Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

by
In 1995, Garr Keith Hardin and Jeffrey Clark were convicted of murdering Rhonda Sue Warford based on forensic evidence and witness testimonies. Robert Thurman, a forensic serologist, testified that a hair found at the crime scene was similar to Hardin’s hair. After over two decades in prison, DNA testing revealed that the hair did not belong to Hardin, leading a state court to vacate their convictions. Hardin and Clark then sued Thurman under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he failed to disclose observation notes that suggested the hair might not have matched Hardin’s hair sample, violating his obligations under Brady v. Maryland.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky denied Thurman’s qualified-immunity defense for Hardin’s Brady claim but granted summary judgment on other claims. The court found that a reasonable jury could determine that Thurman should have recognized the exculpatory value of his notes and that the notes were material to Hardin’s defense. The court also held that Thurman could not invoke qualified immunity because Hardin’s Brady rights were clearly established before 1992.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision in part and dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review Thurman’s arguments that the notes were not exculpatory or material, as these were mixed questions of law and fact. However, the court rejected Thurman’s argument that the law in the mid-1990s did not clearly establish that Brady’s duty of disclosure applied to forensic scientists, affirming that such duties were clearly established and applicable to Thurman. View "Clark v. Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiffs David Moore and David Ermold sued Kim Davis, the clerk of Rowan County, Kentucky, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for refusing to issue them a marriage license, claiming it violated their constitutional right to marry. This refusal occurred after the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, which legalized same-sex marriage nationwide. Davis, citing her religious beliefs, stopped issuing all marriage licenses until the state provided her with an accommodation. Plaintiffs sought damages for the emotional distress caused by Davis's actions.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on liability, and a jury awarded them compensatory damages. Davis appealed, arguing she was entitled to qualified immunity, had defenses under the Free Exercise Clause and the Kentucky Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and that the evidence of emotional distress was insufficient to support the jury's award.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Davis was not entitled to qualified immunity because Obergefell clearly established the right to same-sex marriage, and Davis's actions violated that right. The court also rejected Davis's Free Exercise Clause defense, stating that the First Amendment does not protect state actions that violate constitutional rights. Additionally, the court found that Kentucky's RFRA did not apply in this case because the state was not a party to the lawsuit.The court further upheld the jury's award of damages, finding that the plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence of emotional distress. The court noted that the plaintiffs' detailed testimony about their emotional harm was corroborated and not merely conclusory. Davis's request for remittitur was not considered because it was raised for the first time in her reply brief. The Sixth Circuit thus affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. View "Ermold v. Davis" on Justia Law

by
In the spring of 2021, the Lexington Police Department investigated a large-scale methamphetamine distribution scheme involving Lamonte Brown. Surveillance and a cooperating source led to the discovery of significant quantities of drugs and firearms at an office building used by Brown and his associate, William Hargis. Brown was later arrested for drug trafficking, and additional firearms were found in his car. Brown, a felon, was charged with conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and being a felon in possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky consolidated the two cases for sentencing, and Brown pled guilty to both charges. He received a 310-month sentence. Brown appealed several aspects of his sentence, including the application of a two-level sentencing enhancement for possessing a dangerous weapon, which was based on firearms found in the office used for drug operations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The court upheld the two-level enhancement, finding that it was reasonably foreseeable for Brown to know that his co-conspirator possessed firearms given the large quantities of drugs involved. The court also found no procedural error in the late filing of the third addendum to the presentence investigation report, as the district court had postponed the sentencing hearing, giving Brown sufficient time to respond.Additionally, the court determined that Brown's felon-in-possession charge was not relevant conduct to the drug conspiracy and thus could be counted as part of his criminal history. The court also found that the district court adequately explained its decision to run Brown's sentences consecutively, providing sufficient justification based on the § 3553(a) factors. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentencing decisions. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
Kirstyn Paige Bashaw was employed as the Director of Social Services at Majestic Care of Whitehall, a skilled nursing home and residential facility in Ohio, from November 2021 until her termination in March 2022. Her role involved managing the Social Service department and attending daily meetings. During her tenure, Bashaw was frequently late or absent without authorization, and she raised concerns about resident care and alleged inappropriate behavior by her manager, Edward Beatrice. Bashaw also secretly recorded work meetings and discussed her intention to leave the job with a Human Resources representative.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment in favor of Majestic Care, finding that the company had provided three non-pretextual reasons for Bashaw’s termination: her surreptitious recording of work meetings, her attendance issues, and her expressed desire to leave the job. The court did not find it necessary to resolve whether a fourth reason, related to a resident's readmission, was pretextual.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Majestic Care had legitimate, non-pretextual reasons for terminating Bashaw. Specifically, the court found that Bashaw’s secret recordings undermined trust and posed legal risks, her attendance issues were valid grounds for termination, and Majestic Care reasonably believed she no longer wished to work there. The court concluded that these reasons were sufficient to defeat Bashaw’s retaliation claim under Title VII and Ohio law. View "Bashaw v. Majestic Care of Whitehall" on Justia Law

