Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Johnson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced him as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The Sixth Circuit agreed that Johnson did not have at least three prior convictions for crimes of violence under ACCA. When the district court later resentenced Johnson, it increased his base offense level after finding that Johnson had at least two convictions for crimes of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 71-month sentence, agreeing that his prior convictions—one for robbery under Ohio Revised Code (ORC) 2911.02(A)(2) and one for complicity to commit aggravated robbery under ORC 2923.03(A)(2) and 2911.01(A)(1)—were crimes of violence under the Guidelines, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(2). View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2006, Puckett, a Nashville homebuilder, was overloaded with debt. Banyan, a mortgage broker, and Puckett recruited straw buyers to purchase his unsold homes with loans funded by SunTrust and Fifth Third. For a fee (about $10,000), each buyer submitted a loan application that overstated the buyer’s income and falsely stated that the buyer intended to live in the home. None of those misrepresentations reached SunTrust Bank or Fifth Third, nor did either of those parent banks fund any of the loans. Puckett received about $5,000,000 in proceeds and told the buyers he would make their mortgage payments. By late 2007, Puckett could not make all the payments. The mortgage companies foreclosed. The FBI began investigating in 2009. In 2014, the two were convicted of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344 and conspiracy to commit bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The government could have charged the defendants with mail or wire fraud within the five-year limitations periods but missed that deadline and later charged the two with bank fraud. That offense has a longer limitations period, but the fraud must be perpetrated against a bank—which (as a matter of statutory definition) the mortgage companies were not, because they were not federally insured. Nor did the government make any effort to prove that the loans were funded by the mortgage companies’ parent corporations, which were banks. View "United States v. Banyan" on Justia Law

Robert was admitted to a nursing home multiple times. During his final stay, he fell out of bed, sustained a head injury, and later died. His estate sued in state court, alleging negligence, negligence per se, violations of Kentucky’s Residents’ Rights Act, KRS 216.515(26), corporate negligence, medical negligence, wrongful death, and loss of consortium. The nursing home sought to enforce an arbitration agreement in federal court. The district court held that no valid agreement covering the final visit existed. An Agreement dated January 5, 2015 displays a mark of some kind in the “Signature of Resident” block, but it is difficult to read. Bramer’s estate alleges that this scrawl is a forgery; Robert's widow stated in an affidavit that neither she nor Robert signed that form. On an Agreement dated January 26, 2015, the widow signed in the “Signature of Resident” block. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreements are identical, bind successors and assigns, and require arbitration of a wide range of disputes. They purport to remain in effect through discharge and subsequent readmission. Although signing the Agreement was not a condition of admission, it was presented as part of the admissions packet. The estate presented evidence that the staff implied that signing the Agreement was required. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. By requesting a second agreement on January 26, the nursing home effectively abandoned the first agreement. Lacking Robert’s consent, there was no valid agreement to arbitrate. View "GGNSC Louisville Hillcreek v. Estate of Bramer" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief. Petitioner raised two issues regarding whether the interrogating officer mislead him to believe that he did not have a right under the Fifth Amendment to have counsel present during interrogation and misstated the availability of a defense attorney in the county where Mitchell was interrogated, and whether the officer provided Miranda warnings to petitioner in "mid-stream," in violation of Supreme Court precedent. The court held that, although the manner in which the officer interacted with petitioner regarding the right to counsel was troubling, the Michigan Supreme Court's decision—that the Miranda warnings, considered as a whole, adequately advised petitioner of his rights—was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. View "Mitchell v. MacLaren" on Justia Law

Hendrickson petitioned for review of the Board's finding that Hendrickson's statements constituted unfair labor practices because they coerced employees in the exercise of their rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and order requiring Hendrickson to post remedial notices around its plant.The Sixth Circuit granted the petition, holding that the Board's opinion was not supported by substantial evidence. The court held that there was no record of unfair labor practices at Hendrickson's plant that would cast Hendrickson's plant-wide letter -- cautioning employees that contract negotiations would begin "from scratch" -- in a threatening light. Furthermore, Hendrickson's statements about changing company culture were projections of consequences beyond its control, rather than threats to retaliate against employees for authorizing union representation. Accordingly, the court denied the Board's cross-appeal for enforcement. View "Hendrickson USA, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Moreno-Martinez, a citizen of Honduras, arrived in the U.S. in 1999, returned to Honduras in 2003, and reentered in 2004. In 2007, DHS issued “Notice to Appear” under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), ordering Moreno-Martinez to appear on “a date to be set” at “a time to be set.” Almost two months later, the immigration court sent a notice setting June 26, 2007, as the initial hearing date. Moreno-Martinez applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. An IJ denied those requests but granted voluntary removal. The BIA affirmed. Moreno-Martinez did not seek review of the removal order but left the U.S. in February 2012. He later returned. On August 1, 2018, ICE detained him and DHS filed a Notice of Intent to reinstate its previous removal order. Moreno-Martinez contends that DHS violated due process by not providing him a copy of the reinstatement order or allowing him to make a statement contesting the reinstatement so that he could argue that the removal order was invalid under Pereira v. Sessions, because his notice to appear lacked specific time-and-date information. The Sixth Circuit denied relief, reasoning that it had jurisdiction to review Moreno-Martinez’s due-process challenge because it presents a constitutional issue but that it could not grant the relief that Moreno-Martinez seeks, lacking jurisdiction to reopen the underlying removal order. The petition is an untimely collateral attack on the validity of the removal order, 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1). View "Moreno-Martinez v. Barr" on Justia Law

