Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs submitted proposed ballot initiatives to the Portage County Board of Elections that would effectively decriminalize marijuana possession in Garrettsville and Windham, Ohio. The Board declined to certify the proposed initiatives, concluding that the initiatives fell outside the scope of the municipalities’ legislative authority. Plaintiffs sued, asserting that the statutes governing Ohio’s municipal ballot-initiative process impose a prior restraint on their political speech, violating their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court permanently enjoined the Board of Elections and the Ohio Secretary of State, from enforcing the statutes in any manner that failed to provide for adequate judicial review. The Sixth Circuit vacated the injunction. A person or party may express beliefs or ideas through a ballot, but ballots serve primarily to elect candidates, not as forums for political expression. Heightened procedural requirements imposed on systems of prior restraint are inappropriate in the context of ballot-initiative preclearance regulations. The court applied the “Anderson-Burdick” framework and weighted the character and magnitude of the burden the state’s rule against the interests the state contends justify that burden and considered the extent to which the state’s concerns make the burden necessary. The state affords aggrieved ballot-initiative proponents adequate procedural rights through the availability of mandamus relief in the state courts. View "Schmitt v. LaRose" on Justia Law

In 2004, O’Neal was convicted in state court of the second-degree murder of Shelby, who was shot at a gas station. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to 36-80 years in prison. At trial, O’Neal argued that Hickman had shot Shelby. Over O’Neal’s objections, the court excluded Hickman’s jailhouse confession to another inmate and Shelby’s statement to a police officer at the hospital where he died, identifying Hickman as the shooter. The statement was also overheard by a nurse. Hickman had pleaded guilty to manslaughter, which carried a sentence of 3-15 years' imprisonment, in exchange for his testimony at O’Neal’s murder trial. The district court granted O’Neal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the state’s argument that the Michigan Court of Appeals reasonably determined that the erroneous exclusion of the statements was harmless. The district court properly granted relief based on the exclusion of the jailhouse statement because of its potentially profound impact on jurors, particularly when added to the already considerable admitted evidence indicating that Hickman, not O’Neal, was the shooter. Had the hospital identification been admitted, it would have joined an impressive array of evidence that Hickman was the shooter. View "O'Neal v. Balcarcel" on Justia Law

Johnson moved to Michigan while on probation, violating the terms of his release from a Florida prison. Florida officials issued a warrant. Federal agents found and arrested Johnson and prosecuted him for a federal gun crime, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), before turning him over to Florida authorities. During a remand for resentencing on his federal conviction, Johnson argued that the federal district court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him because federal agents pursued him to execute a Florida warrant. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his sentence. Johnson had Article III standing to contest the primary jurisdiction of the federal government but the federal government and Florida could prioritize between them the order of proceedings. Despite its name, primary jurisdiction does not affect the district court’s jurisdiction over a criminal defendant; it merely determines the order of trial, sentencing, and incarceration. Primary jurisdiction is a matter of comity to be resolved by the executive branches of the two sovereigns. Even if Florida retained its primary jurisdiction over Johnson, that would not deprive the federal district court of jurisdiction. A lack of primary jurisdiction does not mean that a sovereign does not have jurisdiction over a defendant but only that the sovereign lacks priority of jurisdiction for purposes of trial, sentencing and incarceration. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Carman was indicted for her involvement in a massive conspiracy to sell untaxed cigarettes. A jury convicted Carman and others of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud. The district court held a forfeiture hearing the next day. The government stated that the only items of property it sought from Carman were two Cadillacs and later requested a money judgment against Carman of about $35 million. The district court sentenced Carman to 60 months’ imprisonment without addressing any money judgment or otherwise mentioning forfeiture. More than four months after Carman appealed her conviction and sentence, that court entered a forfeiture order for $17.5 million. Carman appealed that order. The Sixth Circuit vacated, finding that the district court lacked authority to enter that order. When a district court finds that property is subject to forfeiture, it must, whenever possible, enter a preliminary order of forfeiture “sufficiently in advance of sentencing to allow the parties to suggest revisions” before the sentencing hearing, Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(2)(A), (B), and “must include the forfeiture when orally announcing the sentence or must otherwise ensure that the defendant knows of the forfeiture at sentencing.” Upon the filing of Carmen’s notice of appeal, adjudicatory authority over her conviction and sentence passed to the Sixth Circuit. A forfeiture order is part of the defendant’s sentence, so the district court lacked authority to enter its forfeiture order after Carman had filed her notice of appeal. View "United States v. Carman" on Justia Law