by
Shenisa Mohammed, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 2010. In 2020, she pleaded guilty to arson under Virginia Code § 18.2-77. The Department of Homeland Security charged her as removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), alleging her arson conviction qualified as an aggravated felony. Mohammed sought cancellation of removal, but the immigration judge (IJ) concluded that her arson conviction was an aggravated felony, making her removable and ineligible for discretionary relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, and Mohammed petitioned for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court confirmed its jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal, limited to constitutional claims or questions of law. The court reviewed de novo whether Mohammed’s state conviction for arson qualified as an aggravated felony under the INA.The court applied the categorical approach to determine if the Virginia arson statute matched the federal arson statute under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). The Virginia statute criminalizes maliciously burning or aiding and abetting the burning of certain properties. The federal statute criminalizes maliciously damaging or destroying property used in interstate commerce by fire or explosives. The court found that both statutes prohibit malicious burning, and the federal statute implicitly includes aiding and abetting liability through 18 U.S.C. § 2.The court concluded that the Virginia arson statute is not broader than the federal arson statute, as aiding and abetting is considered an alternative theory of liability under federal law. Therefore, Mohammed’s state arson conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony. The Sixth Circuit denied Mohammed’s petition for review. View "Mohammed v. Bondi" on Justia Law

by
Rene Ramirez Gomez unlawfully entered the United States and committed multiple crimes, including raping his biological daughter. After serving a short state-court sentence, he was deported but re-entered the U.S. illegally. He then sexually abused the three young children of his new girlfriend in Indiana. Indiana charged him with child molestation, while the federal government charged him with failure to register as a sex offender and illegal re-entry. Ramirez Gomez pled guilty to the federal charges and was sentenced to 51 months in prison, to be served consecutively to his anticipated state-court sentence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee sentenced Ramirez Gomez to 51 months in prison for the federal charges, to run concurrently with one Tennessee sentence but consecutively to any other state sentences. Ramirez Gomez appealed, challenging the procedural aspects of his federal sentence, specifically the application of an eight-level enhancement and the imposition of a consecutive sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court correctly applied the eight-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(b)(1)(C) based on a judicial finding that Ramirez Gomez committed a sex offense against a minor while in failure to register status, without requiring a conviction. The court also found that the district court did not err in imposing a consecutive sentence, as it had considered the relevant guideline and provided an adequate explanation for its decision. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's sentencing decision. View "U.S. v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
Raymond Erker operated a Ponzi scheme that defrauded over fifty people, primarily senior citizens, out of nine million dollars. He created two companies, GenSource and Provident Securities, and solicited investments by falsely promising safe, guaranteed returns. Instead, Erker misappropriated the funds for personal use and risky investments. To cover his tracks, he created office fronts, set up call centers, and fabricated account statements. When his investments failed, he used new investor money to pay old investors, maintaining the illusion of returns. Eventually, he ran out of money and could not repay his investors.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio indicted Erker on multiple counts, including conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and making a false statement under oath. After a four-day trial, a jury convicted him on all counts. The district court sentenced him to 262 months in prison and ordered restitution. Erker appealed, challenging his money laundering conviction, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, and objecting to various aspects of his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected Erker's argument that the government failed to prove he withdrew more than $10,000 of criminally derived property, noting that the evidence showed it was mathematically impossible for the withdrawals to include less than $10,000 of dirty money. The court also found no procedural error in the district court's sentencing, as it had considered the necessary factors and did not need to address national sentencing statistics. The court affirmed Erker's sentence but remanded for the district court to consider his eligibility for a sentence reduction under Amendment 821 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The court declined to address Erker's ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal. View "United States v. Erker" on Justia Law

