defendant participated in the robbery of a business known as Cash Express, which offers check cashing, short-term loans, and related financial services. With assistance from his then-girlfriend, the defendant orchestrated the robbery, during which he physically restrained the clerk, brandished a firearm, and escaped with $2,680. Shortly after his arrest, the defendant pleaded guilty to Hobbs Act robbery as part of a plea agreement. Eleven days after signing the agreement, an image implying retaliation against informants was posted on his Facebook profile, which became relevant at sentencing.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee sentenced the defendant. The court applied several sentence enhancements: it determined Cash Express was a "financial institution" under the Sentencing Guidelines, imposed a leadership role enhancement, and declined to grant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility due to the defendant's conduct after the plea. The court rejected certain enhancements related to obstruction of justice and reckless endangerment, resulting in a Guidelines range of 151 to 188 months, and sentenced the defendant to 188 months' imprisonment. The defendant appealed, challenging the application of the financial institution and leadership enhancements, the denial of the acceptance of responsibility reduction, and the reasonableness of his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that Cash Express qualifies as a "financial institution" under the plain meaning of the term in the Guidelines, affirmed the district court's finding that the defendant acted in a leadership role, and upheld the denial of the acceptance of responsibility reduction due to conduct inconsistent with remorse. The court also found that the sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable and that the government did not breach the plea agreement. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Glover" on Justia Law

This case concerns a challenge to new regulations issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) regarding the importation of dogs into the United States. The CDC, responding to incidents in which rabid dogs entered the country using fraudulent paperwork, amended its regulations to require that all imported dogs have a microchip, be at least six months old, and that importers submit a Dog Importation Form. These measures were intended to ensure the identity of the dogs, their vaccination status, and prevent the introduction of rabies, which remains a risk in other countries.Plaintiffs, consisting of a U.S. hunter, a Canadian dog breeder, and a hunting organization, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. They argued that the age and microchip requirements exceeded the CDC's statutory authority and were arbitrary and capricious. They sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of these requirements, particularly as applied to dogs from rabies-free and low-risk countries. The magistrate judge recommended, and the district court agreed, that the plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits, and denied the injunction. Plaintiffs then appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. The appellate court concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims. The court held that the age and microchip requirements were likely within the CDC’s statutory authority under 42 U.S.C. § 264, as they constitute inspections or other necessary measures to prevent the introduction of communicable diseases. The court also determined that the rulemaking was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. View "U.S. Sportsmen's Alliance Found. v. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention" on Justia Law

A global manufacturer of automotive clutches entered into a contract with a components manufacturer to supply levers for use in the clutches. The levers were to be manufactured strictly according to the specifications provided, with no design responsibility on the supplier. Between 2017 and 2018, several of the supplied levers broke, causing clutch failures in the field. The buyer communicated with the supplier about these issues through emails, reports, and meetings, and the parties disputed whether these communications constituted notice of breach. The buyer eventually filed suit for breach of contract and breach of express and implied warranties.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied the supplier’s motions for judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment, holding that there were sufficient allegations and factual disputes regarding whether the buyer had given adequate notice of breach as required under Ohio law. The case proceeded to trial, where the jury found in favor of the buyer on all claims and awarded significant damages. The supplier appealed, arguing that the Ohio statute requiring pre-suit notice of breach barred the buyer’s claims, and that errors in witness testimony and jury instructions warranted a new trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court held that under Ohio Revised Code § 1302.65(C)(1), interpreted through Ohio Supreme Court precedent, notice of breach does not require explicit language alleging breach, but rather communication sufficient to alert the seller that there is a problem. The court found the evidence supported the jury’s verdict, the jury instructions properly reflected Ohio law, and there was no reversible error in the admission of witness testimony. The judgment in favor of the buyer was affirmed. View "Eaton Corp. v. Angstrom Auto. Group, LLC" on Justia Law

During a contentious divorce and custody dispute, Amanda Hovanec, who had returned to Ohio from South Africa with her children, conspired with Anthony Theodorou, her romantic partner, to kill her husband, T.H. After failed attempts to hire hitmen in South Africa, Theodorou, at Hovanec’s direction, obtained and shipped etorphine, a dangerous animal tranquilizer, to the United States. Hovanec ultimately used the drug to fatally inject T.H. at her mother Anita Green’s home. Green assisted after the murder by helping to select a burial site, driving the others to dig a grave, and later transporting them and the body for burial. The group also undertook efforts to conceal the crime, including disposing of T.H.’s belongings and misleading authorities. All three were arrested after an investigation revealed dashcam footage of the crime.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Hovanec pleaded guilty to multiple controlled-substance offenses resulting in death, and Green pleaded guilty to being an accessory after the fact. Hovanec received a 480-month sentence; Green received 121 months and was ordered to pay restitution for psychological care for T.H.’s and Hovanec’s children. Both defendants appealed their sentences and, in Green’s case, the restitution order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentences for both Hovanec and Green. The appellate court upheld the denial of a sentencing reduction for Green based on her lack of candor regarding knowledge of the murder plan. The court also affirmed the sentencing enhancements for Hovanec’s leadership role and obstruction of justice. However, the court reversed the restitution order against Green, holding that under federal law, restitution for psychological care requires evidence of bodily injury, defined as physical harm or physical manifestations of psychological harm, and remanded for further factual findings on this issue. View "United States v. Green" on Justia Law

An employee at a construction company alleged that he faced repeated harassment at work after revealing that he was bisexual. According to his account, coworkers and a supervisor directed homophobic slurs and derogatory comments at him over several months. The employee reported the harassment to a manager on two occasions, initially without naming the harassers, and later with more details. Eventually, after a particularly hostile exchange, he formally complained to the company’s human resources department, which initiated an investigation. The HR manager interviewed the employee and nine other workers, none of whom corroborated his claims. Nonetheless, the company issued a written warning to the supervisor for inappropriate language, required all employees to review the antidiscrimination policy, and allowed the employee to transfer worksites and take medical leave.After the employee took extended medical leave, the company offered him several alternative work assignments, which he either declined or raised objections to. Ultimately, the company considered his refusals as a voluntary resignation and terminated his employment. The employee sued, alleging a hostile work environment and retaliation under Title VII and Michigan law.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment to the employer on both claims. It found the company’s actions in response to the harassment allegations were prompt and appropriate, and that the employee failed to show that the termination was pretext for retaliation. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the employer was not liable for coworker harassment because it took reasonable steps to investigate and address the allegations, and that the employee did not present sufficient evidence of pretext regarding his termination. View "Hamm v. Pullman SST, Inc." on Justia Law

A woman was murdered by her neighbor, who had a documented history of violence and mental illness. Over the two years preceding her death, the Sheriff’s Office in the relevant county received multiple reports about the neighbor’s threatening behavior, particularly toward women, but allegedly failed to act appropriately. The decedent’s estate claimed that the Sheriff’s Office systematically provided inferior protective services in response to threats against women compared to men, citing examples involving both the decedent and other women who reported threats. The estate asserted claims under the Equal Protection Clause and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed the federal claims for lack of standing and for failure to state a claim, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. The estate appealed, challenging only the dismissal of its federal equal protection claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the estate lacked standing to bring the federal equal protection claims because the complaint did not allege that the decedent herself was personally denied equal protection by the Sheriff’s Office. Instead, the complaint described discriminatory treatment experienced by other women. The court explained that equal protection claims must be based on the plaintiff’s own legal rights, not those of third parties, and the estate did not qualify for the limited exception allowing third-party standing. As a result, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint in its entirety. View "Henry v. Blank" on Justia Law