Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2015, Davis was the Rowan County, Kentucky County Clerk, responsible for issuing marriage licenses. Same-sex marriage offended her religious beliefs; when the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to same-sex marriage, Davis stopped issuing marriage licenses altogether. When plaintiffs, same-sex couples, sought marriage licenses they could not get them. Plaintiffs sued Davis in her individual capacity and in her official capacity, seeking damages. In a different lawsuit, the district court enjoined Davis from refusing to issue marriage licenses. After the injunction, plaintiffs obtained marriage licenses. Before the Sixth Circuit could rule on the injunction, Kentucky legislators changed the law and Davis began to issue licenses without objection. The Sixth Circuit dismissed Davis's appeal of the injunction. Davis then moved to dismiss the complaints, arguing that sovereign immunity shielded her from suit in her official capacity and that qualified immunity shielded her from suit in her individual capacity. The Sixth Circuit held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity shields Davis as an official because, when refusing to issue marriage licenses, she acted on Kentucky’s behalf, not on Rowan County’s behalf. The doctrine of qualified immunity does not shield Davis as an individual; the plaintiffs adequately alleged she violated plaintiffs’ right to marry, which was clearly established when she acted. View "Yates v. Davis" on Justia Law

A1 learned that government auditors thought that the company had overcharged a federal agency by several million dollars for services provided to Medicare beneficiaries. A1 challenged the auditors’ decisions at two levels of the Medicare appeals process but changed the auditors’ minds only in a few minor ways. The government tried to start collecting the money, as the regulatory regime allows, 42 U.S.C. 1395ff(a)(5), (c)(3)(E). Fearing bankruptcy from the government’s recoupment efforts, A1 obtained a preliminary injunction, barring the government from recouping the money until A1 received a hearing before an administrative law judge. The Sixth Circuit vacated the injunction, first holding that although A1 did not proceed to the third and fourth levels of the administrative appeal, the district court had jurisdiction over A1’s constitutional claims. On the merits, the court identified unanswered questions regarding the statistics concerning the relief likely to be obtained at the third level of administrative review; details about A1’s choice not to take advantage of an option to escalate its claim to the fourth and final level of administrative review; and the parties’ awareness of a recoupment option that might have allowed A1 to obtain an ALJ hearing before making most or even all of its recoupment payments. View "A1 Diabetes & Medical Supply v. Alex Azar II" on Justia Law

The day after a controlled buy, Detroit police officer Benitez obtained a warrant to search 12011 Bramell. His affidavit stated that a reliable confidential informant had been at two Burnette addresses and “12011 BRAMELL (the target location) and that a certain drug dealer had been selling cocaine and heroin out of 9542 Burnette for several months. Burnette Street and Bramell are eight miles apart. Benitez could not have simultaneously observed the locations as stated in the affidavit. Detroit police executed the warrant at Bramell, which is owned by Butler, a retiree with no prior convictions or links to drug operations. Officers asked for Butler's ID, which Butler provided; he stated he had a concealed pistol license and was carrying a weapon. Butler was handcuffed. Sergeant Meadows “slammed” him “against the wall.” Butler had sustained a serious neck injury during military service, resulting in a spinal fusion operation and disability-based retirement. The “slam” reinjured him. From the house, the police recovered $3,702 cash, weapons, a bulletproof vest, and ibuprofen pills. The state did not charge Butler, who filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to Meadows on the excessive force claim and reversed the denial of qualified immunity to Benitez on the false affidavit claim. Assaulting an unarmed, compliant individual is a clearly-established violation of the Fourth Amendment. Removing alleged falsehoods, Benitez had not personally seen suspicious activity at Bramell but he corroborated what the informant stated about the Burnette addresses. Officers need not corroborate every detail provided by an informant to show the informant’s reliability. Even without personally observing any drug activity at Bramell, Benitez put enough in the affidavit for a magistrate to conclude that the informant—who was correct about everything else—would be right that Bramell was a “stash house.” View "Butler v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

In 1995, Pike and Slemmer, students at the Knoxville Job Corps Center, had a strained relationship; Pike told Iloilo, that she intended to kill Slemmer. The next day, Iloilo observed Pike and Slemmer together. That night, Pike told Iloilo that she had just killed Slemmer and showed Iloilo a piece of Slemmers’s skull, describing many details about the murder. Pike made similar statements to another student. After Slemmer’s body was found, police quickly discovered Pike’s connection to the crime. Pike waived her Miranda rights and gave a complete statement. At trial, much of Pike’s defense centered on her mental health. A jury convicted Pike of premeditated first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. At a sentencing hearing, Pike’s attorney, Talman, originally intended to rely on the testimony of Dr. McCoy, a mitigation expert; shortly before the hearing, Talman switched his plan and called only Pike’s relatives to testify about Pike’s difficult childhood, and her behavioral problems throughout her adolescence.The jury sentenced Pike to death by electrocution. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed. State courts also denied postconviction relief, concluding that Pike’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present alternative expert testimony or additional lay testimony on compelling mitigation in her life history. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her federal habeas petition; the state court’s determination that she is unable to establish prejudice on her claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. View "Pike v. Gross" on Justia Law