by
Sardar Ashrafkhan owned and operated a fraudulent medical practice where doctors wrote and billed Medicare for fake prescriptions. These prescriptions were filled at specific pharmacies, which paid Ashrafkhan kickbacks. The scheme resulted in millions of dollars in fraudulent Medicare claims and the illegal sale of opioid-based drugs. Ashrafkhan was indicted in 2013 and tried in 2015, where the government presented evidence that he masterminded the scheme. The jury convicted him of drug conspiracy, health care fraud conspiracy, and money laundering. At sentencing, he received an adjustment for being an organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan sentenced Ashrafkhan to 276 months of imprisonment, varying downward from the guidelines range of 600 months. Ashrafkhan appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence. After his sentencing, the United States Sentencing Commission promulgated a new guideline, USSG § 4C1.1, which provides a two-point reduction in the offense level for defendants with no criminal history points, known as "zero-point offenders." Ashrafkhan moved for a sentence reduction under this new guideline, but the district court denied his motion, reasoning that his aggravating role adjustment rendered him ineligible for the reduction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that to be eligible for the zero-point offender reduction under USSG § 4C1.1, a defendant must not have received an aggravating role adjustment and must not have engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise. Since Ashrafkhan received an aggravating role adjustment, he was ineligible for the reduction, regardless of whether he engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise. The court's interpretation was based on the plain text and context of the guideline, as well as precedent from similar cases. View "United States v. Ashrafkhan" on Justia Law

by
Calvin Cogdill pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court determined that Cogdill had committed three prior drug offenses on different occasions, which subjected him to an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). This decision was made over Cogdill’s objection, who argued that the determination should be made by a jury, not a judge.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee sentenced Cogdill to a 15-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment based on the ACCA enhancement. Cogdill appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit initially affirmed the sentence. However, the Supreme Court vacated this decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its ruling in Erlinger v. United States, which clarified that a jury must decide whether prior offenses were committed on different occasions for ACCA purposes.Upon reconsideration, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s error for harmlessness. The court concluded that the error was not harmless because the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any rational jury would have found that Cogdill’s prior offenses were committed on different occasions. The court noted that the evidence regarding the timing, proximity, and relationship of the offenses was insufficient to meet this burden.As a result, the Sixth Circuit vacated Cogdill’s sentence and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court also left it to the district court to address any potential double jeopardy issues on remand. View "United States v. Cogdill" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
Larry Smith worked for Newport Utilities for many years, primarily repairing downed powerlines during weather emergencies. He began experiencing seizures, which led to two on-the-job incidents within months. Newport Utilities placed him on leave and later forced him to retire. Smith sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), claiming discrimination based on his disability.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee granted summary judgment to Newport Utilities, finding that Smith posed a safety threat in his position and that the company could not reasonably accommodate him.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Smith posed a direct threat of harm to himself and others due to his seizures, which could not be eliminated by reasonable accommodation. The court found that the essential functions of Smith's job as a bucket foreman included working extended hours and being on standby, which Smith could not perform safely. The court also determined that Newport Utilities had investigated potential alternative positions for Smith, but he did not qualify for any of them. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Newport Utilities. View "Smith v. Newport Utilities" on Justia Law