Pineda-Duarte, a citizen of Mexico, has twice been removed for entering the U.S. without authorization. He returned again and went to Clark County. Kentucky State Police had under surveillance a farm that was suspected of containing marijuana plants. They saw Pineda cultivating apparent marijuana plants, surrounded him, announced their presence, and ordered Pineda to “get on the ground.” Pineda swung a shovel he was holding, then dropped it and attempted to flee. After a struggle, the officers detained Pineda, who was charged with manufacturing more than 1,000 marijuana plants, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and reentering the U.S. after having been deported, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). Pineda pleaded guilty to the manufacturing charge. The PSR recommended a two-step offense-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(2) because the “defendant used violence, made a credible threat to use violence, or directed the use of violence” in conjunction with a drug offense. Defense counsel framed Pineda’s action as reflexive rather than an attempt to injure the officer and disputed whether the conduct constituted “violence,” because the shovel did not make contact with the officer. The court applied the enhancement, characterizing the defendant as either having threatened to use violence or, alternatively, having attempted to use violence. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Neither characterization fits the Guideline provision. The conduct was not directing the use of violence and was more than a threat, so the application of the Guideline requires a finding that Pineda “used violence.” View "United States v. Pineda-Duarte" on Justia Law

Buchanan was convicted of one count each of possession with intent to distribute marijuana and conspiracy to distribute marijuana. The district court sentenced him to 50 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit vacated Bush’s sentence, based on a challenge to a two-level increase in his offense level for committing a crime “as part of a pattern of criminal conduct engaged in as a livelihood” under USSG 2D1.1(b)(16)(E) and 4B1.3. The district court sentenced Buchanan based on the understanding that 4B1.3 required only one finding, that Buchanan’s criminal earnings exceeded 2,000 times the minimum wage in a 12-month period; it never made a factual finding on the record of exactly how much Buchanan’s criminal activity profited him. On remand, that court must analyze whether, under the “totality of circumstances,” Buchanan’s crimes were his “primary occupation.” Relevant factors may include an estimate of hours worked in each capacity and the amount of income earned in each capacity. The court rejected claims that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury properly on how to weigh the mixed fact and opinion testimony of two witnesses and erred in sentencing him without considering the statutory maximum sentence of 60 months on each of the counts, and that his attorney was ineffective in failing to raise the matter of the statutory maximum. View "United States v. Buchanan" on Justia Law

Owens covered his estranged wife’s nose and mouth with duct tape, hogtied her arms and legs behind her back, and left her alone in a shed to die. A Tennessee jury convicted Owens in 2003 of second-degree murder. The trial judge increased Owens’s sentence to 24 years, based in part on the judge’s finding that a sentencing enhancement was warranted for “exceptional cruelty.” Owens sought federal habeas relief, arguing that the Sixth Amendment required the jury, rather than the judge, to make that finding. The Sixth Circuit denied relief, finding that the state court’s error was harmless. Under Supreme Court precedent, the verdict alone did not authorize Owens’s sentence. There is, however, little doubt that, if asked, the jury would have made the requisite finding that Owens’ actions amounted to “psychological abuse or torture,” and reflected his “calculated indifference toward [her] suffering.” View "Owens v. Parris" on Justia Law

Hennessee pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The government sought an enhanced penalty under the Armed Career Criminal Act, section 924(e)(1) based on Hennessee’s three prior convictions for violent felonies. Hennessee objected that the government could not prove that two of his prior offenses were committed on different occasions. The district court agreed with Hennessee, finding that Sixth Circuit precedent precluded its review of non-elemental facts when conducting the different-occasions analysis. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing with the ACCA enhancement. A sentencing court may consider non-elemental facts such as times, locations, and victims in documents described in the Supreme Court’s “Shepard” decision when conducting the different-occasions analysis. The facts of Hennessee’s prior convictions—as established in Shepard-approved documents—indicate that he committed those violent felonies on occasions different from one another. The government proved that Hennessee’s prior convictions qualify him for a sentence enhancement as an armed career criminal. View "United States v. Hennessee" on Justia Law