One summer night in 2015, at a Louisville nightclub, someone discharged a firearm, shooting eight people. Six of those people sued the nightclub’s owner, Cole’s Place, in state court, arguing that Cole’s Place failed to protect them from foreseeable harm. United Specialty Insurance (USIC) obtained a federal declaratory judgment that it is not obligated to defend or indemnify Cole’s Place in the state court litigation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion in exercising Declaratory Judgment Act jurisdiction over USIC’s lawsuit and did not err in finding that an assault-and-battery exclusion in Cole’s Place’s insurance policy with USIC applies to the state court litigation. There are no factual issues remaining in the state-court litigation or complex state-law issues that are “important to an informed resolution” of this case. View "United Specialty Ins. Co. v. Cole's Place, Inc." on Justia Law

The Clean Air Act directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to establish National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for certain air pollutants, 42 U.S.C. 7409. Each state must propose a state implementation plan (SIP) that “specif[ies] the manner in which national . . . ambient air quality standards will be achieved and maintained” for approval by the EPA. A 1990 CAA amendment set a national Reid Vapor Pressure (RVP) standard for gasoline. In 2004, the EPA informed Michigan that eight counties in southeast Michigan were “nonattainment” areas for the ozone NAAQS. In response, Michigan enacted the “Summer Fuel Law” to limit the RVP for gasoline sold during the summer months within those eight counties. After concluding that the revised RVP standards were “necessary” for the attainment of the ozone NAAQS, the EPA approved the incorporation of the Summer Fuel Law into Michigan’s SIP. Ammex unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the Michigan Department of Agriculture and Rural Development from enforcing the Summer Fuel Law, arguing that the standard violates the Supremacy Clause and dormant Foreign Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. MDARD’s enforcement of the standard is the enforcement of federal law. View "Ammex, Inc. v. Wenk" on Justia Law

Vanderhoef crashed his Ford Mustang into Dixon’s vehicle. Dixon, an off-duty, part-time reserve Maryville, Tennessee police officer, responded by holding Vanderhoef and his passengers at gunpoint for about two minutes. Keller let them go after a bystander threatened to call the police. A jury found that Dixon violated Vanderhoef’s Fourth Amendment rights (42 U.S.C. 1983). The district court set aside the jury’s verdict, ruling that Dixon was entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established law put him on notice that doing what he did was unconstitutional. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The facts presented at trial adequately established a violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights to be free from excessive force and unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. At the time of this accident and confrontation, Dixon should have known that pointing his gun at a non-fleeing teenager whom he did not reasonably suspect of any prior crime beyond speeding and reckless driving and holding him at gunpoint for roughly two minutes, violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. View "Vanderhoef v. Dixon" on Justia Law

McCloud pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and to one count of actually distributing the drug, 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii). He was sentenced to 180 months of imprisonment. The district court applied a two-level sentencing enhancement (U.S.S.D. 2D1.1(b)(1)) because McCloud carried a firearm during an attempt to buy marijuana during a trip to Detroit in the course of the conspiracy. McCloud argued that the marijuana incident was not “relevant conduct” under the Sentencing Guidelines. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence. Although the government charged a meth conspiracy, the overall relevant conduct as described in terms of what was found in various homes along the way included cocaine and marijuana. One of McCloud’s sources of meth, whatever else he might have been doing in Detroit, was in Detroit and the Detroit trip involved others involved in the conspiracy. The Detroit trip was within the scope of the overall conspiracy and relevant conduct. View "United States v. McCloud" on Justia Law

Due to an unsafe condition on the premises, Osborne suffered a broken arm at the Center, which is owned and operated by Metro Nashville. Osborne obtained a state court judgment against Metro under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act; the damages included specific medical expenses related to the incident and found Osborne’s comparative fault to be 20 percent. Before the state court suit, Osborne incurred medical expenses for which Metro did not pay at the time. Medicare made conditional payments to Osborne totaling at least $9,453.09. Osborne claims he incurred—in addition to the costs of his state court litigation—the cost of his co-pays, deductibles, and co-insurance for treatments not covered through Medicare. Osborne alleged Metro is a primary payer who failed to pay under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act (MSPA), 42 U.S.C. 1395y(b), and was therefore liable for reimbursement of Medicare’s conditional payments and a double damages penalty under section 1395y(b)(3)(A). Metro claimed it paid the judgment in full, including discretionary costs. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that Osborne lacked statutory standing to sue for his individual losses and the conditional payments made by Medicare because the MSPA does not permit a private cause of action against tortfeasors. Because the MSPA is not a qui tam statute and financial injury suffered by Medicare is not attributed to Osborne, he also lacked Article III standing to sue for Medicare’s conditional payments. View "Osborne v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County" on Justia Law

In 1999, Vowell pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, agreeing that his prior criminal history qualified for a sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Vowell waived his right to collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, except for claims asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, or “that an applicable change in the case law renders the defendant’s conduct ... not a violation of federal law.” Vowell had Tennessee convictions for second-degree burglary, armed robbery, and aggravated burglary, and a 1983 conviction for Georgia burglary. The district court determined that Vowell qualified as an ACCA career offender and sentenced him to 180 months of imprisonment. Vowell did not appeal. In 2016, Vowell filed a section 2255 motion to set aside his sentence, asserting that his 1983 Georgia conviction did not constitute a predicate offense because it was broader than generic burglary and “portions of Georgia’s burglary statute could only have qualified as a violent felony under the ACCA’s now-void residual clause,” citing the Supreme Court’s Johnson and Mathis decisions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Vowell’s petition, first holding that Vowell’s appellate waiver did not prohibit him from raising his claims. The court determined that Georgia’s burglary statute was divisible and that because Vowell was convicted of burglarizing a “dwelling house,” Vowell was correctly designated as a career offender. View "Vowell v. United States" on Justia Law