Bank of America advances funds whenever customers deposit checks. During this “float” period, it permits the customer to withdraw the funds while the bank confirms the check’s validity. In Michigan, Thomas would enlist BoA customers and give the customers’ information (account numbers, debit card numbers, and PINs) to Illinois conspirators led by Cobb. The Illinois conspirators would steal corporate checks, alter the checks to list the customers as payees, and deposit the checks at BoA. In Michigan, Thomas would withdraw the funds before the bank uncovered that the checks were bad. Thomas would then divvy up the funds. The fraud caused bank losses of $214,286.03. All the defendants were charged with a conspiracy to commit bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344(2) and 1349. Thomas, listed on 25 counts, pleaded guilty to a conspiracy count and to one count of bank fraud, which generated a guidelines range of 46-57 months. His probation officer found that he lied during his presentence interview. Thomas denied leading the Michigan cohort, denied recruiting others, and denied knowing of Cobb’s role. (2016). The government sought an obstruction enhancement, U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 and compiled evidence that Thomas oversaw the Michigan recruiters and facilitated the withdrawals. The court applied the obstruction enhancement and declined the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction U.S.S.G. 3E1.1, which produced a guidelines range 70-87 months; concluded that this range was insufficient under the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors; and imposed an above-guidelines 102-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Debtor is the sole member of REN, a Kentucky limited liability company that owns Louisville real estate. The Chapter 7 Trustee sought authority to sell that property, asserting that Debtor’s interest in REN was estate property under 11 U.S.C. 541(a)(1), deemed to have been assigned to Trustee. The bankruptcy court held two hearings, both times explaining that Trustee stands in Debtor’s shoes as the sole member of REN and has whatever authority Debtor would have to sell the property, then granted Trustee’s motion. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel dismissed an appeal. There is no evidence that Debtor is a “person aggrieved” by the Sale Order. REN—not Debtor—owns the real estate. Debtor failed to explain how its sale would diminish his property, increase his burdens, or impair his rights and lacks the requisite pecuniary interest in the real estate sale contemplated in the Sale Order. Debtor did not claim an exemption in his membership interest in REN and failed to demonstrate that his success on appeal would otherwise entitle him to a distribution of surplus assets from his chapter 7 estate. View "In re Pasley" on Justia Law

Shyan Frye, age 13, was struck by a train while walking her bicycle over a rail crossing in Huron Township, Michigan. At the time of the accident, the train was traveling below the applicable speed limit and its horn sounded for approximately 20 seconds before it reached the crossing—more than required by federal law. The collision proved fatal. Shyan’s mother sued CSX, the train’s owner, Gallacher, the train’s conductor; and Conrail, the owner of the track. The claims against Gallacher were resolved in his favor at summary judgment. A jury returned a verdict in favor of CSX and Conrail. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s entry of summary judgment for Gallacher. The court also upheld the district court’s refusal to strike a potential juror for cause during voir dire; evidentiary rulings admitting evidence of the potential side effects of an anti-depressant Shyan was taking at the time of her death, and excluding photographs of the railroad crossing after it was resurfaced; and the court’s refusal to give a jury instruction regarding the heightened duty of care imposed on tortfeasors when children are present. View "Frye v. CSX Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

Gonzalez, a citizen of Guatemala, surrendered himself at the U.S. border and requested asylum. Gonzalez alleges that he would be persecuted and tortured because of his status as a former taxi driver if he is removed to Guatemala. An immigration judge denied Gonzalez’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed and the Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. Gonzalez’s Notice to Appear, which omitted the date and time of the hearing, was promptly followed by a Notice of Hearing that provided this information, so both the IJ and the BIA had jurisdiction over Gonzalez’s case. There is no evidence that Gonzalez would be targeted as a former taxi driver, nor any evidence that former taxi drivers are perceived as a distinct group by Guatemalan society or by the gangs. View "Gonzalez-De Leon v. Barr" on Justia Law

Hubbell worked as a FedEx parcel sorter. She alleges that her manager told her she should accept a demotion because “females are better suited to administrative roles and males are better suited to leadership roles,” repeatedly disciplined her, then eventually demoted her from her position as lead parcel sorter based on her sex. She also alleges that FedEx retaliated against her for filing complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and for filing a lawsuit by unfairly disciplining her, not allowing her to earn extra pay by clocking in early or clocking out late, and closely surveilling her. Eventually, she was fired. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict finding in favor of Hubbell on her Title VII retaliation claim and the reduction of her attorney’s fees from the requested amount. A reasonable factfinder could find that several of the actions Hubbell testified about would be sufficient, on their own or in combination, to dissuade a reasonable worker from filing or pursuing an EEOC complaint. A reasonable factfinder could also find that some or all these acts were taken in retaliation for Hubbell’s EEOC complaints. A reasonable factfinder could determine that, despite its formal anti-discrimination policy, FedEx did not engage in good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII. View "Hubbell v. FedEx SmartPost, Inc." on Justia Law

A 911 caller reported that two men had approached and tried to break into her parked car. Officers were dispatched. Because there was fresh snow, the officers followed a trail of snowprints to the Coffey home. Outside the home, Coffey’s father, David, told the officers that Coffey and Jerrell were inside. David claims he never gave them permission to enter the home. The officers claim that David did consent. The officers entered and found Coffey, asleep on a loveseat. David says that the officers tried to wake Coffey by poking him in the chest. An officer then punched Coffey in the face and yelled, “stop resisting.” Officers flipped him onto his stomach and handcuffed him. Coffey says he did not resist but that the officers used his face to open the storm door as they dragged him out of the house, leaving him with injuries. The officers claim that Coffey, fought, kicked two officers, and pulled his arms away. Coffey was acquitted of assaulting a police officer. Coffey sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, The officers sought summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit agreed that there existed material disputes of fact over whether the officers unlawfully entered Coffey’s home, whether they used excessive force when arresting Coffey, and whether the officers influenced or participated in the decision to prosecute Coffey for assaulting a police officer. View "Coffey v. Carroll" on Justia Law